


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Public attitudes on migration: rethinking how people perceive migration

An analysis of existing opinion polls
in the Euro-Mediterranean region

Developed for ICMPD under the EU funded programme
EUROMED Migration IV by the Observatory of Public
Attitudes to Migration - Migration Policy Centre, European
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<http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/opam/about/>
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The presented study includes active links to sources and references that are accessible online.

Readers are strongly encouraged to consult the soft version of this study to access all proper links.

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Executive Summary

The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) commissioned the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) of the European University Institute to provide this report in early 2018, based on the work of the MPC's Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration (OPAM). This built on the insight and recommendations of the first EuroMed Migration Communications Study—'How does the media on both sides of the Mediterranean report on migration?' This second study aims to:

- **Offer a better understanding of public attitudes to migration** in 17 selected countries on both sides of the Mediterranean;¹
- **Attempt to explain why attitudes to migration are what they are** — with an emphasis on the role of media. The report both summarises previous findings and provides new analyses;
- **Provide recommendations on how to communicate on migration** in a non-polarising manner.

A better understanding of public attitudes to migration

The report includes a comprehensive data inventory of all extant quantitative evidence of attitudes to immigration and emigration in all 17 countries since 2010. For the Southern Partner Countries (SPCs), this includes 35 datasets. In Europe, where such surveys are considerably more common and exclusively focused on immigration, sources were divided into three groups: international academic surveys; national academic surveys; and commercial polling companies.

The key findings about what attitudes to migration are include the following:

- **In Europe, contrary to popular belief, attitudes to immigration are not becoming more negative. Rather, they are notably stable** and, in recent years, have become more positive.
- What emerges unambiguously is that **Europeans everywhere want immigrants who are able to assimilate socially**, labour market issues like professional qualifications are considered important but less so, while racial and religious backgrounds are considered unimportant.
- **Unlike preferences about immigration, the perceived importance of the issue of immigration is volatile and has risen sharply across Europe.** As such, it will likely continue to dominate national and European elections discourses in 2019. In this context, voters most concerned about immigration—who often already held anti-immigration attitudes—are more likely to vote for anti-immigration parties, even when these parties do not align with other issues they believe in.
- **Europeans increasingly associate the EU with not enough control at external borders, though far less so than with freedom of movement.** At the same time, major Southern host countries must contend with persistently critical domestic attitudes towards the hosted displaced populations of concern.

Based on the data available it emerges that **attitudes to immigration tend to be more negative in the southern Mediterranean** than in Europe, though here there are important geographical differences. In the Middle East, Lebanese, Palestinian and Jordanian citizens tend to more strongly prefer not living next to foreigners. In the North of Africa, by contrast, this preference is weaker.

¹ Algeria, Austria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Spain, Sweden, and Tunisia – mirroring the first study's sample and allowing for progressively deeper insight.

Comparatively, the Germans, Spanish and Swedes tend to report significantly lower rates.


Even starker is the divide when respondents are asked whether employers should give priority to national citizens over immigrants. Significant majorities of Jordanians, Egyptians, Moroccans and Tunisians answer in the affirmative, whereas only a slight majority of Spaniards and minorities of Germans and Swedes do likewise. **On emigration, there is less national variation.** Egyptians, Lebanese, Palestinians, Moroccans, Jordanians, Algerians and Tunisians all lay somewhere between 15% and 33%. There is a lack of data on EU member states in this regard.

Explaining attitudes to migration

The report explains variation in attitudes to migration by summarising the key scientific findings of the academic literature and by providing new, econometric analyses of the most up-to-date data, both of attitudes to emigration and immigration across the 17 countries.

The key extant theoretical explanations for attitudes to immigration were classified as following:

- **Media effects:** Numerous studies have shown that, in general, the framing of the media affects public attitudes to immigration. In particular, there is evidence that negative stories provoke a perception of a threat to one's group. This effect is stronger in regions with smaller existing immigrant populations. Further, stories emphasising humanitarian plight lead to increased support for provision of services to immigrants, and perhaps more permissive policies. Images of immigrants engaging in common human activities increase positivity to migrant groups. However, evidence remains mixed, not least because of the difficulties in ruling out 'reverse causality'. Furthermore, scientific evidence has shown that media effects on attitudes weaken as an issue becomes more salient and well known—itsself partially a function of media attention—, after which time the attitudes becomes a fairly ingrained aspect of the individual's political outlook. Crucially, one can expect different media messages to have varying effects on individuals who have differing 'human values'.
- **Economic competition:** According to this group of explanations, individual attitudes to immigration are driven by both personal economic interests and the economic interests of the group(s) with which the individual identifies. However, the evidence for actual, rather than perceived, economic competition causing anti-immigration attitudes is limited.
- **Contact and group threat theories:** Both predict that individual attitudes to immigration are the result of short-term interaction with immigrants, but with opposite theorised effects. Contact theory predicts that some individuals hold misconceptions about immigrants and that contact lessens those misconceptions and thus makes individuals more pro-immigration.
- **Early life socialisation effects:** According to this group of explanations, certain types of early life socialisation—such as peer group, area of origin and education—lead to latent political values, which then can be activated by political exposure and events. These are contrary to later life socialisation effects—like jobs, contact with immigrants, media and political cues—that are expected to have less long-lasting impacts.
- **Psychological effects:** Psychological explanations for attitudes to immigration have focussed on the individual's personality, values and identity. The correlation between immigration attitudes and other attitudes has increased over time. 'Human values' remain some of the strongest predictors of attitudes to immigration, with a desire for universalism leading to positivity and a desire for conformity, tradition and security all leading to negativity.



The funnel of causality of attitudes to immigration

These various explanations can be arranged by proximity in the following 'funnel of causality':

The explanations for variation in **attitudes to emigration** were organised into the following groups:

- **Media effects:** Exposure to media, such as via the introduction of television, has been shown to increase the propensity to migrate. The existence of media from the destination country in the country of origin has been shown to increase the propensity to emigrate to that country and the success of the emigrants upon arrival. Social media has also been shown to increase positivity to emigration by expanding information flows, increasing logistical capacity and creating real life networks. Far less developed are investigations into how portrayal of emigration and emigrants in origin countries affects attitudes to emigration.
- **Political and economic context:** The quality of the country's democratic system, and its ability to fulfil basic governance responsibilities – as measured using perceptions of neighbourhood safety, perceptions of government corruption, reported crime victimhood, reported corruption victimhood, perceptions of government efficacy and satisfaction with democracy – affect the degree to which an individual reports considering emigration.
- **Socio-demographics:** These include having certain characteristics such as being male, young and relatively well educated, as well as urbanity; and subjective personal economic dissatisfaction. Findings at the macro-level, indicate that education increases the propensity to emigrate in developing countries. Quality of life and life satisfaction measures have also repeatedly shown to be negatively associated with one's propensity to emigrate.

- **Existing migrant networks:** Individuals are more likely to be desirous of emigration when they are aware of existing networks for emigrants in a destination country. Existing migrant networks provide logistical and social support to would be migrants, information flows and decrease perceived risk, with geographical proximity increasing effects.

From this review, eight testable hypotheses regarding the formation of attitudes to immigration and two regarding the formation of attitudes to emigration are postulated and then tested using advanced econometric modelling. The most crucial findings are that (1) higher levels of media consumption accentuate attitudinal differences to immigration; (2) intimate contact with immigrants leads to more positive attitudes to immigration, whereas non-intimate contact with immigrants leads to more negative attitudes; (3) national rates of education, higher GDP per capita, lower unemployment, stronger states, less reported nationalism, higher patriotism, less anti-immigration media messaging are more pro-immigration. For emigration, (1) being male, single, unemployed and educated increase one's likelihood of emigrating and (2) individuals that use social media and have access to traditional media have positive attitudes to emigration was supported.

How to communicate in a manner that does not drive polarisation

Based on the above analysis, the following findings were formulated:

1. **Media matters.** Attitudes to migration vary strongly between individuals according to the type of media they access, even when controlling for other issues.
2. **National challenges demand national solutions.** Countries may develop guidelines for responsible and sensitive coverage of migration.
3. **Consensus is more likely to emerge when discussing more specific types of migration,** this should take into account the migrants' background, host community needs, and the means available to implement a consensus based policy.
4. **Hard facts alone do not convince.** Individuals have different values. To be persuasive and inclusive, different values should be considered when making value judgements on migration, not just economic figures, for example.
5. **Simplification of migration related issues should be avoided.** Migration should be reported not as a singular, bi-polar issue but as a nuanced, complex one.
6. **Nuanced, balanced communication can help avoid polarisation.** While there are some individuals who are very pro- and very anti-migration, most individuals are in the middle. By adopting polemic language, they are forced to pick a side.

Media reports that frame migration in the value-and attitudinal-based terms that align highly with pre-existing dimensions of political conflict are likely to activate pro- and anti-immigration attitudes. For example, if a story on immigration assumes that readers are purely motivated by the positive effects of immigration in terms of the human values of universalism ('equal rights for all') or power (e.g. economic growth) while ignoring or diminishing the importance of conservative preoccupations (typically based on valuing tradition, conformity and security) such as by encouraging citizens to 'celebrate diversity', this will alienate certain groups.

Introduction

Building on the first EuroMed Migration Communications Study—'How does the media on both sides of the Mediterranean report on migration?'—this study has three main objectives. First, it seeks to offer a better understanding of public attitudes to migration on both sides of the Mediterranean by identifying what these attitudes are and what quantitative sources on attitudes to migration are available across 17 selected countries. Second, it seeks to explain variation in attitudes to migration across these countries—in other words, why are attitudes as they are?—with a special emphasis on the role of media. This is done both by considering and summarising previous findings in the academic literature and by providing new, sophisticated econometric modelling using the latest data from across the EuroMed region. Third, based on our findings, we provide recommendations to government communications experts, and media professionals on how to communicate on migration in a manner that does not drive polarisation.

The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (hereafter, ICMPD) commissioned the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) of the European University Institute to carry out this report in early 2018, based on the work and expertise of the MPC's Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration. In line with the key objectives of the study, the ICMPD requested a study that would provide three key results built on a number of deliverables. The three expected results were the following:

1. **Better understanding is generated** of what polling information on public attitudes to migration exist in the region, with a view to understanding the methodologies, questions and analytics applied, as well as the gaps that are present.
2. **A hypothesis is formulated and tested** in a limited scope, linking how migration related topics are reported, with a view to informing future larger scale polling efforts.
3. **Recommendations are developed,** for governmental communication experts, and media professionals on how to communicate on migration in a manner that does not drive polarisation.

The ICMPD's specific deliverables, as agreed with the MPC, were the following:

- Overview of existing opinion polls on, or related to, migration in the same 17 country, SPCs and EU Member State, sample as the first study¹, since 2010;

¹ Algeria, Austria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Spain, Sweden, and Tunisia.

- Overview of methodologies / approaches used in EU and SPC opinion polls towards / related to migration;
- Main differences and similarities between attitudes across countries, and preliminary hypotheses on what this could mean;
- Changes of / evolution of attitudes towards migration over time, in EU and SPCs;
- The key drivers of attitudes towards migration in earlier polls;
- Analysis of how migration-related themes / issues were covered / approached;
- Recommendations for policy makers, governmental communication experts, and media professionals on how to communicate on migration in a manner that does not drive polarisation.

We at the MPC are confident that the above results have been achieved and the deliverables have been delivered in this study.

We start by offering an overview of what are attitudes to migration in the EuroMediterranean region. We show that, in Europe at least, contrary to popular belief, attitudes to immigration are not becoming more negative. Rather, they are notably stable and, in recent years, have become more positive. We also show that there are important national differences but that these national differences are reduced to some extent when different types of immigration are specified. Indeed, Europeans everywhere want immigrants who are able to assimilate socially. Practical issues like work are considered important but less so, while racial and religious backgrounds are widely considered unimportant.

Whereas attitudes, in terms of favourability, to immigration in Europe are stable, the perceived importance of immigration as an issue has risen sharply across Europe in recent years and we should expect it to dominate national and European elections in 2019. This benefits explicitly anti-immigration parties who, in such a climate, are able to tempt social conservatives away from their usual parties because of the salience of immigration. Europeans increasingly associate the EU with not enough control at external borders and simultaneously with freedom of movement.

Perhaps surprising to some is that attitudes to immigration tend to be more negative in the southern Mediterranean than in Europe, though here there are major geographical differences. In west Asia, around four-in-ten Lebanese, Palestinian and Jordanian citizens would not like to have an immigrant as a neighbour. In north Africa, by contrast, less than three-in-ten Algerians, two-in-ten Tunisians and one-in-ten Moroccans answer similarly. Comparatively, the proportions of Germans, Spanish and Swedes who give this response are 21%, 8% and 4% respectively. We see an even more stark European-Southern Mediterranean divide when respondents are asked whether employers should give priority to national citizens over immigrants. Very large majorities of Jordanians, Egyptians, Moroccans and Tunisians answer in the affirmative, whereas only a slight majority of Spaniards and minorities of Germans and Swedes do likewise. Finally, on emigration, we find less national variation. Whereas 16% of Egyptians and 33% of Lebanese express a willingness to emigrate, the proportions of Palestinians, Moroccans, Jordanians, Algerians and Tunisians all lay somewhere between these two extremes.

We then move on to outlining the various sources of evidence on attitudes to migration in our 17 countries of interest. We give the title, dates, countries, sample sizes, questions, languages and sources of 35 datasets on attitudes to migration in the southern Mediterranean. In Europe, where such surveys are considerably more common, we divide evidence on attitudes to migration into three groups: international academic surveys; national academic surveys; and commercial polling companies. Of the first group, we outline in full the questions on attitudes to, almost exclusively, immigration in these high quality surveys. We then outline the various methodologies by which evidence on attitudes to migration can be gathered, considering different types of surveys and experiments.

Having established the major trends in attitudes to migration in the EuroMediterranean and performed an exhaustive investigation of the sources of evidence for this information, we begin to offer an explanation for variation in these attitudes. We start with existing explanations of variation in attitudes to immigration, which we summarise as: economic competition; contact and group threat theories; early life socialisation effects; later life socialisation effects; psychological explanations; and media effects. We also offer a short critique of the state of the literature. We summarise explanations for variation in attitudes to emigration into the following groups: political and economic context; socio-demographics; existing migrant networks; and media effects. From this literature review, we produce nine testable hypotheses for how attitudes to immigration are produced and two hypotheses for how attitudes to emigration are formed.

Our analysis test these hypotheses. We outline our sources of data both for attitudes to migration and for the myriad of variables used to explain them in our models. Our key findings for attitudes to immigration are the following:

- Controlling for a wealth of socio-demographic variables, increased internet usage increases positivity towards immigration and immigrants.
- Intimate contact with immigrants (such as friendship or working together) increases positivity to immigrants.
- Living in a more economically prosperous country and in a more educated country increases positivity to immigrants.
- Living in a weaker state, as measured by perceived corruption and lower trust in institutions, decreases positivity to immigration.
- Higher levels of nationalism are associated with greater opposition to immigration.
- Countries in which the media express greater negativity towards immigration are associated with more negative attitudes to immigration.

For willingness to emigrate, we find the following:

- Being male, single, unemployed and highly educated all increase the chance of wanting to emigrate.
- Use of traditional media and especially social media—in increasing order, Facebook, Twitter and particularly Instagram—all increase ones chance of wanting to emigrate.

Finally, we use the above trends, findings from the literature and our own analysis to produce some key recommendations for governmental communications experts:

- Migration should be reported not as a singular, bi-polar issue but as a nuanced, complexed issue.
- Consensuses are more likely when discussing more specific types of migration.
- While there are some individuals who are very pro- and very anti-migration, most individuals are in the middle. By adopting polemic language, they are forced to pick a side.
- Individuals have different values. To be persuasive and inclusive, all different values—from universalism to tradition, security and conformity—should be considered when making value judgements on migration, not just economic figures, for example.
- Countries may develop guidelines for responsible and sensitive coverage of migration.
- Media matters. Attitudes to migration vary strongly between individuals according to the type of media they access, even when controlling for other issues.
- Media reports that frame migration in the value-based and attitudinal-based terms that align highly with pre-existing dimensions of political conflict are likely to activate pro- and anti-immigration attitudes most strongly and irrespective of the more nuanced reality of the story. For example, if a story on immigration assumes that readers are purely motivated by the positive

effects of immigration in terms of the human values of universalism (equal rights for all) or power (e.g. economic growth) while ignoring or diminishing the importance of conservative preoccupations (typically based on valuing tradition, conformity and security) such as by emphasising the diversity of immigrants, this may lead to a conservative backlash, in spite of conservatives and moderates often being sympathetic to more benevolence-based arguments.

What are attitudes to migration in the EuroMediterranean region today?

We start by giving a broad idea of what attitudes to migration in the EuroMediterranean today are and what we can make of the key noticeable trends. Identifying and describing attitudes to migration is not a simple matter. First, human attitudes in general are abstract, rather than material, and so any measurement of them is bound to be highly qualified. We can overcome this, to some extent, by using a variety of sources and methodologies, as well as making comparisons while holding such sources and methodologies constant to examine trends. Second, migration is a broad subject matter; and not only in terms of the division between immigration and emigration. Attitudes to immigration alone can be divided into attitudes towards immigrants, towards immigration policy; to what are the perceived effects of immigration; towards who should and should not be admitted as an immigrant; as well as more fundamentally to how important immigration is as an issue. Because emigration tends to, these days, be less of a pressing political issue, the primary attitude to emigration of interest is the individual's propensity, willingness or desire to emigrate—a prospective personal behaviour, rather than a political attitude *per se*.

No data source, that we are aware of, covers all of the 17 countries of interest in this study simultaneously. Fortunately, each of the countries is studied in some study that also allows for comparison with a significant number of other relevant countries. We start by looking at attitudes to immigration in Europe, the area for which there is by far the most extant data and research. In Figure 1, we see the percentage of citizens in eight European countries, as well as Israel, who report that they wanted 'few' or 'no' immigrants, by type of immigrant, between 2002 and 2016. A number of obvious trends immediately become apparent. In every country, a significantly smaller proportion of the population are opposed to immigration by the same race or ethnicity than those who are opposed to non-Europeans or those of a different race. Second, the levels of opposition to immigration vary considerably by country, with Spain and Sweden reporting negligible opposition while Hungary, Israel and, when reported, Greece showing high levels. Third, in a number of countries—France, Germany, Israel, Spain and Sweden—opposition to immigration is falling, while in Austria and Hungary it is fairly level. Most trends are secular rather than there being high volatility in attitudes, which we can conclude are fairly stable, with greater variation between countries than within them over time.






Figure 1. % wanting 'few' or 'no' admission of different types of immigrants, as opposed to 'some' or 'many'.

Source: European Social Survey, 2002-2016.






Figure 3. % of respondents reporting that immigration is one of the top two issues affecting their country and the EU.

Source: Eurobarometer, 2005-2018






Figure 2. % feel negative to immigrants from other EU member states and non-EU member states.

Source: Eurobarometer, 2014-2018

When we look at more recent data on immigrants, rather than immigration, between 2014 and 2018 in all of the nine European countries of interest to this study, as well as the EU28 as a whole, we see even more obvious trends. As shown in Figure 2, in every country, and across the EU, those reporting feeling negativity towards EU immigrants has fallen. In all but two, Hungary and Sweden, negativity towards non-EU immigrants has also fallen. Again, despite the source of data being different, we see Spain and Sweden as consistently reporting the lowest negativity, and Greece and Hungary reporting the highest.

The sheer stability of attitudes to both immigration and immigrants, as displayed above, makes using these variables as explanations for the pronounced changes to European party systems in recent years—particularly the rise of so called 'populist radical right' parties—implausible. Instead, we must look towards other variables. Prior work by researchers at the Observatory of Public Attitudes has pinpointed one: the salience, or 'perceived importance', of immigration as a policy matter. When immigration is considered highly salient, voters with pre-existing, latent anti-immigration attitudes are more likely to switch their vote to such parties than when economic or social issue are considered more important, when those same voters will stick with parties they consider more trustworthy. As shown in Figure 3, in all nine of the European countries of interest to this study, as well as across the EU as a whole, the salience of immigration—both when respondents are asked about what are the most important issues affecting their country and the EU—has experienced a sharp uptick. Interestingly, there is a slight tendency for more voters to see immigration as an important issue affecting the EU than their country.

Moving on from over-time trends, we can examine European attitudes to migration by what Europeans see as important qualifications for immigration. The pattern, shown in Figure 4, is fairly clear. Around 80% of Europeans see commitment to the national way of life as important (between 6 and 10 on the 0-10 scale). Similarly, around 75% see the ability to speak the local language as important, while around 70% see having relevant work skills and high education qualifications as important, respectively. By contrast,




Figure 4. 'To what extent are the following important qualifications for accepting or excluding immigrants?'
Source: European Social Survey, 2014

less than 25% see coming from a Christian background as important and less than 15% see being white as important.

What do Europeans see as the effects of immigration? As we can see in Figure 5, when asked to place the effect of immigration on each area of public life—the national economy, culture, quality of life, jobs, government accounts and crime—Europeans clearly distinguish between the six. Crime is the only facet in which a majority of Europeans see the effect of immigration as being negative—around 54% place the effect between 0 and 4 on the 0-10 spectrum. Conversely, the effect of immigration on culture is the only area in which a majority of Europeans see the effect of immigration as positive—around 54% placing its effect between 6 and 10 on the 0-10 spectrum. Europeans are more ambiguous on the other effects—with the economy perceived as being most positively affected and the government's budget seen as most negatively, with the effects on jobs for native workers and quality of life being in the middle. This supports previous research in that, on the one hand, individuals are most concerned about the effect of immigration on their safety and on the sustainability of rapid demographic transformation on government budgets and, on the other, we know that Europeans most concerned by immigration are those who value security most highly in their day to day lives.

Since 2005, the Eurobarometer has asked Europeans of every member states what they associated the EU with, with multiple answers being permitted. Two of these answers relate to migration: the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU, and a loss of control of external borders. Both responses assumed a downward trend during the financial crisis but increased significantly thereafter. Crucially, however, at all times far more Europeans associated the EU with free movement (between 41% and 52%) than with a loss of control of borders (between 12% and 25%).




Figure 5. 'Do you believe that immigrants have a good or bad effect on the following issues?'

European Social Survey, 2014

However, the percentage responding 'not enough control at external borders' varies greatly by member state, with just 12% of Spaniards giving this response and 48% of Austrians doing so, as show in Figure 7. Such national differences would likely scupper any pan-European consensus unless there is a serious change in the perception of the EU's ability to control its border.




Figure 6. 'What does the EU mean to you personally?'

Source: Eurobarometer, 2005-2017; pan-EU; multiple answers possible




Figure 7. 'What does the EU mean to you personally?' Percentage responding 'Not enough control at external borders'.
Source: Eurobarometer, Nov 2017; multiple answers possible

To what extent do Europeans wish to see discrimination between citizens and immigrants in the labour market? In Figure 8 we see the results to the question 'when should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits and services?' in 14 countries that were surveyed both in 2008 and 2016 by the European Social Survey. The available responses were 1) 'Immediately on arrival', 2) 'After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked', 3) 'Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year', 4) 'Once they have become a [country] citizen', 5) 'They should never get the same rights'. The countries are placed in descending order according to the proportion in 2008 who responded either that immigrants should only receive social benefits once they become citizens or that they never should—i.e. the proportion of the population who believe that labour market participation should not endow immigrants with equal rights. In both 2008 and 2016, Slovenia and the Czech Republic were the only countries in which a majority (in both cases very slim) of citizens gave one of these two responses in both 2008 and 2016. In both years, a majority of citizens of Finland, Great Britain, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, France, Ireland and Switzerland responded that labour market participation or less was sufficient to receive social benefits. This was also the case in Estonia in 2016 and the Netherlands in 2008. In terms of change over the eight years, in 11 of the 14 countries, the proportion of respondents saying that labour market participation or less was sufficient to receive social benefits increased. The only exceptions were Czechia, the Netherlands and Poland. Overall, there is a geographical trend, with CEEC countries more likely to be desirous of restrictions on social benefits, though this trend is not absolute (see the Netherlands and Finland).

What about attitudes to immigration in the southern Mediterranean? As we can see from Figure 9, the percentage who would not like to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbours tends to be higher here than in Europe. In particular, in west Asia—Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan—around four-in-ten share this fairly anti-immigrant sentiment, possibly reflecting the geo-political instability of the region. In north Africa, slightly less, three-in-ten, feel the same in Algeria, whereas only 19% and 11% respectively report that they would not like an immigrant as a neighbour in Tunisia and Morocco respectively. By contrast,




Figure 8. 'When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services?'
Source: European Social Survey, 2008, 2016




Figure 9: % would not like to have as neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers.
Source: World Values Survey 2010-2014

in Germany, Spain and Sweden the percentages are 19%, 8% and 4% respectively.

When we look to employment chauvinism—the belief that nationals should be prioritised for jobs over immigrants—we see even greater regional disparities. Large majorities across the four southern Mediterranean countries—Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia—report this sentiment, likely reflecting the greater problems of unemployment in recent years. This would also explain why Spain, usually a relatively pro-immigration country by most metrics, reports a majority with this view. By contrast, 'only' 41% of Germans and 14% of Swedes feel the same.

Finally, we look at the basic descriptive statistics of our key attitude to emigration variable—desire to emigrate across the southern Mediterranean. Here we see less variation, suggesting that country-level factors are less important than they are in




Figure 10: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants (% respondents picking "agree").

Source: World Values Survey 2010-2014

determining of other variables of interest. The two extremes are Lebanon, where a third of respondents would like to emigrate, and Egypt, where just 16% feel this way. The other countries of interest—Palestine, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia—all report between 22% and 28% on this metric. As we show later in this study, the education profile of Lebanon is a strong explanation for its outlier status, while other non-varying demographics—such as gender and to an extent age—help explain the relatively flat distribution of desire to emigrate across the region.




Figure 11: % in each country expressing a desire to emigrate.

Source: Arab Barometer, 2016-2017

What evidence exists on attitudes to migration in the EuroMediterranean region?

Overview of existing surveys examining public attitudes to migration in the Southern Mediterranean and typology of questions asked

Note: Full list of existing surveys available in Appendix 1, including title of survey, dates, countries, populations surveyed, questions of interest, language and source

Overall, we have located 35 surveys that measured attitudes to immigration and/or emigration amongst the eight Southern Partner Countries since 2010. These are a mix of commercial polling companies such as Ipsos Mori and Gallup and international academic surveys such as the Arab Barometer, the European Social Survey (for Israel) and the World Values Survey, as well as a number of country specific, one-off surveys. These surveys generally rely on face-to-face interviews.

Surveys with questions regarding attitudes to emigration are generally confined to countries aside from Israel. These are: Egypt (8 surveys); Lebanon (6); Morocco (5); Palestine, Jordan and Tunisia (4 each); Algeria (3); and Israel (1). Surveys with questions regarding attitudes to immigration are divided by country as follows: Israel (13); Lebanon (9); Jordan (8); Morocco (5); Egypt (4); Tunisia (3); Algeria and Palestine (2 each).

Overview of existing surveys examining public attitudes to migration in Europe and typology of questions asked

In this section we turn to sources of evidence of attitudes to immigration in Europe. Because there are so many more surveys and polls in Europe, we can afford to be selective, unlike in the southern Mediterranean, for which we tried to be as comprehensive as possible. As such, we divide this section into three types of sources of evidence.

First, we look at all of the international, academic surveys. These tend to be face-to-face and very high quality, as well as being harmonised by country, allowing for greater comparability. On the other hand, the amount of planning and resources going into them makes them inflexible when trying to pick up short term contextual effects.

Second, we look at national, academic surveys. These are also of high quality but may be less internationally comparable. This may allow them to pick up certain country-specific issues, however, such as related to the national media. They also tend to be fairly irregular.

Third, the most regular sources of evidence are from commercial polling companies. They are also far more likely to directly deal with contextual and media (i.e. short term, newsworthy) issues. The downside is that they are often not comparable across countries and the source of the data (phone or internet surveys) is less high quality than face to face surveys. They also tend to be considerably shorter so the surveys offer less explanatory power.

European Social Survey 2002 - 2016

	Round 1 [2002]	Round 2 [2004]	Round 3 [2006]	Round 4 [2008]	Round 5 [2010]	Round 6 [2012]	Round 7 [2014]	Round 8 [2016]
Albania						●		
Austria	●	●	●	●	●		●	●
Belgium	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Bulgaria			●	●	●	●		
Croatia				●	●			
Cyprus			●	●	●	●		
Czech Republic	●	●		●	●	●	●	●
Denmark	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Estonia		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Finland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
France	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Germany	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Greece	●	●		●	●			
Hungary	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Iceland		●				●		●
Ireland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Israel	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Italy	●	●				●		●
Kosovo						●		
Latvia			●	●			●	
Lithuania				●	●	●	●	●
Luxembourg	●	●						
Netherlands	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Norway	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Poland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Portugal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Romania			●	●				
Russia			●	●	●	●		●
Slovakia		●	●	●	●	●		
Slovenia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Spain	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sweden	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Switzerland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Turkey		●		●				
Ukraine		●	●	●	●	●		
UK	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

European international academic surveys

1. European Social Survey

Source: European Social Survey

Language: English

Title of Survey: European Social Survey 2016

Dates: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016

Countries: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Spain and Sweden, as well as other European countries (varies by round, see on the left)

Population surveyed: over 1000 per country

Type of questions asked: core questions used in every wave:

- B38. Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here ?
- B39. How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?
- B40. How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?
- B41. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?
- B42. And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
- B43. Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

Two special rounds on immigration: Round 7 (2014) and Round 1 (2002):

Concept: Opposition to immigration

D4 (Included in core) Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? D5 (Included in core) How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? D6 Now, still using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the richer countries in Europe to come and live here? D7 And how about people from the poorer countries in Europe? D8 To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the richer countries outside Europe to come and live here? D9 (included in core) How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?

Concept: criteria for entry/exclusion

Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to D10 have good educational qualifications? D12 be able to speak [country]'s official language(s) D13 come from a Christian background? D14 be white? D16 have work skills that [country] needs? D17 be committed to the way of life in [country]?

Concept: realistic threat

Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Firstly D18 Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here D25 Using this card, would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs? D26 Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out? D27 (Included in core) Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?

Concept: symbolic threat

D28 (Included in core) And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people

Concept: security threat

D30 Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people

Concept: prejudice/social threat

And now thinking of people who have come to live in [country] from another country who are of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people. How much would you mind or not mind if someone like this. D36 was appointed as your boss? D37 married a close relative of yours?

Concept: discrimination

How good or bad are each of these things for a country? D45 A law against racial or ethnic discrimination in the workplace. D46 A law against promoting racial or ethnic hatred

Concept: attitudes to immigration policy

Using this card, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements. Firstly D40 It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions D43 Communities of people who have come to live here should be allowed to educate their children in their own separate schools if they wish

Concept: group size

D56 Out of every 100 people living in [country], how many do you think were born outside [country]?

Concept: symbolic threat

NEW 1 These days, I am afraid that [country] culture is threatened by ethnic minorities. NEW 2 Immigrants improve [country] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures

Concept: contact

We would now like to ask you a few questions about the people in your neighbourhood. By neighbourhood, we mean the area within 15-20 minutes walking distance from where you live. NEW 3 How often, if at all, do you mix socially with people from in your neighbourhood? Never, Very rarely, Sometimes, Quite often, Very often NEW 4 How often, if at all, do you have brief everyday encounters with people from, which might involve exchanging a couple of words, for example, in corner shops, buying a paper and so on? Never, Very rarely, Sometimes, Quite often, Very often The next few questions are about your friends. NEW 5 What proportion of your close friends are? None or very few, A few, About half, A lot, Almost all or all NEW 6 And how often, if at all, do you spend time with your friends from? Never, Very rarely, Sometimes, Quite often, Very often

Concept: attitudes to asylum seekers and Muslims

Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the following groups to come and live here? NEW 7 People seeking political asylum NEW 8 People coming from Muslim countries who wish to work in [country]

2. Eurobarometer

Source: Eurobarometer

Language: English

Title of Survey: Eurobarometer

Date: 1974-2017

Countries: EU28 plus candidate countries

Population surveyed: unknown

Type of questions asked: Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you.

Immigration of people from outside the EU

Immigration of people from other EU member states

What do you think are the two most important issues facing (YOU PERSONALLY / OUR COUNTRY / Europe) at the moment?

3. World Values Survey

Source: World Values Survey

Language: English

Title of Survey: European Values Survey

Date: Wave 6 2010-2014

Countries: Germany 2013; Poland 2012; Spain 2011; Sweden 2011

Population surveyed: 1000 per country

Type of questions asked: V46 When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants. (p. 12 of questionnaire) V39 (Do you agree) Would not like to have as neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers

4. International Social Survey Programme

Source: International Social Survey Programme

Language: English

Title of Survey: National Identity III – ISSP 2013 available [here](#)

Date: 2013

Countries: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, Sweden

Population surveyed: 1000-2000 per country

Type of question asked: Q9. Attitude towards immigrants (scale) a. Immigrants increase crime rates.

- b. Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY'S] economy
- c. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].
- d. Immigrants improve [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY] society by bringing new ideas and cultures.
- e. [COUNTRY'S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants.
- f. Legal immigrants to [COUNTRY] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizens.
- g. [COUNTRY] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.
- h. Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]

Q10. Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be... increased a lot o increased a little o remain the same as it is o reduced a little o reduced a lot? o Can't choose

Q11. Which of these statements about immigrants comes closest to your view: Immigrants should retain their culture of origin and not adopt [COUNTRY'S] culture. o Immigrants should retain their culture of origin and also adopt [COUNTRY'S] culture. o Immigrants should give up their culture of origin and adopt [COUNTRY'S] culture. o Can't Choose (pp. 6-7)

5. Transatlantic Trends

Source: Transatlantic Trends

Language: English

Title of Survey: Transatlantic trends

Date: 2011-13; 2014

Countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Greece

Population surveyed: 1000 per country

Type of question asked: Q26: Some people say that immigration is more of a problem for (COUNTRY). Others see it as more of an opportunity for (COUNTRY). Which comes closer to your point of view? Immigration is more of a problem for (COUNTRY)

Q4a: As you may know, according to official estimates, around XX percent of the COUNTRY population was born in another country. In your opinion, is this too many, a lot but not too many, or not many?

Q4b: Generally speaking, how do you feel about the number of people living in (COUNTRY) who were not born in COUNTRY? Are there too many, a lot but not too many, or too many?

Q9: I am now going to read a few statements that are sometimes heard about immigrants in general. Could you please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of them? 1: Immigrants take jobs away from native born (NATIONALITY) 4: Immigrants bring down the wages of (NATIONALITY) citizens

Q9:1: Immigrants take jobs away from native born (NATIONALITY)

QD3: How does the financial situation of your household compare with what it was 12 months ago? Got worse Got better or stayed the same

Q14: Now I am going to ask you about (In UK: social security benefits / in US, EU, and Canada: social benefits) available in COUNTRY. Can you please tell me whether access to each benefit should be available to NATIONALITY citizens only, available to NATIONALITY citizens and all legal immigrants, or available to NATIONALITY citizens and all immigrants, both legal and illegal? B.3: Access to healthcare (NOT ASKED IN THE US) Available to NATIONALITY citizens only Available to NATIONALITY citizens and all legal immigrants Available to NATIONALITY citizens and all immigrants, both legal and illegal

Q14: Now I am going to ask you about (In UK: social security benefits / in US, EU, and Canada: social benefits) available in COUNTRY. Can you please tell me whether access to each benefit should be available to NATIONALITY citizens only, available to NATIONALITY citizens and all legal immigrants, or available to NATIONALITY citizens and all immigrants, both legal and illegal? 1: Access to (In UK: state schools / all others: public schools) Available to NATIONALITY citizens only Available to NATIONALITY citizens and all legal immigrants Available to NATIONALITY citizens and all immigrants, both legal and illegal

QD2: In the past six months, would you say that the government in general has been doing a very good job, a good job, a poor job, or a very poor job? Very good / good job Q17: Thinking about the steps that have been taken to manage immigration, would you say that the government has been doing a very good job, a good job, a poor job, or a very poor job? Very good / good job Q20: Thinking about the steps that have been taken to integrate immigrants into NATIONALITY society, would you say that the government has been doing a very good job, a good job, a poor job, or a very poor job? Very good / good job

Q19: Some people think that the NATIONALITY government should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to COUNTRY each year. Others think that the European Union should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to each European Union country, including COUNTRY, each year. Which comes closer to your point of view? The NATIONALITY government should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to COUNTRY each year The European Union should decide how many immigrants are allowed to come to each European Union country, including COUNTRY, each year

Q7: Now I am going to read you a few statements that are sometimes heard about legal immigrants. Can you please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements? A.2: Legal immigrants increase crime in our society

Q11: Some people think that legal immigrants who come to (COUNTRY) to work should only be admitted temporarily and then be required to return to their country of origin. Others feel that they should be given the opportunity to stay permanently. Which comes closer to your point of view? They should be given the opportunity to stay permanently They should only be admitted temporarily and then be required to return to their country of origin It depends on the circumstances

Q7: Now I am going to read you a few statements that are sometimes heard about legal immigrants. Can you please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1: (SPLIT A: Legal / SPLIT B: Illegal) immigrants are a burden

on social services like schools and hospitals 2: (SPLIT A: Legal / SPLIT B: Illegal) immigrants increase crime in our society 5: (SPLIT A: Legal / SPLIT B: Illegal) immigrants are often exploited in the workplace

Q12: Thinking now about immigrants who are currently living in (COUNTRY) illegally, should they be required to return to their country of origin, or should they be given the opportunity to obtain legal status that allows them to stay here? They should be required to return to their country of origin They should be given the opportunity to obtain legal status that allows them to stay in (COUNTRY)

Q13: Thinking about policies that could be adopted in (COUNTRY) at the national level, to what extent do you support or oppose the following measures designed to reduce illegal immigration into (COUNTRY)? A.4: Making it easier for immigrants to legally enter (COUNTRY) to work and study

Q28: Generally speaking, how well do you think that (SPLIT A: Muslim immigrants / SPLIT B: immigrants) are integrating into NATIONALITY society?

Q28: Generally speaking, how well do you think that (SPLIT B: Immigrants / SPLIT C: Hispanic immigrants) are integrating into NATIONALITY society? Q29: And what about the (SPLIT B: Children of immigrants / SPLIT C: Children of Hispanic immigrants) who were born in COUNTRY? How well do you think they are integrating into NATIONALITY society?

Q29: And what about the (SPLIT A: Children of Muslim immigrants / SPLIT B: Children of immigrants) who were born in COUNTRY? How well do you think they are integrating into NATIONALITY society?

Q10a: Which of the following attributes do you think is the most important precondition to obtaining NATIONALITY citizenship (U.S. ONLY: American citizenship)? Sharing NATIONALITY cultural values Being able to speak NATIONAL LANGUAGE(S) Respecting NATIONALITY political institutions and laws

Q22: Some people think that legal immigrants should have the right to vote in local government elections. Others think that this right should be reserved for (NATIONALITY) citizens only. Which comes closer to your point of view? Legal immigrants should have the right to vote in local government elections

6. European Election Studies

Source: European Election Studies

Language: English

Title of Survey: European Election Studies

Date: 2009, 2014

Countries: EU28

Population surveyed: 1000 per country

Type of question asked: Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues. For each issue, we will present you with two opposite statements and we will ask your opinion about these two statements. We would like to ask you to position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that you 'fully agree with the statement at the top' and '10' means that you 'fully agree with the statement at the bottom.' Then if your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that describes your position best. 0 You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration 10 You are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration.

National surveys

In addition to international academic surveys, there are also a number of national surveys – typically centred around elections – that include multiple questions on attitudes to immigration. Some of these, particularly in Austria, Germany and Sweden, have accompanying surveys of the impact of media.

Table 1. National academic surveys

	Austria	Austrian National Election Study 2017.....To be released in April 2018 Austrian National Election Study 2013.....Multiple on attitudes AUTNES Manual Content Analysis of the Media Coverage: Actors and Issues Add-on.....Multiple on tone and occurrencesof media references to immigration
	France	2017 French National Election Study (10 waves).....Non-public
	Germany	The German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) 2013, 2017.....(see GESIS) German Social and Political Attitudes 2017.....(see GESIS) Campaign Media Content Analysis: TV (GLES 2013)..... See also Politbarometer and multiple others.....
	Greece	National Centre for Social Research.....Non-public
	Hungary	Hungarian Election Study.....In Hungarian only
	Italy	Italian National Election Study (ITANES).....Multiple
	Spain	CIS election studies Actitudes hacia la inmigracion (2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015).....Multiple
	Sweden	Swedish National Election Studies (SNES).....Multiple 2014 CSM panel.....Includes media effects Swedish Media Supply Swedish TV Supply

Commercial polling

The third source of data in Europe is commercial polling. The most important sources, which also harmonise their surveys across countries are Ipsos, Gallup, YouGov and Pew. However, there are also a number of important country-specific sources of data in each of the European countries in this study. These are described below:

Table 2. Polling companies by country

Country	Polling Company	link	Country	Polling Company	link
	Meinungsraum.....	www.meinungsraum.at		Allensbach Institute.....	www.ifd-allensbach.de/
	Research Affairs.....	www.researchaffairs.at		Civey.....	www.civey.com
	OGM.....	www.ogm.at/		Kantar-EMNID.....	www.kantaremnd.de/
	Market Institut.....	www.market.at		Forsa.....	www.forsa.de
	Unique Research.....	www.unique-relations.at/en/		Forschungsgruppe	
	Spectra.....	www.spectra.at/		Wahlen.....	www.forschungsgruppe.de/
	Peter Hajek			www.forschungsgruppe.de/
	Public Opinion.....	www.peterhajek.com/		GMS.....	www.aproxima.de/
	IMAS.....	www.imas.at/		Infratest Dimap.....	https://www.infratest-dimap.de/en/
	BVA.....	www.bva.fr/en/home/		INSA.....	http://www.insa-meinung.strend.de/
	Elabe.....	www.elabe.fr/			
	Harris.....	www.harris-interactive.fr/		Alco.....	www.alcopolls.gr
	Ifop.....	www.ifop.com		Kapa Research.....	www.kaparesearch.com
	Kantar.....	www.tns-sofres.com/		Marc.....	www.marc.gr
	Le Terrain.....	www.leterrain.fr		Metron.....	www.metronanalysis.gr
Odoxa.....	www.odoxa.fr/	MRB.....	http://www.mrb.gr/		
OpinionWay.....	www.opinion-way.com/fr/	Palmas.....	www.palmasanalysis.com/		
		PAMAK.....	www.uom.gr/		
		Public Issue.....	www.publicissue.gr/en/		
		Pulse RC.....	www.pulserc.gr		
		Rass.....	http://www.rass.gr/		



Country	Polling Company	link
	iSurvey.....	http://www.independent.com.mt/
	MaltaSurvey.....	www.malta-surveys.com
	MaltaPolls.....	maltapolls.wpengine.com/
	MaltaToday Surveys.....	www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/data_and_surveys
	Celeste-Tel.....	www.celeste-tel.es
	DYM.....	https://institutodym.es
	Estudio de Sociologia Consultores.....	https://www.einforma.com/
	GAD3.....	https://www.gad3.com/
	Invymark.....	Invymark.es
	JM&A.....	www.jaimemiquel.com/
	Metroscopia.....	metroscopia.org/
	MyWord.....	myword.es/
	NC Report.....	ncreport.es/
	Simple Logica.....	www.simplelogica.com/
	SocioMetrica.....	sociometrica.es/
	Demoskop.....	https://demoskop.se/
	Inizio.....	www.inizio.se/en/
	Novus.....	https://novus.se/
	SCB.....	www.scb.se/en/
Sentio.....	sentio.no/en/	
	Sifo.....	www.kantarsifo.se/
	Iránytű.....	www.iranytuzintezet.hu
	Medián.....	http://median.hu/
	Nézopont.....	http://nezopontintezet.hu/
	Publicus.....	http://www.publicus.hu/
	Republikon.....	www.republikon.hu
	Századvég.....	szazadvég.hu/
	Tárki.....	tarki.hu/en
	ZRi.....	www.zavecze-research.hu/
	Bidimedia.....	sondaggibidimedia.com/
Demopolis.....	www.demopolis.it/	
EMG Acqua.....	http://acquagroup.it/	
Euromedia.....	www.euromedia-research.it/	
Index.....	www.index-research.it	
IPR.....	www.ipr-marketing.it	
Ixe.....	www.istitutoixe.it/	
Piepoli.....	www.istitutopiepoli.it/	
SWG.....	www.swg.it/	
Tecnè.....	tecne-italia.it/	

What are the methods by which attitudes to migration can be measured and analysed?

Several methods have been developed in the social sciences in order to gather data and to research public opinion and attitudes. This section provides a comprehensive overview of the most common methodologies used for data gathering of public opinion. It especially highlights empirical ways and different quantitative scientific methods of studying public opinion. Data on public opinion can be collected in different ways. The most common methods of data collection are surveys, focus groups and experiments.

Surveys

Survey research is part of quantitative research which involves the collection of data from a sample of population. The key factor is a good sample selection, which allows generalizing from the sample to the entire population. Surveys about public opinion aim at answering questions about a population with the help of a questionnaire. They are ideal for scientific research studies, since standardized questionnaires administered to all participants eliminate the researchers' own biases and ensure high reliability.

There are several ways to conduct surveys – for instance face-to-face interviews, interviews by phone, questionnaires administered by mail or via the internet. Face-to-face interviews are usually regarded as of the highest quality, but also as the most expensive and time-consuming. Among the other methods, the online survey method is becoming increasingly popular, because it costs significantly less than to send postal mail surveys or make phone calls and the response rate is usually higher.

Single country surveys

Single country surveys involve the collection of data from a sample of a well-defined population (i.e. all people living in Germany). They allow researchers to determine differences between subgroups in a population as well as to test causal hypothesis. Within single country surveys, one can even compare changes in attitudes over time. This can be done in two ways - either by looking at repeated cross-section surveys in which different samples of the same population are surveyed at (two or more) different times or by looking at panel survey data. Repeated cross-section surveys can be used, for example, to examine the impact of a specific event that occurred between the surveys on public attitudes. Further, it allows researchers to determine a causal relation when changes over time in a dependent variable parallel changes in a proposed independent variable. If a hypothesized causal relation exists between two variables, between-wave changes in the independent variable should be mirrored by between wave changes in the dependent variable. For instance, if pro-immigrant attitudes might be increased by higher rates of interaction between the native population and immigrants, an increase in rates of such interaction over the years should lead to an overall reduction of anti-immigrant attitudes in the country.

In a panel survey, the same sample of respondents (a panel) is interviewed repeatedly over time. This allows researchers to assess how specific life events (changes in the independent variable) may lead to changes in, for instance, opinions (dependent variable). For instance, researchers can see whether people who have been exposed to increased negative media coverage regarding migration over time manifested more negative attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, researchers can also assess whether changes in opinion over time (dependent variable) can be predicted by prior levels of an independent variable. For instances, do people who reported the highest rates of contact with immigrants at Time 1 manifest the largest decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes between Time 1 and Time 2? This type of research design provides relatively strong evidence consistent with a causal hypothesis, because the changes in the dependent variable could not have caused the prior levels of the independent variable.

Cross-country surveys

Cross-country surveys facilitate the systematic cross-national analysis of public opinion around the globe. The comparability of cross-country surveys allows to move from comparing individuals and groups within countries towards the comparison of people living under different types of societies and regimes. They help to generalize findings established in single-nation studies. Cross-country surveys can also be used to test whether underlying individual-level attitudes are influenced by contextual characteristics of countries. Cross-national datasets may be centralized, collaborative or integrative projects. Centralized surveys have a single questionnaire translated into different languages (Eurobarometer). Collaborative surveys also have a single questionnaire, but fieldwork is mainly administrated by national sources (World Value Survey). At last, integrative projects unite locally administrative surveys.

However, there are also challenges regarding the quality and comparability of the cross-national surveys. Even small differences in sampling processes, interview techniques, questionnaire design and other methodological differences can lead to misinterpretations of cross-country differences in attitudes and values. Moreover, researchers often face challenges associated with the cross-country comparability of questionnaires, as the same words can have a different underlying meaning attached to them in different languages. At the same time, this problem is not unique to cross-national surveys, since multilingual and plural societies also face the same issues. Research has shown a persistent connection between language-of-interview and political opinion. For instance, Taeku and Pérez show that Latino respondents' opinions in the United States vary according to the language used in the interview and this pattern is not isolated to attitudes that directly or indirectly involve Latinos (e.g. immigration policy, language policy).

Social Desirability Bias

A key issue surrounding survey evidence of attitudes to immigration is that of social desirability bias. This bias is the result of individuals giving misleading or insincere responses to questions when they believe that their 'true' attitudes on a given issue may contradict social norms. It may be that individuals therefore underplay negativity towards immigration or immigrants and to a greater degree in those countries in which there are strong social norms against such attitudes. This may explain some degree of cross-country variation in reported attitudes to immigration. On the other hand, given that social norms are the result of the aggregation of individual attitudes *anyway*, this may be overstated. It should also be stated that although behavioural science and psychology has devoted considerable attention to biases, one recent authoritative literature review concluded, first, that although such biases 'are real, reliable and occasionally quite powerful, on average, they tend to be weak, fragile, and fleeting' and, second, that conclusions on biases 'routinely greatly overstate their power and pervasiveness, and consistently ignore evidence of accuracy, agreement, and rationality in social perception' (Jussim, 2017: 1).

There are a number of ways to overcome the issue of social desirability bias. If we assume that the propensity to mislead, as determined by deep social norms, is fairly constant on a country-by-country basis, we can at least understand changing attitudes to migration by looking at cross-time variation (as done above) as a way to control for social desirability bias. When looking at individual attitudes to migration, we can use panel data, or control for those variables which may lead to varying levels of susceptibility to social desirability bias, such as education, age and economic class (as done below).

Experiments within Surveys

Surveys can provide additional evidence of casual inferences by incorporating experiments into them. Randomly selected survey respondents can be exposed to one version of a questionnaire ('treatment' group), while others are exposed to another ('control' group). Differences in responses between the two groups can then be attributed to the specific aspects that were varied (the treatment).

Methodologies used to examine surveys

There are different statistical methods that enable researchers to analyse collected survey data. Regression analysis, after accounting for assumptions about causal relations among variables, supports the estimation of the causal impact of an independent variable on the dependent variable. Regression analysis and structural equation modelling are the most common quantitative methods used to measure attitudes to migration and to test the determinants of variation in attitudes to migration across individuals as well as countries. Multiple regression techniques as well as other techniques (for instance path analysis and structural equation modelling) can also test for moderators and mediators of causal relations.

Other data gathering methods

There are also other methods that enable researchers to gather data regarding public attitudes. Nevertheless, these are not usually generalizable to the entire population.

Focus groups

During a focus group survey, respondents from the target population are typically put in one group and interviewed in an interactive manner in a guided or open discussion. Participants are free to talk with other group members about their opinion, beliefs and attitudes. During this process, researchers are able to study more natural conversation patterns and modes of interactions than in surveys. One of the advantages of focus groups is their low-cost compared to surveys. However, although the main purpose of focus groups is to study participants' reactions in order to generalize them, the results may not fully represent the opinion of the larger population.

Experiments

There are two main types of an experimental design in social sciences – laboratory experiments and field experiments. Field experiments take place in a real world setting such as a university. Laboratory experiments take place in a controlled environment such as a laboratory. As with experiments within surveys, participants in an experimental setting are usually assigned to the 'treatment' and 'control' group.

Field experiments

Field experiments have the advantage that outcomes are observed in a natural setting rather than in a contrived laboratory environment. For this reason, field experiments are sometimes seen as having higher external validity than laboratory experiments. On the other hand, they can get more easily impaired and are in general less controlled than laboratory experiments. One of the main disadvantages of field experiments is their low replicability.

Laboratory experiments

Laboratory experiments enable researchers to measure precisely the effects of the independent variable on dependent variable establishing cause and effect relationships. They have excellent reliability, because controlled environments allow for the exact conditions of the research to be repeated and results tested. The main disadvantages of experiments within laboratory settings is the usual low generalisability of the findings given the general homogeneity of the sample and the fact that they tend to overestimate the size of the effect (for instance because undergraduate students, often used for these types of experiments, are easily influenced).

Why do attitudes to migration vary?

Theory

Attitudes to immigration

Today there is a broad and growing range of explanations for variation in attitudes to immigration. In this theoretical review, we summarise the key findings in the literature and note the major existing shortcomings, particularly emphasising media or similar (framing, communications, etc.) effects. In doing so, we show that despite the existing literature being broad and theoretically rich, with some areas of consistent empirical consensus, it suffers the following weaknesses.

- Hypothesised causal mechanisms tend to be tested singularly, precluding comparisons of explanatory power, causal ordering and/or understanding theoretical interrelationships. This is likely to result in the overstating of each causal mechanism's importance.
- The literature is overwhelmingly US-centric, with fewer tests on attitudes to immigration in Europe and even fewer elsewhere, such as the southern Mediterranean.
- There has been a tendency to treat attitudes to race and immigration as singular, owing in part to the, until recent, dominance of the literature by American studies and the conflation of negative attitudes to immigration (as a policy or reality) with immigrants (as individuals).
- Literature is riddled with serious endogeneity and methodological issues – particularly surrounding contact theory (the findings on which are likely to be heavily influenced by self-selection bias) and explaining attitudes to immigration with other attitudes, which breaks the temporal precedence criteria for causality.
- Aggregate (particularly, country) and individual level explanations are often muddled and mistakenly treated as interchangeable – aggregate level explanations have been left particularly theoretical under-explained. As such we know relatively little about country or regional effects.
- Anti-immigration attitudes are often treated as the phenomena to be explained with pro-immigration attitudes treated as a default or a non-problematic phenomenon, which is a form of normative bias. Variance *in toto* should be explained instead.

Below, we discuss several prominent theories hypothesizing individual-level and contextual-level factors explaining attitudes towards immigration.

Economic competition

According to this group of explanations, individual attitudes to immigration are driven by both personal economic interests and the economic interests of the group(s) with which the individual identifies. However, the evidence for actual, rather than perceived, economic competition causing anti-immigration attitudes is limited. Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) find no evidence to support this theory. Perceptions of economic threat have received greater support. Burns and Gimpel (2000) and Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) find that a pessimistic personal economic outlook leads to greater negativity towards immigrants. The most well supported findings, however, are those related to the effects of immigration not to oneself, but to the community, state or nation (in line with findings to political attitudes more generally). Economic downturns and rising unemployment rates at the national level are shown to increase anti-immigration sentiment (Aksoy 2012; Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte 2014; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Finseraas, Pedersen and Bay 2014; Polavieja 2016; Ruist 2016) as are lower FDI inflows (Rustenbach 2010). Unsurprisingly, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), Fennelly and Federico (2008), Fussell (2014), and Ilias, Febbely and Federico (2008), find that seeing immigration as costly to the above units (countries, regions) leads to opposition to immigration. Similarly, Blalock (1967), Pichler (2010), Rohmann, Florack and Piontkowski (2006) and Schneider

(2008) found that feeling that minority groups take finite resources leads to opposition to immigration. Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz (2005) added nuance to the findings by showing that some immigrant groups in the United States – Europeans and Asians – were seen as likely to contribute and were thus more likely to receive public support, whereas the contrary was the case for Latin Americans and especially Africans. Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), McLaren (2003), Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders (2002) found *both* a sense of economic threat and cultural threat combined to lead to anti-immigration attitudes.

Overall, the strength of this strand of the literature has been its ability to consistently differentiate between the effects of real and perceived economic competition or threat, as well as to differentiate between the effects of perceptions of the effect of immigration on oneself (fairly weak) and immigration on one's community or country (far stronger). The major weakness is that attitudes to the effect of immigration are a type of attitude to immigration *anyway* so its explanatory power is highly susceptible to endogeneity, as well as being susceptible to individual's reporting a threat to justify their opposition or support of immigration *post facto*.

Contact theory and group threat theory

Contact theory and group threat theory both predict that individual attitudes to immigration are the result of short term interaction with immigrants, but with opposite theorised effects. Contact theory predicts that some individuals hold misconceptions about immigrants and that contact lessens those misconceptions and thus makes individuals more pro-immigration, as first outlined in Allport's (1954) classic work. Since then a number of studies have supported this claim (Dixon 2006; Ha 2010; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 1998; McLaren 2003; Oliver and Wong 2003; Rocha and Espino 2009). Berg (2009) found that more legal immigrants in area lead to pro-immigration attitudes, a finding supported by Schee and Slaughter (2001). Nevertheless, these findings suffer from two methodological weaknesses. The first is that contact tends to be either measured through the ethnic composition of the individual's neighbourhood, which fails to actually measure contact. The second is that more pro-immigration individuals are likely to be more willing to have contact with immigrants to start with. These weaknesses have to some extent been overcome by experimental studies (e.g., Barlow, Louis and Hewstone 2009; Hewstone *et al.* 2005), which support contact theory's supposed mechanisms of improved knowledge, greater empathy, and especially, a reduction in intergroup anxiety (Barlow *et al.* 2012; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, see also Kauffman 2014).

By contrast, group threat theory expects contact with immigrants to increase the sense of threat to non-immigrants, who then become more opposed to immigration. Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2002) find that in Germany and the UK, higher concentrations of immigrants at the local level lead to anti-immigration beliefs. This finding was supported and expanded into a 'power threat model' in the United States whereby the relative size of the minority group increases anti-immigration attitudes (Berg 2014; Dixon 2006; Filindra 2013; Ha 2010; Hood and Morris 1998; Hopkins 2010; and Rocha and Espino 2009). Moreover, this finding was supported in Europe by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), Meuleman *et al.* (2009), McLaren (2003), Quillian (1995), Scheepers *et al.* (2002) and Schneider (2008). Hopkins (2010) also found that speed of immigration into an area lead to more anti-immigration attitudes.

At first, the sheer number of contrary findings seems perplexing. However, two syntheses have been put forward, first, regarding the level of intimacy of the contact and, second, regarding who the immigrants are. The first synthesis argument states that whereas intimate (friends, co-workers, etc.) contact leads to pro-immigration attitudes (Fetzer 2000) non-intimate contact (e.g. seeing in the street) leads to anti-immigration attitudes (Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995). Similarly, Kaufmann (2014: 267) showed that 'White British people in locales experiencing rapid ethnic change are more likely to call for lower immigration ... On the other hand, where there is already a high level of ethnic minorities, white opinion is less hostile to immigration ... Habituation to change, typically within a decade, and assimilation – especially of Europeans – over a generation reduces hostility to immigration.' The second shows that the effect of contact is reliant on

the immigrants, and less commonly the natives, in question. Ha (2010) and Rocha *et al.* (2011) show that in the United States more Asians in the area lead to more pro-immigration views whereas more Latinos lead to more anti-immigration attitudes. Hood and Morris (1998) show that more illegal immigrants in the area lead to more anti-immigration attitudes, while Ha (2010) shows that more Asians in the area lead to more anti-immigration attitudes amongst African Americans. Finally, Berg (2014) shows that the presence of more mixed race individuals also leads to more pro-immigration attitudes.

Socialisation effects

Early life socialisation effects

According to this group of explanations, certain types of socialisation in one's early life (and less commonly later life) lead to latent political values, which then inform attitudes to immigration when activated by political exposure and events. Work by and Calavita (1996), Espenshade and Calhoun (1993), and Sears (1997) largely support this idea. Perhaps the key explanatory variable within this framework is education, which has been repeatedly shown to be positively associated with attitudes to immigration, particularly tertiary education. Jackman and Muha (1984) and Janus (2010) argue that education has an indoctrinating effect which leads individuals to support certain normative ideologies, in this case leading to pro-immigration views while attending university, with its focus on a 'universal', rather than a national, outlook. Inversely, Espenshade and Calhoun (1993), Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), and Mayda (2006) argue that less education leads to less tolerance for diversity which leads to anti-immigration attitudes. Thomsen and Olsen (2017) show that as democracy becomes more imbedded in a country and democratic values become more embedded in institutions, the effect of education on attitudes to immigration is strengthened.

Education is also seen in terms of broader socialisation experiences including living or being born abroad, white collar-work or being an ethnic minority, which lead to a cosmopolitan worldview and, thus, pro-immigration attitudes (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Haubert and Fussell 2006). Interestingly, less integrated Latinos have been shown to be more pro-immigration (Branton 2007; Hood, Morris and Shirkey 1997). Being religious and taking part in religious activities have been argued to increase empathy or induce universalistic values and thus lead to support for immigration (Knoll 2009).

Other long-term socialisation factors take into account the inter- and multi-cultural nature of the country and its history, which result in cultural traditions that may be more or less predisposed to sympathy for migration (Bello, 2017; García-Faroldi 2017). In particular, individuals in those countries that have built a national identity around the nation as an ethnic group are less likely to be supportive of immigration than individuals in which nationalism has a more institutional or civic character (Levanon and Lewin-Epstein 2010), particularly in those countries with a history of war (Hiers, Soehl and Wimmer 2017).

Similarly, Van Assche *et al.* (2016) argue that right wing attitudes are more associated with negativity towards outgroups in countries with strongly right wing political climates, while Helbling and Traunmüller (2015) find that Swiss cantons that are non-secular and include Christianity in institutions and law create climates that create greater negativity towards Muslim immigrants and the more awkward political and legal changes that must be made to accommodate them. Finally, national cultures—if not policies—built more around supposed individualism (e.g. Northern Europe) rather than the collective (e.g. East Asia), have been shown to lead to greater positivity towards immigration, with similar results in Europe (Meeusen and Kern 2016; Shin and Dovidio 2016).

Other scholars have looked at more obtuse societal factors to argue that whites are socialised in the United States into latent racist attitudes which can be activated by political symbols (Berg 2013; Huddy and Sears 1995; Sears *et al.* 1997; Tarman and Sears 2005). These subtly racist views manifest in support for tradition, exaggerated perceptions of difference and weaker empathy for non-whites and thus lead to anti-immigration attitudes (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995).

Later life and contextual socialisation effects

In this vein, party cues have been shown to increase anti-immigration attitudes (Bohman 2011; Sides and Citrin 2007), particularly on those with *more* education who are more aware of elite cues (Hellwig and Kweon 2016). Jones and Martin (2016) show that party cues are more powerful in US states that have had larger increases in immigration. Careja (2016) showed that individuals who are pro-immigration become more so when confronted by highly negative party cues. Wilkes, Guppy and Farris (2007) argued that the relationship between radical right support and anti-immigration attitudes is only significant when the radical right party takes on a ‘culturally racist’ message.

In policy terms, Schlueter and Davidov (2013) show that European countries that actively pursue immigrant integration policies foster lower levels of feelings of group threat amongst their citizens. Messing and Ságvári (2018) argue that perceptions of state capacity *in general* affect attitudes to immigration, with those living in what are perceived to be states with high levels of capacity less likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes.

Terrorist attacks had been shown to affect attitudes to immigration (Legewie 2013), but more recent evidence suggests that attitudes to immigration have become sufficiently embedded in Europe that short term events and attacks are unlikely to affect them further (Silva 2018; Brouard, Vasilopoulos and Foucault 2018).

At the personal level, Jackson *et al.* (2001) show that having a family and children leads to greater anti-immigration views, as individuals become more concerned and cautious about major societal changes. Somewhat similarly, a lack of feeling of safety in one’s neighbourhood has also been shown to lead to anti-immigration views (Chandler and Tsai 2001).

Overall, it seems likely that being socialised from an early age into ethnically heterogenous peer groups and neighbourhoods in which immigration is a norm is likely to lead to more pro-immigration attitudes later in life and that this is reinforced by university education. Those who have not been socialised in such circumstances have latent support for social homogeneity activated through party cues and those for whom immigration is only recently a salient issue are likely to be more greatly affected by these and other short-term events.

Psychology

Psychological explanations for attitudes to immigration have focussed on the individual’s personality and social identity. According to these explanations, attitudes to immigration form part of a broader attitudinal set that individuals create to make sense of their circumstances. Indeed, the correlation between immigration attitudes and broader political attitudes has increased over time (Semyonov, Reijam and Gorodzeisky 2006). Similarly, so-called Right Wing Authoritarian predispositions – valuing order and unambiguity above all – have been shown to increase anti-immigration attitudes (Cohrs and Stelzl 2010).

Research by the Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration has sought to delve deeper into the effects of human values on attitudes to immigration across Europe. We use one of the most empirically efficacious of these value systems—Schwartz’s ten basic personal values—to predict attitudes to immigration in Europe. Previous attempts to do so have collapsed the ten values into two dimensions, as proposed by Schwartz when charting the values in the abstract. However, we show that the dimensional approach mis-specifies the relationship between values and attitudes to immigration. We do this using 2014 European Social Survey data in 21 countries. In fact, only four of the values—‘universalism’, ‘conformity’, ‘tradition’ and ‘security’—have strong effects on attitudes to immigration, with the other six values having either minimal or, in the case of five, no effect at all. This undermines previous findings that such values as ‘benevolence’ affect attitudes to immigration, as well as the assumption that each of these values’ anti-poles in Schwartz’s

theoretical model (see Figure 12 below) should have equal but opposite effects. We then show that this pattern is largely consistent across countries and that the pattern holds true both when the dependent variable is positivity towards accepting immigrants and positive perception of the effects of immigration. Overall, though values predict attitudes to immigration consistently and powerfully, they do not do so according to Schwartz’s theoretical model of relations amongst values, of higher order value types or according to bipolar value dimensions, as previously assumed.

Aside from values and personality types, consciousness of in-group and out-group social identities are often shown to be associated with immigration attitudes (Fussel 2014; Lee and Ottati 2002; Stets and




Figure 12. Schwarz’s ten human values. Positive predictors of standardised attitudes to immigration in 2014 European Social Survey in green; negative predictors in red. Source: Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration

Burke 2000). Brewer (1999) shown that in-group favouritism was more important than out-group prejudice, with the former leading to a desire to see one’s group’s interests furthered. Perhaps related, lower societal trust is associated with anti-immigration attitudes (Hooghe *et al.* 2006). Unsurprisingly, having cultural stereotypes have repeatedly been shown to be associated with anti-immigration views (Ayers *et al.* 2009; Berg 2013; Cowan, Martinez and Mendiola 1997; Huddy and Sears 1995; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995).

Media effects

In this study we are particularly interested in the effects of media – and related outlets – on attitudes to immigration. Newman *et al.* (2015: 603) show that humanitarianism leads to greater support for provision of services to immigrants and their children and carry out experiments that show that ‘if the media were to highlight the plight of prospective immigrants, the ‘heavy hand’ typically dealt immigrants by the public

in many immigrant-receiving nations may be eased in favor of support for more permissive policies. Most interestingly, our research suggests that humanitarian appeals have the potential to mitigate opposition to immigration, even in the presence of countervailing threats.' Similarly, Motyl *et al.* (2011) show that when individuals are given visual prompts of immigrants engaging in common human activities or when encouraged to think of shared childhood experiences, individuals become more pro-immigration and less anti-Arab. Inversely, Schlueter and Davidov (2013: 179) use repeated cross-sectional survey data from Spain over an 11 year period and a longitudinal content analysis of newspaper reports to find that 'a greater number of negative immigration-related news reports increases perceived group threat over and above the influence of immigrant group size ... that the impact of negative immigration-related news reports on perceived group threat is amplified in regions with a smaller immigrant group size.' Van Klingeren *et al.* (2015: 268) 'cautiously' find that in one of the two countries they studied in Europe, a positive tone towards immigration in the media is associated with an increase in positive attitudes, though the reverse effect is not true. They also argue that the longer the immigration issue is salient in public debate, the less impact the media will have.

Conversely, Czymara and Schmid-Catran (2017) find that the media coverage of sexual assaults in Germany over New Year's Eve 2015/2016 had no negative effect on attitudes to immigration of refugees but may have increased hostility to immigration of Africans and Arabs moreover. Merolla, Ramakrishnan and Haynes (2013) argue that changing the terminology related to immigrants (e.g. 'illegals', 'undocumented', 'unauthorized') have little or no effect attitudes to immigration, however, framing effects of immigration policy may be stronger. Knoll, Redlawsk and Sanborn (2011) similarly find that various group frames only have an impact on conservative voters for whom the issue of immigration is important. Lahav and Courtemanche (2011) furthermore find that framing effects—the marginal effect on attitudes by the manner (positively, negatively or otherwise) in which media, politicians and others portray an issue—are 'not ubiquitous and may be conditional upon ideology', though they find that framing effects were stronger on liberals than conservatives. Valentino, Brader and Jardina (2013) similarly downplay the effects of media by finding that the media's attention to the issue of immigration over the last 30 years has largely followed the increase in immigration in the United States during that period. Bloemraad, Silva and Voss (2016) also find that frames have varying effects on different subgroups but that most of these are small and that the largest is the effect of the family unity frame on conservatives in increasing support for legalisation. As a result, they express scepticism of the progressive and right-based frames of immigration.

Finally, Facchini *et al.* (2017) show that ideological self-placement can only partially explain the large differences between Fox, CNN, CBS and PBS viewers in terms of attitudes to immigration, suggestive of effects of watching these channels. In Europe, Héricourt and Spielvogel (2013: 225) showed that 'individuals who spend more time to get informed on social and political matters through newspapers and radio have a better opinion on the economic impact of immigration compared with individuals who devote time to other types of content.'

Rather than changing attitudes to immigration *per se* it seems more likely that the media has a positive impact on the amount that individuals think about immigration with the result in striking increases in the reported salience of immigration in recent years – the proportion of individuals who name immigration as one of the most important issues affecting their countries or Europe (Facchini *et al.* 2017). Kim *et al.* 2011 have further argued that when migration is referenced in Western media, there is an overuse of terms such as 'illegal immigration' and topics such as crime, security and border protection, all of which are likely to especially alarm consumers with conservative value sets. Critics of this approach have blamed the commercial nature of some media outlets who have a tendency to seek the most hyperbolic and emotionally alarming stance of any story in order to drive commercial revenues (Branton and Dunaway 2008).

The causes of variation in the importance of an issue—issue salience—remain fairly undertheorised and are even less commonly tested. Krosnick (1990: 74) argues that salience varies between individuals according

to three factors: self-interest, social identification and values, whereas it varies across time according to 'prominent events or problems' that 'focus national attention.' Evidence of the predictive power of each the three between-individual factors was found in five separate studies by Boninger *et al.* (1995).

The exception to the lack of attention given to the causes of variation in issue salience is that of the agenda setting literature. As Fournier *et al.* (2003: 52) state 'agenda setting concerns the influence of factors—most notably, but not exclusively, media coverage—on the issues that individuals consider important and unimportant (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar *et al.*, 1982; Behr & Iyengar, 1985; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).' These claims are usually substantiated by comparing survey-responses to MII questions to media coverage of issues, either at the individual or national levels. A rich literature has gone on to consider when and why agenda setting works, with first memory accessibility and later type of news content shown to arouse levels of emotions that determine salience (Miller, 2007).

However, attitudinally, panel data studies have shown that media preferences tend to follow consumer preferences, rather than vice versa (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010) while experimental studies have shown that the effects of messaging and framing on political attitudes tend to be non-durable (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Moreover, the prevalence of the agenda setting literature has long led scholars to criticise as exaggerating the role of media (and politicians) in their ability to affect salience (e.g. Erbring *et al.*, 1980). Ansolabehere and Puy (2018: 105) criticise the assumption that 'the weight given to an issue is entirely a function of media attention to the issue, and not of some underlying preferences of voters' by academics who 'use campaign strategies to estimate the emphasis on each political issue.' Perhaps the most consistent finding regarding the causes of cross-time variation is that issue salience responds to actual events and their gravity. Behr & Iyengar (1985) show that 'real-world cues' affect issue salience both via the positive effect they have on news coverage and directly, with Erbring *et al.* (1980) reporting similar findings for 'real world conditions' (see also Wlezien, 2005).

The literature on the effects of media and communications on attitudes to immigration are somewhat mixed but show some consensus. The effects of changing certain terms in order to frame immigrants in a certain manner are unlikely to have strong, consistent or durable effects. In line with previous work on human values, we should expect that messages on the similarities between immigrants and natives (and all humans, in fact) are the most likely to increase positivity towards immigration. This is because those values that anti-immigration individuals are most likely to hold are conformity, tradition and security, therefore emphasising the benefits of difference or diversity are likely to have negative effects. This also would explain why individuals react differently to different frames. It also seems that media effects are likely to be stronger in those countries in which immigration is a relatively 'new' political issue.

Funnel of causality

What should one do with so many findings from the literature? There is no reason to necessarily believe that not *all* of them can be right. Indeed, many of the above causal mechanisms are intricately related and reliant on each other. As such, many of the most important factors are likely to have both direct *and* indirect effects (via their effect on other predictors) on attitudes to immigration. Some of the predictors of attitudes to immigration are likely to be distal—and thus theoretically should have big effects and be hard to change—while others are likely to be proximal (small effects and easier to change). Moreover, the more proximal effects are likely to be contingent on the distal predictors. A broad abstraction of these complex and multidirectional relationships are shown in Figure 13.




Figure 13. The funnel of causality of attitudes to immigration

Attitudes to emigration

Whereas attitudes to immigration tend to be focused on politics and policy, attitudes to emigration are typically measured in terms of intention to emigrate. As such, attitudes to immigration tend to be related to what someone else or the state should do or in terms of perceptions of the reality affecting the state or some other social unit. By contrast, attitudes to emigration are about a hypothetical future personal behaviour. Only occasionally are individuals asked about the perceived effects of emigration on their country or, for that matter, on themselves. Instead, they tend to be asked about their own personal intention or propensity to emigrate – ‘would you like to emigrate?’; ‘do you ever think about emigrating?’; ‘do you have an intention of emigrating?’.

As a result, the causes of variation in attitudes to immigration and emigration are notably different. Indeed, because behaviour, even when just hypothetical, is less abstract than attitudes to policy or even ideological outlooks, the literature has arguably produced more consistent results. However, the literature on attitudes to emigration, even when focusing on the most pronounced area of propensity to migrate, is less developed than the literature on attitudes to immigration, both theoretically and in terms of sheer volume. Indeed, as Hiskey, Montalvo and Orcés (2014: 93) note ‘very little work exists on the cognitive process that precedes the actual act of emigration.’ Below, we group the major findings regarding attitudes to emigration.

Political and economic context in origin country

Hiskey *et al.* (2014) analysed survey data across 22 Latin American countries in which respondents were asked ‘Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next 3 years?’ They present strong evidence to support the idea that the quality of the country’s democratic system – as

measured using a 15 year average of Freedom House and Polity’s regime scores – and its ability to fulfil basic governance responsibilities – as measured using perceptions of neighbourhood safety, perceptions of government corruption, reported crime victimhood, reported corruption victimhood, perceptions of government efficacy and satisfaction with democracy – affects the degree to which an individual reports considering emigration. They state (Hiskey *et al.* 2014: 94) ‘the emigration decision of certain individuals in authoritarian regimes is without a doubt in large part a function of the political system and one’s assessment of their future within that system.’

Furthermore, Van Dalen and Henkens (2007) find that individuals are driven to emigrate by weak state capacity and institutions in their home country, when measured using the quality of the education system, the level of social security, the ability of the state to impose law and order, and the level of pensions. Both of these findings – on democracy and state capacity – fit in with the common understanding that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between a country’s level of development and the pro-




Figure 14. Hypothesised relationships between migration and development for emigration and immigration compared.

propensity of its citizens to intend to migrate, so that citizens in the very poorest and very richest countries are least likely to want to migrate (Clemens 2014; Dao *et al.* 2018; Hiskey *et al.* 2014). The U-shaped relationship has been shown to not only interact with education rates but also the unemployment rate, whereby higher unemployment leads to a higher effect the country being partially economically developed (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2011; Migali and Scipioni 2018). This relationship is shown in Figure 14.

Socio-demographics

Aside from their findings on the effect of the level of democratisation in the origin country, Hiskey *et al.* (2014) also find evidence of other effects on the willingness to emigrate that have already been supported in the literature. These include: having family member who have already migrated; having certain socio-demographic characteristics such as being male, young and relatively well educated, as well as urbanity; and subjective personal economic dissatisfaction. Dao *et al.* (2018) similarly find that at the macro-level, education increases the

propensity to emigrate in developing countries. This finding is supported by Migali and Scipioni (2018), who also report the common finding that being male, unmarried and foreign-born are all socio-demographic traits that increase the chance of emigrating.

Quality of life measures have also repeatedly to shown to be negatively associated with one’s propensity to emigrate. Both Ivlevs (2014) and Hiskey *et al.* (2014) show that individuals who report being less satisfied in life are more likely to have a favourable attitude to migration. Individuals who report having been the victim of criminality are also more likely to express a desire to migrate (Wood *et al.* 2010; Van Dalen and Henkens 2007). Unsurprisingly, at the extreme end, individuals whose states are at war or have collapsed following war have been shown to be far more likely to desire to migrate, even from rich countries (Cohen 1987).

Existing migrant networks

Individuals are more likely to have a positive attitude to emigration when they are aware of existing networks for emigrants in a destination country, to which they are then more likely to be desirous of emigrating. Existing migrant networks provide logistical and social support to would be migrants, information

flows and decrease perceived risk (Bertoli and Ruysen 2016; Docquier, Peri and Ruysen 2014; Esipova et al. 2011; Hiskey et al. 2014; Haug 2008; Migali and Scipioni 2018). This effect is expected to be enhanced by geographic proximity (Dao et al. 2018).

Media effects

Exposure to media, such as via the introduction of television, has been shown to increase the propensity to migrate (Farré and Fasani 2011). The existence of media from the destination country in the country of origin has been shown to increase the propensity to emigrate to that country and the success of the emigrants upon arrival (Mai 2005). Social media has also been shown to increase positivity to emigration by expanding information flows, increasing logistical capacity and creating real life networks (Dekker and Engbersen 2013). Far less developed are investigations into how portrayal of emigration and emigrants in origin countries affects attitudes to emigration.

Hypotheses

Following the above literature review, we develop the following hypotheses to explain both attitudes to immigration and to emigration in Europe and the Southern Mediterranean.

Attitudes to immigration

- H1: Higher levels of media consumption are expected to accentuate attitudinal differences to immigration.
- H2: Intimate contact with immigrants should lead to more positive attitudes to immigration, whereas non-intimate contact with immigrants should lead to more negative attitudes.
- H3: Countries with higher economic development should have more positive attitudes to immigration, whereas national level economic downturns should lead to more negative attitudes towards immigration.
- H4: Countries with higher shares of populations with tertiary education should have more positive attitudes to immigration.
- H5: Countries with weaker states should display more negative attitudes to immigration.
- H6: Countries with higher levels of nationalism should display more negative attitudes to immigration.
- H7: Countries with more media prevalence of the issue of immigration should display more negative attitudes to immigration.
- H8: Countries where the media report negatively regarding migration should display more negative attitudes to immigration.

Attitudes to emigration

- H1: Being male, single, unemployed and educated are all expected to increase one's likelihood of emigrating
- H2: Individuals that use social media and/or have access to traditional media are more likely to have positive attitudes to emigration.

Analysing attitudes to immigration

Data

Past research concerned with differences in attitudes towards immigration has primarily focused on individual level explanations. In this report, we build upon previous research and look not only at differences between individuals, but also at differences between countries. We do so by empirically analysing cross-nationally comparable surveys at the individual level and country level factors at the macro level. Unfortunately, none of the readily available datasets mentioned in the previous section includes all countries of interest for this report - for this reason, to cover all the countries of interest, we look at multiple cross-nationally comparable datasets.

Regarding individual attitudes towards immigration, the core information comes from three datasets – European Social Survey (ESS), Special Eurobarometer and World Value Survey. All three datasets provide the highest quality data for cross-country comparative research, each assuring the comparability of questions asked in different countries. All surveys are conducted using a standardised questionnaire that measures changing values covering a vast range of topics and together they provide valuable information about individual beliefs, values and attitudes in a broad spectrum of different developed and developing countries. For the purpose of our analysis, only native individuals are retained in the sample, since the objective of the analysis is to study native attitudes towards immigration.²

European Social Survey (ESS) conducts bi-annual cross-country surveys since 2002 covering a wide-range of European countries and Israel. The data used in the present analysis comes from the newest round available – Round 8 – with data collected between the years 2014 till 2016, thus in the middle of the so-called “European migrant/refugee crisis”. ESS provides multiple questions regarding attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, which allows us to differentiate between several types of attitudes, taking into consideration the multidimensionality of the concept and therefore present a more complex analysis. Countries of interest for this report included in the ESS Round 8 are Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, Israel, Italy and Sweden.

Eurobarometer surveys are conducted by the European Commission since 1974 covering all the EU countries as well as few countries outside the European Union. In addition, Special Eurobarometer reports are carried out based on in-depth thematic studies. In the present analysis, we make use of the Special Eurobarometer 469, which conducted an in-depth thematic study regarding the Integration of immigrants in the European Union and Corruption. Data were collected in October 2017 and the countries of interest include Hungary, Greece, Malta, Italy, Austria, Germany, France, Spain and Sweden.

Unfortunately, both the European Social Survey as well as the Special Eurobarometer 469 concentrate mostly on European countries. For this purpose, we also included data from the World Value Survey, a cross-national survey that covers a variety of geographic regions. Generally, countries included in the World Value Surveys represent a full range of different political, cultural and economic backgrounds. Thus, these surveys provide valuable information about individual beliefs, values and attitudes in a broad spectrum of different developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, unfortunately, not all the countries of interest from the Southern Mediterranean region were included. However, we were able to obtain at least some information regarding attitudes to immigration and immigrants in this region. We analyse the World Value Survey's sixth wave, which contains data collected between the years 2010 and 2014 and countries of interest for this report include Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

² In the ESS, only individuals that are citizens in their country of residence are analysed. In the Special Eurobarometer, only those with the nationality of their country of residence are retained. In the WVS, only those who are not immigrants in their country of residence are analysed.

At the macro-level, we collected data from several sources. Firstly, we used data provided by the International Monetary Fund regarding GDP per capita (current prices) measured in U.S. dollars. When analysing the European Social Survey, we refer to GDP values for the year 2016, when interviews were conducted. On the other hand, for the analysis of the Special Eurobarometer we refer to the year 2017. Regarding the percentage of population with a Masters degree within a country we use data from OECD. Furthermore, the information regarding the percentage of population aged 30–34 with tertiary educational attainment as well as data on unemployment rates are obtained from EUROSTAT³. The direction of media reporting regarding immigration and the prevalence of the topic in the two most important national newspapers is taken from the complementary Media Claims dataset provided by the ESS. Additionally, we constructed several macro variables from the datasets itself. Trust in institutions, levels of patriotism and nationalism were obtained from the data provided by the ESS, whereas average country feelings about media reporting regarding immigration, tolerance to corruption index and feeling of corruption extent in country from the Special Eurobarometer dataset.

Attitudes to immigration

Attitudes to immigration are numerous, multidimensional and complex. As we pointed out in the previous section, these can be, for instance, attitudes regarding specific types of immigration policies, attitudes regarding specific group of immigrants, attitudes regarding the impact of immigration and prejudice regarding immigrants in general. Thus, measuring attitudes to immigration can be challenging because it is important to keep apart attitudes towards immigrants, perceptions of the effects of immigration and attitudes towards immigration. Distinguishing between different types of attitudes has not always been the case in previous research. While these attitudes co-vary, they are not necessarily the same. For example, it is possible for a respondent to want to reduce the inflow of immigrants, but at the same time recognize their social and democratic rights once admitted. In this study, we aim at analysing all three types of these attitudes separately. We specifically analyse attitudes towards immigration in general, attitudes towards specific types of immigrants and perception of the effect of immigration – these are different, although strongly connected, aspects of attitudes to immigration.

Different types of attitudes towards immigration

Firstly, the primary measure of attitudes towards immigration in general is obtained from the ESS.⁴ The question represents an overall assessment about the respondents' perception of whether immigration is bad or good for their country.⁵ At the individual level, answers were coded on a 0 - 10 scale with 10 being the most positive reply. At the country level, we use the mean of the fully-weighted country sample. Figure 15 shows there are significant differences between countries. Values above 5 mean that the average opinion in a given country is more positive, while values below 5 mean that the average opinion regarding immigration is negative. For example, as Figure 15 shows, while the average opinion regarding immigration is generally positive in Sweden (6.2), it is significantly negative in Italy (3.4).

Secondly, we distinguish between three measures of attitudes towards immigrants – attitudes towards immigrants of the same race/ethnic group⁶, attitudes towards immigrants of different race/ethnic group⁷

³ Data regarding the unemployment rate for Israel are obtained from CEIC Data.

⁴ Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

⁵ This question is complemented by two similar questions which focus on more narrowly defined impacts of immigration on the economy and culture of the country. However, for the purpose of this analysis we were more interested in attitudes towards immigration in general as opposed to attitudes towards a specific area.

⁶ To what extent do you think (country) should allow people of same race/ethnic group as majority? 1. Allow many to come and live here; 2. Allow some; 3. Allow a few; 4. Allow none.

⁷ To what extent do you think (country) should allow people of different race/ethnic group as majority? 1. Allow many to come and live here; 2. Allow some; 3. Allow a few; 4. Allow none.




Figure 15. Attitudes towards immigration by country (mean) (source: ESS 2016)

and attitudes towards immigrants from poorer countries outside the EU⁸. The original scale of the variables was reversed so that higher scores mean higher acceptance of immigrants. At the individual level, answers were coded on a 1 – 4 scale. At the country level, we use the mean of the fully-weighted country sample. Figures 16 - 18 show the country averages of all three variables measuring attitudes towards immigrants for countries of interest included in the ESS. Sweden is the country with the highest acceptance of all three types of immigrants, whereas Hungary is the country with the lowest acceptance regardless the type of immigrants in question. The Figures show that, apart from Israel, countries show similar average acceptance/rejection scores regardless the type of immigrants in question.

Thirdly, using the Special Eurobarometer 469 survey, we measure attitudes towards the effect of immigration. We look at respondents' fear regarding the effects of immigration on different areas – national economy, employment, welfare, crime, culture. We also incorporate opinions that immigration does not help to fill in jobs and does not bring innovation. We then create a composite Fear index, measuring respondents' fear regarding possible effects of immigration. The Cronbach's alpha of the composite Fear index is 0.84.




Figure 16 – Attitudes towards allowing immigrants of the same race by country (source ESS 2016)

⁸ To what extent do you think (country) should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe? 1. Allow many to come and live here; 2. Allow some; 3. Allow a few; 4. Allow none.




Figure 17 - Attitudes towards allowing immigrants of different race by country (source ESS 2016)




Figure 18 - Attitudes towards allowing immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe by country (average) (source ESS 2016)

Figure 19 shows country differences in specific factors comprising the Fear index. Hungary, Greece, Malta and Italy are the top countries regarding almost all aspects of fear, while Sweden, Spain and France are the countries with the lowest country averages of seeing immigration as a threat for most areas. This is, of course, also reflected in Figure 20, showing the country averages of the composite Fear index. Figure 19 also shows that, on average, immigration is feared to pose a threat mostly for the welfare state and crime, while it is feared less regarding culture. Most countries are primarily centred between the values

of two and three which means that they feel immigration as a relative threat. Sweden is the only country with a mean below two, meaning that in Sweden, on average, people do not see immigration primarily as a threat. At the individual level, the Fear index is the mean value of the specific factors, while at the macro level it is the country mean of the individual Fear index.



Figure 19 - Country differences in specific factors comprising the Fear index (source Special Eurobarometer 469)





Figure 19 Continued – Country differences in specific factors comprising the Fear index (source Special Eurobarometer 469)




Figure 20 – Average values of the composite Fear index by country (source Special Eurobarometer 469)

Individual level effects on attitudes towards immigration

The particular focus of this report is to look at – and explain - country differences in aggregate levels of attitudes towards immigration. However, we start with a less complex model. Hypotheses H1 and H2 expect individual level factors to influence attitudes towards immigration. We test the validity of these hypotheses by looking at intra-country patterns regarding individual factors influencing these attitudes.

Table 3 – Impact of individual and country level variables on attitudes towards immigration (source: ESS 2016)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	-0.138	(0.183)	-1.183***	(0.186)	-1.613***	(0.189)	-0.878***	(0.173)
Age	-0.004***	(0.0013)	-0.003*	(0.0013)	-0.002*	(0.0013)	-0.002+	(0.0013)
University	0.489***	(0.0527)	0.480***	(0.0557)	0.428***	(0.0549)	0.385***	(0.0548)
Female	0.182***	(0.0417)	0.228***	(0.0432)	0.234***	(0.0432)	0.231***	(0.0433)
Urban residence	0.385***	(0.0478)	0.428***	(0.0465)	0.431***	(0.0464)	0.484***	(0.0467)
Institutional trust	0.261***	(0.0127)	0.229***	(0.0129)	0.262***	(0.0127)	0.269***	(0.0129)
Interpersonal trust	0.179***	(0.0134)	0.192***	(0.0138)	0.207***	(0.0137)	0.222***	(0.0138)
Economic satisfaction	0.172***	(0.0306)	0.199***	(0.0313)	0.237***	(0.0308)	0.253***	(0.0306)
Life satisfaction	-0.004	(0.0124)	0.002	(0.0125)	-0.014	(0.0126)	0.003	(0.0125)
Religiosity	-0.0107	(0.0075)	-0.026***	(0.0076)	-0.036***	(0.0076)	-0.032***	(0.007)
Victim of burglary/assault	0.111+	(0.0576)	0.379***	(0.0588)	0.335***	(0.0594)	0.312***	(0.059)
Feeling safe at dark	0.374***	(0.0281)	0.463***	(0.0284)	0.450***	(0.0283)	0.447***	(0.028)
Use of internet	0.063***	(0.017)	0.087***	(0.0170)	0.091***	(0.017)	0.100***	(0.017)
GDP per capita			3.15***	(3.39)				
% Tertiary Education					0.133***	(0.009)		
Unemployment rate							0.0573***	(0.004)
Country institutional trust								
Media direction								
Media Prevalence								
Patriotism								
Nationalism								
Model Summary								
Adjusted R ²	0.257		0.204		0.210		0.209	
Country dummies	YES		NO		NO		NO	
Observations	15,208		15,208		15,208		15,208	

Table 3 continued...

	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	-0.263	(0.201)	-0.125	(0.168)	-0.0239	(0.163)	-0.160	(0.207)
Age	-0.00203	(0.00137)	-0.00252+	(0.00138)	-0.00225+	(0.00136)	-0.00200	(0.00137)
University	0.433***	(0.0558)	0.456***	(0.0554)	0.444***	(0.0544)	0.431***	(0.0557)
Female	0.230***	(0.0435)	0.225***	(0.0433)	0.217***	(0.0429)	0.230***	(0.0435)
Urban residence	0.401***	(0.0467)	0.398***	(0.0465)	0.351***	(0.0463)	0.403***	(0.0468)
Institutional trust	0.243***	(0.0133)	0.238***	(0.0128)	0.271***	(0.0127)	0.245***	(0.0131)
Interpersonal trust	0.209***	(0.0139)	0.204***	(0.0138)	0.214***	(0.0136)	0.210***	(0.0139)
Economic satisfaction	0.251***	(0.0310)	0.237***	(0.0309)	0.268***	(0.0304)	0.253***	(0.0309)
Life satisfaction	0.00402	(0.0125)	0.00448	(0.0125)	0.00602	(0.0124)	0.00443	(0.0126)
Religiosity	-0.0309***	(0.00779)	-0.0278***	(0.00766)	-0.0332***	(0.00755)	-0.0315***	(0.00769)
Victim of burglary/assault	0.410***	(0.0592)	0.394***	(0.0589)	0.317***	(0.0590)	0.408***	(0.0593)
Feeling safe at dark	0.451***	(0.0283)	0.447***	(0.0282)	0.413***	(0.0278)	0.450***	(0.0283)
Use of internet	0.101***	(0.0169)	0.0933***	(0.0170)	0.0906***	(0.0169)	0.101***	(0.0169)
GDP per capita								
% Tertiary Education								
Unemployment rate								
Country institutional trust	0.00258	(0.0342)						
Media direction			0.101***	(0.0232)				
Media Prevalence					-0.00805***	(0.000534)		
Patriotism							-0.0232	(0.0342)
Nationalism								
Model Summary								
R square	0.198		0.200		0.214		0.198	
Country dummies	YES		NO		NO		NO	
Observations	15,208		15,208		15,208		15,208	

Based on the ESS Round 8 data, Model 1 in Table 3 shows the effect of individual level variables on attitudes towards immigration in general in several countries. We included a set of demographic variables such as age, gender⁹, level of education¹⁰ and type of settlement¹¹ as control variables. We also included other various variables measuring beliefs and attitudes assumed to influence attitudes towards immigra-

9 Estimated by a binary variable where 1 indicates female and 0 male.

10 Estimated by a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent holds a university degree and 0 otherwise.

11 Estimated by a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent resides in an urban area and 0 otherwise.

tion – interpersonal trust¹², institutional trust¹³, economic satisfaction¹⁴, life satisfaction¹⁵, religiosity¹⁶, feeling of insecurity¹⁷. Finally, in order to test our hypothesis regarding media consumption, we also included a variable measuring the respondents' frequency of internet usage¹⁸.

The results of the regression analysis with country fixed effects for all 8 countries of interest show that we were able to explain around 26 % of the variance in attitudes towards immigration with our individual level model. The coefficients of Model 1 in Table 3 on the individual socioeconomic characteristics confirm the results of numerous previous studies: attitudes towards immigration are more positive among younger and higher educated individuals, women and those residing in urban areas. Institutional trust, interpersonal trust, economic satisfaction and feeling of security also significantly positively affect attitudes towards immigration, whereas life satisfaction and religiosity have no significant effect. In line with hypothesis H1 stating that *higher levels of media consumption are expected to accentuate attitudinal differences to immigration*, our results show that higher levels of internet usage lead to significantly more positive attitudes towards immigration.




Figure 21 - Dot-and-Whisker Plots of the Covariates of Attitudes towards different types of immigrants in the European Social Survey Round 8 (source: ESS 2016)

Based once more on data from the ESS Round 8 we also analysed factors affecting attitudes towards several types of immigrants – those of the same race as the country's majority, those of a different race as the country's majority, and towards those from poorer countries outside Europe. As the original scale of these dependent variables is ordinal, we performed a series of ordinal regression models with countries fixed effects. To facilitate the comparison within the three models, we present our results as a dot-and-whisker plot of three regressions that explain attitudes towards different types of immigrants (Figure 21). The dots are odds ratios and the whiskers correspond to 95% confidence intervals. A vertical line at one represents the null hypothesis for which no overlap with a whisker means a statistically significant effect.

- 12 Interpersonal trust was measured by three variables. 1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? 3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Each question was measured on a 0 to 10 scale. The interpersonal trust index denotes a simple mean of the three items and the Cronbach's alpha is 0.74.
- 13 Institutional trust is measured by a number of variables measuring the respondents' trust in, respectively, the legal system, police, politicians, parliament and political parties. Each question was measured on a 0 - 10 scale. The interpersonal trust index denotes a simple mean of the five items and the Cronbach's alpha is 0.87.
- 14 The variable asked the respondent's feeling regarding household's income nowadays. Possible answers: 1. Very difficult on present income 2. Difficult on present income 3. Coping on present income 4. Living comfortably on present income. The variable was measured on a 1 – 4 scale, with higher values indicating higher economic satisfaction (the original scale was reversed).
- 15 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? The variable is measured on a 0 – 10 scale and higher numbers indicate higher life satisfaction.
- 16 How religious are you? The variable is measured on a 0 – 10 scale and higher numbers indicate more religiosity.
- 17 Feeling of security is measured by two variables. The variable "feeling safe at dark" was measured with a question asking; How safe do you – or would you - feel walking alone in this area after dark? Variable "Victim of burglary/assault" was measured with a question asking; Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?
- 18 How often do you use the internet? The variable is measured on a 1 – 5 scale, with possible answers being; 1. Never; 2. Only occasionally; 3. A few times a week; 4. Most days; 5. Every day.

As Figure 21 shows, there are multiple consistent effects across all three models. This suggests that the effects of several predictors on attitudes towards immigrants are consistent irrespective of the type of immigrants in question. For instance, university has a consistent positive effect on attitudes towards all three types of immigrants. This finding is in line with a wide body of scholarship regarding the positive effect of education on attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. As was the case with attitudes towards immigration, women and people living in urban areas are significantly more likely to welcome immigrants in their countries. We have also found a robust positive effect of interpersonal and institutional trust, economic satisfaction and general feeling of safety. On the other hand, we were not able to detect any age difference in attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly, life satisfaction appears to have no significant effect across all three models. Religiosity has a significantly negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants of a different race and those from poorer countries outside Europe, while there is no significant effect in attitudes towards immigrants of the same race/ethnic group. Nevertheless, overall, religiosity explains relatively little regarding attitudes towards immigrants in our analysis.

Our primary concern in this analysis is the effect of the frequency of internet usage on attitudes towards immigrants. A respondent that uses internet often is significantly more likely to allow immigrants of all three types (those of the same race, of a different race and from poorer countries outside Europe) into her respective country. These findings, once again, are in line with our argument in hypothesis H1 that higher levels of media consumption are expected to accentuate attitudinal differences to immigration.

Finally, Model 1 in Table 4 shows the results of a country fixed effects regression model explaining fear of the effects of immigration. Data from the Special Eurobarometer have been used in this model. The individual level variables are similar, but not identical, as in the previous analysis presented in Table 3. These variables are; age, having a university degree¹⁹, gender²⁰, residing in an urban area²¹, life satisfaction²², difficulties paying bills²³, perception of corruption extent in one own's country²⁴, daily use of internet²⁵, intimate²⁶ and non-intimate²⁷ contact with immigrants and opinions about overall media portrayal of immigrants²⁸. Overall, at the individual level our model can explain about 38.5 % of the variation in fear linked to immigration in the 9 countries of interest (Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Greece, Malta, Spain, Sweden and Hungary). Being older, without a university degree, having difficulties paying bills, having low life satisfaction, perceiving high levels of corruption in one own's country and believing that the media portrays immigrants too positively are all factors that contribute to more fear regarding the effects of immigration. On the other hand, once more in line with hypothesis H6, frequent use of internet reduces the fear of immigration. Our analysis also shows that while having frequent, but not intimate contact with immigrants significantly increases the fear of immigration, having intimate contact reduces the perception

19 Estimated by a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent holds a university degree and 0 otherwise.
 20 Estimated by a binary variable where 1 indicates female and 0 male.
 21 Estimated by a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent resides in an urban area and 0 otherwise.
 22 On the whole, are you (4. Very satisfied, 3. Fairly satisfied, 2. Not very satisfied or 1. Not at all satisfied) with the life you lead?
 23 During the last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month...? 1. Almost never/never, 2. From time to time, 3. Most of the time.
 24 How widespread do you think the problem of corruption is in (our country)? 1. There is no corruption in (our country); 2. Very rare; 3. Fairly rare; 4. Fairly widespread; 5. Very widespread.
 25 Estimated by a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the respondent uses internet daily and 0 otherwise.
 26 Estimated by a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the respondent has immigrants either as friends, family or both and 0 if none of these.
 27 On average, how often do you interact with immigrants? Interaction can mean anything from exchanging a few words to doing an activity together? A. In your workplace, at a childcare centre, school or university, B. When using public services (e.g. hospitals, local authorities' services, public transport), C. In your neighbourhood (e.g. shops, restaurants, parks and streets), D. During sport, volunteering or cultural activities, E. When using household services (e.g. home helps, cleaners, repair technicians or babysitters). The variables are measured on a 1 – 5 scale where 1. Daily; 2. At least once a week; 3. At least once a month; 4. At least once a year; 5. Less often or never. The non-intimate contact index denotes a simple mean of the six items and higher numbers indicate more contact (the original scale was reversed). The Cronbach's alpha of the index is 0.84.
 28 When matters concerning immigrants are presented in the media, do you think that they are presented too positively, in an objective way or too negatively? Estimated by a dummy variable where 1 indicates whether a respondent thinks media refer to immigrants too positively and 0 otherwise.

of potential threat that comes from immigration. These findings are in line with contact theory and our hypothesis H2 stating that *intimate contact with immigrants should lead to more positive attitudes to immigration, whereas non-intimate contact with immigrants should lead to more negative attitudes.*

Unfortunately, there are not many available cross-country datasets measuring attitudes towards immigration in the countries of interest in the Southern Mediterranean region. This is mostly given by the fact that Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia are predominantly sending, not receiving countries. Therefore, opinions about the effects of immigration and attitudes towards immigrants are not a salient issue in these countries. Nevertheless, World Value Survey provides at least some information regarding opinions towards immigration policy and immigrants in these countries.

Table 4– Impact of individual and country level variables on fear of immigration (source: Special Eurobarometer 469)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	2.810***	(0.0524)	3.664***	(0.155)	3.775***	(0.109)	3.390***	(0.146)
Age	0.001**	(0.000395)	-3.98e-05	(0.000462)	-0.000100	(0.000574)	-0.00103	(0.000790)
Female	-0.0223+	(0.0120)	-0.0174	(0.0118)	-0.0209	(0.0126)	-0.0182	(0.0106)
Urban residence	-0.0332**	(0.0128)	-0.0823*	(0.0356)	-0.0558+	(0.0294)	-0.0797+	(0.0347)
Higher education	-0.130***	(0.0141)	-0.179***	(0.0237)	-0.140***	(0.0199)	-0.183***	(0.0314)
Life satisfaction	-0.119***	(0.00944)	-0.122***	(0.0147)	-0.147***	(0.0173)	-0.161***	(0.0162)
Daily use of internet	-0.065***	(0.0161)	-0.0898***	(0.0120)	-0.0928***	(0.0155)	-0.115***	(0.0191)
Difficulties paying bills	0.079***	(0.0226)	0.0473	(0.0438)	0.168**	(0.0480)	0.110+	(0.0561)
Not intimate contact	0.047***	(0.00603)	0.0372*	(0.0158)	0.0397+	(0.0185)	0.0419	(0.0227)
Intimate contact	-0.309***	(0.0136)	-0.368***	(0.0270)	-0.350***	(0.0415)	-0.387***	(0.0337)
Media portrayal	0.425***	(0.0166)	0.427***	(0.0500)	0.416***	(0.0499)	0.398***	(0.0502)
Perception of corruption extent	-0.071***	(0.00808)	-0.0602*	(0.0209)	-0.0883**	(0.0237)	-0.108**	(0.0242)
GDP			-1.35**	(3.74e-06)				
% of Tertiary Education Aged 30-34					-0.0150*	(0.00460)		
Unemployment rate							-0.00124	(0.00839)
Country average media reporting about immigration								
Tolerance to corruption index								
Corruption extent in country index								
Model Summary								
R square	0.385		0.349		0.352		0.331	
Country dummies	YES		NO		NO		NO	
Observations	8,403		8,403		8,403		8,403	

Table 4 continued

	Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	2.661**	(0.644)	2.486***	(0.305)	2.444**	(0.663)	6.080**	(1.438)
Age	-0.00104	(0.000818)	-0.000149	(0.000431)	-0.000404	(0.000658)	0.000578	(0.000519)
Female	-0.0157	(0.0106)	-0.0205	(0.0113)	-0.0171	(0.0111)	-0.0189	(0.0134)
Urban residence	-0.0723+	(0.0331)	-0.0614+	(0.0289)	-0.0851*	(0.0354)	-0.0476+	(0.0222)
Higher education	-0.182***	(0.0289)	-0.179***	(0.0277)	-0.172***	(0.0272)	-0.152***	(0.0209)
Life satisfaction	-0.163***	(0.0159)	-0.138***	(0.0188)	-0.140***	(0.0175)	-0.113***	(0.0106)
Daily use of internet	-0.109***	(0.0179)	-0.0951***	(0.0157)	-0.0969***	(0.0116)	-0.0738***	(0.00926)
Difficulties paying bills	0.0830	(0.0459)	0.105*	(0.0401)	0.0767	(0.0611)	0.0842**	(0.0249)
Not intimate contact	0.0501+	(0.0252)	0.0222+	(0.0113)	0.0450+	(0.0228)	0.0354*	(0.0144)
Intimate contact	-0.378***	(0.0356)	-0.361***	(0.0323)	-0.378***	(0.0324)	-0.323***	(0.0330)
media portrayal	0.383***	(0.0470)	0.406***	(0.0468)	0.420***	(0.0510)	0.420***	(0.0479)
Perception of corruption extent	-0.113**	(0.0259)	-0.106**	(0.0238)	-0.0669***	(0.0125)	-0.0714***	(0.0117)
GDP							-2.99e-05*	(1.06e-05)
% of Tertiary Education Aged 30-34							-0.0163+	(0.00779)
Unemployment rate							0.000615	(0.0197)
Country average media reporting about immigration	0.386	(0.338)					0.319	(0.346)
Tolerance to corruption index			0.600**	(0.161)			-0.188	(0.418)
Corruption extent in country index					0.182	(0.145)	-0.381	(0.219)
Model Summary								
R square	0.335		0.350		0.339		0.373	
Country dummies	NO		NO		NO		NO	
Observations	8,403		8,403		8,403		8,403	

Table 5 shows the percentage of respondents in several Southern Mediterranean countries of interest who would not like to have an immigrant as their neighbour²⁹. Table 5 also includes information on few countries of interest in Europe included in the World Value Survey for the ease of better comparison. Asking this type of question seems especially appropriate in these countries. While questions regarding specific immigration effects or regarding immigration policy may simply not be an issue the respondents feel particularly strongly about, having immigrants as their immediate neighbours should feel relevant. Table 5 shows that, overall, the percentage of respondents not wanting an immigrant as their neighbour is generally higher in countries from the Southern Mediterranean region than in European countries. We therefore explore attitudes towards immigration in these countries with more detail, provided by Figure 22 and Table 6.

29 Who would you not like to have as neighbours? Binary variable indicating 1 when respondent mentioned Immigrants/foreign workers and 0 when not mentioned.

Table 5 – Percentage of respondents not wanting an immigrant/foreign worker as their neighbour by country (source: World Value Survey 2010 – 2014)

Country	Who would you not like to have as neighbours - immigrants/foreign workers
Algeria	28%
Germany	21.4 %
Jordan	37.2 %
Lebanon	40.4 %
Morocco	10.8 %
Palestine	39.9 %
Spain	7.5 %
Sweden	3.5 %
Tunisia	18.84 %

Figure 22 summarizes graphically and from a different perspective what was already observed in Table 5, specifically concentrating on the countries from the Southern Mediterranean. We can immediately observe from Figure 22 that the between-country variation regarding attitudes towards immigrants as neighbours is quite large in the region. Lebanon and Palestine are the two countries where respondents are willing the least to accept immigrants as their neighbours (around 40 percent of respondents in both countries would mind). In contrast, only 10 percent of respondents would mind immigrants as their neighbours in Morocco. In order to look more into detail regarding these differences, Table 6 shows the percentage of respondents expressing not wanting an immigrant as their neighbour within socio-demographic characteristics by country.

Table 6 generally confirms our expectations regarding socio-demographics effects on attitudes towards immigration. Nevertheless, there are a few interesting points worth highlighting. It appears that age makes no difference on attitudes towards immigration. In each country, the distribution between age




Figure 22 – Country means of not wanting immigrants as neighbours for countries in the Southern Mediterranean region (source: World Value Survey 2010 – 2014)

categories in mind having immigrants as neighbours seems to be fairly equal. Interpersonal trust seems to contribute little to more welcoming attitudes towards immigrants – especially in Morocco, where almost 60 % of those generally trusting of others would mind immigrants as their neighbours. While in Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon about 40 % of religious respondents would refuse immigrants as their neighbours, only 9 % of religious people would do so in Morocco. Moreover, while in Jordan and Lebanon non-religious people would not accept immigrants as their neighbours almost at the same rate as religious ones, in Palestine non-religious respondents would mind immigrants much less than those who are religious. These preliminary findings point to the fact that factors influencing attitudes to immigration usually hypothesised for European countries, do not apply as well in other parts of the world.

There appears not to be a particularly large difference between the effects of different media as daily sources of information on individual attitudes towards immigration. However, there are several differences between countries. Using TV, the newspaper or the internet as a daily information source contributes to negative attitudes towards immigrants in Lebanon, Palestine and to some extent in Jordan, but reduces negative attitudes in Tunisia.

Table 6 - Percentage of respondents expressing not wanting an immigrant as their neighbour within socio-demographic characteristics (source: World Value Survey 2010 – 2014)

Age category	Algeria	Palestine	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Tunisia
18 - 40	27.98 %	39.21 %	37.58 %	41.26 %	11.53 %	18.6 %
41 - 60	28.28 %	42.75 %	40.46 %	40.33 %	9.40 %	18.71 %
Over 60	25.62 %	34.85 %	39.47 %	31.58 %	8.55 %	19.5 %
Male	26.25 %	37.09 %	39.11 %	40.31 %	10.76 %	16.30 %
Female	29.42 %	42.58 %	38.07 %	40.27 %	10.60 %	21.48 %
No university education	28.2 %	42.27 %	38.47 %	42 %	10.5 %	19.45 %
Has completed university education	24.56 %	30.30 %	39.52 %	35.21 %	18.52 %	11.54 %
Is non/religious/atheist	48.8 %	25.68 %	40.1 %	41.16 %	23.77 %	14.07 %
Is religious	25.88 %	44.89 %	38.23 %	40 %	9.72 %	18.82 %
Lives in a rural area	27.72 %	N/A	N/A	41.01 %	N/A	N/A
Lives in an urban area	28.16 %	N/A	N/A	43.12 %	N/A	N/A
Was not victim of a crime during the past year	28.57 %	40.34 %	38.77 %	39.74 %	10.53 %	18.84 %
Was victim of a crime during the past year	28.35 %	29.41 %	35.71 %	50.56 %	11.94 %	15 %
Is not trusting of others	27.79 %	41.55 %	39.04 %	39.26 %	10.55 %	18.30 %
Is trusting of others	26.96 %	34.81 %	35.48 %	56.03 %	11.56 %	22.04 %
Daily information source: TV	27.21 %	39.68 %	36.38 %	38.33 %	N/A	15.31 %
TV less frequent	29.93 %	40.56 %	44.4 %	43.38 %	N/A	33.64 %
Daily information source: Newspaper	22.9 %	38.41 %	33.81 %	37.50 %	N/A	13.25 %
Newspaper less frequent	30.98 %	40.17 %	39.37 %	40.51 %	N/A	19.63 %
Daily information source: Internet	27.92 %	38.36 %	36.36 %	43.76 %	N/A	14.32 %
Internet less frequent	28.59 %	40.43 %	39.40 %	37.63 %	N/A	20.70 %

Country level effects on attitudes towards immigration

Apart from individual level characteristics, we also identified several country level factors that may influence attitudes to immigration. Introducing macro level variables gives us the opportunity to capture the context in which individuals are living. For example, while not being concerned regarding the effect of immigration on the personal probability of (un)employment, living in a context of high unemployment may influence individual's concerns regarding the effect of immigration on the economy as a whole. It is therefore important to also control for these macro factors when trying to explain differences in attitudes towards immigration between individuals and between countries.

The macro level characteristics used in further analysis cover several economic, social and political factors. National level economic downturns are measured by countries' GDP per capita and national unemployment rates. Countries' level of education is measured by the percentage of population having a master's degree or equivalent (when analysing ESS) and by the percentage of population aged 30–34 years with tertiary educational attainment (when analysing the Special Eurobarometer 469). Levels of trust in institutions³⁰, nationalism³¹ and patriotism³² are country averages constructed from the fully weighted ESS dataset, while tolerance to corruption index, corruption extent index are country averages constructed directly from the Special Eurobarometer dataset. We also included several variables regarding media. The prevalence of the topic of immigration in the media and the direction of media claims regarding immigration are constructed from the Media Claims dataset in the ESS Round 8. Table B1 in the Appendix B shows the prevalence of the topic of immigration (how many times news about immigration appeared on the front cover of the two most important national newspapers) and whether this news was positive, negative or neutral, which is based on expert's assessment provided by the ESS.³³ The media prevalence variable shows the frequency of the appearance of media news regarding immigration.

The country-level assessment of media reporting regarding immigrants is constructed directly from the information available in the Special Eurobarometer. Generally, it measures whether respondents think the media reports too negatively, neutrally, or too positively regarding immigration. Table B2 in the Appendix B shows what are the actual times media reported about immigration in the years 2014 – 2016 and the direction of the claims (taken from ESS) and what are the national percentages of people for each category regarding the opinion about media reporting (too positive, neutral, too negative). What we can observe, for example, is that while in countries like France and Sweden the majority of respondents believes that the media report too negatively about immigration and immigrants, they in fact report mostly positively, according to the expert's assessment. This is in a sharp contrast with countries like Hungary, where the media reports about immigration mostly negatively (66.6 %), while half of the respondents believe that media news regarding immigration are mostly neutral. Values of country level factors used in the analysis for each country are presented in Table B3 in the Appendix B.

To begin with, we looked at the strengths of the relationship between the macro level variables of interest and all our dependent variables. Table 7 and Table 8 summarize this preliminary analysis by presenting a correlation matrix. Statistically significant relationships were found for most of the macro level factors hypothesized to affect attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. GDP per capita and the share of

³⁰ Institutional trust is measured by several variables measuring the respondents' trust in, respectively, the legal system, police, politicians, parliament and political parties. Each question was measured on a 0 to 10 scale. The interpersonal trust index denotes a simple mean of the five items and the Cronbach's alpha is 0.81.

³¹ How emotionally attached are you to your country? The variable is measured on a 0 – 10 scale where 0 means not at all emotionally attached and 10 very emotionally attached.

³² Patriotism is measured by several variables measuring the respondents' satisfaction with, respectively, the way democracy works in their country, the present state of economy in country, the state of education, health services and the national government. Each question was measured on a 0 to 10 scale. The interpersonal trust index denotes a simple mean of the five items and the Cronbach's alpha is 0.87.

³³ For the country level variables, we coded positive news as 1, neutral as 0 and negative -1 and we created a scale for each country. We used only information regarding news about immigration and not those regarding the effect of immigration on economy and culture, as this information was not available for each country included in the analysis.

the population with tertiary education are one of the factors which correlate strongly with attitudes towards immigration. These factors are positively correlated with welcoming immigrants of different race or those from poorer countries outside of Europe, while they show a strong negative relationship with fear regarding the effect of immigration. Other macro level factors also seem to significantly correlate with attitudes to immigration, although some relationships are rather weak (unemployment rate, media prevalence and institutional trust). Large shares of higher educated populations appear to have a strong positive relationship with allowing immigrants of a different race and from poorer countries outside EU into one own's country as well as with the Fear index. The two variables measuring corruption appear to have a strong relationship with fear of immigration. Nationalism seems to be strongly negatively correlated with the willingness to allow immigrants of a different race and from poorer countries outside the EU into one own's country, it does not influence general attitudes towards immigration nor the willingness to allow immigrants from the same race. Patriotism seems to form exactly the opposite types of effects.

Table 7– Correlations of country level factors and attitudes towards immigration/immigrants (source: ESS 2016)

	Country better with immigration	Allow immigrants of same race	Allow immigrants of different race	Allow immigrants from poorer countries outside EU
GDP per capita	0.5794*	0.5300*	0.7430*	0.7186*
% of population with tertiary education	0.3033*	0.2171*	0.5135*	0.6179*
Unemployment rate	0.0454*	-0.2947*	0.2567*	0.3316*
Media direction	0.3913*	0.2936*	0.4219*	0.3836*
Media prevalence	-0.2427*	-0.2460*	-0.1373*	-0.1775*
Institutional trust	0.4100*	0.3768*	0.3709*	0.2614*
Patriotism	0.4121*	0.5513*	0.2752*	0.2027*
Nationalism	-0.4269*	-0.3097*	-0.7536*	-0.7740*

Note: Correlation coefficients with Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels. *=1%

Table 8 – Correlations of country level factors and the Fear index (source: Special Eurobarometer 469)

	Fear Index
Fear Index	1.00
GDP per capita	-0.7349*
% of population aged 30-34 with Tertiary Education	-0.6707*
Unemployment rate	0.1542*
Media Reporting about Immigrants	0.2192*
Tolerance to Corruption Index	0.6582*
Corruption Perception Index	0.5972*

Note: Correlation coefficients with Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels. *=1%

In order to investigate how attitudes to immigration may change with macroeconomic circumstances, we firstly compare average attitudes by country with the macro level factors mentioned above. This is done in Figures 23-38 showing how several macro level factors are related to the five dependent variables of interest. Secondly, we investigate the strengths of the effect of the macro-level factors in a regression analysis, while controlling for individual level characteristics. Results and regression coefficients for attitudes towards immigration are presented in Table 3 and for the Fear index in Table 4. For ease of comparison, odds ratios for attitudes towards different types of immigrants are presented in the form of figures (Figure 23 and 24). Just as in the regressions presented as a table, individual level factors are controlled for, but omitted from the figure.




Figure 23 – Odds ratios from three ordinal logistic regressions. Effects of macro level factors on attitudes towards different types of immigrants (source: ESS 2016)




Figure 24 – Odds ratios from three ordinal logistic regressions. Effects of macro level factors on attitudes towards different types of immigrants (source: ESS 2016)

In our hypothesis H3, we expected that Countries with higher economic development should have more positive attitudes to immigration, whereas national level economic downturns should lead to more negative attitudes towards immigration. We tested this hypothesis by looking at two factors measuring the economic prosperity of countries – GDP per capita (current prices) and national unemployment rates. Based on H1, we expected countries with higher economic development, that is to say higher GDP per capita, to hold more positive attitudes to immigration, whereas countries with higher rates of unemployment to be less favourable. Figures 23, 25, and 26 preliminarily confirm these expectations.

Concerning GDP per capita, all patterns are very similar regardless the type of the dependent variable in question. People living in countries with higher GDP per capita have a more positive attitude towards immigration in general and are also more welcoming to all types of immigrants. Similarly, fear regarding the effects of immigration is lower in more economically developed countries. Nevertheless, when looking at the regression results, we see that while GDP per capita contributes significantly to pro-immigration attitudes and also significantly reduces fear of immigration, it has no significant effects on attitudes towards immigrants. Simply put, on average, there are no statistically significant differences in attitudes to any type of immigrants between respondents living in countries with either a high or low GDP per capita.

The effect of unemployment is slightly surprising. Figure 27 suggests that while higher unemployment rates lead to less welcoming attitudes towards people from the same race/ethnic group, they, on the contrary, lead to more welcoming attitudes towards people from different ethnic groups and from poorer countries outside Europe. This is further confirmed by the results of the three ordinal regressions presented in Figure 23. Moreover, unemployment rates have a very small, but statistically significant effect on general attitudes to immigration.

The overall picture, nevertheless, shows that people living in economically more prosperous countries are more positive towards immigration. On the other hand, when experiencing national economic downturns such as high unemployment rates, people become more hostile towards immigrants (of the same race). This confirms our hypothesis H3.




Figure 26 - The relation between GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars) and Fear of immigration (source Special Eurobarometer 2018)

Education was one of the most significant factors predicting attitudes to immigration at the individual level. Having a university degree reduces the fear of immigration and contributes significantly to positive attitudes towards immigration in general as well as towards all types of immigrants. This fits well also with your findings at the macro level. Countries with larger shares of tertiary educated populations tend to have more pro-immigration attitudes. However, there are some exceptions to this – for example Greece, despite having a relatively high share of population with a tertiary education, manifests very high levels of fear of immigration (Figure 30) and Italy manifests negative attitudes towards immigration in general as well as against immigrants of the same race (Figure 29). Nevertheless, results from the regressions confirm the preliminary general picture, since the coefficients and odds ratios are statistically significant. Our hypothesis H4 expecting that




Figure 25 – The relation between GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars) and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)




Figure 27 – The relation between unemployment rate and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)

countries with higher shares of populations with tertiary education should have more positive attitudes to immigration has been therefore confirmed.

In H5, we expected countries with weaker states to display more negative attitudes to immigration. We measure the weakness of the state by the presence and level of corruption and trust in state institutions. Firstly, we examined the relationship between general level of trust towards institutions of the state and attitudes towards immigration and the three indicators measuring attitudes to various types of immigrants. We found that institutional trust on a country level significantly contributes to more welcoming attitudes towards immigrants, but we found only a weak relationship between institutional trust and general attitudes towards immigration. Secondly, we looked at the effects of levels of perceived corruption and of tolerance to corruption. Both of these factors weaken the state and especially the trust people have in their country. The




Figure 28 - The relation between unemployment rate and Fear of immigration (source Special Eurobarometer 2018)




Figure 30 - The relation between the share of population aged 30-34 with tertiary education and Fear of immigration (source Special Eurobarometer 2018)

picture from Figures 32 and 33 is quite clear. In countries with higher tolerance towards corruption and in countries where people perceive corruption to be more widespread the fear of immigration is higher. Nevertheless, as Table 4 shows, only tolerance to corruption leads to significantly more fear from immigration. However, our expectations that in weaker states people fear immigration more and are more hostile towards immigrants were confirmed by the results.

We hypothesized that in countries with higher levels of nationalism attitudes towards the perceived "other" will be more hostile than in countries with more civic forms of national pride. The mechanism proved to be in the expected direction. Countries with higher levels of national pride are significantly less welcoming to immigrants as well as against immigration in general. Countries with higher levels of patriotism, on the other hand, are much more open to immigration and immigrants. It should be noted, however,

that the relationship is much weaker with regards to immigrants of different race or from poorer coun-




Figure 29 – The relation between the share of population with tertiary education and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)




Figure 31 – The relation between institutional trust and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)

tries outside of Europe. There are, again, some exception to this pattern. For instance, as Figure 35 shows, while Austria demonstrates high levels of patriotism, it is relatively unwelcoming to immigrants. However, overall, our hypothesis H6 has been confirmed by our models - countries with higher levels of nationalism display more negative attitudes to immigration and immigrants, while those with high levels of patriotism are generally more positive towards immigration.

Finally, we also had several expectations regarding media effects on attitudes towards immigration. To begin with, we looked at the prevalence of the topic of migration in the two leading newspapers during the time period when fieldwork for the ESS Round 8 was conducted (2014 - 2016) and the direction – positive, neutral or negative – of claims regarding migration. This is all summarized in Table B1 in Appendix B. Another table (Table B2) then shows the difference between expert's assessment of the direction of media claims (from the Media Claim dataset provided by ESS 2016) and how respondents feel regarding media reporting (whether they believe media report about immigration too positively, neutrally or too negatively).

Looking at Figure 36 we see that Austria is quite an outlier. While media coverage of migration was extremely high in the country compared to all other countries, Austria's attitudes towards immigration are very negative. This is in line with the general pattern – more media coverage of the issue of migration leads to more negative attitudes regarding the phenomenon. Nevertheless, and maybe somewhat surprisingly, the prevalence of the topic of immigration significantly influences only attitudes to immigration in general, not attitudes to immigrants.

Regarding media direction, we see from the Figure 37 that Sweden stands in sharp contrast to the rest of the countries - its media coverage of immigration is overwhelmingly positive, unlike in others. As expected, informing about immigration positively leads to significantly more positive attitudes towards immigration as well as towards immigrants. Finally, when, on average, people believe that the media report too positively about immigration, this leads to more fear from immigration. However, this effect is not statistically significant. Moreover, it is possible that the mechanism may work the other way around - in countries where there is, on average, more fear regarding immigration, people generally believe that the media reports too positively about immigration. To conclude, our hypothesis H7 – H9 were generally confirmed. However, H9 stating that countries where the media report negatively regarding migration should display more negative attitudes to immigration found some support – while the direction was confirmed, the hypothesis was not supported by statistical significance.




Figure 32 - The relation between the level of perceived corruption and Fear of immigration (source Special Eurobarometer 2018)




Figure 33 - The relation between the level of tolerance to corruption and Fear of immigration (source Special Eurobarometer 2018)




Figure 34 – The relation between nationalism and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)




Figure 35 – The relation between patriotism and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)






Figure 36 – The relation between prevalence of the news regarding immigration in the media and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)




Figure 37 – The relation between type of media coverage of the immigration issue and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (source ESS 2016)




Figure 38 - The relation between the perception of the way media report about immigration and Fear of immigration (source Special Eurobarometer 2018)

Analysing attitudes to emigration

Data

Questions regarding attitudes towards emigration are not usually asked in European countries. They are far more common in surveys including countries outside of Europe. As we already explained in the previous sections, this is mostly due to the salience of the immigration/emigration issue in each respective country. While the everyday life of European respondents is mostly affected by immigration, in countries from the Southern Mediterranean region emigration plays a more prominent role. Unfortunately, there is a lacuna of available cross-national comparable data regarding attitudes to emigration in the European countries of interest. In this report, we therefore concentrate on the determinants of attitudes to emigration in the Southern Mediterranean region, with a special focus on media effects. We investigated media effects at the individual level – how the sources of daily news and the frequency of social media usage influences attitudes towards emigration. Unfortunately, due to the lack of available data, we were not able to investigate how mass media prevalence of the topic of migration may also influence these attitudes.

We use data from the Arab Barometer IV wave conducted in 2016 and 2017 that provides data regarding attitudes to emigration for all countries of interest in the Southern Mediterranean region; Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia. The Arab Barometer fourth wave includes nationally representative face-to-face public opinion surveys and, in most countries, the sample includes 1200 citizens.

Attitudes towards emigration

Unlike with attitudes towards immigration, measuring attitudes towards emigration is quite straightforward. Our dependent variable under examination signifies whether the respondents has intentions to emigrate or to re-emigrate. It is defined as a binary variable taking the value one if the respondent indicated a willingness to emigrate and takes the value of zero otherwise.³⁴ Table 9 shows the overall percentage of respondents thinking about emigration in each country. We can observe that in most countries up to one-third or one-quarter of respondents has thought about emigration. Only in Egypt the number of respondents thinking about emigration is quite low (15,6 %).

³⁴ Do you think about emigrating from your country? A binary variable denotes 1 when the respondents thinks about emigrating from his/her country and 0 otherwise.

Table 9 - Overall percentage of respondents expressing willingness to emigrate in countries (source: Arab Barometer 2017)

	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Tunisia
Overall within respondents in country	22.8 %	15.6 %	23.8 %	33.2 %	27.6 %	27.7 %	22.42 %

Individual level effects on attitudes towards emigration

Hypotheses H1 and H2 expect several individual level factors to influence attitudes towards emigration and we test their validity by looking at intra-country patterns regarding individual factors influencing these attitudes. We include several independent variables to test our hypotheses. Specifically, these are sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender³⁵, unemployment status³⁶, marital status³⁷, living in an urban area and educational level³⁸. We also control for a bad economic situation of the respondent³⁹, whether the respondent finds that sometimes news are forbidden in his country⁴⁰, his or her daily sources of news (Tv, newspaper, internet)⁴¹, whether the respondent uses internet to find out about political activities⁴², whether the respondent uses internet to express political opinion⁴³ and whether the respondent actively uses social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram)⁴⁴.

Table 10 shows the percentages of respondents expressing their willingness to emigrate by different socio-economic characteristics. We can make already few observations from the table regarding our hypothesis H1 expecting those who are willing to emigrate to be predominantly male, unemployed and single. We observe, as expected, that in most countries around 60 per cent or more of those pro-emigration respondents are male. However, in Palestine the gender distribution within pro-emigration respondents seems more equal. We also notice country differences in the willingness to emigrate and unemployment. While many of those willing to emigrate are unemployed in Morocco (34 %), Algeria (21.1 %) and Tunisia (23.7 %), it is only 6.3 % in Egypt and 10.4 % in Lebanon. University education seems to contribute equally to the propensity to emigrate in all countries. While in Algeria and Morocco those willing to emigrate are overwhelmingly not married, in other countries only about a third of the respondents willing to emigrate is single. Regarding other socio-demographics, we see that in all countries the youngest age category is the one mostly willing to emigrate. While in Algeria and Morocco it is almost exclusively the young respondents who are willing to emigrate, in other countries it is around three quarters of the sample of their respective countries. The rest is represented by the middle-aged group (between 40 and 60 years old), while we observe that those among the respondents who are willing to emigrate and are between 40 and 60 years old represent around three and half per cent of the Algerian sample and around 7 per cent in Morocco. Except for Egypt, most of the respondents among those willing to emigrate in each country lives in an urban settlement and around half of them finds themselves in a bad economic situation.

35 A binary variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise.

36 A binary variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent is unemployed and 0 otherwise.

37 A binary variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent is not married and 0 otherwise.

38 A binary variable equal to one when the youth has university education and 0 otherwise.

39 How would you evaluate your current household economic situation? 1. Very good, 2. Good, 3. Bad, 4 Very bad

40 When you want to get newspapers, magazines, foreign books, or view sites on the internet, do you sometimes find it is forbidden by the government and/or its agencies?

41 In general, do you follow political news through the television, newspaper, internet.

42 Do you use the internet in order to find out about political activities?

43 Do you use the internet in order to express your opinion about political issues?

44 Are you a member of or participant in Facebook? Are you a member of or participant in Twitter? Are you a member of or participant in Instagram? Binary variables that denote 1 when the respondents uses the social media and 0 otherwise.

Table 10 - Percentage of Respondents within those expressing their willingness to emigrate by socio-demographic characteristic countries (source: Arab Barometer 2017)

AGE CATEGORY	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Tunisia
18 - 40	95.7 %	75.5 %	72.5 %	68.8 %	91.8 %	77 %	72.4 %
41 - 60	3.6 %	23.4 %	25.2 %	28.3 %	7.2 %	21.6 %	22.3 %
Over 60	0.7 %	1.1 %	2.3 %	2.9 %	1 %	1.4 %	5.3 %
Is male	64.5 %	67 %	57.9 %	59.4 %	80.3 %	54.3 %	65.4 %
Is unemployed	21.1 %	6.3 %	22.4 %	10.4 %	34 %	18.3 %	23.7 %
Has a university education	30 %	24.4 %	25.7 %	24.8 %	22.6 %	33.9 %	31.2 %
Is not married	78.3 %	27.6 %	30.5 %	35.1 %	74.3 %	31.5 %	45.3 %
Feels in very bad or bad economic situation	43.4 %	42 %	50.5 %	69.4 %	44.9 %	47.7 %	47.3 %
Lives in an urban area	65.5 %	51 %	85.4 %	73.4 %	61.9 %	72 %	75.8 %

Table 11 provides a different perspective. While Table 10 revealed what are the socio-demographic characteristics of those willing to emigrate, Table 11, on the other hand, shows us how many percent from each category of interest are willing to emigrate. Table 11 reveals some interesting observations – for instance, while in all other countries the number is around thirty percent, over 65 % of males in Tunisia are willing to emigrate. On the other hand, university seems to contribute almost equally to the likelihood of emigration in each country – between twenty and forty percent of those having a university education are willing to emigrate. In Morocco the unemployed have a much higher propensity to emigrate compared to all other countries – more than half of those unemployed are willing to emigrate. Using internet as a daily source of information appears to be an especially pushing factor for the willingness to emigrate in Morocco and Tunisia, where over half of the respondents who use internet are willing to emigrate. Regarding social media, Twitter and Instagram seem to be especially important in Morocco and Tunisia. Around sixty percent of those respondents who use Twitter and Instagram in these countries are willing to emigrate.

Table 11 - Percentage of each group expressing a willingness to emigrate (source: Arab Barometer 2017)

Age category	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Tunisia
18 - 40	34.66 %	21.75 %	31.43 %	38.76 %	44.84 %	35.55 %	34.88 %
41 - 60	3.02 %	8.89 %	17.72 %	27.81 %	5.56 %	18.60 %	13.16 %
Over 60	1.79 %	3.85 %	4.76 %	13.33 %	3.45 %	4.65 %	7.61 %
Female	16.17 %	10.46 %	20 %	27.04 %	10.85 %	24.84 %	15.50 %
Male	29.53 %	20.76 %	27.6 %	39.47 %	44.48 %	30.83 %	65.4%
Is unemployed	41.91 %	31.58 %	37.74 %	45.22 %	64.37 %	37.65 %	33.86 %
Is employed	20.16 %	20.76 %	28.87 %	34.07 %	27.59 %	29.10 %	23.73 %
Has a university education	28.18 %	23.12 %	29.11 %	33.51 %	43.10 %	40.65 %	38.71 %
Lower than univesity	21.25 %	14.19 %	22.38 %	33.19 %	25.02 %	23.89 %	18.86 %
Is not married	44.47 %	35.62 %	39.93 %	41.47 %	62.12 %	41.67 %	48.61 %
Rural	22.98 %	13.94 %	19.26 %	32.55 %	26.3 %	24.54 %	16.93 %
Lives in an urban area	22.74 %	17.78 %	24.8 %	29.92 %	28.55 %	29.27 %	25 %
Finds news are forbidden	31.37 %	31.82 %	34.56 %	29.69 %	51.79 %	31.40 %	33.33 %
Gets news daily from:							
TV	15.63 %	13.75 %	19.33 %	30.94 %	21.2 %	23.67 %	16.89 %
Newspaper	15.79 %	18.97 %	25.53 %	19.30 %	28.89 %	29.55 %	18.6 %
Internet	46.15 %	28.72 %	35.65 %	42.07 %	54.87 %	36.14 %	52.43 %
Uses the internet in order to:							
Find out about political activities	21.71 %	31.49 %	35.46 %	38.74 %	45.19 %	35.15 %	36.64 %
Express your opinion about political issues	30.34 %	37.25 %	43.65 %	36.21 %	42.41 %	36.45 %	46.9 %
Member or participant of:							
Facebook	33.28 %	28.79 %	33 %	36.99 %	48.33 %	35.24 %	39.44 %
Twitter	43.18 %	26.47 %	38.33 %	39.86 %	60.58 %	49.3 %	52.87 %
Instagram	47.44 %	31.65 %	42.42 %	40.44 %	57.03 %	41.45 %	63.06 %

Table 12 presents the correlation matrix between some variables of interest. Although simple correlations do not point to any form of causality, they, when statistically significant, nonetheless provide a preliminary indication about the sign of the relationship between the variables. We find that being male, not married, having a university education, being unemployed, living in an urban area and having socio-economic concerns are all significantly positively correlated with the willingness to emigrate. However, in all cases the coefficients are very small. It is interesting to note that using internet as a daily source of information is significantly positively correlated with the willingness to emigrate, while using a Tv or a newspaper as a daily source of information are not. Finding that news are forbidden (i.e. censored) in one own's country and using the internet in order to express your opinion about political issues are also positively correlated. Finally, using Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are all positively correlated with the willingness to emigrate.

Table 12 - Correlation matrix between variables of interest (all countries included) (source: Arab Barometer 2017)

	Willing to emigrate	Age	Male	Unemployed	University education	Not married	Bad economic situation	Urban area
Willing to emigrate	1.0000							
Age	-0.2913*	1.0000						
Male	0.1567*	-0.0051	1.0000					
Not married	0.2782*	-0.5234*	0.1672*	1.0000				
University education	0.0979*	-0.1267*	0.0259	0.1240*	1.0000			
Unemployed	0.1467*	-0.1498*	0.1355*	0.2706*	0.0085	1.0000		
Bad economic situation	0.1238*	0.0558*	0.0084	-0.0622*	-0.1516*	0.1102*	1.0000	
Urban area	0.0470*	0.0146	0.0031	0.0211	0.0721*	0.0038	-0.0168	1.0000
Willing to emigrate	1.0000							
Finds News are forbidden	0.0594*	-0.0418	0.0635*	0.0443*	0.1000*	0.0086	-0.0298	0.0433
TV	-0.0372	0.1891*	0.0930*	-0.1197*	0.0480*	-0.0237	-0.0053	0.0702*
Newspaper	0.0358	0.0191	0.1794*	0.0320	0.1759*	-0.0108	-0.1152*	0.0845*
Internet	0.2661*	-0.4692*	0.1300*	0.3604*	0.3366*	0.0802*	-0.1394*	0.1747*
Use the internet in order to find out about political activities	0.0282	0.1173*	0.1135*	-0.0527	0.1190*	-0.0204	-0.0347	0.0022
Use the internet in order to Express your opinion about political issues	0.0554*	0.0577*	0.1068*	-0.0180	0.1168*	-0.0109	-0.0124	-0.0031
Facebook	0.1103*	-0.2176*	0.1096*	0.2074*	0.1188*	0.0538	-0.0613*	-0.0023
Twitter	0.1100*	-0.1178*	0.0650*	0.1464*	0.1128*	0.0122	-0.0243	0.0181
Instagram	0.1346*	-0.2294*	0.0270	0.2352*	0.1235*	-0.0052	-0.0745*	0.0390

The estimation results of a logit model are presented in Table 13. Model 1 controls for basic socio-demographic characteristics, while Models 2 – 10 each add a media variable in order to assess their influence separately. Finally, Model 11 presents the full model that includes all characteristics. All models are country fixed effects logistic regression models (with countries not shown) where entries represent odds ratios.

Table 13 confirms our expectations from the Tables with cross-tabulations (Table 10 and Table 11). In the final model (Model 11), being in a bad economic situation increases the propensity to emigrate by 75 %. We also find that, after controlling for all other characteristics, being male (60 %), not being married (52 %), having a university degree and being unemployed all increase the propensity to emigrate. These results are significant across all model specifications (Models 1 – 11). The connection between these socio-demographic characteristics and the willingness to emigrate are in line with our hypothesis H1, which states that *being male, single, unemployed and educated are all expected to increase one's likelihood of emigrating*. Finally, the results also indicate that older respondents are less likely to emigrate. The corresponding odds ratio implies a 3 % decrease in the probability of emigrating for each year of age in the full model.

Finally, the final model reveals that the effect of traditional media is negative and significant. Receiving news mostly from TV significantly reduces respondents' propensity to emigrate. On the other hand, those who have access to the internet as their main source of information are significantly more likely to decide to emigrate. The estimation of the effects of being a member of, or participating in, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram show some interesting results. Those using either Facebook, Twitter or Instagram are almost half as likely to emigrate compared to those who do not use these social media. Nevertheless, in the final model the use of Instagram is the only relevant determinant in the decision to emigrate, controlling for the use of all other social media types at the same type.

The quantitative results presented here are, generally, in line with previous academic work. They point to socio-economic concerns being the major drivers of migration. Essentially, respondents expressing their willingness to migrate aim at enhancing their ability to have better job and life prospects. This confirms our initial hypothesis H1.

Individuals who have access to traditional media (TV and newspaper) are less likely to emigrate. Since the use of internet as a daily source of information as well as using social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram all play a positive role regarding the propensity to emigrate our hypothesis H2, which stated that *individuals that use social media and have access to traditional media are more likely to have positive attitudes to emigration* was supported.

Table 13 - Logistic model of determinants of willingness to emigrate (source: Arab Barometer 2017)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Odds ratios	S.E.								
Intention to emigrate										
Age	0.953***	(0.00263)	0.953***	(0.00268)	0.953***	(0.00266)	0.953***	(0.00265)	0.963***	(0.00284)
Male	1.989***	(0.114)	1.970***	(0.115)	1.996***	(0.115)	1.938***	(0.113)	1.827***	(0.106)
Not married	1.696***	(0.124)	1.671***	(0.124)	1.681***	(0.124)	1.707***	(0.126)	1.586***	(0.118)
University	1.628***	(0.105)	1.615***	(0.105)	1.632***	(0.105)	1.589***	(0.103)	1.336***	(0.0891)
Unemployed	1.354***	(0.109)	1.360***	(0.111)	1.355***	(0.109)	1.356***	(0.109)	1.382***	(0.112)
Bad economic situation	1.626***	(0.0607)	1.626***	(0.0620)	1.619***	(0.0607)	1.632***	(0.0614)	1.720***	(0.0661)
Urban residence	1.244***	(0.0763)	1.206**	(0.0751)	1.246***	(0.0765)	1.227***	(0.0756)	1.127+	(0.0704)
Finds news are forbidden			1.295**	(0.118)						
Gets news mostly from:										
TV					0.985	(0.0197)				
Newspaper							1.062*	(0.0256)		
Internet									1.215***	(0.0220)
Uses the internet in order to:										
Find out about political activities										
Express your opinion about political issues										
Member or participant of:										
Facebook										
twitter										
Instagram										
Constant	0.159***	(0.0305)	0.158***	(0.0308)	0.165***	(0.0328)	0.141***	(0.0279)	0.0546***	(0.0120)
Observations	8,608		8,314		8,600		8,575		8,593	
Model chi-square	1451		1409		1451		1453		1567	
Df	14		15		15		15		15	
Loglikelihood	-4048		-3928		-4047		-4035		-3986	
Pseudo R2	0.152		0.152		0.152		0.153		0.164	
Country dummies	YES									

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10		Model 11	
	Odds ratios	S.E.										
Age	0.963***	(0.00359)	0.963***	(0.00358)	0.965***	(0.00363)	0.964***	(0.00359)	0.966***	(0.00362)	0.970***	(0.00383)
Male	1.671***	(0.113)	1.658***	(0.112)	1.641***	(0.111)	1.661***	(0.112)	1.672***	(0.113)	1.624***	(0.114)
Not married	1.648***	(0.137)	1.658***	(0.138)	1.630***	(0.136)	1.615***	(0.135)	1.578***	(0.133)	1.522***	(0.131)
University	1.365***	(0.0947)	1.356***	(0.0943)	1.340***	(0.0928)	1.339***	(0.0931)	1.321***	(0.0921)	1.262**	(0.0910)
Unemployed	1.318**	(0.121)	1.316**	(0.121)	1.321**	(0.122)	1.325**	(0.122)	1.362***	(0.126)	1.365**	(0.130)
Bad economic situation	1.726***	(0.0784)	1.720***	(0.0782)	1.717***	(0.0782)	1.732***	(0.0790)	1.745***	(0.0797)	1.755***	(0.0823)
Urban residence	1.058	(0.0777)	1.055	(0.0777)	1.064	(0.0783)	1.057	(0.0779)	1.039	(0.0768)	0.983	(0.0743)
Finds news are forbidden											1.119	(0.113)
Gets news mostly from:												
TV											0.929**	(0.0246)
Newspaper											0.995	(0.0295)
Internet											1.139***	(0.0424)
Uses the internet in order to:												
Find out about political activities	1.165*	(0.0808)									1.042	(0.0879)
Express your opinion about political issues			1.285**	(0.103)							1.150	(0.109)
Member or participant of:												
Facebook					1.460***	(0.140)					1.180	(0.121)
Twitter							1.440***	(0.113)			1.179+	(0.105)
Instagram									1.508***	(0.113)	1.252**	(0.108)
Constant	0.161***	(0.0358)	0.164***	(0.0364)	0.109***	(0.0263)	0.147***	(0.0327)	0.131***	(0.0294)	0.0746***	(0.0231)
Observations	5,039		5,035		5,055		5,047		5,046		4,892	
Model chi-square	668		671.4		681.4		688.2		694.3		715.7	
Df	15		15		15		15		15		23	
Loglikelihood	-2885		-2879		-2886		-2879		-2874		-2767	
Pseudo R2	0.104		0.104		0.106		0.107		0.108		0.115	
Country dummies	YES											

Conclusion

The phenomenon of migration is becoming more and more important in recent decades, since the number of people moving from one country to another is, worldwide, at its highest. Migration clearly has its impact on both the receiving and sending countries and drives many contemporary political decisions as well as policy preferences. These are usually based on public support of these policies. Understanding people's attitudes to migration is therefore of crucial importance. Generally, these attitudes differ vastly between individuals as well as between countries. Understanding attitudes to migration became especially salient during and after the European migration crisis in 2015. We want to emphasize that our analysis contains data that were collected before, during as well as after the crisis. That said, we believe that the trends described in this report, both at the individual and aggregate level, are relatively stable and unaffected by the crises. In this report we investigate some potential factors behind the differences in attitudes towards migration in several countries of interest at the individual, as well as aggregate level.

Our analysis focuses on both attitudes towards immigration as well as attitudes towards emigration. By integrating the literature and data on immigration and emigration together, we provide a more complex picture regarding attitudes to migration. Nevertheless, this approach has not been without problems. The main issue is a lack of available data regarding attitudes to emigration in Europe, while questions regarding immigration are rarely asked in the Southern Mediterranean region. The lack of data speaks to an issue we wish to highlight. For too long, the study of attitudes to migration has been largely divided into studying attitudes towards immigration in Europe and attitudes towards emigration in other parts of the (developing) world. The extent to which models can be applied to other parts of the world is difficult to ascertain given the data limitations. It is clear, however, that the omission of scholarly investigation into attitudes toward immigration in other parts of the world works against our ability to assess whether factors influencing these attitudes apply as well as they do in Europe. Our preliminary analysis shows that this might not be the case - especially the results in the Appendix showing stronger effects of individual level factors in European countries than in the Southern Mediterranean underline that intuition. Recent survey efforts to explore attitudes towards immigration worldwide by the World Value Survey are a welcome addition to this research. Yet, we would like to encourage other, especially cross-national surveys, to begin collecting data on attitudes towards immigration in other parts of the world. This will help to assess the validity of previous research efforts.

Attitudes towards immigration and immigrants are a multidimensional and complex type of attitude. In this report, we study three different types of attitudes to immigration - attitudes towards immigration in general, attitudes towards specific types of immigrants and fear regarding the effects of immigration. These attitudes are interlinked, but each tackles a different aspect of attitudes to immigration. Our analysis at the individual level identified several factors explaining attitudes to immigration in European countries. Overall, younger respondents, women, those with a university degree, those who live in an urban area, who have trust in their country's institutions, who are generally trusting of others, who feel safe at dark and those who use the internet daily have significantly more positive general attitudes towards immigration.

Further, we analysed attitudes to different types of immigrants - we specifically distinguished between immigrants of the same race as the country's majority, immigrants of a different race as the country's majority and immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe. At the individual level, the analysis shows that there are multiple consistent effects across all three models - except for age, European attitudes towards different types of immigrants are influenced by the same factors. Finally, we analysed attitudes towards the effects of immigration on several aspects - by constructing a Fear index regarding the effects of immigration. Being older, without a university degree, having difficulties paying bills, having low life satisfaction, perceiving high levels of corruption in one own's country and believing that the media portrays immigrants too positively are all factors that contribute to more fear regarding the effects of immigration. On the other hand, once again, frequent use of internet reduces the fear of immigration. Our

analysis also indicates that while having frequent, but not intimate contact with immigrants significantly increases the fear of immigration, having intimate contact reduces the perception of potential threat.

We also identified several macro level factors behind the country differences in attitudes towards immigration. Among the most influential is the level of general economic development of a country. Countries with high levels of GDP per capita and low unemployment rates are generally more welcoming to immigrants and do not perceive immigration as a threat. Countries with weaker states – those with high levels of tolerance to corruption, high levels of perceived corruption extent and low institutional trust also manifest more anti-immigration attitudes. Finally, we also showed that while countries with high levels of patriotism (pride in national institutions) are generally pro-immigration, those manifesting high levels of nationalism and emotional national pride and generally much less welcoming to newcomers.

In the section regarding attitudes to emigration we identified several characteristics that increases the average willingness to emigrate in the countries of interest from the Southern Mediterranean region. Overall, we established a socio-demographic profile of people that show a propensity to emigrate. In line with our expectations, the empirical results reveal that men, unmarried respondents, the unemployed and those with a university education have a higher desire to emigrate. Moreover, using internet as a primary source of news promotes the willingness to emigrate, while receiving news primarily from TV acts as a discouragement to emigration. Finally, using social media generally promotes the willingness to emigrate among respondents. Particularly the use of Instagram appears to significantly positively increase the willingness to emigrate, when directly compared to the usage of Facebook and Twitter.

In this report we specifically concentrated on the effect of media on attitudes to migration. Overall, our report shows that media play an important role in shaping both, attitudes to immigration and emigration. At the individual level it is especially the use of internet, compared to the use of traditional media that influences migration attitudes. When used as a daily source of information, internet increases the willingness to emigrate in the Southern Mediterranean region. On the other hand, daily use of internet also decreases the fear of immigration. We also demonstrated that the usage of social media, and especially of Instagram, increases the propensity of the willingness to emigrate. At the country level, we showed that more media coverage of the issue of migration leads to more negative attitudes regarding the phenomenon. The type of messages in the media also matter – unsurprisingly, more negative news lead to significantly less positive attitudes to immigration.

Recommendations for ICMPD stakeholders and media professionals

Recommendations for governmental communication experts and media professionals on how to communicate on migration in a manner that does not drive polarisation

One of the objectives of this report was to analyse the effect of media on attitudes to migration. The results presented here show that both traditional media as well as new forms of communication such as social media need to be considered among the factors that shape attitudes to migration. Complex issues as migration require media mediation of the many competing political, economic and security interests on top of the difficult compromises made to produce new policy. Thus, in this brief overview, we discuss the implications for communication and policy and how both the traditional and new media might help in the development of better informed public debates regarding migration.

- **Do not report 'immigration' as a singular, bi-polar issue. Instead, recognising nuance increases the chance of consensus**

Perhaps the most important insight is that 'immigration' should not be communicated as a singular concept. Our analysis of both data and existing studies shows that individuals are well aware that immigration is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon and that their attitudes towards different types of immigration—in terms of the motivations for coming, the legal route to entry, and socio-demographic characteristics—vary considerably. By discussing immigration in either purely 'good' or 'bad' terms, the debate is forced into bi-polar camps, despite there being vast areas of consensus on policy and effects of immigration, with most recognising that immigration can and does mean many things.

- **Understand that not everyone has the same values and that what constitutes a 'benefit' or 'burden', as well as a priority, of immigration varies for different people in different places**

One of the key insights of the psychological literature on attitudes to immigration is the central importance of human values—our broad motivational goals for life—in forming attitudes. Currently, in Europe, there is overwhelming evidence that those who particularly value 'universalism', whereby people are seen as equal and should have equal opportunities in life, are likely to be pro-immigration. On the other hand, those that value 'security', 'conformity' and 'tradition' are likely to be more opposed. Other human values, such as 'benevolence', 'power', 'self-expression', and 'recognition', are, by contrast, fairly irrelevant. This highlights that none of these values are 'good' or 'bad'—indeed, most individuals see themselves as having good motivations and all human values are important and useful at different times—but just that individuals who prioritise different things are likely to hold differing opinions. To bridge poles, it is important to recognise that 'celebrating diversity', for example, is likely to have positive effects on attitudes to immigration for some and negative for others, despite neither being in the wrong. By taking a more value-balanced approach and considering the varied effects of immigration on a range of issues—the economy, crime, quality of life, to name just three—individuals are less likely to be drawn to competing camps. Put simply, to convince people, it is important to understand their motivations and allay their fears.

- **Countries may develop guidelines and resources for media reporting to encourage responsible and sensitive coverage. A national dissemination strategy that supports media professionals in their understanding and use of the guidelines may be established for the evaluation of the extent to which journalists have embraced and followed these.**

Beside the quantity of news coverage, the quality or framing of the stories of migration plays an important role. Drawing on the findings from our empirical analysis, we show the relationship between positive media coverage of the issue of immigration and a softening of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in general. This effect takes place at the individual level after controlling for other individual-level drivers of attitudes to immigration, such as age, gender, interpersonal trust, religiosity etc. as well as at the aggregate level, where countries with generally positive coverage of the migration issue have, on average, more positive attitudes to immigration and immigrants.

- **We recommend frequent presence and high engagement by governmental organisations on social media, since social media can help governments to better understand, respond to, and attract the attention of specific audiences.**

Our analysis clearly showed that the increased use of social media influences attitudes to migration at the individual level. Governments that enable interactive communication with its citizens contribute to an effective and efficient manner of informing and better understanding complex issues such as migration. Nevertheless, government use of social media must meet tests of credibility, privacy, authority and accountability.

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Appendix A

Full list of existing surveys examining public attitudes to migration in the Southern Mediterranean and typology of questions asked

Note: Please note that 'language' refers to the language in which the source is available and has been hyper-linked.

Title of Survey	Ipsos Mori, Perils of Perception 2017 , available here
Date	2017
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	Approx. 500 individuals via online survey (detailed methodology here)
Question(s) of interest	Out of every 100 prisoners in [Israel], about how many do you think were born in a foreign country? (p. 7)
Language	English
Source	Ipsos Mori
Title of Survey	Ipsos Mori, Perils of Perception 2015 , available here .
Date	2015
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	Approx. 500 (detailed methodology here)
Question(s) of interest	What percentage of the population do you think are immigrants (i.e. not born in this country)? (p. 12)
Language	English
Source	Ipsos Mori
Title of Survey	Gallup Potential Net Migration Survey
Date	2007-2017
Countries	Egypt, Israel, Palestinian Territories (inc. East Jerusalem), Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia
Population surveyed	Approx. 1000 per country (see dataset)
Question(s) of interest	Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country? (see this page)
Language	English
Source	Gallup
Title of Survey	Gallup, Migrant Acceptance Index, 2017 , available here .
Date	August 2017
Countries	Egypt, Israel, Palestinian Territories (inc. East Jerusalem), Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia
Population surveyed	Approx. 1000 per country (see dataset for 2017)
Question(s) of interest	[Do] people think immigrants living in their country, becoming a neighbour and marrying into their families are good things or bad things. The higher the score, the more accepting the population is of migrants. (link)
Language	English
Source	Gallup
Title of Survey	IOM/Gallup, How the world views migration , available here .
Date	2015 (data collected 2012-2014)
Countries	Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon. (pp. 56-57)
Population surveyed	1000/country (As reported by Gallup here)
Question(s) of interest	'In your view, should immigration in this country be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?' and 'Do you think immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens in this country do not want (e.g., low-paying or not prestigious jobs), or mostly take jobs that citizens in this country want?'
Language	English

Source	International Organisation for Migration/ Gallup
Title of Survey	World Values Survey available here.
Date	2012
Countries	Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Algeria
Population surveyed	1200 per country
Question(s) of interest	V46 When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants. (p. 12 of questionnaire) V39 (Do you agree) Would not like to have as neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
Language	English
Source	World Values Survey
Title of Survey	National Identity III – ISSP 2013 available here.
Date	2013
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	1000-2000 per country
Question(s) of interest	Q9. Attitude towards immigrants (scale) a. Immigrants increase crime rates. b. Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY'S] economy c. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY]. d. Immigrants improve [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY] society by bringing new ideas and cultures. e. [COUNTRY's] culture is generally undermined by immigrants. f. Legal immigrants to [COUNTRY] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizens. g. [COUNTRY] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants. h. Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] Q10. Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be... increased a lot o increased a little o remain the same as it is o reduced a little o reduced a lot? o Can't choose Q.11. Which of these statements about immigrants comes closest to your view: Immigrants should retain their culture of origin and not adopt [COUNTRY's] culture. o Immigrants should retain their culture of origin and also adopt [COUNTRY's] culture. o Immigrants should give up their culture of origin and adopt [COUNTRY's] culture. o Can't Choose (pp. 6-7)
Language	English
Source	International Social Survey Programme
Title of Survey	Arab Barometer Third Wave available here.
Date	2012-2014
Countries	Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Algeria, Tunisia
Population surveyed	1200 per country
Question(s) of interest	Q104 Do you think about emigrating from your country? (p. 2) Q206 What are the two most important challenges your country is facing today (from a list) (Refugees included in Palestine survey) (p. 8)
Language	English
Source	Arab Barometer
Title of Survey	Arab Barometer fourth Wave available here.
Date	2016
Countries	Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Algeria, Tunisia
Population surveyed	1200 per country

Question(s) of interest	Q104 Do you think about emigrating from your country? Q104a Why do you want to emigrate (p. 4) Q602. For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care? (Read): (Not all items asked in all countries) Option 3. Immigrants or foreign workers
Language	English
Source	Arab Barometer
Title of Survey	Egypt-HIMS Egypt Household International Migration Survey 2013 available here.
Date	2013
Countries	Egypt
Population surveyed	Around 11,000 (non-migrants)
Question(s) of interest	Scale Intentions to migrate? (p. 139) What is the most important reason of intended migration (p. 152) (Range of factors from country of origin factors, preferred destination factors and country of origin compared with preferred destination factors) When do you intend to migrate? (p. 157) Preferred destination (p. 159) Who would make the decision for you to move abroad? (p. 161) Source of financing intended migration (p. 162) Previous attempts to move abroad and reasons for the failure of these attempts (p. 163) Have you ever been contacted by an employer who wants you to move abroad (p. 352)
Language	English and Arabic
Source	Arab Republic of Egypt Central Agency for Public mobilisation and statistics
Title of Survey	SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 available here.
Date	2016
Countries	Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia
Population surveyed	Around 11,000 (non-migrants)
Question(s) of interest	Q.513 What was the main reason for your move to the country where you spent most time? Q. 514 Did you have legal permission to stay in the country where you spent most time? Q. 515 If you have lived abroad, why did you come back from the country where you spent the most time? Q. 516 Would you like to emigrate or re-emigrate? Q. 517 Which countries most attract you (list 4) Q. 518 Is your first choice random or do you have a specific reason for selecting it? (select from a list of reasons) Q. 519 Could you tell us the main reasons pushing you to want to emigrate? Q. 520 What are the main reasons encouraging you to move abroad? Q. 522 How will you fund your emigration? Q. 523 What are your plans once you are abroad? (chose from stay in country, move, settle, other) Q. 523 If you had the opportunity to emigrate without legal permission, would you? Q. 524 What is the likelihood of this happening in the next five years? Q. 525 Could you tell me if one or more of the following people live abroad? (Interviewer: read the following options – Parents, spouse, Brother(s) sister(s) other family members, friends, colleagues)
Language	English and Arabic
Source	SAHWA
Title of Survey	Jordan-HIMS Household International Migration Survey available here
Date	2014
Countries	Jordan
Population surveyed	Around 1,164 (return-migrants)
Question(s) of interest	Q701 What was the reason for your return from [country] (circle all that apply) Q703 How long before leaving [last country abroad] did you begin to think about leaving Jordan? Q704 who made the decision for you to return from [last country abroad]? Q705 Did you receive any support from [last country abroad] or from Jordan to help you to return? Q706 When you decided to return, did you have any clear idea about what you were going to do back in Jordan? Q709 How do you perceive your experience in [last country abroad]? Q710 Ho w would you compare your economic situation in [last country abroad] compare with now ? Q711 How do you compare your current living standard with that you had in [last country abroad]? Q713 How do you compare the status of your occupation now with that you had in [last country abroad]? Q714 Have you had any problems since returning to Jordan? If yes what problems (interviewer to tick all that apply from a list of i) no job ii) low wage iii) Access to housing iv) Personal/family problems v) difficulties to adapt vi) Other reason vii) Didn't face any problem) Q715 Where (which country) do you intend to live in the future? Q716 What is the main reason for this preference? Q718 When do you plan to leave? Q719 If you were able to go back to [last country abroad], would you still chose to move to another country or not to move abroad? Q801/802/803 Did you send money home when you lived in [last country abroad]? How much/ Q808 How many times? Q818 Apart from money sent back whilst you were living in [last country abroad], how much money did you bring back? Q819 did the money enable you or others to do any of the following? (list)

Language	English and Arabic
Source	The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Department of Statistics

Title of Survey	Current Issue polls
Date	2012 and 2014 reported here
Countries	Jordan
Population surveyed	1200 per year
Question(s) of interest	As a result of the Syrian crisis, Jordan has received hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. Are you happy with the continuation of the reception of more Syrian refugees, or not? (p. 74)
Language	English
Source	Centre for Strategic Studies, MercyCorps and UK FCO Conflict Pool

Title of Survey	Conflict Management between Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Host Communities, Baseline – End-line Survey Results
Date	2015 as reported here
Countries	Jordan
Population surveyed	3149
Question(s) of interest	Which do you prefer more, having Jordanian or Syrian neighbours? (p. 47) Do you think that with the increase in the number of Syrian refugees the level of security in the region where you live in Jordan will decrease? (p. 48) Do you think that the work of Syrians in shops and facilities might create disputes between Jordanians and Syrians? (p. 49)
Language	English
Source	Centre for Strategic Studies, MercyCorps and UK FCO Conflict Pool

Title of Survey	Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
Date	2015 see here
Countries	Lebanon
Population surveyed	600

Question(s) of interest	Q7. What aspects of your life did Syrian presence in Lebanon impact negatively? Q8. What aspects of your life did Syrian presence in Lebanon impact positively? Q9. Have you recently heard any statements that express hate towards Syrian refugees? Q10. Where have you heard such statements? Q11. Have you heard statements about Syrian presence in the country that made you feel threatened? Q 13. To what extend do you feel towards the Syrians(A lot, Somewhat, A little, Not at all) e) Hatred f) Fear g) Respect h) Compassion Q14. How would you describe your interaction with Syrian refugees where you live: a) Very good b) Good c) Neutral d) Bad e) Very bad f) No interaction Q15. During the last six months, did you ever feel unsafe interacting with Syrian refugees: Q16. Did you ever experience any of the following: i) Me/ my family were insulted) Me/ my family were threatened verbally k) Me/ my family were assaulted/ beaten l) Me/ my family were blackmailed (<i>ibtizaaz</i>) m) My friends were insulted n) My friends were threatened verbally o) My friends were assaulted/ beaten p) Heard stories of other Lebanese insulted/ threatened/ assaulted Q16. Where is this happening: i) In the building j) On the street k) In shops l) At school m) At my home n) Other Q17. Where is this happening: i) In the building j) On the street k) In shops l) At school m) At my home n) Other Q18. Who was responsible for the assault: a) Syrian refugees b) Lebanese individuals c) Unknown persons Q19. Pls elaborate on the context, what happened? Q20. In case you were victim of incident from above, how did you react? a) Reported the incident b) Responded to the perpetrator c) Limited my movement outside d) Changed my daily routine e) Changed accommodation f) Did nothing (business as usual) Q21. If 21 (a): What was the outcome? d) Concerns addressed e) Complaint not recorded f) Complaint recorded/ no response? 2. If 21 (b): What did you do: e) I picked up a fight; f) I returned the insult ;g) I reconciled with the perpetrator h) Other Q23. If 21 (c), (d) or (e): Why did you react that way? Lack of trust g) Did not want to draw attention h) Feared extortion i) I was afraid for my safety j) I was afraid for the safety of my family k) Other Q28. Do you have close Syrian friends? Q32. Would you agree that a Syrian refugee lives in your neighbourhood? Q33. Would you agree that your child studies in a school where there are Syrian refugee students? Q35. Are your children getting along with Syrian students at school? Q37. Has public health services been impacted by Syrian refugee presence in the country? Q38. Do you think that Syrian refugees respect the law in Lebanon?
Language	French
Source	Institut des Sciences Politiques, Université de Saint-Joseph

Title of Survey	Jordanian Hosts and Syrian Refugees: Comparing Perceptions of Social Conflict and Cohesion in Three Host Communities
Date	2015 see here

Countries	Jordan
Population surveyed	79

Question(s) of interest	A. What are the most important / main forms of conflict prevalent between Syrian and Jordanian children and youth in urban and village communities in northern Jordan? - What are the root local causes of this conflict? What local actors are involved in this conflict and how should they be involved in addressing it? B. What are the most pressing needs (at the community level) in addressing these different forms of conflict between Syrian and Jordanian children and youth? - How can the root causes of local conflict be addressed through community based programming? - What resources are needed to address local conflict through community based programming? (p. 35)
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Language	English
Source	Generations for Peace Institute

Title of Survey	Global attitudes report 2007 available here
Date	2007

Countries	Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon
Population surveyed	2600

Question(s) of interest	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement 'We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now' (p. 25)
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Language	English
Source	Pew Research Centre

Title of Survey	Labour Market Outcomes and Egypt's Migration Potential, Working paper RSCAS 2014/55 available here
Date	May 2014

Countries	Egypt
Population surveyed	2509

Question(s) of interest	'do you have any plans to migrate abroad?' and 'open-ended questions on migration plans and expectations about migration'(p. 14)
Language	English

Source	Fargues, P. and Amer, M., RSCAS, Migration Policy Centre, EUI
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Title of Survey	Les jeunes Libanais face à l'émigration , available here
Date	2007

Countries	Egypt
Population surveyed	Uncertain

Question(s) of interest	Do you intend to emigrate? (p.13) do you think that emigration brings more disadvantages than advantages, equal of both or do you not know? (p. 15) What are the major advantages of emigration? (From a list) (p. 17) What are the major disadvantages of emigration? (from a list) (p. 18) What are the main drivers of emigration? (p. 18) Are your family encouraging you to emigrate? (p. 19).
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Language	French
Source	Kasparian, Chohig, RSCAS, EUI, CARIM

Title of Survey	Attitudes towards Foreign Worker , available here
Date	November 2010

Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	505

Question(s) of interest	1) Threats (index computed as the average of the 4 following questions (1-7 scale, 1 = not at all, 7 = strongly agree): 'To what extent do you agree that...') i) Foreign workers take jobs from Israelis ii) The presence of foreign workers in Israel lowers the average wages in Israel. iii) The presence of foreign workers in Israel contributes to the Israeli economy.' iv) The presence of foreign workers in Israel raises the crime rate v) core on the question: 'To what extent do you agree that in the future the proportion of foreign workers will be so high that they will pose a threat to the Jewish majority of the state.' Attitudes i) Of the following actions, what do you think Israel should do regarding the entrance of foreign workers to Israel? 1 = Allow unlimited entrance of foreign workers 2 = Limit entrance, but less than permitted today 3 = Keep the current limitations without any change 4 = Limit more than is done today 5 = Prohibit the entrance of foreign workers 'Israel should take more aggressive measures to prevent the entrance and the staying of foreign workers' 'To what extent do you agree with the government decision to deport the children of 400 foreign workers' 'Are you for or against granting citizenship to foreign workers' children who were born in Israel?' 1 = for 2 = against 'To what extent do you agree that it is preferable to enlarge the number of Palestinian workers from the territories and thus lower the number of foreign workers'
Language	English
Source	Amit, Karin, Public attitudes towards labour migration in Israel. <i>The Social Science Journal</i> , vol. 52, 4, pp. 516-526.

Title of Survey	Perceptions of security among Syrian refugees and host communities , available here
Date	2017
Countries	Lebanon
Population surveyed	80

Question(s) of interest	i) Do refugees have an impact on your daily life? (No effect / negative effect / positive effect) ii) Has the refugee crisis effected employment opportunities (yes/no) iii) what are your interactions with refugees (positive relation/no relation/work/provide assistance/NA) iv) Are you aware of intermarriage between the Syrian refugee and Lebanese community? v) How do you evaluate the living standards in your area (substandard/average/above average) vi) (if answer to v = substandard) Do you blame the Syrian refugees for this? vii) What is your main concern (economy/refugees/security/no worries/education/garbage/overpopulation/terrorism)viii) do you believe that the presence of Syrian refugees has raised security problems in your area? (No/slightly/in great amounts) ix) How could we increase aid [from the government] to this area? (Expel Syrians/limit Syrians)
Language	English
Source	ALEF for Human Rights

Title of Survey	Lebanon Host Communities Support Project: Impact Evaluation Report
Date	12 May 2016
Countries	Lebanon
Population surveyed	1504

Question(s) of interest	This report uses the SenseMaker research approach that relies on qualitative narratives to display changes in perceptions over time. Prevailing attitudes towards refugees are tracked. This may not be useful, but it may be interesting to observe the types of new techniques that are being used to handle relatively large sample sizes.
Language	English
Source	AKTIS

Title of Survey	Panel Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) 2014: Generating Evidence for Policy and Programs , available here .
Date	2014
Countries	Egypt
Population surveyed	10,916

Question(s) of interest	[Attitudes to emigration measured only] Intentions to migrate, Countries to which participant wishes to migrate, Reasons to migrate (p. 148) Sources of information about desired destination (p. 150), Who will finance migration (p. 150) Did you start thinking about migrating before or after the revolution? (p. 151).
Language	English
Source	Population Council

Title of Survey	Migration et compétences au Maroc , available here
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Date	March 2013
Countries	Morocco
Population surveyed	2600

Question(s) of interest	In which sector do you plan to work if/when you emigrate from Morocco? (P. 51) How do you evaluate your migration experience (to returned migrants) (Answers from successful – very successful – neither successful nor unsuccessful – unsuccessful – very unsuccessful) (p. 66) Why did you return (to returned migrants) How useful was your migration experience (to returned migrants)? (Answers from high use – medium use – almost no use) (p. 69) How do you rate your current living situation now that you are back in Morocco? (to returned migrants)(Answers from A lot worse than before – worse than before – the same as before – better than before – a lot better than before)
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Language	French
Source	European Training Foundation Working Together for Life

Title of Survey	Country Survey 2016
Date	2016
Countries	Lebanon here Jordan here
Population surveyed	254 (Lebanon) 85 (Jordan)

Question(s) of interest	K4. Please rate how you feel when you think about the impact of the refugees in regards to... Lebanon's economy, Social cohesion, National economy, Public service delivery, Lebanon's poor and marginalized (Response options) No impact at all / A very negative impact / A somewhat negative impact / A somewhat positive impact / A very positive impact
Language	English
Source	World Bank Group

Title of Survey	Lebanese attitudes towards Syrian refugees and the Syrian crisis, Results from a national opinion poll implemented 15-21 May 2013
Date	February 2013
Countries	Lebanon

Population surveyed	2600
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Question(s) of interest	5.1 General trust in Syrians 5.2 Comfortable with Syrians living in the same village/town 5.3 Comfortable with Syrians as close neighbours 5.4 Comfortable sharing a meal with Syrians 5.5 Comfortable working together with Syrians 5.6 Comfortable going to the same religious place as Syrians 5.7 Comfortable with a Syrian marrying a family member 5.8 Comfortable with Syrians attending the same school as one's own children 5.9 Level of agreement with the statement 'Syrian refugees are enriching the local community' 5.10 Level of agreement with the statement 'Syrian refugees are contributing to the overall Lebanese economy' 5.11 Level of agreement with the statement 'Syrian refugees are straining Lebanon's water and energy resources' 5.12 Level of agreement with the statement 'Syrian refugees are taking jobs from the Lebanese' 5.13 Level of agreement with the statement 'Syrian refugees are supported financially to an unfair degree' 5.14 Level of agreement with the statement 'Syrian refugees are posing a threat to national security and stability' 5.15 Level of agreement with the statement 'The Syrian crisis is causing Lebanese wages to fall' 5.16 Level of agreement with the statement 'The Syrian crisis is hurting Lebanese commerce/businesses because Syrian goods are now offered at lower prices than before' 5.17 Level of agreement with the statement 'The Syrian crisis is hurting Lebanese farmers' 5.18 Level of agreement with the statement 'All Syrians should be able to enter Lebanon freely' 5.19 Level of agreement with the statement 'The border with Syria should be more policed' 5.20 Level of agreement with the statement 'Lebanon should not receive more Syrian refugees' 5.21 Level of agreement with the statement 'Lebanon should close its border with Syria' 5.22 Level of agreement with the statement 'Lebanese authorities should clamp down on Syrian imports' 5.23 Level of agreement with the statement 'Syrian refugees should primarily go to live in Palestinian refugee camps' 5.24 Level of agreement with the statement 'The Lebanese Government should establish refugee camps for Syrians (inside Lebanon)' 5.25 Level of agreement with the statement 'The UN should establish refugee camps for Syrians in Lebanon'
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Language	French
Source	Fafo (authors Mona Christophersen, Jing Liu, Cathrine Moe Thorleifsson, and Åge A. Tiltnes)

Title of Survey	General Survey of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip number 53 , available here
Date	Every March, July, September and December of the years 2014-2017
Countries	Palestine

Population surveyed	1200
Question(s) of interest	If you had the opportunity to leave the Gaza strip or the West bank and emigrate to another country, would you take it?
Language	Arabic
Source	Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research
Title of Survey	Polling the Lebanese on the current situation in Lebanon available here (poll actually unavailable, but reported on in newspaper here)
Date	July 2014
Countries	Lebanon
Population surveyed	Uncertain
Question(s) of interest	Do you want to emigrate?
Language	Arabic
Source	Information International
Title of Survey	General Survey of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip number 53 , available here
Date	Every March, July, September and December of the years 2014-2017
Countries	Palestine
Population surveyed	1200
Question(s) of interest	If you had the opportunity to leave the Gaza strip or the West bank and emigrate to another country, would you take it?
Language	Arabic
Source	Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research
Title of Survey	Polling the Lebanese on the current situation in Lebanon available here (poll actually unavailable, but reported on in newspaper here)
Date	July 2014
Countries	Lebanon
Population surveyed	Uncertain
Question(s) of interest	Do you want to emigrate?
Language	Arabic
Source	Information International
Title of Survey	From Tension to violence: Understanding and Preventing Violence between Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon available here
Date	July 2017
Countries	Lebanon
Population surveyed	2437
Question(s) of interest	[to the effect of] Has there been any violence between you and a Syrian refugee [<i>Caveat</i> , it is not explained exactly how this question was asked].
Language	English
Source	Mercy Corps International – partner organisation Information International
Title of Survey	The Peace index
Date	January 2018 see here
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	600
Question(s) of interest	Do you agree with this statement: Israel – as the state of the Jewish people, which suffered from violence and persecution and sought refuge in various countries over the course of history – should show greater generosity than other peoples and allow the asylum seekers [note, Eritrean and Sudanese AS currently at risk of mass deportation] to remain in the country?
Language	English
Source	Israeli Democracy Institute
Title of Survey	The Peace index
Date	May 2012 see here

Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	600
Question(s) of interest	Should an open-door policy be adopted toward refugees who were persecuted in their countries of origin? And what about an 'open door' for job seekers who are not refugees? Are there refugees and migrant workers where you live? Do you agree that African asylum seekers are a 'cancer in the body of the nation'? Are all the foreign workers undesirable?
Language	English
Source	Israeli Democracy Institute
Title of Survey	European Social Survey 2010
Date	2010 see here
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	Unknown but solid sample methodology
Question(s) of interest	To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here ? How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
Language	English
Source	European Social Survey
Title of Survey	European Social Survey 2012
Date	2012 see here
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	Unknown but solid sample methodology
Question(s) of interest	To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here ? How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
Language	English
Source	European Social Survey
Title of Survey	European Social Survey 2014
Date	2014 see here
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	Unknown but solid sample methodology

Question(s) of interest	To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
Language	English
Source	European Social Survey
Title of Survey	European Social Survey 2016
Date	2016 see here
Countries	Israel
Population surveyed	Unknown
Question(s) of interest	To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
Language	English
Source	European Social Survey

Appendix B

Table B1 - Appearance of media news regarding immigration (source: Media Claims dataset from ESS 2016)

	Ethnic Difference and Immigration				Economic Effects of Migration				Cultural Diversity			
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total/% of issue	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total/% of issue	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total/% of issue
Austria	57	33	39	129	3	1	1	5	2	0	0	2
%	44.2 %	25.6 %	30.2 %	94.9 %	60 %	20 %	20 %	3.7 %	100 %	0 %	0 %	1.5 %
France	3	1	3	7	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	6
%	42.9 %	14.3 %	42.9 %	53.8 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	33.3 %	0 %	66.7 %	46.2 %
Germany	21	21	8	50	2	1	0	3	12	3	5	20
%	42 %	42 %	16 %	68.5 %	66.7 %	33.3 %	0 %	4.1 %	60 %	15 %	25 %	27.4 %
Hungary	28	0	12	40	0	0	2	2	2	0	1	3
%	70 %	0 %	30 %	88.9 %	0 %	0 %	100 %	4.4 %	66.7 %	0 %	33.3 %	6.7 %
Israel	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
%	50 %	0 %	50 %	100 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
Italy	2	2	4	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
%	22.2 %	33.3 %	44.4 %	100 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
Spain	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
%	100 %	0 %	0 %	33.3 %	0 %	0 %	100 %	33.3 %	0 %	0 %	100 %	33.3 %
Sweden	0	0	3	3	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
%	0 %	0 %	100 %	60 %	100 %	0 %	0 %	40 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %

Table B2 – Comparison between types of media claims in newspapers from experts and how respondents see media reporting regarding immigration (source ESS 2016 and Special Eurobarometer 469)

	Media Claims in Newspapers - Expert Assessment (ESS)				Respondents Opinion: Media Report... About Immigration (Eurobarometer)			
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total	Too Negatively	Neutrally	Too Positively	Country Mean Average (Negatively – Positively)
Austria	62	34	40	136	289	465	177	1.879
%	45.5 %	25 %	29.5 %		31.04 %	49.95 %	19.01 %	
France	5	1	7	13	473	271	131	1.609
%	38.4 %	7.6 %	54 %		54.06 %	30.97 %	14.97 %	
Germany	35	25	13	73	414	544	357	1.956
%	48 %	34.2 %	17.8 %		31.48 %	41.37 %	27.15 %	
Hungary	30	0	15	45	372	466	84	1.687
%	66.6 %	0 %	33.4 %		40.35 %	50.54 %	9.11 %	
Israel	1	0	1	2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
%	50 %	0 %	50 %					
Italy	2	2	4	8	282	446	114	1.8
%	25 %	25 %	50 %		33.49 %	52.97 %	13.54 %	
Spain	1	0	2	3	343	438	85	1.702
%	33.3 %	0 %	66.7 %		39.61 %	50.58 %	9.82 %	
Sweden	2	0	3	5	389	372	177	1.773
%	40 %	0 %	60 %		41.47 %	39.66 %	18.87 %	
Greece	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	299	368	254	1.951
%					32.46 %	39.96 %	27.58 %	
Malta	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	124	265	47	1.823
%					28.44 %	60.78 %	10.78 %	

Table B3 – Country level characteristics

Country	Country Abbreviation	GDP per capita (in US dollars) (year)	Unemployment rate (year)	Population with Master's degree	Population aged 30–34 with tertiary education	Media Direction (Country Average)	Media Prevalence (Country Average)	Media Reporting (Country Average)
Austria	AT	48014 (2016)	6.025 (2016)	11.7	40.8	-0.14	129	1.879
		49247 (2017)	5.3 (2017)					
France	FR	42367 (2016)	10.05 (2016)	9.9	44.3	0	7	1.609
		43550 (2017)	9.2 (2017)					
Germany	DE	48532 (2016)	4.125 (2016)	11.4	34	-0.26	50	1.956
		50206 (2017)	3.5 (2017)					
Hungary	HU	27770 (2016)	5.1 (2016)	6.6	32.1	-0.4	40	1.687
		28910 (2017)	3.8 (2017)					
Israel	IL	37192 (2016)	4.695 (2016)	11.7	N/A	0	2	N/A
		N/A (2017)	N/A (2017)					
Italy	IT	36877 (2016)	11.725 (2016)	13.7	26.9	0.22	9	1.8
		37970 (2017)	11.2 (2017)					
Spain	ES	36444 (2016)	19.625 (2016)	14.3	41.2	-1	1	1.702
		38171 (2017)	16.6 (2017)					
Sweden	SE	49996 (2016)	6.975 (2016)	13.1	51.3	3	3	1.773
		51264 (2017)	6.1 (2017)					
Greece	EL	N/A (2016)	N/A (2016)	N/A	43.7	N/A	N/A	1.951
		27776 (2017)	21.2 (2017)					
Malta	MT	N/A (2016)	N/A (2016)	N/A	30	N/A	N/A	1.823
		42532 (2017)	4.4 (2017)					

Table B3 continued

Country	Trust in institutions index	Patriotism	Nationalism	Tolerance to corruption index	Corruption extent index
Austria	5.256	5.801	7.916	1.397	3.468
France	4.219	4.422	8.038	1.218	3.906
Germany	5.264	5.71	7.476	1.38	3.609
Hungary	4.713	4.593	8.325	1.764	4.261
Israel	4.162	5.132	8.259	N/A	N/A
Italy	3.669	4.161	7.939	1.241	4.347
Spain	3.789	4.179	7.633	1.197	4.526
Sweden	5.667	5.631	7.884	1.197	3.367
Greece	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.435	4.517
Malta	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.172	4.244

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