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Evidence-driven Migration Governance Policy and Practice in North Africa (eMGPP)

North Africa migration academic network (NAMAN) –
Moroccan national committee

*Mobilisation of Moroccan skills abroad, situation
analysis*





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Foreword

The project

The “Evidence-driven Migration Governance Policy and Practice in North Africa” (eMGPP) project is funded by the European Union within the framework of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The project aims to strengthen regional cooperation on the migration issue. Building on existing expertise and know-how, eMGPP seeks to strengthen the dialogue on migration between researchers and government officials in order to align their priorities and work on studies to advise new public policies. The studies, their conclusions, and the good practices identified will be shared with key stakeholders in the migration sector, to inspire and energise the adoption of enlightened migration policies and practices.

The regional North Africa migration academic network

The North Africa Migration Academic Network (NAMAN) is one of two components of the eMGPP project. The NAMAN's primary objective is to establish a sustainable regional network of researchers and experts on migration, with the aim of conducting innovative research on migration and formulating suggestions for migration policies, as well as to establish a dialogue with government officials. The NAMAN is also tasked with advising the second component of the project – the North Africa Data Collection (NOADAC) - by sharing its expertise with it through common data contextualization work.

National chapters and the Moroccan NAMAN

In order to create a momentum for research and strengthen dialogue within each country, national chapters of the NAMAN have been created. Their purpose is to establish a national network dedicated to migration that brings together researchers and institutional representatives.

As such, the first meeting of the Moroccan NAMAN was held on June 17, 2020 by video conference to respond to the exceptional sanitary conditions of Covid-19. The meeting was organised by the Ministry Delegate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and African Cooperation, in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad (MRAs). The meeting brought together researchers and representatives of the Ministry Delegate, the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad and the Office of the High Commissioner for Planning. The meeting included the selection of the researchers who would be members of the national committee, the adoption of the committee's constitutive statutes, and the election of the members of the various subcommittees. This first meeting was also the opportunity to begin discussions on the selected first research priority. This issue was discussed in more detail at a second meeting held in early July 2020. Mobilising the skills of Moroccans living abroad was considered the

priority theme. A note on the methodology has been prepared, setting out and delineating the objectives of the study, which is itself segmented into several phases. This is detailed below in the executive summary.



Executive summary

In the framework of the “Evidence-driven Migration Governance Policy and Practice in North Africa” project, funded by the European Union, ICMPD aims to strengthen regional cooperation on migration. As its first component, the North Africa Migration Academic Network was formed, bringing together researchers and institutional representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Subsequently, national chapters were created to launch a new dynamic of research and dialogue at the regional and national levels.

This first study is part of the Moroccan National Committee. Its members have chosen the mobilization of Moroccan skills abroad for the benefit of their country of origin as their first research priority. This project is part of a long-term reflection process, consisting of several phases, starting from a documentary review (phase 1), conducting qualitative surveys in several countries (phase 2), establishment of a database on migration of skills in Morocco (phase 3), drafting of a report on the surveys conducted (phase 4), presentation of lessons learned (phase 5) and finally the drafting of the study conclusions (phase 6). The project aims to propose new measures specific to the Moroccan context. This first phase is a documentary study, aiming, firstly to learn from Moroccan experiences in the field of skills, and, secondly, to capitalise on and learn from the experiences carried out in other countries.

The present study confirms the importance of the Moroccan diaspora, both in terms of number - *the diaspora represents about 15% of the country's total population* – and in terms of economic contribution - *remittances represent about 10% of the country's national wealth*. Thus, Morocco quickly grasped the stakes and the importance of valuing its diaspora through its migration policies and its desire to protect its nationals abroad. Its policies and perceptions of migration and of its diaspora have evolved over time. The desire to match the needs of the country with the skills of its nationals living abroad has led to the design of several initiatives since the late 1970s, such as the TOKTEN, FINCOME or MAGHRIBCOM. The study seeks to learn from these experiences, without making an exhaustive evaluation, in order to capitalise on and improve the Moroccan response to mobilising the skills of its diaspora.

The question of defining the concept/term “skills” is essential. Traditionally, the Moroccan conception of skills/competencies covered only the qualified know-how of Moroccan professionals or scientists. However, this understanding has evolved, culminating in 2013 in a new definition adopted by the Council of the Community of Moroccans Abroad. It extends the concept, hitherto limited to managers, to the entire diaspora with professional skills that can satisfy an identified need. The concept of “skills” now encompasses scientific, economic and technical know-how and expertise. However, it is necessary to reconsider this definition and envisage its expansion, on the one hand by opening it to other types of mobilisation, and on the other hand by studying the different profiles constituting the current diaspora.

It would, therefore, be appropriate to extend the concept of mobilisation to forms other than the definitive return of members of the diaspora. For example, by opening it to students, short stays, inter-

university agreements and other modes of collaboration. Opening up this field of possibilities would make it possible to encompass the part of the diaspora that does not consider a definitive return to Morocco, but that still wishes to contribute to the Moroccan edifice. It is also necessary to have a better understanding of the different aspects of the diaspora, to comprehend their motivations and their careers in order to adapt and adopt mechanisms that would be attractive to all of this multifaceted diaspora. For example, many researchers residing abroad *are former students* who have settled in the host country. New profiles are also emerging, such as *the entrepreneur migrant*, young, educated, dual-resident and invested economically both in the host country and in the country of origin. This type of profile is not only characterised by its financial contribution and its economic input to the country of origin, but also by an active political participation. Another profile is that of *the descendant of Moroccan immigrants*, with its dual character, having grown up in the host country while being raised in the culture and traditions of his/her parents' country of origin. Thus, the mobilisation of skills and their attraction must be adapted to the different profiles emerging today within the Moroccan diaspora.

The study also profiles the Moroccan diaspora, which¹ accounts for 1/7th of Morocco's population and is present in more than 100 countries. It is predominantly male (68.3%), young (27% are between the ages of 15 and 29), and is mainly located in Europe (86.2%). The level of education of its members is higher than that of residents in Morocco. Thus, two thirds of its members have attained higher or secondary education levels and the majority have obtained their higher diploma in Morocco (74.1%). However, there is a wide disparity in the diaspora among host countries. Thus, the typical profile of a Moroccan living in France is singularly different from a Moroccan living in Spain or Italy. For example, 60% of the Moroccan diaspora in France has French nationality, compared to 10% of the Moroccan diaspora in Spain; and although the feminisation of the diaspora is in progress, its unemployment rate is high in both countries.

In Morocco, the study found a discrepancy between the national investment effort and the average long-term GDP growth rate. This is most likely due to the lack of qualifications of part of the labour force – 55.4% of the employed workforce in Morocco do not have a diploma – and could easily be compensated by the skills of its diaspora. Since 2009, Morocco has begun to develop multisectoral programmes aimed at reducing the youth unemployment rate and revitalising the economy. The Coronavirus pandemic reinforced this strategy, recalling that the country can only rely on itself. The population's needs for health, food security, education and scientific research have increased. Thus, having identified the needs and the potential supply of recognised expertise, it is necessary to find the most appropriate mechanism to attract and convince the diaspora to support its country of origin. Numerous examples of programmes and good practices implemented abroad and applicable to the Moroccan context are identified. The study identifies practices implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chile, the Philippines and Taiwan.

It is worth noting that, like migration which is a dynamic and evolving phenomenon, all initiatives to mobilise the skills of the diaspora take place in a singular context with its specific and evolving

¹ The data relate to the period 2018-2019 and are issued by the Directorate of Consular and Social Affairs and the Office of the High Commissioner for Planning. The conclusions of the two surveys overlap.

parameters. It is easy to criticise retrospectively, but more difficult to grasp and propose concrete measures adapted to an ever-changing context. This research project aims to learn from the experiences previously implemented in Morocco and to identify good practices applied abroad that can be transposed to the Moroccan context. It also aims to study the Moroccan diaspora through the widest possible data collection, to better understand and delineate its complex and protean nature in order to be able to propose new measures, initiatives and/or approaches that would attract the diaspora to mobilise, while strategically regulating needs and demands, according to sectors, expertise/knowledge, and qualifications. That is what this research project is about.



Introduction

The Coronavirus crisis, due to its rapid and widespread nature, has brought Morocco, like all the North African countries, into a historically unprecedented situation, calling for new economic and social policies, and before that, the adoption of new tools for reflection and analysis. Issues relating to international migration in general, and to skills in particular, are not exempt from this rule. It is therefore more than necessary not to ignore this reality when addressing the skills paradigm and more specifically that of the scientific diaspora.

The continued spread of the Coronavirus pandemic has plunged Morocco into a period of uncertainty and has clearly demonstrated the fragility of its economy as well as that of its education and health systems. In particular, as a result of this crisis, we realised that an entire part of the country's economy is based on the informal sector² and that lockdown and deconfinement decisions cannot be the only tool for public policy in the field of public health. The management of the pandemic also pointed to a certain difficulty that the authorities have shown in giving visibility to their economic and social initiatives, and also in developing reliable forecasts for development in the short and medium term.

The diaspora option has therefore emerged as even more crucial in these times of shortage and loss of direction, to represent a kind of lifeline that can contribute to filling some of the gaps in qualified human resources from which the country suffers. This concerns particularly, but not exclusively, the sectors of medicine, teaching and scientific research. The use of these skills still needs to be handled with caution and tact. That is precisely where the real problem lies and is the whole point of our study.

This study, undertaken within the framework of the NAMAN network, is timely for Morocco, but also for all the Maghreb countries, especially that one of the factors that appeared to be most lacking during these difficult times is qualified human resources, and at the same time many of their highly skilled citizens live and work abroad. This is true in the medical sector, as well as in teaching/research, industry and financial services, etc.

The objective of this study is to enable the most credible possible analysis of Moroccan skills available abroad, based on a better knowledge of their geographical distribution, profiles, characteristics, and the sectors/activities in which they are involved. This is with a view to proposing methods of mobilising them - in ways to be invented/reinvented - as part of an appropriate policy that aims at obtaining their optimal contribution to Morocco's economic and social development. As such, the study should:

- Help deepen the understanding of the skill exodus/departure problem by capitalising on previous studies;
- Enable the collection of a large amount of recent statistical data and relevant qualitative and quantitative information;

² The informal sector consists of poorly organized production units operating on small scales and not registered according to the existing national legal forms. These production units are very present in the countries of North Africa and will surely grow in size because of the Coronavirus crisis.

- Provide the most detailed inventory possible of qualified migrants, describing the nature of their skills, their sectors of activity, as well as the impact of their experiences abroad on their skills;
- Indicate future prospects and feasible solutions to “compensate for the loss of value” suffered by the country as a result of their departure. In this sense, the study will propose ways and means to make these expatriate skills an asset for the development of their home society;
- Develop a range of measures to enhance the attractiveness of the country for its expatriate skills. Knowing that their return to Morocco is no longer, for many, an easy option, because without being actively attracted, these skills could continue their mobility and investment in other countries. These measures should take into account the experiences already carried out in Morocco in this area, and also draw on some of the good practices at the international level in the mobilisation of expatriate skills.

The present deliverable, which is the report of the first phase of the Moroccan NAMAN research project, is dedicated to the establishment of a "Literature Review and First Collection of Statistical Data" and consists of five chapters. The first chapter is a presentation/discussion of the Diaspora concept; the second contains a summary of the work done on Moroccan skills and the first initiatives aimed at their mobilisation in Morocco; the third is a summary of certain international experiences relating to the same subject; the fourth deals with the main quantitative and qualitative data giving an overview, in particular, of the numbers of Moroccans residing abroad (MRAs), the countries in which they reside and their educational level; and finally the fifth chapter takes a first approach to the possible match between the needs for qualified human resources expressed (or not) by the different sectors of activity in Morocco and the supply of skills capable of meeting these needs.

The second phase of this project will be devoted to conducting a series of qualitative surveys, and to continuing the literature review, with a view to refining the data contained in the last two chapters, as well as proposing a framework and modalities that would enable the Moroccan economy to derive the best benefit of the multifaceted contribution of national skills present outside Morocco.



I. The diaspora, a lever for development?

The Moroccan diaspora represents nearly 15% of the country's total population. It transfers, year after year, substantial sums reaching up to 10% of national wealth (if we consider both official and unofficial flows). These remittances play a major role in macroeconomic balances (smoothing of economic growth, abundance of foreign exchange reserves, etc.). Most often targeted at rural and poorer families, these remittances contribute to the fight against poverty, to the consolidation of human capital in the broad sense (access to education, but also to the care of the recipient families) and, *ultimately*, to economic growth and a kind of social stability. It should be pointed out, however, that such remittances can have adverse effects on the Moroccan economy, as they are linked to a significant migration involving young populations who, when leaving to go abroad, reduce the supply of labour in certain regions and sectors. This results in a decrease in production in the regions/sectors concerned. It is well established in the literature that the desire to migrate, even if the act of migration does not take place, can reduce the supply of labour. Not to mention other harmful effects such as the “Dutch syndrome” which occurs when realised transfers reach large sums. This, however, is far from being the case in Morocco.

It should be pointed out that the positive effects of these capital flows, which, in our view, far outweigh their negative effects in the Moroccan case, have been possible because of a flexible migration policy, carried out since the early 1960s by the Moroccan authorities. The country, which lacks in oil and gas resources, unlike its Algerian neighbour, has long understood - in the absence of an endogenous, proactive economic and social policy - the role that the diaspora can play in improving national well-being and economic development, through the alleviation of pressures on employment and the acquisition of knowledge and expertise abroad. Migration policies have, theoretically, been designed and implemented around these objectives, while also ensuring, for political and diplomatic reasons, the preservation of national identity and the protection of the rights of Moroccans living abroad. These policies have been accompanied and facilitated by the establishment, outside Morocco, of a dynamic and enterprising network of banking representations. Indeed, Moroccan banks did not hesitate to settle directly in the main countries hosting migrants since the early 1970s. They quickly grasped the magnitude of the benefits they could derive from the deposits and savings of Moroccan nationals abroad. One example of these “aggressive” banking policies has been the establishment of (more or less official) counters within some Moroccan embassies to encourage, with great insistence, the diaspora to open accounts with them.

This optimistic view by public policies to maintain the link with the diaspora and to encourage savings and investment towards Morocco can be offset by another less positive one, clearly showing that the authorities of this country have not been able, or did not know how, to establish the right conditions to create enough wealth within their own borders, so as not to allow part of their population to migrate to other horizons, considered more favourable. This is all the more damaging given that, today, we are witnessing the migration of an elite with a high level of education, unlike in the 1960s when the bulk of migrants were low-skilled workers. It is in this context that some people do not hesitate to talk about bleeding or a “brain drain”. In the same vein, remittances would constitute a form of “minimum

income” for the families of migrants who have remained in the country, which allows the Moroccan State to benefit from a kind of social peace financed from outside.

Beyond that, it is useful to recall that the effects of remittances on the economic growth of Morocco are far from clear. Thus, several studies show that their impact is low and significant only in the short term (Bouoiyour et al. 2020), especially since in times of crisis they tend to decrease, even if they show some resilience. This was demonstrated in a documented way during the 2008 crisis, but remains valid today as well. Indeed, if we consider the first seven months of 2020, we realize that foreign direct investment to Morocco decreased by 27.4%, while remittances have decreased by “only” 3.2%.

1. “Brain Drain” or “Brain Gain”.

Put another way, the lever of remittances is not a universal remedy. However, the diaspora has other virtues. The option of mobilising the diaspora consists of using the skills and knowledge of expatriates for the benefit of their country of origin. These are mainly qualified and highly qualified persons who, through their experience in the host countries, can make a substantial contribution to national economic, scientific and technological development. This option compares the loss caused by the departure (sometimes definitively) of the scientific elite with the gains obtained through its return, definitive or temporary, virtual or real, to the country of origin. The birth of this scientific and technical diaspora invalidates, in a way, the traditional theories of the definitive loss caused by the departure of this elite. Quite the opposite, it highlights a new concept relating to the circulation of skills.

In an increasingly open world, such an elite could not only move easily from one country to another, but is very often the object of international desire within the framework of what had been called selective migration. This paradigm seems more relevant to explain this new form of mobility. This makes it possible to reconsider the traditional “brain drain” model which is characterised by a clear and definitive departure of a migrant, a priori from the South to the North. The new “brain gain” model emphasises the circulation of talent between their host country(s) and their home country.

It can be said, undoubtedly, that Morocco won the first round by draining, substantially and regularly, the savings of Moroccans living abroad, even if it is legitimate to wonder about their sustainability. However, the same cannot be said of the second round, namely to take advantage of the strengths of its diaspora in terms of expertise, scientific research, industrial, organisational and financial skills, etc. However, the authorities cannot be blamed for the lack of initiatives. Indeed, several attempts have been made, as detailed in this report. The Moroccan authorities have invested in this positive vision of the diaspora, by setting up programmes such as the TOKTEN (Transfer of knowledge through expatriate nationals) or the FINCOME (International Forum of Moroccan Skills Residing Abroad), or Maghribcom. Other initiatives have followed, but have not yielded tangible results, and for good reason, in our view, as they are based on a biased premise.

2. The permeability of links.

First odd, the assumption that maintaining a (supposed) sentimental/identity-based relationship between an individual and his homeland suffices to arouse the “nationalist mission” of the diaspora.

As, having emigrated does not necessarily mean diasporic behaviour. The diaspora is not a given that would happen instinctively by the crystallisation of a chance.

The second pitfall is that the Moroccan diaspora is estimated to be between 4 and 5 million people. Statistics vary from one country to another, from one agency to another, because of the method of calculation, but the Moroccan authorities usually consider the upper limit of this range. This quantitative estimate can be confusing because it assumes, on the one hand, that a “reserve army” is available *ad vitam aeternam* and can, at any time, be mobilised to serve its country; and, on the other hand, that the diaspora is homogeneous.

Thirdly, virtually all diaspora administrations in the countries of origin have progressively set themselves the primary objective of creating an inventory which records all possible and imaginable information on each member of the scientific diaspora. This objective is considered to be the Holy Grail, and the Moroccan authorities do not seem to be an exception.

Before going further in the analysis, it is first necessary to agree on the concepts used and on the theoretical foundation used. "To name things incorrectly is to add to the misfortune of the world," according to Albert Camus. If the diagnosis is wrong from the outset, the public policies advocated will be unreliable. In reality, the diaspora's relationship with its country of origin is more complex than it seems. The diaspora paradigm is based on the constitutive role of individual decisions, which precludes, from the outset, any abusive generalisation/aggregation, which is very often erroneous. Similarly, the compilation of an inventory of skills has no intrinsic value. It must be put in parallel with local scientific research and the identification of the real needs of the economy of the country of origin. Even if we could identify the needs and offers in/of skills, it is not certain that we get good results. Additional conditions must be met.

One cannot, for example, limit oneself to geographical criteria (dissemination of a group of persons into world space from an original country) to talk about the diaspora. Nor can the ethnic or historical criterion suffice on its own. To these criteria must be added an overview of the history of appearances³, a universe of network-like connections and the identification processes shared by all the members of the group, without forgetting to take into consideration the experiences of the individuals claiming to be from these groups. To this, we must not forget to take into consideration the belief in something that goes beyond diaspora groups, that can unite them, that is capable of confluence of divergent trajectories; a kind of transcendence, of common destiny, since only what goes beyond us can unite us.

Beyond that, it should be recalled that the diaspora option cannot replace an endogenous development policy, which questions the whole issue of institutions and the mode of governance in

³ The problem of the diaspora is based on a powerful concept that is supposed to create consensus among its members; it is the original “point of reference” that some consider as a kind of condenser of feelings of belonging (Calafat and Goldblum, 2012). Nevertheless, it would be desirable to question its diversity, and its re-compositions, in connection with the history, or histories and trajectories of diaspora groups.

the country of origin. If institutions fail, this will indirectly affect relations with the diaspora. There is therefore no reason why this issue of mobilising skills should be analysed *in abstracto*.

The achievement-oriented speeches of the Moroccan authorities are therefore not enough to create a lasting link and have a common interest with the diaspora. First of all, it is necessary to accept the diversity of the diaspora and its heterogeneity; because while the diaspora is singular, the profiles are plural.

The official discourse, based on the rhetoric of love of the homeland and the exaltation of patriotism, does not work with what is commonly called, wrongly, the second and third generations. The diaspora, as it has changed, no longer seems to hear or assimilate this narrative. The old discourse, infantilising, lenient and/or simplistic no longer has a place today. The issue of the diaspora must now be dusted off and renewed. It is true that today we are witnessing an exhaustion of narratives; this requires taking into account the complexity of personal trajectories and therefore the intricacy, or overlap, of the collective and the individual. It is therefore necessary to decentralise the gaze and get out of the aging vision that the authorities of the country of origin may have with the oversimplification and linking to its origin of their own diaspora.

Then we have to face up to the past. Much of the diaspora, even if it is a category on its way to extinction, has accounts to settle with the system, related to Morocco's years of lead. We must give this generation the opportunity to express itself and to become integrated, using a soothed language and the right words so that it regains its dignity and feels comfortable in a new, strong, and open Morocco that assumes its past and promotes a proud future, where every Moroccan can and must find a place.

Finally, it is necessary to admit double allegiance and to understand that identity is not fixed and that it must be analysed in relation with other phenomena (political, economic, social, historical, etc.). We must not forget, for example, that King Hassan II has always been reluctant to the integration of Moroccans into their country of settlement and refused to "deny" Moroccan nationality. However, this work is not intended to accuse the political authorities, but to capitalise on Morocco's unique experience, compared to other countries in North Africa.

This singularity must be highlighted in order to move towards new research perspectives that would integrate all actors working on the issue of skills. It should be recalled here that Morocco has several State bodies and institutions (Ministry of Migration, Hassan II Foundation, Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad, Ministry of Religious Affairs, etc.) that deal closely or at a distance with the issue of skills. The multiplicity of actors is not a problem in itself, but it requires a minimum of coordination.

3. Horizontality overrides verticality.

This redefinition of the relationship between the diaspora and the country of origin requires a higher-level call, which goes far beyond traditional relationships where culture, heritage, identity (including religious) are thought through behind the screen of authenticity (Moroccan), rather than being considered as hybrid and composite ideas.

The advent of coronavirus has further disrupted the conceptualization of this relationship. Indeed, thanks to the lockdown of the society and the closure of all the country's borders to the transport of persons, we are able to envisage the possibility of another sort of relationship between the diaspora and its country of origin. New diaspora experiences have thus emerged, through the proliferation of conferences and webinars between expatriate researchers and their Moroccan colleagues, between these same researchers and students or associations via popular teleconferencing platforms (Zoom, Skype, Microsoft Teams, etc.) or more traditional social networks (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, etc.). An abundance of ideas and projects has emerged, but we still have to capitalise on the moment. This mode of operation - in the absence of other mechanisms – may seem optimal to match the supply and demand of knowledge and expertise, at least in the intangible sectors, which allows direct dialogue, without an intermediary, in this case the authorities who consider themselves responsible for the diaspora.

These new practices constitute, in a way, a transgression of scientific boundaries, which have become increasingly virtual. They offer a historical shortcut, giving socio-cognitive abilities an unprecedented ubiquity (Meyer, 2004). They open up new gaps in the international division of labour, making it easier to access a large pool of knowledge, while reducing transaction costs (transport costs, logistics, etc.). This scientific sowing runs counter to the polarisation that characterises the current evolution of scientific research and economies at the global level. It undermines the role of the authorities in charge of the diaspora by depriving them, in a way, of their *raison d'être*. The authorities must themselves find their place in a configuration in which horizontality takes precedence over verticality. It is up to them to find the open space that illuminates the connected time in which the new generations live. It is up to them to make the diaspora not a projection of their desires, but a companion of their needs and those of the country. It is up to them to take advantage of their long experience of “managing” the diaspora, which is all very interesting, despite tenuous results, to give impetus, thickness, prospects and, at the same time, the necessary retreat to this relationship which fluctuates according to the host countries, individual stories and periods of immigration, while avoiding, as much as possible, abusive aggregations. It is ultimately up to them to combine the fluid, fluctuating and frenetic time of the diaspora with the longer time of genuine economic and human development policies. It is up to them, finally, to rebuild an exhausted, shattered and dislocated relationship, giving the different generations of the diaspora a real sense of belonging to a predestined territory, magnifying its trajectory and reconnecting with the prospect of shared progress.

The second chapter presents the most exhaustive possible overview of the work on Moroccan competencies. The diversity of contributions to this issue as well as its challenges and dependencies will be addressed. The semantics of the scientific diaspora will be specified. Arrangements for accompanying the return of these skills, or at least their involvement in the development of their country of origin, will be dealt with in the second part.

The third chapter will be devoted to a brief analysis of good practices at the international level relating to the issue of the scientific diaspora. The aim will be to draw on foreign experiences in order to improve skills management.

The study of Moroccan skills cannot ignore a thorough knowledge of their fields of activity, the places where they exercise, their levels of education, their specializations in the countries where they are based; this will be the subject of the fourth chapter.

Likewise, it is extremely important to analyse carefully the degree of investment of Moroccan skills in their country of origin, their area of preference, the number of projects carried out, the privileged regions... This will allow us to quantify, if only briefly at this stage of the study, the needs of the Moroccan market in skills and the measures of the diaspora to respond favourably (or unfavourably). This issue will be discussed in the fifth chapter.

This quick overview will allow us to dig deeper into this paradigm and go to the end of this logic, in order to propose new forms of governance just as new as the problem itself. It will be a question of going off the beaten track by eliminating quantitative management. As far as possible, the history of multiple affiliations and the identification processes should not be contradicted. Network connections should be thought of or rethought, while accompanying the expressed mobility by reasonable projects. In other words, it will be a question of cultivating the link between well-organised agglomerations of expatriate groups rooted in their host country, highlighting their heritage (acquired in their country of origin and enriched in host countries). It is therefore useful to promote these networks with dual affiliation, instead of enforcing the classical dichotomous approaches, which are sometimes communitarian, sometimes assimilationist.

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II. Overview of works addressing Moroccan skills installed abroad.

We wish to recall that the theme of mobilising Moroccan expertise has become, in recent years, an issue of great importance in the works on migration and in Moroccan public policies. All institutions working both closely or indirectly on the migration issue are interested in Moroccan skills, including their mobilisation and/or return to the country of origin, with a view to contributing to its development. Several support and accompaniment schemes have emerged since the late 1990s to attract or bring back these "skilled migrants". Alongside these measures, much has been written and published which closes the gap to a better knowledge of this population. As a result, numerous reports, studies and scientific articles have addressed this issue over the past 20 years. Far from being exhaustive, this overview attempts to shed light on the diversity of recent contributions on Moroccan skills and on the issues and challenges raised by this audience. Various points will thus be addressed. First of all, what is meant by "skills"? Who are they? What mechanisms are in place to support the return of these "skills"? What is the evaluation of these measures?

After a first part that will give epistemological definition of the term skills, we shall analyse, in a second part, the discourse around public policies developed in Morocco to attract these skills. Three important mechanisms have marked these policies: the TOTKEM, the FINCOME and MAGHRIBCOM. Finally, in conclusion and in light of the analysis carried out, we will reflect - in preparation for the second phase of this project - on the types of organisations to be mobilised for future qualitative surveys.

1. How to define "Moroccan skills"?

a. A term initially negative: plague, haemorrhage, leakage, exodus and brain drain.

The book by the Association of Studies and Research on Migration⁴ "La migration Sud-Nord : la problématique de l'exode des compétences" published in 2002 by the Hassan II Foundation, following the symposium with the same title, shows that the semantics used to refer to skills is, from the outset, a representation of a departure linked to an escape or an evil. In all cases, these terms tended to indicate the need to combat such departures. The titles of the various chapters of the book use the terms exodus and flight. Thus, "brain drain" (Gaillard 2002), "exodus of skills" (Dioury 2002), "the flight of skills" (Charef 2002), "combating the emigration of skills" (Naji 2002), "exodus of skills" (Boussetta 2002), "facing the problem of the "exodus of skills"" (Imad 2002), "combating the phenomenon of the flight of skills" (Beni-Azza 2002) are examples of titles using the vocabulary that designates these migrants who leave and abandon their country. Also, in this book (AMERM 2002), "skills" are meant in the sense of qualified skills, scientific skills, managers of the country. This is the

⁴ Association d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Migration - AMERM

case of Alami-Mchichi who recalls in the introduction to the book that “the theme concerns a phenomenon that increasingly challenges societies: the issue of the departure of a number of high-level scientific executives from their country of origin to other destinations considered to be more profitable and rewarding” (2002 : 8). In order to justify the use of the term of “brain drain”, she added that the term was chosen in the absence of a definition capable of describing the phenomenon in a sufficiently clear and precise manner.

The term exodus thus evokes the idea of departure and exit, of a mass movement, a sort of flight. H. Alami-Mchichi (2002) links it to globalisation and international migration, which does not concern only Moroccan workers who left in the 1960s, already chosen for their working skills and to rebuild a Europe in difficulty. In this sense, the brain drain is the price to pay for globalization and the opening up of markets (Dioury 2002, Bouoiyour 2002). The opening up of markets has first hit the capital market, then the goods market, and finally the labour market, especially skilled labour (Bouoiyour 2002). The growing demand at the international level for competent and highly skilled personnel and the expansion of the opportunities for further study abroad will inevitably put pressure on the stock of highly skilled labour from “exporting” countries.

The exodus of skills, otherwise called brain drain in the original English concept, was born in the 1950s, says economist Khachani. It literally means brain drain or brain flight. It was in 1963 that the term brain drain appeared in the United Kingdom, for the first time in a Royal Society document that sought to dramatise the movement of scientific personnel from the country to the United States of America, where a growing market offered better working conditions and wages (Gaillard 2002). For Khachani, it was a massive departure of British scientists and engineers to the United States. This term used to describe the skills that leave can appear stigmatizing, even guilt-inflicting for the person who decides to leave. There is a duality in the construction of “skill drain”, as skill remains a positive and attractive element, while drain is clearly more negative. One might wonder in the end how is this a flight? Isn't fleeing a way of pejoratively describing the migration of these “elites”? To attenuate the term so that it appears less pejorative, J. Bouoiyour (2002) uses the “circulation of “brains”, and it is the name that changes but the content remains the same.

The use of the word “skills” will evolve, and it is in this sense that in 2013 sociologist Farid El Asri will try to give it another explanation. It is part of the dynamics of social science research that addresses the question of skills, and uses the term in the sense of “knowledge workers”. This definition is adopted by the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME), to include expertise in areas of scientific, technical, economic and solidarity-based development. Yet the definition does not put an end to a certain ambiguity that persists among Moroccan institutions and researchers regarding the usage of the concept.

We will retain the definition of El Yazami (2013), former president of the CCME, which has a broader and more inclusive definition of skills, while noting that this concept has too often been selective and elitist, taking into account only executives and often those from the hard sciences: “This concept should concern any person residing abroad, temporarily or permanently, with professional, scientific, technical, artistic, cultural or associative expertise, who could satisfy a clearly identified need in the

public or private sector; or meet the human resources needs of sectoral development plans and programmes; or participate in any project at the territorial or national level, that requires human resources strengthening in Morocco. A broad approach to the notion of mobilisation also appears to be necessary. Too often, skills are reduced to the dimension of return. While maintaining this objective, a new mobilisation policy should address all forms of mobility of Moroccan skills: students, short-term assignments and consultancies, creation of transnational companies, agreements between universities and research centres, projects developed within the framework of decentralised cooperation, contribution of associations to local development, etc.” (El Yazami, 2013).

b. The many facets of the “skilled migrants”.

According to various authors, “Moroccan skills” are viewed in various ways and reveal the multiple nature of what they represent. Several cases are thus analysed in order to define such skills. One of the many definitions that qualify Moroccan skills is that of senior managers, scientists and research teachers.

For M. Charef (2002), this migration of skills is a result of the difficulties of climbing the social ladder due to lack of transparency and “meritocracy”. Also, Europe, Canada, the United States, the Gulf Countries, Australia and South Africa become like an enchanted dream, or even an obsession, for this elite who seeks to express themselves and flourish “elsewhere”. The researcher notes that these Moroccan professionals, especially scientists, are increasingly numerous in the diaspora and are generally former students who, once their studies completed, remain there for family or professional reasons, or because of the lack of technical and financial resources from which research in Morocco suffers.

According to J. Bouoiyour (2002), students leave their country at the end of secondary school or in the course of higher education, in order to continue their studies at a higher educational institution abroad. In all cases, departure abroad is either part of a training programme (organised mobility) or is decided within the family (individual mobility). The mobility of students is by definition temporary (limited to the duration of the training in question) and therefore presupposes a return to the country of origin, once the training has been completed or the diploma obtained. In many cases, however, these students opt for integration into the labour market of the country of settlement.

The works of Z. Chattou (2011) and H. Jamid (2015), show the emergence of another type of skilled migrant, that of the “migrant-entrepreneur”. For H. Jamid, the practice of trading in networks allows an ethnic group composed of Soussis (Berbers from the Souss region of central western Morocco, on which he works) to increase in number and broaden their influence outside Morocco's borders. Today, the emergence of a new generation of migrants reveals that the return to the country of origin is not a return at the end of the “migration career”, but on the contrary, they are migrants who suggest another form of transnational migration, involving young well-educated people (H. Jamid 2015). The projects undertaken by these Soussis traders are more modern. The real estate sector frequented by former generations of returning migrants is now giving way to the catering sector, or to small supermarkets where a modern type of organisation replaces traditional grocery stores. The work of Z. Chattou (2011) is interested in Moroccans-living-abroad (MRAs), entrepreneurs in tourism, and

analyses their involvement in their country of origin according to the distance (social and spatial) they take to their country of immigration. Z. Chattou calls them “MRA”, “bi-resident MRA”, “ex-MRA”. We can speak here of the “mixed intellectual” in the political sense of the term (Aissa Kadri, 2012), because participation is not only economic, it is also political, where the migration elite participates in the debates taking place in their country of origin, even from a distance. As a result, groups of associations working for the development of their home regions, such as the Immigration Development Democracy (IDD) and Migration and Development (M&D) networks, of whom some are participating in building this character of the mixed intellectual who is part of a transnational migration acting “here and there”. Nevertheless, the latest work on this category of migrants gives a different meaning to the return and departure project. The work of C. Pellegrini (2018) shows that young Moroccans with diplomas from abroad find skilled jobs faster on their return to Morocco than graduates of Moroccan schools and universities at an equal level. The supposed difference in skills or work experience would lead the offshore graduate to an overstatement of self and skills, which would allow him/her to feel more comfortable looking for work upon return to Morocco. This sociological finding also reveals clearly the multi-faceted crisis in which the education system in Morocco is struggling. Thus, “young graduates of foreign schools, especially those coming from wealthy families, succeed quickly to get integrated into the labour market thanks to the networks and contacts of their families, and not only by virtue of their skills”. This is consistent with the first assumption made in this paragraph. The author adds that this creates in public opinion the illusion of the superiority of the foreign diploma over that obtained from the national schools.

The concept of competences does not only affect those who have left, it also concerns descendants of Moroccan immigrants. The work of Abarri (2020) analyses this new character of skills, which often seems hidden to us: the return of the descendants of Moroccan immigrants to the country of origin of their parents. It shows the constitution of a form of Moroccanity that is built on the basis of dual membership and dual allegiance. For her, the heirs of Moroccan immigration are generations who have experienced no other way of life than that abroad, who have lived and have been educated in France and who have known Morocco only when they went during the summer holidays. Progressively, attachment to the two respective nations is undergoing change. We have young people, above all French – by practices, principles and values – and Moroccan by the origin of their parents and also by their cultural, religious and tradition proximity.

What brings these different actors together is the return to the homeland, after a stay or a life abroad (Nafa 2018), crowned with proven experiences, knowledge, and ideas that can contribute to the development of the country. Nevertheless, in the current context, the issue of return remains difficult and linked to the political environment of the country of origin. Rather, we are witnessing the emergence of several mobility paradigms such as circular migration (Arab 2018), transmigration (Tarrius 2012, Alami-Mchichi 2010, Jamid 2015, Alioua 2015), transnational migration (Basch and Szanton, 1992, Lacroix, 2005, 2018, Wihtol de Wenden, 2010), migratory movement (Tarrius 2012, Arab 2009), etc.

However, to attract these skills home, Morocco has put in place several mechanisms. While the issue of skills and their departure has taken an important place in the literature on migration, the analysis

and evaluation of the main mechanisms that accompanied the return of skills to Morocco remain limited. What is the evaluation of these measures, and in particular of TOKTEM, FINCOME and MAGHRIBCOM?

2. The results of programmes dedicated to Moroccan skills abroad.

Morocco is one of the main countries of emigration in the world with 4.4 million Moroccans residing abroad (2014), making the Moroccan diaspora one of the largest migrant communities in Europe (Hamdouch and Wahba 2015). This migration represents 13% of the Moroccan population. And, while the country has benefited from the financial remittances of its workforce abroad, it also wants to take advantage of these skilled human resources residing abroad. In a globalised market, Morocco continues to “lose” its own human resources as they leave the country in search of better prospects elsewhere. The programmes launched by Morocco since the 1990s to recover part of its skills have been the subject of a number of articles and study reports. It should be pointed out in this sense that studies on the migration of skills in Morocco date back to the early 2000s. Yet in other countries, studies date back to the 1970s with the concept of brain gain (El Asri 2013). Before analysing these studies, it is important to make an initial series of observations about these writings:

- Expertise or research work is marked by an essentially quantitative approach. Moroccan initiatives to attract skills are perceived on the basis of their number and not their effectiveness.
- Much of the writing remained descriptive of the programmes and judged their effectiveness vaguely and superficially, without discussing their implementation on the ground.
- Some of the work is offensive, very critical, and highlights only the negative aspects of how these initiatives are managed by the State authorities.
- Very little of the evaluation work of these programmes has attempted to measure their impacts from the point of view of the actors concerned.
- Finally, all the studies are written in French and English, with an absence of works in Arabic.

The intersection of these observations allows us to form an idea of how skills management has been perceived by this literature. The common feature of these works is that Morocco is one of the first countries in the world to establish links with its citizens residing outside its territory, and that it has sought to mobilise these skills since the 1990s (Gaillard 2017, El Asri 2013, Belguendouz 2010, Khachani 2010). Added to this, however, is the observation that these initiatives have not really led to a public policy on the management of MRAs. Generally speaking, we note that these works take stock of the attitude of the various programmes with regard to Moroccan migration, this view seems to meet three imperatives:

1. “Maintaining migration flows as a means of regulating the labour market.

2. Strengthening immigrants' human and cultural ties with the country of origin.
3. Encouraging remittances. These remittances are the main source of foreign exchange for the country'' (Chiguer al, 2002 : 60).

However, in order to adapt to a new situation, the authorities have expressed their interest in the issue of migration from the point of view of its role in economic and social development. Nevertheless, the link between skills and migration has only become a topical issue in the public debate only much later (Belguendouz 2010). The brain drain (Khachani 2010) is generally considered harmful and penalising for Morocco. While the message conveyed by the Moroccan media about the country's emigration of skills is rather alarming, some see this migration as a way to change the image given to Moroccan migration, as a "more rewarding" reality (Belguendouz 2010, Khachani 2010). These studies have even shown that, to some extent, unemployment is not necessarily the only reason for emigration. This is the case of the results of the survey conducted between 2011 and 2012 by the European Training Foundation (EFF) and the Moroccan Association for Migration Studies and Research (AMERM), which demonstrate the causal link between migration and skills on the one hand, and migration and development on the other hand. The study goes further to break the myth that migration concerns only poor social categories or the unemployed (EFF & AMERM 2013). Paradoxically, data collected from 4,000 participants show that the propensity to migrate increases among the population with good socio-economic conditions. The study concludes that migration is not the tool of the poor in Morocco, but it is a social phenomenon. To explain migration as a social phenomenon, it is necessary to analyse migration by combining several factors (Khachani 2010), namely: the international context, the scale of the migration phenomenon, the consequences of the brain drain on the countries of origin, and, finally, the prospects for the future.

In view of the increase in the outflow of Moroccan skills abroad, the country preferred to look at the problem realistically and to mobilise appropriate programmes that better attract those skills. Different organisational arrangements (TOKTEN 1993, FINCOME 2006, MAGHRIBCOM 2013) put in place, sometimes inconsistently, fail to be really effective (El Asri 2013). Morocco took charge of mobilising Moroccan expatriate skills for its development on three main stages, that of TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals) and that of FINCOME (International Forum of Moroccan Skills Residing Abroad) then MAGHRIBCOM. The work on the Moroccan experience has attempted to analyse mainly the difficulties in organising and mobilising Moroccan skills abroad. While there is a real awareness that the emigration of Moroccan brains and talents can also serve the country, i.e. their mobilisation, both internally and externally, it is still difficult to channel this into creating projects and implementing them. It is this difficulty that is highlighted and analysed (Gaillard al, 2017, Tuccio 2019, El Asri 2013, Belguendouz 2010).

The report, produced in 2013 by the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad led by El Asri, aimed, among other things, to analyse the results of the policies to mobilise Moroccan skills worldwide, and in particular the public and associative initiatives undertaken since the early 1990s. The report notes that the mobilisation of Moroccan skills abroad requires taking stock of the results of initiatives in this

field and drawing lessons from them to establish a public policy of skills management in a coherent and comprehensive manner.

TOKTEN, which plays an important role in this work, is the first programme aiming to attract skills. This programme was launched in 1976 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the development of agricultural, scientific, technical and other projects. After its launch in 1993 in Morocco, three meetings were held without really capitalizing on their results (Belguendouz 2010). It was the establishment in 1998 of the State Secretariat for Scientific Research that led to the first institutionalisation of TOKTEN and the development of a national plan. The programme, led by UNDP, was effectively implemented in 1999 with the objective of encouraging temporary return of targeted skills. This incentive to return was hampered by the country's unmet skill needs.

Research sees TOKTEN as an opportunity to change the way Moroccan migration is viewed. It highlights the evolution of this migration, which went from a labour migration in the 1960s, in particular to France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, to a family migration from family reunification in the 1980s, finally to a migration of skills (Gaillard al, 2017). However, for some researchers, this migration of skills dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s (Gaillard al, 2017), with the decision of King Hassan II to grant scholarships to holders of the baccalaureate to study in France. The arrival of these students led to the diversification of the immigrant population, from "86,300 highly qualified persons in 1990 to 156,120 ten years later" (Gaillard al, 2017: 278).

TOKTEN is thus seen as the programme that reflects a change in policy towards Moroccan migration, which has been diversified in its destinations, particularly to North America (Canada and USA), and in its profiles. This migration is perceived as a brain drain and a flow that public authorities must regulate (Gaillard al, 2017), as we have indicated in the first part of this overview. However, TOKTEN is perceived by this research as an initiative that was aborted due to a lack of political will on the part of the public authorities (Belguendouz 2010).

Following the failure of TOKTEN, Morocco launched the FINCOME cooperation programme which links various players, including collaboration between UNDP and the National Centre for Scientific and Technical Research (CNRST). FINCOME (*Forum International Compétences Marocaines à l'Etranger*) means in colloquial Arabic: "Where are you? ". It is a linking and intermediary tool set up to institutionalise and facilitate the participation of Moroccan skills from around the world in Morocco's development, with the strategy of involving them in a sustainable manner. The aim was also to support all potential initiatives and investment projects by Moroccan skills abroad, and to be able to finance them from the activities of FINCOME (Belguendouz 2010). The working text that was "sent for opinion to some members of the diaspora, comes back with, among other recommendations, that of not going through official channels - consulates and embassies - if we want to mobilise Moroccan skills abroad, the latter being considered by some as state control agents" (Gaillard al, 2017 : 289).

FINCOME has been in operation since 2006 with staff assigned by the CNRST. The FINCOME unit within the CNRST operated on the basis of calls for projects, and several Moroccan experts residing abroad benefited from these calls. Most of the projects supported under FINCOME fall under "expertise", 50%

of which are for master type education. Very few relate to research. The majority of beneficiaries (60%) come from France, followed by Germany at 31%, Canada at 10%, the United States at 6%, Belgium at 3%, while the rest (Austria, Saudi Arabia, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Sultanate of Oman, Switzerland, Spain) represent 6%" (Gaillard al, 2017 : 291). Since 2014, FINCOME has opted to diversify its actions by setting up a mobility programme for a period of 6 to 12 months and, following a strong centralisation of CNRST projects, all mobilities and interventions under the FINCOME programme have been carried out within the Rabat-Casablanca axis. The FINCOME programme led by the CNRST focuses the question of skills and reduces it only to scientific and technical knowledge.

However, like TOKTEN, FINCOME has, according to researchers and experts, been the victim of a lack of coherence and of contradictions that have emerged because of the vagueness observed in the public discourse around the mobilisation of skills. This research also finds that the term skills is poorly defined or even unclear, which illustrates a lack of strategy for mobilising scientific and technical skills. Despite the fact that the FINCOME programme and strategy were approved in 2004, the programme remained cut off from all forms of funding and only operated with UNDP funds. This lack of resources was the main reason for FINCOME's failure as a lever for mobilising skills in favour of the country (Gaillard al, 2017, El Asri 2012, Belguendouz 2010). The number of actors within FINCOME and the lack of coordination have led to a dysfunction and inconsistency in the programme.

In the absence of resources, the FINCOME programme has become a kind of sectoral strategy of the CNRST with a number of objectives support for research and training; transfer of know-how and technology; creation of economic, social and cultural development strategies; partnership and attraction of investment; synergy between local skills and MRAs. To achieve these objectives, the CNRST has put in place a plan that recommends:

- The establishment of a joint laboratory between Morocco and Europe;
- The creation of two operational units for the FINCOME between the Research Institute for Development (IRD) and CNRST.

But the FINCOME has become a mobilisation programme with a rather political dimension "less focused on science, technology and innovation" (Gaillard al, 290). Most of the FINCOME's actions have been "reduced to individual initiatives (invitations were limited to members of the personal networks of the inviting institutions)" (Gaillard al, 2017: 292). The finding of these works is that policies to mobilise scientific and technical expertise (S&T) are attractive, but they are characterised by a lack of purpose and clarity. They are not targeted because the reasons "for which the expatriates are mobilised for their country of origin are multiple and are at several levels: family, identity, economic, cultural, cultural, political, etc. The traditional role of the diaspora of the country of origin is also multiple. The homeland expects from them: 1. Political support; 2. An economic role; 3. Strengthening of the S&T capabilities. While some of these roles require a massive involvement of the diaspora, this is not the case for home country S&T capacity building. "We must have a much more discriminatory policy at this level and target populations corresponding to identified and specific needs " (Gaillard al, 2017: 286). Mobilising the S&T diaspora thus requires knowledge of needs, a deeper look at science at

the global level, but also a commitment from public and private universities in the transfer of knowledge.

Another initiative was launched by the Ministry in charge of Moroccans residing abroad on 31 January 2013, called MAGHRIBCOM. This initiative did not benefit from in-depth analysis, as was the case with the other two programmes. From the beginning, MAGHRIBCOM has been presented in the form of a CV platform of Moroccan skills abroad. It aims to serve as a formal framework for the flow of information concerning business opportunities, ad hoc collaboration, investment or employment, based on a win-win partnership between economic operators, universities, research institutions in Morocco and Moroccan skills residing abroad, temporarily or permanently. It offers Moroccan professionals an appropriate information framework concerning business opportunities, investments, and employment. The rare work that addressed this initiative sees it as a great success (Bukharouaa al, 2014); it has even materialised in the creation of the International University of Rabat in 2010, which is seen as the image of a good private-public partnership between Moroccan competences from inside and outside (Bukharouaa al, 2014).

However, the works that evaluated these initiatives identify a range of challenges. These obstacles are both bureaucratic (Belguendouz 2010), but also practical as shown by the work coordinated by Gaillard and Bouabid (2017), on scientific research in Morocco and its internationalisation. This is the same conclusion made by the CCME report led by El Asri (2013). These works identify several challenges, particularly in the area of research, including:

- High-level skills do not have time outside of their professional and personal commitments.
- Commitment is often based on voluntarism; expatriates are asked to sacrifice their time out of love for the country of origin.
- The scientific interest and objective are unclear, making S&T collaboration ineffective.
- The priority sectors are known but there is no detailed analysis (type of jobs, profiles, number).
- Lack of funding and lack of follow-up of actions taken.
- The programmes, notably the TOKTEN and the FINCOME, showed weak monitoring, a multiplicity of actors and institutional rivalries.
- A gap between supply (of skills) and demand (of Morocco).
- The topic of mobilising skills often refers to the issue of return.
- Institutional actors use the question of returning skills from the emotional and patriotic bond.
- Programmes and initiatives can have an encouraging effect if good coordination practices are taken up by State and non-State actors.

However, we can put forward two observations which we believe are important and which highlight these works; these two observations attempt to open up a new perspective of debate on migration and skills which takes as a basis the works mentioned above.

First, we note that these studies avoid raising the political reasons for the departure of these competences, as if the political climate could not be a trigger. In line with Kadri's work on migratory Intelligentsia, this Maghreb Intelligentsia is forced into exile mainly for political reasons in a regional climate of authoritarianism. These intellectuals, who are supposed to bring about change and activate public debate on the political problems of the country of origin, find themselves disconnected or even opposed to the intellectuals who have remained (Kadri 2012). Kadri notes that this Intelligentsia is becoming more and more feminised, with more educated young women who mark their distance from local values and norms dominated by a masculine and conservative tradition. However, contrary to Kadri's argument, we also find that this Intelligentsia, composed of artists, writers, researchers and entrepreneurs, is not necessarily in opposition to the regimes in place; it has in some cases become a spokesperson and lobby for the political regimes of the countries of origin. Thus, the political cost of these skills that leave the country is rather favourable to political regimes, which do not hesitate to defend them even in times of great political repression.

The second observation is of a theoretical nature, since this research neglects theoretical framing and believes that the choice of a qualitative or quantitative methodology can fill this conceptual gap. In this sense, most of these studies have ended up producing an opposition between two types of migration, that of so-called skills which refers to a brain drain, and that of an older labour migration, studied only in terms of its impact of financial flow on the country of origin. This duality, inherited from the sociological and anthropological work of the colonial period (popular Islam/official Islam, *beldi/romi*, rural/urban, indigenous/foreign etc.), has been implanted in studies on Moroccan migration without any change. This resulted in works that go even further in the opposition between the "here" and the "there". Thus, Elmadmad pits the skilled and competent emigrant against the radical and extremist immigrant. To her, this qualified migration of Moroccans, who left for lack of recognition, is likened to immigrants of the second or third generation that adopts radical, extremist and violent behaviour (Elmadmad 2009). These simplistic shortcuts based on a certain populist media discourse and common sense are the result of a lack of serious theoretical debates around migration in the Moroccan context.

Whether TOKTEN, FINCOME or MAGHRIBCOM, the official speech reveals a kind of political marketing intended for MRAs. What these programmes achieve is referred to as a hypermarket or buzz by the international observers. Programmes are not replaced by the completion of their mission, but by the arrival of a new manager, and they are put in competition with one another. In an interview granted to the Economist's website on August 7, 2013, Abdellatif Maâzouz, Minister in charge of MRAs at the time, compared MAGHRIBCOM to FINCOM: "I can assure you that the "Maghribcom" portal recorded in six months more than what "Fincom" recorded in 4 years, both in terms of visits, registrations and contacts between Moroccan skills among themselves, and between these skills and those looking for skills in Morocco. Maghribcom is today an international hypermarket of skills, which creates the buzz".

This fluctuating gaze by the institutions has resulted in a repetitive failure of programmes that target skills. Thus, replacing one programme with another is seen as a relevant response by decision makers. The failure of these programmes is due to several reasons, which we can relate in the following points:

- The most recent programmes launched between 2008-2012 by the delegated ministry in charge of the Moroccan community abroad aimed to pre-empt the economic crisis, and a possible return of the MRAs; although the issue of skills was highlighted, the programme had a preventive objective (Aboussi 2013).
- The failure of these programmes is partly due to the lack of political representation of the MRAs in parliamentary bodies, which confirms a sense of distrust of these programmes. The creation of the CCME has only reinforced doubts, as its objective is to reduce and control the political ambitions of the MRAs by creating exclusive bodies (Aboussi 2013).
- The non-participation of the political actor has opened the door to institutional fluctuation concerning the proposed programmes, which is more a bureaucratic than a political vision.
- The “failure” of these programmes is the result of a lack of coordination and harmony and of a competition between the various ministerial departments. The policy of Moroccan skills abroad is not seen as a work that connects the different bodies, but rather as a field where the spirit of domination takes more space than that of cooperation and synergy.
- The programmes for the return of skills are conceived in an angular vision, because they do not think of the starting factors, which are linked to problems of management, access to quality public services in health and education, problems of justice and individual freedom, etc. These are the reasons given by some of the young computer scientists who leave Morocco each year, 600 persons.
- These programmes rely more on the emotional link that MRAs maintain with their country of origin than on sociological conditions that motivate a decision to return, partially or permanently.

It should also be remembered that these programmes are facing a globalisation of skills. Developed countries are engaged in a fierce battle to attract the best talent. This opens the analysis to new perspectives, placing it in an international perspective.

It should be recalled that one of the sectors most affected by the departure abroad is that of IT and Engineering Service Companies (ISSCs), which places the management of these skills as one of the strategic priorities in the coming years (Elmadmad 2009). Admittedly, Moroccan migrants often face a professional downgrading in the host country (AMERM 2013), but this does not prevent them from moving towards new horizons.

In order to make migration profitable for the migrant, the country of origin, and the country of destination, the migrant must be placed in a virtuous circle. Therefore:

- The country of origin responds to skill shortages in the destination country's labour market.
- The know-how and experience gained by migrants are used upon their return to the country to integrate into the labour market and contribute to the development of local enterprise.
- Information on labour migration is available and accessible, including information on support services for potential migrants and returnees.

Morocco is expressing increasing interest in its diaspora, which is considered ideally suited to the new context of international migration and the effects on the country of origin (Nafa 2018). However, return is often conditional on the nature of the political, social and economic environment in the country of origin.

Nevertheless, in order to make a stimulating and realistic policy, it is necessary first of all to collect qualitative and quantitative data from the MRAs (qualifications, skills, men, women, etc.), before founding a relevant mobilization policy. The exodus of skills requires the implementation of attractive measures (salary, work environment, etc.) in order to cope with this bleeding talent departure. We need to find a policy of return to the homeland, not on an ad hoc or periodic basis, but definitively, for the benefit of the development of Morocco. This requires attractive measures with a much lower impact than the actual contribution.

Thus, the CCME (CCME 2013) advocates the creation of a new “dedicated body” under the supervision of the Government in order to align its action with the national priorities of the entire national policy, with the creation of a “one-stop shop” for all partners (public or private, Moroccan or foreign). Other research points to the absence of a reliable and effective policy based on improving the mechanisms of operation of the State and enterprises through the establishment of a true meritocracy, accompanied by a reform of public life, but also of life within enterprises through the application of the principles of probity and integrity (Boussetta 2002). It is, therefore, necessary to modernise attitudes and in the same time widen the areas of freedom and democracy (Boussetta 2002). Currently, the programmes launched by the Moroccan State rely on the unwavering link to the country of origin which is neither sufficient nor operating (Gaillard and Gaillard 2017). In an era of globalisation, science is shared and developed within peer networks in highly specialised fields. It is therefore important that a scientific watch be put in place to establish a scientific agenda for the future.

Reflecting on the thorny issue of the mobilisation of the diaspora requires, at the same time, that the equally important issue of brain drain be taken into account by the political authorities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we recall the vagueness, complexity and diversity that make up these Moroccan skills abroad. We can only mention the competent persons within the group of qualified Moroccans. The

return support schemes (Tokten, Fincome, Maghribcome) seem unsatisfactory to really attract Moroccan skills. Their evaluation remains partial and biased (depending on who is the sponsor of the evaluation). Finally, perhaps even before evaluating these systems, it would be important to know the expectations and needs of these skills.

Therefore, following these various criticisms and recommendations, it seems necessary to us to place our thoughts on “Moroccan skills” in a world that is moving, changing, increasingly unfolding in a globalized and interconnected way, where the question of Moroccan skills abroad can only be done from a “win-win” relationship. Moroccan skills abroad are in action, whether through a concrete return to the country, or remotely, via social networks, new digital technologies, which instantly make it possible to highlight a vision, an idea, an opinion, an action and to maintain the link. They are increasingly practising transnational mobility and migration. They operate here (in their country of residence and immigration) and there (in their area of origin, Morocco). Moroccan skills act both in the scientific, artistic, and cultural spheres, as a “developer”, but also in the political sphere. Particular attention should be paid to this issue in the analyses to be carried out. Ultimately, these migrated skills reflect an ever-growing Moroccan diaspora that mirrors an increasingly diverse Moroccan society.

Finally, it seems relevant to our investigation to work on this diversity of the immigration actors: whether in the different generations, taking into account the issue of gender, or in the organisation of this diaspora. This structuring takes place in associations such as knowledge clubs (association of a professional body such as the Association of Moroccan IT Professionals in France), development associations (EMCEMO in the Netherlands, IDD and M&D in France, etc.), elected or political groups (the Eugène Delacroix group in France, the MDCD platform in Belgium), and entrepreneurship aid associations (Morocco Entrepreneurs for example), artists from the Moroccan community, etc.

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III. International experience in mobilising expatriate skills

The use of expatriate skills has become a major concern for many states around the world in recent years, hoping to make the best use of the creative, investment and productive capacities of their nationals living abroad. Thus, our bibliographic research has also been devoted to the study of some of the most relevant international practices in the field of the use of expatriate skills and their integration into the economic and social development of countries of origin.

In a first part, we refer below to some of the experiences in this area of countries such as the Philippines (whose number of migrants in relation to the total population corresponds to that of Morocco), Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Taiwan, Bosnia Herzegovina or Ireland, from which Morocco could usefully draw.

In a second point, we will return to those that we believe can be transposed into the approach that Morocco could adopt to further strengthen the ties that it has built over decades with its communities living abroad, in particular with its expatriate skills.

1. Useful good practices.

Bosnia Herzegovina

The programme "Who Is Who in BiH⁵ Diaspora". In Bosnia Herzegovina, the Diaspora Department of the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees started this publication project in 2006 in order to get in touch with successful professional members of the Bosnian diaspora. The first edition was launched in 2009; it featured the full biography of 142 PhD holders and researchers from Bosnia Herzegovina. The second edition entitled *Who Is Who in BiH⁶ Diaspora, PhD Holders and Researchers*, published in 2010, covered 242 members of the diaspora.

This initiative has fostered cooperation between the academic and professional communities in Bosnia Herzegovina and the persons mentioned in the two publications. The Diaspora Department received positive feedback from participants who sent information about themselves. As the Department's staff contacted them via the Internet as part of their normal activities, the cost of the project amounted to approximately 2,500 Euros, representing the cost of printing the two documents. A database is being developed.

⁵ Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH).

Chile

Chile Global / Chili Global is a unique example of the impact that a diaspora can have on the transfer of knowledge and of innovation on a country. Chile Global - a network of talent for the transfer of innovation - privileged and facilitated the development of economic groups (key clusters) in Chile by strengthening their ties with Chileans living abroad. This Chilean diaspora contributes its time, experience, knowledge, contacts and skills to the Chilean companies present around the world. Through its network of more than 400 influential members living abroad, Chile Global has helped create 76 companies with more than 50 national and international partners (including private companies, universities and research institutes). Among these companies were world leaders in biotechnology and information technology.

Colombia

“Red Caldas” or Caldas Network. Colombia was one of the first countries to establish a scientific and technical network among its diaspora. This network was established in 1991 by the Colombian Institute for the Advancement of Science and Technology, a public body better known by its Spanish acronym, Colciencias. Red Caldas was considered one of the first initiatives to establish contacts between members of a scientific diaspora and science and technology projects in their home countries. The network has made many achievements, including the development and implementation of public policies and the development of human resources in the fields of science and technology.

Through its conferences, scholarships and projects, it mobilised researchers, fostered exchanges among them and even encouraged their return to Colombia. A large number of Red Caldas members have participated in economic and cultural development activities that have been beneficial to Colombia.

The success of the programme owes much to pairing with renowned scientists who, by collaborating on research projects in Colombia and in the countries of residence of Colombians, have contributed to capacity-building, the exchange of researchers, and the training of graduates. These scientists could also put the result of their work in the service of development, although industrial expansion and transition to production are not really part of the network's mission.

Croatia

During the war that took place in Croatia between 1991 and 1995, the country experienced a very strong forced migration, which concerned a large part of its scientists and other qualified personnel. With the independence of the country and its return to a situation of peace, there was a need to “recover” some of those who had left, in order to rebuild peace and contribute to the country's development. One of the first initiatives in this direction was the establishment of a public body named “Unity through Knowledge Fund” (UKF). This entity targeted the Croatian scientific community abroad. Its objective was to strengthen collaboration among researchers. It was launched in 2007 by the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport with funding from the World Bank. Its programme

at that time included grants of up to 200,000 euros for projects bringing together scientists and professionals residing in Croatia and abroad.

Ireland

If your last name is McNamara and you live outside Ireland, expect⁷ to receive a letter. “Ireland Reaching Out”, a non-profit non-governmental organisation (NGO) funded largely by the Irish Government, has paved the way for what it calls “reverse genealogy”. Rather than people from Ireland themselves trying to find their Irish ancestry, the NGO is constructing family trees from “roots to branches”, tracking descendants of those who left for America (North America), Australia, New Zealand and other countries. Volunteers then invite them to visit their parents' and grandparents' country of origin, Ireland. It is a striking and useful task. It aims to arouse the feelings and desire to re-establish ties between the country of their ancestors and millions of Irish whose great-grandfathers have been scattered throughout the world since the 16th and 17th centuries. Mike Feerick, the initiator of the project, wants to start by establishing a database of the Irish diaspora containing names of 30 to 40 thousand families.

In addition, Ireland appointed a Minister for the Diaspora in 2014 for the first time in its history. In the spring of 2015, it unveiled a “Diaspora Strategy”. Like Ireland Reaching Out, the Irish government wants to support hundreds of groups that support Irish emigrants in need, and those who go to the front of those who have succeeded. One of them, Connect Ireland, uses members of the diaspora as a sort of economic spies to find Irish immigrant investors to encourage them to start businesses and thus create jobs in Ireland.

The Philippines

In the case of the Philippines, where nearly 10 million inhabitants, out of a total population of 99 million, who live abroad, there are three – among a dozen - particularly interesting programmes that deserve to be mentioned as a reference in Morocco's relations with its qualified citizens living outside its borders. They are:

a. The “Alay-Dunong Sa Bayan Program”, or programme “Alay Dunong”

The programme systematises and strengthens skills and the exchange or transfer of technology between overseas Filipinos and their country of origin in strategic areas of development such as science and technology, engineering, arts and culture.

Actually, a similar system exists in the framework of the “Exchange Visitor Program”(EVP) which can be called “Program of Exchange Visitors” or “Programme of Exchanging Visitors”, where Filipinos holding visa J1 and looking to have a permanent resident status in the United-States are invited to moderate seminars at the post-graduate level as a condition to getting a No Objection from the

⁷ “Gone but not forgotten”. The Economist, Jun 27th 2015.

Philippines Government which would allow them to be expatriates in the country of their choice. Nonetheless, this exchange framework is limited only to Filipinos belonging to the EVP programme.

The best practices underlying this programme take into account China's experience in this regard, where the incentives include the establishment of scientific and technological parks for the researcher migrants and for educational purposes of their children. These practices also build on what India has done, where there is a sort of duplication of these initiatives and where numerous facilities are given for the creation of branches of multinationals and mixed enterprises between these multinationals and local enterprises created by the Indian scientists who have emigrated and then came back home and created enterprises of engineering and of biotechnology of information. India has also facilitated the conclusion of contracts and has paid the scientists for their academic and entrepreneurial merits.

Among the specific activities that can be exploited in the EVP framework, we can name: (1) the strengthening of the cartography of the diaspora, by particularly highlighting the migrants who have specific high-level qualifications and can meet the needs of strategic development programmes of the government; (2) establishing consensus and agreements on governance measures as well as rules of engagement for the government (incentives, and regulations for sanctions; credit and payment for services rendered; accreditation for work in the country of origin with the qualifications obtained in the host country; assigning resources of collective research, exchange of professional and practical education programmes, methods to avoid conflict and mechanisms for conflict resolution, etc.); (3) alignment and dissemination of the experience of the diaspora by the local approval agencies; (4) coordination of the diaspora input across political bodies that perpetuate its effect; collaboration of research between relevant institutions in the host country of Filipino migrants and national institutions in the same domain; and organising regular exchange fora for the exchange of knowledge and experience, and establishing a virtual education environment and discussion fora.

b. The Balik-Turo, Teach-Share & Educational Exchange Program

The objective of Balik-Turo programme is to establish a network of Filipino professionals residing abroad and working in the domains of education, training, health services and other domains, that can provide voluntary services in education, apprenticeship, and vocational training of their fellow citizens in the country of origin and make this network evolve into an extended and lasting scientific and educational exchange programme.

More precisely, the programme would target to bring the Filipino educators installed abroad again to the Philippines to share with their fellow citizens the information, the knowledge, the know-how, the experience, the strategies, the world evolution trends, the new technologies, and the most recent developments in the different educational sectors through the organisation of seminars and training workshops. The direct beneficiaries of these actions are the professors of the public and private educational establishments everywhere across the Philippines. In this way, the Balik-Turo programme works to improve the competencies and the knowledge of teachers and to provide them with the necessary tools that are more performing and globally competitive.

c. The Brain Gain Network.

Another Filipino initiative of interest to our project is *the Brain Gain Network* (BGN). This network of well-known professionals and organisations in the Philippines and abroad aims to increase the competitiveness of the national economy. It is a private organisation, funded by Narra Venture Capital that promotes cooperation between Filipino experts, students residing abroad, professionals, students, and businesses in the Philippines. The BGN database contains information on 2,240 members, most of whom live in the United States of America and Singapore. Through a search engine, members can consult the network's profiles to find professionals who meet their criteria in terms of qualifications, education or industry. The goal is to provide the diaspora with a convenient platform for establishing contacts to open a business in the Philippines, to provide consulting services to local organisations, or to start a business abroad that will do business with the Philippines. The BGN network is also associated with recruitment offices to assist diaspora members in finding employment in the commercial sector, academia and governmental and non-governmental organisations; potential employers also have access to the database.

Taiwan

Since 1960, Taiwan has attracted academics from the Taiwanese diaspora by offering them various benefits, such as reimbursement of travel expenses (air tickets and other allowances for the person concerned and his dependants) as well as a placement service. The National Youth Commission (NYC), a ministerial office, provides such assistance.

Initiatives have intensified over time and, in the 1980s, public authorities offered substantial benefits to experienced diaspora members to persuade them to pursue a second career in the Taiwan Province of China, including: remuneration equivalent to that received abroad; subsidy for housing and children's education; and a working environment with modern facilities, instruments and equipment.

The Taiwanese authorities also opened the Hsinchu Industrial and Scientific Park in 1980, seeking to replicate the high concentration of expertise and creativity found in the Silicon Valley, California; many experts of Taiwanese origin are working there today. Companies have been provided with carefully thought-out infrastructure and various incentives, including support for Western-style housing, schools and commercial services. Most importantly, Taiwan Province of China has offered venture capital to innovative diaspora companies.

It is a great success. High-tech companies owned by foreign interests or the diaspora came to settle there and, in 2000, Hsinchu employed 102,000 people and generated a turnover of \$28 billion. That year, Taiwanese living in the United States of America owned 113 of the 289 businesses in the complex, 70 of whom had established businesses in the Silicon Valley. The returning expatriates were highly qualified, with nearly 500 of them holding doctorate degrees.

2. Best practices to follow

Most of the good practices mentioned above can serve as models around which the competent Moroccan institutions (as well as large companies) can initiate sectoral and global programmes that

would benefit from the vast number of national skills currently benefiting primarily foreign countries and companies in which they are engaged. However, among these practices and initiatives, we note the following four that seem to us to be both rapidly achievable and of great value for the country and for the different regions of departure of our migrants.

The Chilean example

The Chilean concept, Chile Global, could be transposed to Morocco under the name Morocco Global or Morocco World. In order to support Moroccan policy and investments in various sectors in Africa, or to support large Moroccan companies, both public and private, in their operations abroad – particularly in the context of the implementation of the association agreements concluded by Morocco with the EU, the USA or Turkey for example – it would be useful to have a Chilean approach to the professionals and skills of Moroccan expatriates. The competent national institutions would thus set up a database of Moroccans living abroad classified according to their skills, their sectors of activity and the countries in which they live. This database would be made available, with the agreement of the expatriates, to companies who would like to participate in such an initiative, and who would find in it the human resources they lack according to their strategy of penetration into international markets. Several dozen, if not hundreds, of Moroccan professionals operating today in France, Spain, Germany, Great Britain or Canada, the United States of America and Latin America would be delighted to bring their knowledge and linguistic capabilities of the countries where they are located to give Moroccan entrepreneurs interested in this added value that is so necessary to be able to exist and prosper in a globalised economy. It should be noted that Chile Global, with its network of over 400 influential members living abroad has helped in the creation of 76 companies with over 50 national and international partners (including private companies, universities and research institutions).

The practice of twinning

This practice of twinning, as initiated within the framework of a programme known as "Partnership Together (P2G)", would be extremely useful both to encourage communities of Moroccan professionals and scientists working abroad to make themselves known and to regroup in order to benefit their regions of origin, and Morocco as a whole, from their knowledge and skills; as well as to push these same regions in search of their children, men and women, who went to live and work elsewhere.

Twinning would take place between regions of departure and regions of residence of the migrants. It would be organised through relevant regional and national institutions and would focus on specific/current issues, such as health, energy, water, sanitation, desertification and environmental protection, as it would be organised for industrial, agricultural, fisheries or scientific and technological research projects.

Regular seminars/meetings could be organised between twinned communities in Morocco and abroad to address specific issues and problems and to find both resources and ways to solve them.

An important role would be given to local associations, but also to elected authorities at a regional level to support and sustain twinning. Central authorities would be accompanying and providing funding for region-wide initiatives, where appropriate. In this respect, it is clear that the ongoing decentralised cooperation between several regions of Morocco and Spain, France, Holland and Italy would be an important contribution to the development and success of the initiative as a whole.

The Philippine example

The “Alay-Dunong Sa Bayan Program” or “Alay-Dunong” programme systematizes and strengthens skills and the exchange or transfer of technology between overseas Filipinos and their country of origin in strategic areas of development such as science and technology, engineering, arts and culture. In this sense, it is possible to stress the following essential aspects of this programme: (1) The strengthening of the cartography of the Moroccan diaspora by highlighting in particular the migrants that have specific high-level qualifications and who can respond to the needs of the different programmes of development launched (or to be launched) by the public authorities, at all levels; (2) write conventions and agreements concerning the rules of engagement of these authorities (and of the government, in particular). It concerns incentives and encouragements systems; credits and payment for the services rendered; accreditations to work in Morocco with the qualifications acquired in the country of installation; assigning resources for collective research, exchange of professional and practical education programmes, methods for avoiding conflict and mechanisms for conflict resolution, etc.; (3) the alignment and dissemination of experience of the diaspora by the national homologation agencies; (4) coordination of the diaspora input across public bodies that perpetuate their effects; collaboration in research among relevant institutions in Morocco and the host countries of Moroccan migrants; and organisation of regular exchange fora for knowledge and experience with establishing a virtual learning environment and discussion fora.

The Taiwanese example

This example can be followed to attract scientists and other university staff from the Moroccan diaspora by offering them various benefits, such as reimbursement of travel expenses (air tickets and other allowances for the person concerned and his dependants) as well as a placement service.

An initiative of this nature is all the more useful today for Morocco, as many researchers and teachers of higher education are leaving national research and training institutions, due to their retirement. Such a phenomenon, which has obviously been foreseeable for many years, has created significant needs for the supervision of research and teaching of scientific and technological subjects, which can only be met in the short and medium term by the use of expertise from outside Morocco. Further, this is even more true because a large number of students who have gone abroad during the last two decades have taken the decision to stay and work where they have finished their studies and even, more and more often, to apply for (and obtain) the nationality of the country where they have settled.

The Moroccan public authorities in charge of scientific and technical research issues could initiate - with the support of important academic institutions and the National Centre for Scientific and Technical Research - and the technological park that has recently emerged in Rabat, the establishment

of a kind of industrial and scientific pole capable of allowing a high concentration of know-how, research and creativity allowing Moroccan research to reach the critical threshold beyond which it will become significant and very useful to the country.

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IV. Moroccan skills residing abroad. Number and main socio-demographic characteristics

Since Morocco's independence in 1956, the migration of Moroccans has undergone a series of important changes both in its number and in its countries of destination, as well as in its structure by gender and age and in its educational level.

Initially oriented towards countries (so-called traditional immigration countries) such as France, Belgium and Holland, it gradually encompassed other European countries such as Germany, Spain and Italy, and North America before moving towards the Middle East.

Moroccans are now present in nearly 100 countries, and their number represents one seventh of the entire population of Morocco.

Moreover, whereas migration was mainly male (during the 1960s and 1970s) and very poorly trained, it is now made up of almost 40% women, and also more than 15% of people with high to very high level of education. This is the case, for example, today with the Moroccan community present in France, and in the United States of America and Canada, as indicated in the data contained in this chapter.

1. Numbers and host countries of Moroccans residing abroad.

The statistical data contained in this chapter represent an overall indication of the number of Moroccans residing abroad, the countries in which they reside and their educational levels. This data, which is necessarily questionable given the magnitude of the task of covering a population of nearly 5 million persons living on five continents, must be approached with caution and would be complemented - which is the specific objective of our project – by targeted qualitative surveys, which should also make it possible to refine it.

1.1. Numbers and demographic profile of MRAs.

One of the main sources of information on MRAs, or Moroccans of the world, as they are increasingly called today, is the Department of Consular and Social Affairs, under the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. In 2018, it numbered them at 4,365,445, distributed – as indicated in the table in Annex 1 (at the end of the text) - over 88 countries, and nearly 4.8 million in 2019⁸, representing approximately 14% of the total Moroccan population. Their gender composition was provided by the

⁸ The only official statistics are those of the Department of Consular and Social Affairs (DACs) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and MRAs. These statistics underestimate the actual number of MRAs, as they only take into account those registered with Moroccan consulates. The DACs shows MRA figures at 4.4 million in 2018 and 4.8 million in January 2019.

latest national survey on international migration conducted in 2018-2019 by the Office of the High Commissioner for Planning (HCP)⁹. This survey indicates the predominance of male migration. Thus, just over two out of three MRAs (68.3%) are men. The rate of feminization of the MRAs is therefore 31.7%.

The same survey shows that the MRA population is relatively young. Thus, more than one in four current emigrants is between 15 and 29 years old (27.1%), women are relatively more numerous than men in this age group, 32.8% and 24.4% respectively. One third of current migrants are aged 30-39 (32.5%), with almost equal shares of men and women, 31.6% and 34.4% respectively. Also, about six out of ten migrants (59.6%) are under 40 years of age, 67.2% are women and 56% are men. And, logically, the share of people aged 60 and over is low. It is only 3.9% (4.4% for men and 2.9% for women).


1.2. Host countries of MRAs

According to data from the Department of Consular and Social Affairs (DACS) in 2018, more than four-fifths (86.2%) of migrants are in Europe. France leads by a share of 28.4% of the MRAs, followed by Spain with 20.8%, Italy 15.1%, Belgium 9.1%, Holland 7.1% and Germany 3.7%. The USA attracts 5.7% and Canada 1.7%. Among the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia ranks first with 1.4%, followed by Algeria 1.2% and the United Arab Emirates 1.2% (see table in Annex 1).

These results were confirmed by the national survey on international migration conducted in by the Office of the High Commissioner for Planning (HCP) 2018-2019. Indeed, according to this survey, Europe receives the bulk of Moroccan migrants, 86.4%. Three countries account for three quarters 74.2%, France 31.1%, Spain 23.4% and Italy 18.7%. North America attracts 7.4% of these migrants (3.8% for Canada and 3.6% for the US) and Arab countries 3.8%.

⁹ For the purposes of the survey, a current migrant is any person of Moroccan nationality, aged 15 and over, who was a member of the household surveyed before leaving the country, and who currently resides in another country.

Figure 1: MRA by host country (%).¹⁰




2. Profiles of Moroccans residing abroad (MRAs).

2.1. Educational level and areas of specialisation of MRAs.

In 2018-2019, the level of education of MRAs is significantly higher than that of the population residing in Morocco¹¹. One in three MRAs (33.5%) achieved higher education, of whom 44.7% were women and 28.4% men. Another third (33.7%) have secondary education, 32.6% are women and 34.3% are men. Those with primary education are 16.9% (9.8% are women and 20.2% are men) and those without primary education make 10.2% (8.2% are women and 11.1% are men).

Figure 2: MRA % by level of education and gender.¹²



¹⁰ Source: HCP, National Survey on International Migration in Morocco, 2018-2019.

¹¹ According to the 2014 RGPH, 36.9% of people have no education, 28% have a primary education level; qualifying secondary and higher education, where emigration takes a high toll, represent only 10% and 6.1% respectively.
Source: HCP, National Survey on International Migration in Morocco, 2018-2019.

The level of education varies according to the host country. The MRAs living in North America have the highest level of education and those residing in the new European countries of immigration, Italy and Spain, have the lowest level. Thus, while the percentage of migrants without any level of education is almost zero (0.2%) in North America, this proportion is much higher in the new European countries of immigration – which are experiencing mainly irregular Moroccan migration - where it is 16.2%.

Table 1: MRA % by level of education and gender.¹³


| Education level | Country of current residence | | | | | Total |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | Older European immigration countries | New European immigration countries | North America | Arab countries | Other countries | |
| Without level | 6.4 | 16.2 | 0.2 | 6.2 | 1.3 | 10.2 |
| Primary | 9.4 | 27.5 | 0.9 | 16.1 | 1.1 | 16.9 |
| College | 11.4 | 23.7 | 2.2 | 18.5 | 2.8 | 16.3 |
| Secondary | 18.8 | 16.2 | 15.0 | 20.6 | 18.8 | 17.4 |
| Professional Training | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 9.5 | 3.0 | 4.8 |
| Higher | 48.9 | 10.9 | 76.0 | 28.4 | 72.0 | 33.5 |
| Undeclared | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Three quarters (74.1%) of the MRAs who completed their higher education obtained their diplomas in Morocco and one quarter (25.8%) abroad. Among the latter, France ranked first (14.9%), followed by Canada (2.4%), the USA (2.2%), Germany (1.8%), Spain (1.2%), Belgium (0.6%) and Italy (0.5%). There are no significant gender differences.

Figure 3: MRE % with completed higher education by country of graduation and gender.¹⁴

¹³ Source: HCP, National Survey on International Migration in Morocco, 2018-2019.

¹⁴ Source: HCP, National Survey on International Migration in Morocco, 2018-2019.



The summary table below, prepared using data produced by the OECD, corresponding to the years 2010/2011, and published by the Agence Française de Développement¹⁵, also reveals the essential characteristics of a large part of the MRAs living in an older immigration country (France) and in two recent host countries (Spain and Italy).

Table 2: Structure by age, gender, level of education, activity and unemployment rates of MRAs living in France, Spain and Italy (2010/2011).¹⁶

| | Persons over 15 years of age born in Morocco and residing in: | | |
|--|---|--|---|
| | France | Spain | Italy |
| Profile | Moroccan diaspora present in the territory since the 1950s: feminisation and aging of the diaspora started. Almost 60% of migrants have French nationality, but overall, this diaspora remains insufficiently economically integrated (low activity rate/high unemployment rate). | Moroccan diaspora present in the territory since the 1950s: feminisation and aging of the diaspora started. 1 in 4 immigrants arrived recently. Overall, this diaspora has low qualifications and a high level of unemployment. Large presence of seasonal work. | Moroccan diaspora present in the territory since the 1950s: feminisation started. 1 in 4 immigrants has arrived recently. Only 1 in 10 immigrants has Italian nationality. In total, a low level of qualifications but high experience. |
| Emigrants over 15 years old | 860.000 | 640.000 | 320.000 |
| Students on international mobility | 29.000 | 6.000 | 2.000 |
| Share of recent emigrants (<5 years) | 7% | 25% | 24% |

¹⁵ AFD, Etude de faisabilité du projet DiasDev. 27 January 2020

¹⁶ Source: OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010/2011. °Low corresponds to pre-primary, primary and early secondary / Medium corresponds to late secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education/ High corresponds to tertiary.

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| Share holding nationality of the host country | 58% | 15% | 11% |
| Share of female | 49% | 43% | 45% |
| Age distribution | 15-24 years: 8% 25-64 years: 77% > 65 years: 15% | 15-24 years: 17% 25-64 years: 78% > 65 years: 5% | 15-24 years: 15% 25-64 years: 82% > 65 years: 4% |
| Level of education | Low: 50% Average: 29% High 21% | Low: 75% Average: 15% High 9% | Low: 71% Average: 23% High 6% |
| Activity rate | 58% | 71% | 61% |
| Unemployment rate | 22% | 55% | 19% |

Such a table corroborates the data provided by HCP. It also tends to indicate that the share of highly educated MRAs would average between 10 and 15%, which represents in absolute terms, between 480,000 and 720,000 persons.

2.2. Activity and employment of MRAs in the host country.

The bulk of the data in this paragraph comes from the survey conducted by HCP, mentioned above. These data, of course, like the previous ones, will be refined and completed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, during the second phase of our project, in order to become a better indicator of the different volts characterising the community of “skills”. At the time of the 2018-2019 HCP survey, nearly two out of three MRAs (64%) had a professional activity in their host country. The proportion of employed men, 76%, was twice as high as that of women, 38.2%.

Employment rate varies greatly according to age. It increases from 37.9% for young people aged 15 to 29 to 79.6% for those aged 40 to 49. It is important to note that 44.2% of MRAs aged 60 years and over continue to work. This is different by host country. It is higher in the Arab countries (78%) and the new European countries of immigration (71.3%) than in the North American countries (63.7%) and the old European countries of immigration (56.6%). This is probably due to a higher proportion of students and also pensioners in the latter countries.

When analysed by occupational status, the majority of employed MRAs were salaried employees (82.2%), with female slightly more than male (84.9% and 81.5%, respectively). Self-employed persons lag far behind with 10.4%, of whom male (11.5%) are more than female (6.1%) and older people (28.8%) than young adults (6%). Self-employed persons are more present among the current migrants settled in the new European immigration countries (13.6%) and the Arab countries (8.9%) than in other countries. As for the share of employers, it appears to be minimal, with 3.3% of the total (4.7% among female and 2.9% among male).

In all cases, and particularly with regard to MRA skills, which are the subject of our project, the data collection, surveys and other interviews that will be carried out during the second phase of our work will allow us, among other things, to approach both the numerical importance of these skills and the essential part of the other elements relating to their qualifications, their sectors of activity, etc., or their willingness or unwillingness to respond to any initiative aimed at their contribution to the development of the economy of their country of origin, Morocco.

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V. Matching the demand for/supply of qualified skills resources

In a report released in October 2019, the World Bank argues that “despite Morocco's remarkably high investment rate, one of the highest in the world with an average of 34% of GDP per year since the mid-2000s, the benefits in terms of economic growth, job creation and productivity, have been disappointing”. For example, the same report continues, “some countries such as Colombia, the Philippines¹⁷ and Turkey have achieved similar or higher growth rates, with significantly lower levels of investment (World Bank, 2016). Countries that have succeeded to take off economically have managed to maintain annual growth rates of GDP per capita well above 4% for decades (compared to average annual rates in Morocco of 2.9% between 2000 and 2017 and only 1.6% between 1990 and 2000).¹⁸ “

In fact, if there is indeed such a discrepancy in Morocco between national investment efforts and the average rate of GDP growth over the long term, it is because the labour force available in the country is - as indicated below - very poorly qualified, and a significant component of this same labour force exercises its talents outside the borders.

In fact, this is a major consequence of the public policies followed for both employment/training and migration. It is also an opportunity to seize, insofar as qualified expatriate Moroccan human resources could help reducing – to a certain extent – the skills deficit from which certain sectors of activity seem to suffer the most.

In this section, we first present some quantitative and qualitative elements relating to the working population in Morocco, and secondly, we discuss the main sectors/projects with a high demand for skilled labour. Finally, we are introducing options for connecting what might be called “demand and supply” of Moroccan skills abroad.

1. Employment in Morocco: low activity rate and limited level of qualification

The working population in Morocco is marked by two major characteristics. On the one hand, its proportion among the population of working age is very low and, on the other hand, it is dominated by the social categories without training or with a very limited level of training.

1.1 Very low participation rate

In 2019, the working age population (15 years and over) reached 26,359,000 persons, of which 12,082,000 are economically active (10,975,000 employed and 1,107,000 unemployed) and 14,277,000 are outside the labour market.

¹⁷ Which we quote in the Benchmark part of this text.


¹⁸ World Bank group, Diagnostic du secteur privé (au Maroc). Octobre 2019.

The participation rate reached 45.8%; 42.3% in urban areas and 52.2% in rural areas; 71% among men and 21.5% among women. This rate goes from 45% among those with no diploma to 42.5% among those with an average diploma, to 56.9% among those with a higher diploma.

Of the 10,975,000 employed, 42.8% are rural and 22.7% are female. Young people aged 15-34 make up 36.7% of the total volume of employment; 10.2% for 15-24 year olds and 26.5% for 25-34 year olds.

The employment rate reached 41.6%; 36.9% in urban areas and 50.3% in rural areas; 65.5% among men and 18.6% among women. It is 57.9% for the 35-44 age group and 18.9% for the 15-24 age group.

Figure 4: Employment rate by age and place of residence (%).¹⁹




1.2 Low qualification of employed persons.

Just over half (55.4%) of the employed have no diploma, 29.6% have an average diploma and 14.9% have a higher diploma. Of those employed in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector, 81.4% have no diploma. This proportion of people without diplomas reaches 59.8% in the construction sector, 46.2% in industry including crafts and 38.1% in services. Nearly seven out of 10 self-employed persons (70.5%) have no diploma, a quarter (24.8%) have an average diploma and 4.7% have a higher diploma. For salaried employees, these proportions are 42.4%, 33.4% and 24.2% respectively.

Figure 5: Structure of the population of working age and the employed population according to degree (in %).²⁰

¹⁹ Source : Haut-commissariat au plan, Rabat. " Principales caractéristiques de la population active en 2019 ".

²⁰ Source: ibid



These two structural data on the labour market in Morocco undoubtedly constitute major obstacles, particularly in high-value-added activities and in sectors with a significant technological component, open to the world economy and therefore subject to the vagaries of international competition. The same data also represent factors limiting the performance of national health, education or scientific research systems.

2. Economic and social activities, sectoral development plans and skills needs of the Moroccan economy

It is in the context of this labour market, marked by a high unemployment rate and above all by the two other structural characteristics mentioned above, that Morocco started, from 2009, one year after the beginning of the economic and financial crisis of 2008, the work on establishing a series of multi-sectoral programmes aimed at reducing the rate of inactivity among its youth, the recovery of its economy and its disconnection from the climate hazards²¹, to which it is heavily exposed. These programmes, which were included in sectoral strategies that were very often unrelated to each other, aimed at ensuring the country's energy autonomy, increasing its food security, and strengthening its position in what would be called "Morocco's global professions", in particular in the automotive and aeronautical industries. This is done by focusing on the development of new information and communication technologies, promising innovations, requiring the use of qualified human resources and advanced skills, present both in Morocco and among its expatriate community. The sectors targeted at the time were industry, agriculture and fisheries, tourism, renewable energy, off-shoring, logistics, health, and higher education and scientific research.

Some of the projects were expected to reach their first term in 2020, and many would be reviewed and relaunched starting that date. More specifically, these are the Green Morocco Plan, renamed Green Generation at the end of 2019, renewable energy programmes, and the Fisheries Plan. However, the health crisis caused by the Corona virus, which started in Morocco in March 2020, has caused, with its multiple economic and social effects, a halt to many of these projects.

²¹ Morocco is characterised by the predominance of the agricultural sector in the country's economy. Agricultural value added (as a percentage of GDP) remains modest, but agriculture continues to shape the economy as a whole significantly.

In the same vein, with the closure of national borders from mid-March 2020, and with the explosion of the population's health care needs, and also to meet the demand for food products from domestic production, four sectors appeared to be even more strategic, imposing a significant mobilisation of the financial resources of the State, and also showing a strong need for human skills. These include agriculture and food industries, health and medical and pharmaceutical industries, education, including its remote component, and scientific research. In these different sectors, suddenly considered by the public authorities to be vital for the country, a twofold observation can be made. On the one hand, in a situation of major crisis, Morocco can rely only on its own efforts and its own financial and human resources. On the other hand, many high-level Moroccan skills are getting active - and are mobilised internationally, including by the US administration, to find the vaccine that would lift the world out of its current health crisis. Their chosen areas are health, medical research, the pharmaceutical industry, energy, and artificial intelligence.

Nevertheless, among the sectoral development programmes, the most important has been industry, known as the "Industrial Acceleration Plan". This plan will introduce a new approach based on the establishment of industrial ecosystems. This flagship element of the new industrial strategy is aimed at reducing the fragmentation of the sector by fostering the development of targeted and mutually beneficial strategic partnerships between industry leaders and very small, small and medium-sized enterprises. More specifically, the intent is to federate groups of enterprises around industrial units carrying out integrated projects. These entities could be national industry leaders, professional groups or foreign investors.

Work in this direction has resulted in the launch of seven ecosystems in the automotive, heavy transport vehicles and industrial vehicle bodywork, aeronautics and textiles industries; six in the building materials, mechanical and metallurgical industries, the chemical, leather, offshoring, pharmaceutical, agri-food and an ecosystem for the Sherifian Phosphates Office (CPO). The industrial strategy adopted in 2014 has then set the following two main objectives for the sector by 2020:

- The creation of half a million jobs, half of which were to come from foreign direct investment, and the other half from a renovated national industrial base;
- Growing Industry's share of GDP by nine percentage points, from 14% in 2014 to 23% in 2020²².

In addition to this industrial plan, mention may also be made of the "National Strategy for the Development of Logistics Competitiveness" and the "Renewable Energy Plan". Regarding the latter, Morocco, an energy importer for nearly 95% of its needs, launched in February 2008 a "National Renewable Energy and Efficiency Plan" to develop alternative energies with a view to meeting 52% of its domestic needs by 2030 and increasing the use of energy saving methods. The plan was to mobilise more than €4.5 billion in investments and lead to the creation of more than 40,000 jobs in 2020. All these components are briefly indicated in the following synoptic table.

²² Ministère de l'Industrie, de l'investissement, du commerce et de l'économie numérique, "Plan d'accélération industrielle' 2014 – 2020". Rabat, Morocco.

Table 3: Main components of sectoral plans and strategies in Morocco.²³

| | Objectives | Concerned sectors | Quantitative objectives/Expected results | Year of launch | Horizon |
|---|---|--|--|----------------|---------|
| Industrial Acceleration Plan (PAI) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boosting Morocco's industrialization • Improve Morocco's international positioning • Accompany sectors with high export potential • Improve Trade balance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automotive, textile, leather, off-shoring, mechanical and metallurgical industries, agri-food, aeronautics and electronics, etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create 500,000 jobs in industry • Share of industry in GDP (%) • Rebalancing trade accounts by favouring exports and substituting local supply for imports | 2014 | 2020 |
| Green Morocco Plan which became "Green Generation in 2019" | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To make agriculture the main engine of growth of the national economy by 2020, through the development of plant chains, high value-added agricultural production and the upgrading of the social fabric, etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating 1 to 1.5 million jobs by 2020 • Achieve an annual GDP of between 70 and 100 Billion Dh. • Increase value added in the sector • Alleviating Poverty | 2008 | 2020 |
| Rawaj Plan (literally, promotion of commercial activities) | <p>The Rawaj plan aims to make Morocco a commercial hub par excellence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote a commercial development adapted to the typologies of the territories • Support the modernization of neighbourhood commerce and encourage the promotion of commercial spaces • Propose an offer adapted to the needs of all customers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commerce | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create 1 to 450.000 jobs by 2020 • Triple GDP in 2006 to reach DH 180 billion by 2020 • Increase the contribution of Trade to national GDP to 15% (from 11% in 2006). • Increase sector growth to 8% annually | 2008 | 2020 |
| Vision 2020 for Tourism | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Position the country among the world's leading tourist destinations (increase in hospitality capacity, training, creation of new seaside resorts, promotion, etc.) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tourism | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create 470 000 new direct jobs • Double the number of tourists • Increase in tourism revenues to reach 140 billion dirhams in 2020 • Increase the share of tourism in GDP by two percentage points | 2010 | 2020 |

²³ Source: Consortium International de Développement en Education (cide), La prospective de l'emploi au Maroc, Mars 2020.



| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|------|------|
| Fisheries Plan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modernizing and upgrading the fisheries sector to make it a driver of the Moroccan economy • Triple sector's GDP and exports by 2020 • Double direct jobs in the sector • Improve the accessibility of seafood • Multiply per capita consumption by 1.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fishing (Seafood products) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create 115 000 direct jobs and 510 200 indirect jobs • Reduce the level of informal activities from 30% to 15% of the sector's turnover • Increase seafood exports by 2.6 times | 2009 | 2020 |
| Morocco Export Plus | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase the value of exports and diversify them to new markets and new products | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Textile/leather, agri-food, seafood, electronics, off-shoring, ICT, aeronautics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create more than 300,000 additional jobs • Triple the volume of Exports • Contribute to GDP growth | 2008 | 2018 |

In this set of programmes/plans, the focus must now be on the health and training/education/research sectors, but also on the agricultural sector – strategic in Morocco in more than one respect (food security, share in overall employment, etc.).

With regard to the health sector, the available human resources and the needs were clearly defined and constituted a real challenge to the Moroccan authorities. In that connection, Morocco had embarked - well before the crisis - on several projects to reform its health system in order to reduce social and territorial inequalities in access to health care and to better distribute medical services.

However, the coronavirus crisis that the country is experiencing, like most regions of the world, has shown that Morocco suffers from a significant lack of medical infrastructure (university medical centres and other regional hospitals or clinics) and also from a great weakness in availability of human resources, both doctors and paramedics. We realise that the problem is latent and the coronavirus crisis only confirms an already critical situation.

In 2020, Morocco had only 27,500 doctors, more than half of whom (53%) are in the liberal sector. This represents just over one doctor per 1,500 inhabitants, whereas the minimum standard agreed by WHO is one doctor per 650 inhabitants. As a result, and with a medical staff quotient of 1.65 per 1,000 inhabitants – for a minimum required of 4.45 per 1,000 people – its health sector suffers from a deficit of nearly 100,000 caregivers, i.e. 32,400 doctors and 64,800 paramedics, between nurses and health technicians. It is also estimated that, as part of this overall deficit, the public sector alone needs 62,000 people, including 12,000 doctors and 50,000 nurses and technicians. At the same time, it is alleged that nearly 8,000 Moroccans practise medicine in France alone²⁴.

With regard to higher education and research, the conditions under which confinement has occurred in both the far East and Western Europe have shown the decisive importance of distance learning and teleworking. This process, which is becoming clearer year after year in advanced societies, is also

²⁴ Site de la Chambre des représentants.

becoming an obligation for countries such as Morocco. However, the digital revolution presupposes that all citizens are its actors and beneficiaries. To that end, the reduction of illiteracy rate among the population and the generalisation of schooling are essential prerequisites, as is the digital coverage of all regions of the country and the facilitation of access for all inhabitants to the various Internet networks available. This is all the more true now that all economies are moving towards greater dematerialisation, in parallel with the accelerated development of artificial intelligence in recent years. Therefore, the use of highly qualified personnel in all these areas has become a development imperative. However, Morocco is all the more lacking in relevant profiles since in the last two decades it has seen many of its university graduates (civil engineers, industrialists, computer scientists, programmers, etc.) leave.

At the same time, both higher education and scientific research have in recent years suffered significant losses of teachers/researchers because of, first, the voluntary departure operation that took place in 2005 and, then with the non-replacement of trainers and research staff who have retired in recent years. Paradoxically, and even in a situation of shortage of relevant human resources, the higher education system has set itself the strategic objective of synchronizing its training with the country's growth dynamics. Such an adaptation calls for ever greater overture internationally because of the new profiles required by the large multinationals established in the national territory, the large public offices, the headquarters of banks or the large SMEs (NICTs – New Information and Communication Technologies) which target professionals with proven experience in globalized exchange networks.

With regard to the agro-industrial sector – whose agricultural component employs nearly 45% of the working population nationwide, and contributes barely up to 14% of GDP – a skill needs identification study was conducted in 2017. This study was conducted with a representative sample of 110 companies²⁵. The skills needs identified by channel²⁶ for this sector were then as shown in the table below :

Table 4: Distribution of the total annual workforce of employment needs between 2017 and 2021 in the agri-industry sector by channel.²⁷

| Channel | Projections | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|--------|
| | 2017 | 2021 |
| Fish Industry | 70.534 | 83,140 |
| Fruits and Vegetables Industry | 17.475 | 20,598 |
| Dairy industry | 16.193 | 19,087 |
| Cereal transformation | 12.833 | 15,127 |

²⁵ These are Maritime Fisheries; Crafts; Tourism; Agriculture; Metallurgic, Mechanical, and Electromechanical Industries (IMME); Construction; Transport; Logistics; Agri-Food; Automotive Industry; Administration, Management, Finance and Insurance; Commerce; Electronics Industry; Textile.

²⁶ Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, de la Formation Professionnelle, de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique, Étude sectorielle d'identification des besoins en compétences pour le secteur de l'agro-industrie, 2017.

²⁷ Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de la formation professionnelle, de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique. Étude sectorielle d'identification des besoins en compétences pour le secteur de l'agro-industrie, 2017.



| | | |
|---|----------------|----------------|
| Biscuits, confectionery and chocolate manufacturers | 10.189 | 12,010 |
| Drinks industry | 8.384 | 9,882 |
| Fats and oils industry | 7.667 | 9,038 |
| Meat industry | 5.858 | 6,905 |
| Tea and coffee industry | 3.537 | 4,170 |
| Animal feed | 3.391 | 3,997 |
| Sugar industry | 2.343 | 2,761 |
| Condiments and seasonings | 1.835 | 2,162 |
| Various food industries | 1.523 | 1,795 |
| Tobacco industry | 1.504 | 1,773 |
| Grand total | 163.324 | 192,514 |

In reality, and regardless of the strategic or non-strategic nature of each sector of activity at the national level, the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC)²⁸ has developed its own survey to “monitor” the labour market. This survey is based on face-to-face interviews and aims to determine the recruitment plans of companies with the objective of making forecasts for required training.

Thus, for the year 2019,²⁹ this agency carried out a prospective monitoring study on the labour market. This was a quantitative survey of a sample of 8,000 companies³⁰. The projected employment needs collected by this study amount to 113.439 at the end of 2020. The automotive sector ranked as the leading provider of jobs, with 27% followed by the NICT/OFFSHORING sector (10%) with recurring offers for tele-operators. As for agriculture, forestry and fisheries, they occupy fourth place with 8% (with projections of needs dominated by low-skilled profiles).


Figure 6: Distribution (%) of provisional human resources needs by sector, ANAPEC 2019.³¹

²⁸The missions of ANEPAC are to prospect, to collect job offers from employers and to link job offer and demand.

²⁹ ANAPEC, Rapport sur l'étude de veille prospective sur le marché de l'Emploi, 2019.

³⁰ The sample is constituted according to the following stages: first of all, the growth sectors are identified in each region within the framework of the Regional Committee for Improving Employability (CRAM). Subsequently, a representative sample of enterprises is selected by the Sectoral Working Group (GTS), for each growth sector, and ANAPEC. This sample is selected from the directory of companies affiliated with the CNSS.

³¹ ANAPEC 2019.



Whatever the source of the data, and pending a comprehensive nationwide survey (e.g. by the High Commissioner for Planning), the various sectors/sub-sectors and other development plans/programmes mentioned above - considered as equally strategic - already appear to require significant numbers and quality of human resources. However, as clearly indicated by the two characteristics of the labour market mentioned above, these do not appear to be quantitatively or qualitatively sufficient in Morocco.

The competent authorities have therefore opted, from time to time, for various methods and initiatives to reduce this need and to enable Moroccan companies, inter alia, to increase the added value of their activities and to keep pace – as much as possible – in terms of competition and competitiveness both on the domestic market and internationally.

These methods include initial training in national institutions of higher education and vocational training; continuing training in production units; or internships abroad and also facilitating access to employment for foreign migrants living in Morocco or attracting qualified human resources from abroad, in particular the skilled resources among the MRAs. This was the essence of the purpose of the three initiatives, Tokten, Fincome and Maghribcom, discussed earlier in this paper. In fact, RMA skills can represent, under certain conditions (to which it will be timely to return in the second phase of this project), a solution to this problem by meeting the needs for professional qualifications not generated today by the national training system where the country has not been able to prevent/reduce departure abroad.

The community of MRAs with ever more successful career profiles, which are, a priori, economically and socially well integrated in their host country, could partially meet these needs. In other words, given that most Moroccan skills living abroad are now found in OECD countries, notably France, but also in Belgium, Germany, North America or Japan and South Korea, it is clear that they have normally adhered to the modes of production and organisation of the structures in which they work. In this

sense, it is logical to raise here an important question, that of how these skills can contribute to national development projects and what their contribution can be to Moroccan companies, both public and private, or to the health and education/research sectors in Morocco.

And in fact, these skills - who are a large number compared to the entire Moroccan migrant community and also in relation to the number of skilled workers in Morocco itself - would provide great support to the latter sectors, contributing to the increase in their added value, as they would in one way or another strengthen national health and training/research systems. All this due to:

- Their scientific and technical expertise which is enriched and updated by a high global exposure to competitiveness;
- Their strong immersion in the norms, codes and values set up within an organizational framework (scientific, technical and ethical) that is more efficient and constantly concerned with innovation;
- Their conduct of business abroad, in accordance with international best practices;
- Their mastery of the global processes of multinational companies;
- Their presence in different markets that emit foreign direct investment and also innovative technologies;
- Their acquired qualifications and networks constituted inside and outside the companies and other production and/or research entities in which they are engaged;
- Their ability to adapt to novelty, openness and flexibility, acquired both during their training and by confronting the economic, social and human realities of the environments in which they operate and/or live.

A final word

The daunting question that now arises, once the needs and potential supply of Moroccan skills abroad have been identified, is what mechanism will the Moroccan economic and political actors use to seduce and attract these skills. This is the whole issue that we want to study in the remainder of this study by conducting field surveys and individual interviews with a representative sample of the said scientific and technical diaspora. It must be said that this question is at the heart of the problem and there is no magic recipe and no unambiguous answer, as we pointed out in the introduction to this report.

This problem must be tackled with seriousness, modesty and rigor in order, first, to get off the beaten track and propose a framework of disruptive analysis with a renewed approach, while avoiding, secondly, falling through classic and divisive analyses that sometimes criticize, at times rightly, the opportunism of the political authorities in the management of the diaspora, and sometimes blame the

diaspora itself for its lack of commitment or organization, and sometimes its inability to propose and carry out unifying projects, mobilisers for the development of their country of origin.

There is a need to digest the fact that public authorities have political agendas and that not all members of the diaspora are, by far, willing to collaborate in networks serving their country of origin. Based on this, our thinking in this work will first be based on verifiable facts and findings. This would be enabled by the qualitative surveys and fieldwork that we plan to carry out in the second phase of this project.

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Annex 1: Number of Moroccans residing abroad by host country in 2018³²

| Host country | workforce | Percentage % by country |
|----------------------|-----------|-------------------------|
| France | 1.238.815 | 28.4 |
| Spain | 906.507 | 20.8 |
| Italy | 659.230 | 15.1 |
| Belgium | 396.743 | 9.1 |
| The Netherlands | 308.956 | 7.1 |
| USA | 250.241 | 5.7 |
| Germany | 163.228 | 3.7 |
| Canada | 74.983 | 1.7 |
| Saudi Arabia | 61.872 | 1.4 |
| Algeria | 53.700 | 1.2 |
| United Arab Emirates | 52.911 | 1.2 |
| Great Britain | 35.492 | 0.8 |
| Tunisia | 34.889 | 0.8 |
| Switzerland | 15.319 | 0.4 |
| Qatar | 11.116 | 0.3 |
| Sweden | 11.084 | 0.3 |
| Egypt | 9.066 | 0.2 |
| Norway | 8.203 | 0.2 |
| Kuwait | 5.469 | 0.1 |
| Turkey | 5.143 | 0.1 |
| Oman | 4.862 | 0.1 |
| Denmark | 3.819 | 0.1 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 3.818 | 0.1 |
| Ukraine | 3.545 | 0.1 |
| Bahrain | 3.419 | 0.1 |
| Jordan | 3.407 | 0.1 |
| Portugal | 3.257 | 0.1 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 3.192 | 0.1 |
| Russia | 3.188 | 0.1 |
| Mauritania | 3.036 | 0.1 |
| Greece | 3.025 | 0.1 |
| Finland | 2.368 | 0.1 |
| Austria | 2.172 | 0.05 |
| Gabon | 1.907 | 0.04 |

³² Direction des Affaires Consulaires et Sociale (DACs), 2018.



| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|
| Syria | 1.725 | 0.04 |
| Lebanon | 1.646 | 0.04 |
| South Africa | 1.515 | 0.03 |
| Ireland | 1.350 | 0.03 |
| Romania | 868 | 0.02 |
| Japan | 855 | 0.02 |
| Australia | 777 | 0.02 |
| China | 675 | 0.02 |
| Brazil | 620 | 0.01 |
| Malaysia | 605 | 0.01 |
| Poland | 553 | 0.01 |
| Palestine | 478 | 0.01 |
| Mali | 421 | 0.01 |
| Czech Republic | 402 | 0.01 |
| South Korea | 399 | 0.01 |
| Congo | 390 | 0.01 |
| Indonesia | 355 | 0.01 |
| Guinea | 309 | 0.01 |
| Burkina Faso | 286 | 0.01 |
| Sudan | 278 | 0.01 |
| Mexico | 275 | 0.01 |
| Niger | 268 | 0.01 |
| Hungary | 230 | 0.01 |
| Iraq | 198 | 0.005 |
| Dominican Republic | 190 | 0.004 |
| Thailand | 190 | 0.004 |
| Madagascar | 150 | 0.003 |
| Chile | 135 | 0.003 |
| Bulgaria | 133 | 0.003 |
| Argentina | 130 | 0.003 |
| Ghana | 114 | 0.003 |
| Pakistan | 98 | 0.002 |
| Peru | 85 | 0.002 |
| Cameroon | 84 | 0.002 |
| India | 81 | 0.002 |
| Serbia | 78 | 0.002 |
| Ethiopia | 76 | 0.002 |
| Angola | 64 | 0.001 |
| Vietnam | 54 | 0.001 |
| Colombia | 53 | 0.001 |
| Mozambique | 52 | 0.001 |
| Kenya | 49 | 0.001 |
| Nigeria | 45 | 0.001 |



| | | |
|-------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Croatia | 40 | 0.001 |
| Benin | 23 | 0.001 |
| Guatemala | 17 | 0.0004 |
| Kazakhstan | 10 | 0.0002 |
| Rwanda | 9 | 0.0002 |
| Bangladesh | 8 | 0.0002 |
| Paraguay | 8 | 0.0002 |
| Tanzania | 5 | 0.0001 |
| Central Africa Republic | 2 | 0.00005 |
| Panama | 2 | 0.00005 |
| Total | 4365445 | 100.0 |

Annex 2: Lexicon

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Weather hazards | Climatic variation In the Moroccan case, reference is made mainly to changes in rainfall levels between years and during the same year. As Morocco is a country whose economic activity relies heavily on agriculture (although gross domestic product of agriculture accounts for only about 12% of the country's total GDP), when it rains heavily and regularly during a year, GDP grows strongly, and when rainfall is not present, the level of annual growth is rather limited. |
| An active person | A person in the labour force (see below). |
| An active working person | A person who is employed An unemployed person is an active person (part of the labour force) but who is looking for a job. |
| Skills | High to very high qualifications which enable an increase in the added value created by an economy, or significantly improve the living conditions and environment of a population |
| Diaspora | Basically, the notion of diaspora concerned the state of dispersion of people or a community. This concept has now been extended to migration to refer to the result of this dispersion, namely the members of the community who are scattered in several countries or regions. |
| Intermediate diploma | A diploma attesting to an educational level between the baccalaureate and a university degree or a diploma from a higher institute. It may be, for example, a diploma awarded by a vocational training institute. |
| Emigrant | Anyone leaving their country of birth to move to another. |
| Official flows | These are flows through formal channels, namely banks (in the form of a transfer), post office (in the form of a money order) or specialised money transfer agencies. |
| Informal flows | These are transfers that use informal or traditional networks based on family, community or commercial ties. These flows are very often not taken into account by the national accounts of the recipient countries. |
| An immigrant | A person living in a country that is not his own. |
| Selective migration | As opposed to “endured” immigration (right of asylum, irregular immigration), selective or “chosen” immigration consists of making the |

authorization to immigrate conditional on national or supranational criteria, giving preference to skilled workers, who are supposed to be the most useful to the economy and to various sectors of activity and life of the host countries.

Labour force

The labour force (working population) is defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the population of working age (15 years and over, up to the retirement age retained by each country) seeking employment.

Unstructured sector

Informal sector of the economy



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