

Learning from Demand-Side Campaigns against Trafficking in Human Beings: Evaluation as Knowledge-Generator and Project-Improver

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About the project

Trafficking in human beings covers various forms of coercion and exploitation of women, men and children. Responses to trafficking have traditionally focused on combating the criminal networks involved in it or protecting the human rights of victims. However, European countries are increasingly exploring ways in which to influence the demand for services or products involving the use of trafficked persons or for the trafficked persons themselves. **DemandAT** aims to understand the role of demand in the trafficking of human beings and to assess the impact and potential of demand-side measures to reduce trafficking, drawing on insights on regulating demand from related areas.

DemandAT takes a comprehensive approach to investigating demand and demand-side policies in the context of trafficking. The research includes a strong theoretical and conceptual component through an examination of the concept of demand in trafficking from a historical and economic perspective. Regulatory approaches are studied in policy areas that address demand in illicit markets, in order to develop a better understanding of the impact that the different regulatory approaches can have on demand. Demand-side arguments in different fields of trafficking as well as demand-side policies of selected countries are examined, in order to provide a better understanding of the available policy options and impacts. Finally, the research also involves in-depth case studies both of the particular fields in which trafficking occurs (domestic work, prostitution, the globalised production of goods) and of particular policy approaches (law enforcement and campaigns). The overall goal is to develop a better understanding of demand and demand-factors in the context of designing measures and policies addressing all forms of trafficking in human beings.

The research is structured in three phases:

- Phase 1: Analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature on demand in the context of trafficking and on regulating demand in different disciplines, fields and countries. From January 2014–June 2015.
- Phase 2: Three in-depth empirical case studies of different fields of trafficking –domestic work, prostitution, imported goods – and two studies on different policy approaches: law enforcement actors and campaigns. From September 2014–December 2016.
- Phase 3: Integrating project insights into a coherent framework with a focus on dissemination. From January 2017–June 2017.

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List of Abbreviations

BMFSFJ	Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend; (Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GAATW	Global Alliance against Traffic in Women
ICAT	Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OJP	Office of Justice Programs
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UN	United Nations
UN.GIFT	United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States of America

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Abstract

Demand-side campaigns seek to influence the spending patterns of persons and organisations or to encourage the reporting of seemingly suspicious occurrences to helplines or the police. Although considerable funds are devoted to such campaigns, little is known about their effectiveness, mainly due to the lack of or insufficient evaluation. However, examples of critical internal evaluation show that evaluative insights *are* possible, particularly with projects designed with a view to their evaluability.

Theoretical analysis of campaign types indicates that awareness-raising helps no one unless it leads to action, that the reduction of exploitation is a more logical primary aim than the reduction of trafficking for the purpose of exploitation, and that campaigns usually rely on complementary measures for their effectiveness.

The interpretation of fragmented information in a theoretically structured way leads to additional conclusions. Campaigns often take on the guise of a big funnel, with several hundreds of thousands of people being targeted initially, yet filtering down to only a handful with the opportunity and motivation to behave as recommended at the end. Also, messages designed to attract attention can all-too-easily be misunderstood and have unintended and harmful side-effects for the public's perception of victims and perpetrators.

As a consequence, it seems promising to turn to more narrowly focused behaviour-change campaigns, to design them with a view to their evaluability and to evaluate them through a learning-oriented approach. Exemplary external evaluations with increased resources, as well as low-budget internal evaluations with the selective sharing of results, could increase our knowledge of what really works and what does not.

Summary of key insights into the effects of campaigns

Demand-side campaigns are those requiring action instead of mere awareness

Campaigning is often embedded as one of several activities performed in anti-trafficking projects. The most prominent form is awareness-raising campaigns that claim to contribute to the fight against trafficking in human beings by informing as many people as possible that trafficking in human beings exists. However, the campaigns do not make clear how raised public awareness can and should lead to a reduction in the exploitation of and trafficking in human beings.

Over the last decade, campaigns addressing the “demand-side” were introduced as a new approach. Demand-side campaigns are understood here as activities which ask target groups *to do* something in a consumption context that is expected to reduce trafficking in human beings. Two types of demand-side campaign are identified: spending-shift and reporting campaigns. The demand-side message can be combined with an appeal for the general public to donate to an organisation that helps victims or to lobby for a policy change.

As there is no trafficking without exploitation, the reduction of exploitation is a more logical primary objective of campaigns

The field-specific theoretical analysis draws attention to the fact that demand-side campaign can only be effective in the reduction of trafficking if they have an effect on exploitation. Therefore, exploitation reduction is a more logical primary aim of campaigns than the reduction of trafficking in human beings. Working out an intervention logic is a way of demonstrating how campaigns are supposed to work. Even the simplified intervention logic consists of quite a long chain of effects. An interruption of the chain at any point means that the campaign has no impact on trafficking via the behaviour of the target group. Defects at any stage will water down the final impact on trafficking in human beings.

It is not known whether spending-shift campaigns really have the intended effect

Spending-shift campaigns ask for a change in individual spending patterns. The target group is asked to avoid spending on goods and services suspected to involve the work of victims of human trafficking. One type of campaign asks the public to buy responsibly by opting to buy only certified goods. These campaigns – often dealing with goods produced in globalised production chains – are not analysed in this study.

Spending-shift campaigns can also ask for the termination of a type of spending. They send out a message to the general public to stop purchasing sexual services or to stop buying small items from or giving money to children who are begging. However, evidence about modified spending patterns in reaction to campaigns has not been documented.

Reporting campaigns resemble big funnels: vast numbers of the general public are addressed in order to generate a mere handful of relevant suspicions per month

Reporting campaigns ask the public to watch out for signs of abuse in the consumption context and to report suspicious observations either to the police or to a confidential helpline. Particularly in the sex sector, such campaigns differentiate between forced and voluntary prostitution and ask clients to indicate signs of the former. The results of several evaluations of reporting campaigns were brought together in a jigsaw synthesis, sorting the available evidence according to the intervention logic of the campaigns. Reporting campaigns expose large audiences to the message and generate just a handful of suspicious activities per month.

Messages are misunderstood and can have unintended side-effects

Campaigns on the sensitive issue of trafficking in human beings bear the continuous risk of inducing unintended consequences or side-effects. In several reporting campaigns, organisers received a high number of irrelevant reactions. One case is documented in which a quarter of callers misunderstood posters to be advertising phone sex. Some campaigners did not consider the issue, while others showed a high awareness of this risk through considering any potential side-effects and pre-testing to determine how messages are understood.

Summary of key insights into the evaluation of campaigns

The European Commission's strong commitment to evaluation did not lead to a high number of campaign evaluations

The European Commission expresses a strong commitment to evaluation. However, most anti-trafficking interventions remain without evaluation. Evaluation is also rare for demand-side campaigns. An intensive search yielded four external and four internal evaluation reports which explicitly deal with a demand-side behaviour-change campaign.

External evaluation is no quality cachet

Of the four external evaluations, only one referred to established standards developed by professional bodies and promoted by the United Nations. In this case, the evaluator concluded that the effectiveness and impact of the campaign could not be assessed because the relevant information and data were not available. The other commissioned external evaluations did not apply established standards. Campaigns were deemed successful on the basis of poor or even no evidence.

Internal evaluation reports were more learning-oriented than external reports

Although internal evaluation reports did not apply established standards of evaluation, some of the reviewed reports offered detailed data on output and selective outcomes that enabled the above-indicated conclusions on campaign effects. Internal evaluators indicated not only a campaign's accomplishments but also shared any unexpected results and critical reflections that could be used for improving future campaigns.

Evaluability-designing allows for better learning from past interventions

In order to improve learning from past campaigns, a theoretical understanding of how a campaign actually works has to be developed (intervention logic). This allows for a focused evaluation of specific aspects of a campaign which can be synthesised, together with insights from other campaigns, and used to improve campaigns in the future or to direct campaign organisers' efforts towards more promising interventions against trafficking in human beings.

1 Introduction

As part of the EU-funded research consortium DemandAT, we investigated what is known about the working and effectiveness of anti-trafficking campaigns addressing a demand-side and how their effectiveness can be improved.

It is the UN Trafficking Protocol that provides the *main* point of reference for present-day debates on trafficking in human beings (Vlassis 2000). The Protocol not only provides a legal definition of the offence of trafficking (Wijers 2015) but also serves as a point of reference for the raising of ‘demand’ arguments in debates on trafficking in human beings (Raymond 2002: 494). For the first time in international anti-trafficking law – in paragraph 5 of Article 9 (Prevention of Trafficking in Persons) – it includes a reference to ‘demand’:

“States Parties shall adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures, such as educational, social or cultural measures, including through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking.”

This *demand provision* was subsequently resumed in other international policy documents addressing trafficking in human beings, at European level by the ‘Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings’¹ as of 2005 and by EU Directive 2011/36/EU.² References to ‘demand’ are also included in several policy documents at international, regional and national levels (Ham 2011; Wijers 2015). Since then, donors have spent a considerable amount of money supporting campaigns aimed at reducing trafficking in human beings, including those which are labelled as tackling the offence from a ‘demand-side’.

In general, campaigns seek to raise awareness of an issue, the final objective being to promote either policy change or individual behaviour changes – or, often, a combination of both (Coffman 2002, 2003). For the purpose of this study, a campaign is defined as a *series of coordinated communication activities seeking to influence what individuals think and do*.³ Only campaigns with the target to influence what individuals *do* are considered to be behaviour-change campaigns – i.e. those which call on people to change behaviour and take conscious action.

Over the last decade, behaviour-change campaigns have gained importance in the context of anti-trafficking efforts. Initially, these campaigns were directed at people in major migrant regions who were considered to be at risk of becoming a victim of trafficking, or to victims who were already in the receiving countries. These campaigns called on potential victims

¹ <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/197.htm> (accessed 22 October 2015).

² http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_trafficking_in_human_beings/jl0058_en.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).

³ This definition differs slightly from that quoted by Raab and Rocha (2011: 7): ‘A campaign is an organized effort to bring public pressure to bear on institutions and individuals so as to influence their actions, as institutions are influenced via the individuals involved and some campaigns aim primarily to change knowledge and attitudes (that might later lead to a change in behaviour).’

both to be aware that promises made by migration facilitators may turn out to be false and merely a way of luring them into a situation of exploitation and trafficking, and to know their rights in case they become victims of human trafficking (Andrijasevic and Anderson 2009; Nieuwenhuys and Pecoud 2007).

Another type of behaviour-change campaign is labelled as ‘demand-side’. The target audience is addressed as ‘the consumer’, who is asked to abstain from buying goods produced or services delivered under unfair and harmful conditions. Conversely, the target audience is requested to buy responsibly – goods produced or services delivered under *fair* conditions. As the general public, they are called upon to report seemingly suspicious occurrences to competent agencies.

Anti-trafficking campaigns are considered here as *demand-side* campaigns either if they address people as consumers who knowingly or unknowingly *pay for the work or services of trafficked persons* or if they address *the general public, who are expected to observe seemingly suspicious occurrences of exploitation, often in a consumption context*. Campaigns which seek to influence the spending patterns of individual persons or public authorities, particularly for the consumption of goods and services, will be called *spending-shift campaigns*. Campaigns which encourage people to share any suspicions of exploitation that they have experienced will be called *reporting campaigns*.

Our empirical analysis is restricted to cases in which a member of the targeted audience of the campaign and a potential victim of trafficking are co-present in the same location. For example, when someone buys a meal or a personal service or donates to a beggar, the spender and the worker are co-present in the same location. Goods can also be produced under exploitative labour conditions a great distance away from final consumers – campaigns and other initiatives targeting the demand for such goods and services in the contexts of global supply chains are discussed in a different sub-project of DemandAT (see McGrath and Mieres 2017).

The key question explored in this paper is how spending-shift and reporting campaigns can have an impact on situations labelled in international law as trafficking in human beings, and how the effects of such campaigns can be assessed. In addition to answers to these questions provided by original academic research, information should also, ideally, be found in data and insights from the evaluation of campaigns.

This paper takes an in-depth look at demand-side campaigns aiming at changing behaviour. The research pursues three questions:

- How are these campaigns supposed to work?
- What is known about their results?
- How can we learn more from the experiences of campaigns?

All these questions concern the *evaluation* of campaigns. Consequently, evaluation reports on demand-side campaigns were simultaneously both source and subject of the study, with the double aim of utilising insights into their evaluation to improve knowledge of the effectiveness of campaigns and, *vice versa*, to develop proposals for an improvement in the evaluation of demand-side campaigns.

Today, the need for the evaluation of publicly funded programmes is accepted and promoted as an intrinsic part of democratic government. Evaluation ideally serves accountability functions, increases the knowledge base for legislation and implementation, informs the public and helps to develop, within agencies, the orientation towards challenge and improvement (Chelimsky 2006: 42). Such a decisively positive attitude towards the necessity and usefulness of evaluation is principally shared among political bodies and policy-makers

at international and European levels (European Commission 2015: 49). The strong EU commitment to evaluation also informs recommendations urging European member-states to measure the effects and impact of interventions against trafficking in human beings (Dottridge 2007b: 28).⁴

Chapter 2 presents general findings on the evaluation of anti-trafficking interventions. The chapter provides an overview of evaluation approaches and considers the implications for the assessment of demand-side anti-trafficking campaigns aimed at changing behaviour in a consumption context.

Chapter 3 proposes a typology of demand-side campaigns – the two main types being spending-shift and reporting campaigns – and introduces a model for the (re-)construction of the intervention logics of three variants of these campaigns.

Chapter 4 introduces demand-side campaigns conducted in Europe and analyses how they were evaluated and with what results.

The elaboration of this paper was accompanied by an intensive exchange with members of the project consortium and external experts, who all provided feedback to much longer drafts.⁵ Subsequently, this paper was revised – in some parts, shortened and, in others, amended. In particular, we put more emphasis on potential side-effects, both intended and unintended.

⁴ ‘Has research been carried out in your country (whether by government-financed institutions or independently) to collect evidence about the impact of your Government’s anti-trafficking policies and measures, including criminal justice strategies, and has this research collected information about their unforeseen or unintended effects as well as their intended effects?’ (Dottridge 2007b: 28).

⁵ A longer draft version of this paper, the draft manual and a case analysis were shared with interested stakeholders and discussed at three workshops – with evaluators (on 20 October 2016 in Berlin), with representatives of organisations involved in planning and conducting anti-trafficking campaigns (on 21 October 2016 in Berlin), and representatives of organisations funding or coordinating campaigns (on 21 November 2016 in Brussels). We are grateful to all participants for generously sharing their ideas and their criticisms!

2 Evaluation as the basis of analysis

This chapter opens with the presentation of findings from studies exploring the state of evaluation of anti-trafficking efforts (2.1). Subsequently, we introduce the evaluation concepts and terminology relevant to our analysis (2.2) and point to established evaluation standards which serve as the frame of reference for the assessment of the quality of evaluation (2.3).

2.1 Key insights from meta-evaluations of anti-trafficking interventions

The issue of ‘demand’ gained relevance in the context of efforts to combat trafficking in humans with the adoption of the UN Trafficking in Persons protocol in 2000 because a reference to ‘demand’ was included for the first time (Cyrus 2015a). As already indicated in the introduction, the document does not directly link trafficking in human beings and demand. It introduces demand as a factor that may foster exploitation, which in turn may lead to trafficking in human beings. However, due to the lack of an authoritative definition, the concept of demand remains vague and is applied with various meanings in different contexts (Vogel 2016).

Among the vast number of anti-trafficking interventions worldwide, campaigns addressing the ‘demand side’ of trafficking in human beings were also conducted. In the meanwhile, a considerable amount of money has been invested in the fight against trafficking in human beings. In recent years private funders have increased their engagement in the support of anti-slavery and anti-trafficking projects worldwide. ‘In the three-year period 2012–2014, US\$ 223 million of private funds were used to combat slavery in all forms’ (Suhr 2016: 3). Several Directorates General of the European Commission spent a total of € 158.5 million on 321 anti-trafficking projects between 2004 and 2015 (Walby *et al.* 2016: 7).

A recent study on preventative anti-trafficking measures, requested by the European Commission, provided an overview of 43 prevention initiatives and reflected on their effects and effectiveness. As a main finding, the study indicated a ‘lack of evaluation’ (Deloitte 2015: 9), testifying

that project-specific evaluations mostly fall short in terms of grasping results and impacts, as they cannot easily be observed within a narrow time span. Hence, project promoters apply what they perceive as an evaluation rather than a monitoring and a review of outputs than an analysis of results and impacts (Deloitte 2015: 8).

The analysis carefully reflected on evaluation efforts and their shortcomings and, in particular, a ‘lack of evaluation’ was identified. The study identified the ignorance of evaluation methods and lack of awareness of standards – in particular the failure to explicate a project theory of change – as a major shortcoming. Consequently, the study provided instructions for project managers on how to design and manage a project that can be evaluated, with the stress laid on the need for a project theory of change (Deloitte 2015: 93–103). However, in spite of the pervasive insight that the assessment of anti-trafficking interventions lacks an evidence base, the study seems to be able to make relatively positive assessments of the effectiveness of information and awareness-raising initiatives. These are considered to be ‘crucial to inform potential victims about the risk of trafficking — and to raise public awareness and encourage policymakers to do more’ and can ‘contribute to behaviour change by clients who purchase goods and services provided by trafficked victims’ (Deloitte 2015: 85). Notably, this assumed the crucial role of campaigns and their contribution to changing client behaviour is stated in spite of the attested lack of evaluation.

Empirical findings on evaluation in the field of EU-funded anti-trafficking interventions show that evaluation is rarely conducted – a recent review found that only 5 per cent of the 321 projects had been externally evaluated and only around a third had prepared a narrative report providing information on the outcomes of a project (Walby *et al.* 2016: 85). Another recent review of the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings (European Commission 2016) explained that member-states reported extensive activity in prevention measures such as training and awareness-raising – following training for frontline staff, there had been an increase in the detection of cases of trafficking in human beings. ‘However, little is known about the actual impact of such action on demand and prevention’ (EC 2016: 13).

Anti-trafficking interventions performed by private actors still have no or only poor evaluation. A systematic review of studies on anti-trafficking programmes and projects (van der Laan *et al.* 2011), which applied rigorous scientific quality standards as promoted in Farrington (2003), found that the effectiveness of anti-trafficking interventions cannot be judged due to the methodological weakness of evaluation reports. The review focused on cross-border trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, with the main objective being ‘to assess the presently available evidence on the effect of interventions that aim to prevent and suppress trafficking in human beings’ (van der Laan *et al.* 2011: 5). The research team screened about 20,000 publications produced between 2000 and 2009 which included in the title or abstract a reference to human trafficking and evaluation. The authors stated that the ‘number of interventions to counter trafficking in human beings (THB) is rising, and many initiatives have been described. At the same time the effectiveness of these programs remains unknown’ (van der Laan *et al.* 2011: 12). According to the authors, most publications were primarily descriptive, for example describing the hardship of victims’ lives or the social assistance they were given. Others mainly aimed at collecting trustworthy numerical data to define the scale of the phenomenon. Few interventions were accompanied by evaluation research and systematic data collection. None of the studies met the rigorous methodological quality standards applied in this meta-evaluation. No studies were found that met the criterion of a controlled design with both pre- and post-test measures and comparable control conditions. The authors argued that non-controlled studies do not provide a basis for drawing conclusions about actual outcomes and impacts. ‘Consequently, no conclusions could be drawn on the effectiveness of anti-THB intervention strategies for preventing and reducing sexual exploitation’ (van der Laan *et al.* 2011: 6).

A second assessment of evaluations of anti-trafficking interventions followed a different approach (Hames *et al.* 2011). It did not focus on the methodological quality and reliability of conclusions regarding causality but aimed to assess whether and to what extent evaluations complied with current norms and standards – a milder standard as described above, not requiring necessarily robust scientific evidence but at least comprehensively documented logical arguments based on the best available empirical information. As frame of orientation, Hames *et al.*’s study chose the DAC norms and standards of evaluation (DAC 1991, 2010) which are included in the UNEG (2016) norms and standards (see Section 2.3). The study reviewed 14 evaluations of anti-trafficking interventions. In the foreword to this publication, Konrad summarised: ‘So far, evaluation has been little more than an afterthought and at best conceived as self-edited reporting on project outcomes’ (Konrad 2011: 3). Even though an assessment with less-rigorous standards regarding causality was applied, most evaluation reports failed to meet the basic requirements with regard to comprehensive documentation, consistent information-based arguments and the indication of an intervention logic and project theory.

Another review of evaluation efforts in the field of anti-trafficking – by the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT 2016) – confirms this and found that few, if any, rigorous evaluations of counter-trafficking activities and little evidence of effectiveness appeared. Claims of ‘good’, ‘effective’ or ‘successful’ practices were not supported by evidence or clear criteria. Programmes and evaluations of such practices have

not systematically collected feedback on their relevance or quality, nor on gaps in services from people who have experienced trafficking. Counter-trafficking interventions tended to lack any theory of change and programme logic, failing to clearly link activities with intended outcomes and leaving evaluations without any guidance on what to measure and how. The design of counter-trafficking responses often failed to reflect either the recommendations of previous evaluations or critical knowledge accumulated over time in the sector and beyond. Finally the programme design, timeframes and resources allocated for evaluation themselves often diminished the potential of evaluations to add values (ICAT 2016).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the international body in charge of monitoring the implementation of international anti-crime conventions – including the 2000 UN Trafficking Protocol – published two independent evaluation reports on its Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking or UN.GIFT (Independent Evaluation Unit 2011, 2014). According to the 2014 report, the overall objective of UN.GIFT, as defined in the original project document, is ‘to prevent trafficking in persons and reduce the number of trafficked persons worldwide’ (Independent Evaluation Unit 2014: 1). However, the main issue considered in the evaluation was the consequence of insecure funding on the programme operation. With respect to the impact assessment, the evaluation soberly stated that ‘the mechanisms to identify and then gather appropriate data to measure impact have not been pursued’ (Independent Evaluation Unit 2014: 13). Thus, the evaluation found that no qualified assessment of the accomplishment of objectives, the effectiveness or the efficiency of the UN.GIFT programme was possible due to the lack of appropriate data, indicating that the first step towards improvement would be the systematic collection and processing of data.

IOM anti-trafficking interventions were scrutinised in an independent evaluation by Berman and Marshall (2011), which highlighted that the IOM has strong documentation of outputs across all project countries. The organisation keeps detailed information about the number of victims assisted (using the IOM Counter Trafficking Module Database), the number of people trained, the amount of awareness-raising materials produced, and other activities associated with their counter-trafficking projects. However, with regard to the positive outcome of the IOM’s objectives, evaluators saw limited documented evidence to demonstrate the relevance or effectiveness of IOM’s information campaigns to preventing trafficking. In particular, no evidence was available to confirm the link between a person’s lack of awareness and their likelihood of being trafficked. The evaluators observed that none of the reviewed IOM missions – including information campaigns – provided articulated intervention logics. This lack of clearly defined outcomes and impacts made it difficult to assess the effectiveness, efficiency or impact of IOM’s activities. Even for immediate outcomes, ‘it was not possible to assess progress toward the intended outcome of raised awareness because there was no baseline or follow-up information on awareness levels relating to any of the campaigns’ (Berman and Marshall 2011: xviii). As a result, evaluators saw a strong need to focus on impacts and the development of theories of change so that programme developers can create an understanding of the intended links between project activities, project outputs and project interim and longer-term outcomes, which may then be linked to impacts (Berman and Marshall 2011: xviii).

Missing theories of change are also identified as key problem in other evaluations. For example, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the majority of US government-funded anti-trafficking projects lacked a logic framework of monitoring that linked activities to goals, indicators and targets (GAO 2007). The Diagnostic Center, a research unit of the US Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP) reviewed anti-trafficking programmes and projects in the USA – as introduced in a report by (Shively *et al.* 2012). With respect to projects implementing an ‘Ending Demand’ approach, the Diagnostic Center concluded that ‘reduction strategies appear to be promising, but many have not been rigorously assessed for effectiveness’ (OJP Diagnostic Center 2013: 6).

An analysis of the efforts of anti-trafficking campaigns – initially presented and discussed at the Conference of State Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Working Group on Trafficking in Persons in Vienna, Austria, on 12 October 2011 – pointed to the lack of reliable data and comprehensive accounts of the true extent and nature of trafficking (Schloenhardt *et al.* 2012: 430). According to this analysis, the difficulties inherent in measuring trafficking in persons hamper the ability of awareness and education campaigns to present clear and accurate information about the phenomenon. Instead, anecdotal evidence, media reports and statistical estimates without any proper evidentiary basis have often constituted the main sources of information on which previous awareness campaigns were built. This has led, in some instances, to misinformation and exaggerations (Schloenhardt *et al.* 2012: 426). Many past campaigns have tended to inflate, distort or otherwise misrepresent the many issues associated with trafficking in persons. ‘In particular, many past Australian campaigns superimposed information from foreign and international sources onto the domestic setting, thus failing to recognize local dimensions and characteristics of the problem’ (Schloenhardt *et al.* 2012: 421). It was observed that many campaigns were driven by political or religious agendas. Additionally, fund-raising was identified as an important additional motive of many campaigns.

As the review of available meta-evaluations indicates, knowledge about the effects and effectiveness of interventions is quite limited. Theoretical considerations of how interventions are supposed to work are not explicated and reliable data that would allow for a sound assessment of effectiveness and impact are lacking. Neither standards of scientifically robust evidence (Farrington 2003; van der Laan *et al.* 2011) nor compliance with established international evaluation standards (UNEG 2016) are usually fulfilled.

2.2 Introduction to the evaluation approach

The preceding section employed evaluation terminology without any explanation. This section introduces the evaluation terminology and approach used in this study. Evaluation involves a systematic analysis of interventions and a value judgement (Sanders 2006: 28),⁶ in other words evaluators ask what happened and why, and whether or not it was beneficial. To describe the effects of interventions, a model is used with the standardised components of objectives, input, output, outcome and impact. These components are applied in most evaluations in a similar way.

Interventions are based on **inputs** (available funds, staff hours) that allow for activities (**outputs**) which are supposed to have effects (**outcomes**) in line with aims (**objectives**). Objectives define changes that are deemed beneficial. Ultimately, campaigns aim at something beyond an outcome – namely at **impact**,⁷ ‘the big changes and benefits being sought for people, services, or systems’ (Coffman 2009: 6). In the cases of interest to this study, the *intended consequence* is to reduce trafficking in human beings in particular, and the suffering from severe forms of exploitation in general (Wijers 2015). The term ‘impact’ is also used for the *unintended consequences* impacting on real-world problems (Coffman

⁶ There are many definitions indicating the different evaluation perspectives (Mark *et al.* 2006: 6) so this is a minimum commonality.

⁷ It is important to note this one terminological difference between European Commission usage and evaluation research. For example, in the context of evaluation research, the term ‘impact assessment’ implies the concretely achieved changes in the real world, while the European Commission applies the term as a tool for the assessment of how *planned* interventions will probably interfere with and impact on the policy fields of other EU Commissions or member-states in the future. In this paper, we apply the evaluation research terminology.

2009: 6).⁸ With regard to objectives pursued by campaigners, the indication of a campaign's intended consequences implicitly highlights the issue of unexpected outcomes – usually perceived to be harmful and undesirable side-effects. However, some unintended side-effects may be appreciated by campaigners as additional, unexpected benefits (see Section 3.2).

Evaluation and monitoring are not clearly distinguished in the field of anti-trafficking efforts. Monitoring concerns the tracking of key indicators of progress over the course of a programme (Khandker *et al.* 2010: 7). Monitoring data can be used to see whether a project or programme develops according to expectations and whether the defined outcomes are realised as planned, so that organisers can quickly react to new developments. Evaluations can and often do use monitoring data as one input; however, evaluation takes this information as material to identify which factors negatively impede or positively contribute to the accomplishment of objectives.

Evaluation may also utilise data collected and stored in the course of the application of the logical framework approach. The logical framework – or the logframe, as it is usually called – is both a general approach to project or programme planning, monitoring and evaluation, and – in the form of a logframe matrix – a discrete planning and monitoring tool for projects and programmes (Baccarini 1999; Crawford and Bryce 2003; Jacobs *et al.* 2010; McLean 1988). At a minimum, a logframe matrix includes four central categories, arranged in a table and containing information on the goal, purpose, activities and output of a project or programme. Logframe matrices are developed during project or programme designing and subsequently updated throughout implementation. The generated data are an essential resource for ex-post evaluation. The core of the logframe is a theory of change which presents the logical flow of causal outcomes between activity targets and the intended results.

Evaluation includes, where possible, not only an assessment of 'what has happened; it also considers why something has occurred' and 'how much has changed as a consequence' (European Commission 2015: 49). Similarly, the United Nations Evaluation Group stated that 'Evaluation aims to understand why — and to what extent — intended and unintended results were achieved and to analyse the implications of the results' (UNEG 2016: 10). It seeks to establish a causal and quantitative link between the intervention and any change.

According to Valente and Kwan (2013: 84), campaign evaluation serves three functions. It improves the probability of achieving programme success by forcing campaign programmers to specify explicitly in advance the goals and objectives of the campaign and the theoretical or causal relations leading to those expectations. Once the objectives are specified, it becomes possible to create programmes to meet these objectives and develop instruments to measure them. The first function, then, is to determine the expected impacts and outcomes of the programme. The second function of a campaign evaluation is to help planners and scholars understand how or why a particular programme worked or did not work. 'Knowing how or why a program succeeded or failed – that is, the theoretical and causal as well as implementation

⁸ In this view, impact is the last item in a logical chain – an imagined mechanism which can take much or little time. If impact is defined solely in a time dimension as something happening in the long term, for example two years (Dottridge 2007b: 5), there would be the need to invent a new term for the effect that is the ultimate aim of the intervention. Using impacts only for 'lasting' effects (Raab and Rocha 2011: 290) is methodologically problematic, since it is difficult to say at the time of an evaluation study what will be long-lasting. In a recent EU staff working document, the consideration of impacts is only discussed with regard to future policies and programmes (*ex-ante*-impact-evaluation) (European Commission 2015), focusing on intended changes in the problem to be tackled and effects in other fields.

reasons – increases the likelihood that successes can be repeated and failures avoided in future behavioural promotion programs’ (Valente and Kwan 2013: 85). A third function of evaluation is to provide information relevant to the planning of future actions. Evaluations can indicate what behaviours or which audiences should be addressed in the next round of activities.

One instrument in evaluation is the explication of an intervention logic. The *intervention logic* of campaigns consists of an explication of ‘the expected chain of events by using a simplified model of causality’, taking context into account (European Commission 2015: 54). The intervention logic is ideally clearly set out at the beginning of a campaign and build into its design. If the intervention logic was not explicated, a basic prerequisite for evaluation is a reconstruction of how the campaign is supposed to work in terms of assumed causal chains of outcomes. An intervention logic is often visualised in a map (Coffman 2009: 6). It is embedded in a theory of change that places an intervention in a broader context.⁹


‘Theory of change’, ‘logic model’ and ‘intervention logic’ are sometimes used synonymously. However, we suggest making a clear distinction between them. Intervention logic follows the assumed causal chain of intended effects of one single intervention. It is part of a theory of change which – in our understanding – considers the interaction of the intervention logics of more than one activity pursued in one project or programme. While changes in a complex environment can never be attributed to one campaign alone (Raab and Rocha 2011: 272), it is still useful to stipulate how a campaign is supposed to contribute to change in a pragmatic one-dimensional representation.

Ideally, a theory of change is derived from problem analysis. Therefore, guides to the planning of measures usually recommend beginning with a thorough problem analysis (Christ and Aranaz 2008). Only if problem analysis shows that a campaign is a promising instrument with which to address a factor identified as causing or contributing to a problem should a campaign be planned.

We address the same issue from a different angle. We do not analyse a problem and construct a theory of change to recommend interventions; instead, we analyse an intervention in order to reconstruct the underlying intervention logic. This approach responds to the empirical observation that donors provide funds earmarked for demand-side campaigns with the aim of reducing trafficking in human beings, and that international organisations and NGOs respond to these calls and conduct such campaigns. Thus, the designing of a campaign is not influenced by problem analysis but by incentives offered by funding organisations. However, in this case, the project design also necessarily implies an assumption about the causation of a problem and about the instruments with which to tackle the causes. Figure 1 sets out the intervention logic of a campaign aimed at changing behaviour (Coffman 2003).¹⁰ At the same time, the figure illustrates how evaluation terms can be used if applied to behaviour-change campaigns.

⁹ However, the campaign intervention logic (or logic model) is part of a theory of change.

¹⁰ For reconstructing the intervention logics of campaigns, Coffman’s stage model and its visualisation has been adopted with some adjustments. The main adjustment concerns the relation between the objectives at different stages of the campaign. The different types of objective are not formulated in a temporal sequence (‘short-term’, ‘long-term’) but in a logical sequential way with regard to the degree of directness (‘immediate’, ‘intermediate’, ‘final’).

Figure 1. Theoretical construction of the intervention logic of a behaviour-change campaign

Source: The authors, developed from Coffman (2003, p. 9).

Communication campaigns consist of activities that disseminate messages through different channels (Atkin and Rice 2013). They can be conducted because of inputs: a campaign budget is used, for example, to print leaflets or to employ organising staff; donated inputs may be used in several ways – organisations allow staff to work on a campaign during their paid time (donation of staff hours); volunteers are engaged in campaigns (donated volunteer time); and products and services can be donated (e.g. printing flyers or allocating time for placing announcements on TV without requiring the usual payment). The input allows for communication activities – for example a TV spot, a website, a press conference or the printing and distribution of a leaflet. These activities are expected to induce particular outcomes.

Evaluation efforts often end after the analysis of the more-or-less-immediate outcomes, as the impacts are influenced by many factors beyond the control of campaign organisers. However, this implicitly suggests that the task of evaluation is thought to be to analyse whether *campaigners* worked well and not whether *campaigns* worked well. The links between behavioural outcomes and intended impacts – in other words the underlying assumptions – can also be subject to evaluation. According to Chelimsky (2006: 47), the study of underlying assumptions can be called ‘knowledge evaluation’. It addresses ‘those beliefs enshrined in the hearts and minds of officials and practitioners that may not stand up under examination’.

For example, if a campaign calls on a target group to report suspicious observations to the police, the effects depend not only on the behaviour of the campaigners but also on the reaction of the police. A campaign may fail to have an impact because it does not reach the target group, or because suspicious observations are – for whatever reason – not consistently and effectively investigated and followed up by law enforcement agencies. In the latter case, campaign organisers may have done a perfect job, yet their campaign still did not have the intended effect on the underlying social problem. We suggest that monitoring data should indicate how far campaigners acted according to expectations, and that evaluation should also search for indications of both expected outcomes *and* impact. Failure to achieve the expected outcomes and impact could, for example, be due to flaws in the underlying theory of change, inadequate behaviour in another line of activities (here, law enforcement) or to unexpected developments between the planning and the execution of the campaign.

2.3 Evaluation standards

Interventions and their effects have long been assessed in the pharmaceutical field of drug development and medical treatments. Today, approval procedures are stringent and require years of testing before a treatment can be put on the market. These tests have to be designed to comply with the highest scientific standards, whenever possible using

randomised controlled trials – experiments in which persons are randomly allocated either to a group receiving the treatment or to a control group not receiving it. If an evaluation seeks to provide evidence of causality, the design has to include experimental and quasi-experimental techniques such as pre- and post-test surveys or focus-group discussions with systematic control-group comparison (Farrington 2003; van der Knaap *et al.* 2008). For several reasons, such experiments are often not possible in other fields – for example, because of the need for large evaluation resources compared to the costs of the intervention, or because the intervention aims at impacting on hard-to-measure issues such as trafficking in human beings.

However, even if ‘gold standard’ scientific evidence cannot always be provided, standards have been developed to ensure the quality of evaluations. A widely recognised set of standards was provided in 1981 by the ‘Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation’ and developed further (Sanders 2006). Other important fields for the evaluation of interventions are health policies and developmental aid. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC) has developed concrete principles and standards of evaluation for the assessment of international aid projects (DAC 1991, 2010). In one GAATW study, evaluations of anti-trafficking interventions are analysed, using six sets of clustered issues derived from the norms and standards developed by the DAC (Hames *et al.* 2011).

The United Nations built on these standards when introducing a special body, the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), which developed norms and standards that should guide evaluation (UNEG 2005a) and translates the normative requirements into a practical implementation frame defining standards – for example, involving detailed recommendations for the structure and content of the final evaluation report (e.g. Standard 4 with 18 items) (UNEG 2005b). UNEG evaluation recommendations are ambitious with regard to their scope, but they also include some reservations that allow evaluation efforts to adapt to specific purposes and small budgets. As the UNEG evaluation standards state, all questions should be addressed *to the highest extent possible*, and *limitations* of knowledge should be clearly acknowledged.

In the field of anti-trafficking initiatives, UNODC refers explicitly to the UNEG framework for the evaluation of UNODC-funded projects and programmes. It provides evaluators with an online handbook that ensures that they are completely familiar with the required principles and standards as set out in UNEG norms and standards (UNODC 2012) and provides a wide range of tools for the different stages of an evaluation.

Taking into account that interventions against trafficking in human beings usually refer to the UN definition of the trafficking offence, we used the UNEG norms and standards of evaluation as our basic frame of orientation for the assessment of evaluation reports. Subsequently, we clustered the general issues covered by UNEG norms and standards into ten sets and formulated a core question for each set which should be answered with ‘Yes’ to indicate a high quality of evaluation.

In the following paragraphs, we introduce the questions we used to analyse the quality of evaluation reports, and how they are related to UNEG norms in their current version (UNEG 2016).¹¹

¹¹ They were developed on the basis of the preceding version (UNEG 2005b). The UNEG norms are more detailed than the ten questions and in many procedural aspects that are relevant for large-scale external evaluations; in some parts they refer explicitly to the United Nations.

1. *Status of the evaluator: is the evaluator independent and impartial?*

This criterion refers to UNEG Norms 4 (Independence) and 5 (Impartiality). Independence is 'necessary for credibility, influences the ways in which evaluation is used and allows evaluators to be impartial from undue pressure throughout the evaluation process'. Impartiality includes 'objectivity, professional integrity and absence of bias. (...) Evaluators need to be impartial, implying that evaluation team members must not have been (or expect to be in the near future) directly responsible for the policy setting, design or management of the evaluation subject' (UNEG 2016:11).

2. *Availability of the evaluation report: is the evaluation available for public learning?*

This criterion refers to UNEG Norm 7 (Transparency) – 'Transparency is an essential element of evaluation that establishes trust and builds confidence, enhances stakeholder ownership and increases public accountability. Evaluation products should be publicly accessible' (UNEG 2016: 12). In addition, Standard 1.5 states that a 'disclosure policy should ensure that the public has easy access to evaluation reports' (UNEG 2016: 17).

3. *Stakeholder participation: are all relevant stakeholders involved, their participation described and their legitimate interests protected?*

This criterion refers to UNEG Standard 1.3 (Evaluation Plan and Reporting) which requires stakeholder participation in the planning process – 'In order to ensure maximum utility, plan preparations should include adequate consultations with stakeholders – especially the intended users' (UNEG 2016: 16). Stakeholder participation is also emphasised in Standard 4.6 (Stakeholder Engagement and Reference Groups): 'Processes should be in place to secure the participation of individuals or parties who may be affected by the evaluation, are able to influence the implementation of recommendations or who would be affected in the long term' (UNEG 2016: 24)

4. *Objectives of the evaluation: are the objectives of the evaluation clearly stated?*

This criterion refers to UNEG Standard 4.3 (Terms of Reference), which states that evaluation reports should introduce terms of reference, including the evaluation purpose, scope, design and plan. The terms of reference should include, *inter alia*, the evaluation context and purpose; a description and a clear definition of the subject to be evaluated; the scope of the evaluation, the evaluation objectives with key questions and/or criteria; and the evaluation methodology (UNEG 2016: 22).

5. *Intervention logic of the campaign: are the project theory and intervention logic explicated or reconstructed?*

This criterion refers to UNEG Standard 4.2 (Evaluability Assessment), which raises the question of evaluability assessment and is closely related to the explication of project theory of change. As Standard 4.2 states: 'If evaluability is not established, the evaluator must take measures to address the problem, such as reconstructing the theory of change, readjusting the evaluation scope or timing or consulting the evaluation commissioner in order to revise the expectations' (UNEG 2016: 22).

6. *Output, outcomes and the impact of campaigns: are they addressed and observable or measurable indications determined?*

This criterion refers to UNEG Norm 3 (Credibility): 'Evaluation results (or findings) and recommendations are derived from — or informed by — the conscientious, explicit and

judicious use of the best available, objective, reliable and valid data and by accurate quantitative and qualitative analysis of evidence' (UNEG 2016, p. 11).

7. Reliability: is the reliability of the presented results discussed?

This criterion refers to UNEG Norm 3 (Credibility) which requires a rigorous methodology (UNEG 2016: 10). In addition, UNEG Standard 4.2 raises the issue of evaluability and sets it as a basic requirement that sufficient data be available or collectable at a reasonable cost (UNEG 2016: 22).

8. Efficiency: are costs transparent and related to outcome or impact?

This criterion refers to the definition, provided by UNEG Norms and Standards (2016: 10), which states that evaluation should include the application of the criterion of efficiency for the assessment of the level of achievement. In the earlier version, the key idea behind this was explained – evaluation 'examines the efficiency of the use of inputs to yield results. Finally, evaluation asks: *Are there better ways of achieving the results?*' (UNEG 2005b: 6). In addition, we follow OECD standards stating that efficiency, in its most general sense, refers to a 'measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results' (OECD 2002: 21). In this sense, efficiency requires a relationship of inputs to results. Output efficiency is a more limited concept, with no effort made to indicate what results were achieved with any input. We refer to output efficiency if there are no signs of any waste of resources for a given output (OECD 2002: 20). Assessing output efficiency is an integral aspect of monitoring.

9. Side-effects: are possible side-effects and unintended consequences considered?

This criterion refers to the definition, provided by UNEG Norms and Standards (2016: 10) which states that evaluation 'analyses the level achievements of both expected and unexpected results (...).'

10. Final part: are conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned explicitly linked to the findings presented?

This criterion refers to UNEG Norm 3 (Credibility), which states that evaluation results (or findings) and recommendations have to be 'derived from – or informed by – the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of the best available, objective, reliable and valid data and by accurate and qualitative analysis of evidence' (UNEG 2016: 11). In addition, Standard 4.9 explicates that the 'final evaluation report should be logically structured and contain evidence-based findings, conclusions and recommendations' (UNEG 2016: 26).

2.4 Theoretical reflections on the observation of the effects of interventions

This section deals with the question of whether and how theoretically assumed effects can be observed in the real world. Substantiation can be brought forward for any link in the whole chain of effects. For each link, efforts can be made to observe what happens and to establish a causal connection with the intervention.¹² This can be in the form of either quantitative measurement or qualitative observation.

¹² This topic is intensely discussed with respect to development measures (Reade 2008) and also applied in other fields such as integration policy evaluation (Lechner and Lutz 2012: 6).

The temptation is to report only easily countable items.

As a rule, output items can be easily observed and counted. Thus, it is tempting to attest to the successful implementation of a project by pointing to the delivery of outputs – for example, the number of posters and leaflets printed, the launching of websites or the holding of press conferences,

For immediate outcomes, measurement is also relatively easy, as is the establishment of a causal link to activities. For example, the number of media reports referring to a press release can be very reliably counted. For particular channels, the number of persons exposed to a special activity can be estimated with some reliability, particularly when information is available on the reach of the media – for example, on the circulation of a newspaper.

The temptation to present only countable items in evaluation reports neglects the fact that some qualitative assessments can also be done relatively easily. Above all, it is easy to check whether the message of a campaign was understood as intended. For example, media reports can be assessed to determine whether they reproduce the intended message in their reporting; a record can also be kept of calls to a helpline in which the callers misunderstood the message. Ideally, potential misunderstandings are reduced by pre-testing campaign materials; however, campaigning experiences can still produce unexpected misunderstandings. With subsequent stages in the intervention logic, it is more difficult to establish a definite link to the intervention, as other factors may interfere and have to be accounted for.

The visibility effects in surveys and reporting data

Surveys are a classical means of establishing a connection between an intervention and the outcomes such as attitudes, norms, behavioural intentions and reported behaviour. They are conducted either before or after an intervention, seeking to prove change. For example, they could show that the percentage of persons intending to behave in an undesirable way has declined. If the search for an alternative explanation has not produced a likely alternative reason, it could be argued that this change in intended behaviour was caused by the campaign.

Alternatively, survey answers of a test group of persons exposed to the campaign could be compared to those of others who were not exposed to it. If the test group shows fewer intentions to behave in an undesirable way, one could argue that this is due to the campaign.


However, surveys addressing campaigns aiming to change socially undesirable behaviour have an inherent problem – they *simultaneously* change what is considered to be a socially *desirable* answer in a survey.¹³ Measurement of self-reported behaviour ‘is subject to error because of the tendency to over-report socially desirable behaviour’ (Freimuth *et al.* 2001: 486). Therefore in surveys it is virtually impossible to distinguish whether a person’s behaviour has changed in the desired way or whether s/he only pretends to have done so.

Similarly, crime statistics on trafficking in human beings are dependent on public perceptions of the issue (Brown *et al.* 2010: 59–97). Efforts to hide or mask undesirable behaviour affect criminal statistics or other enforcement data, which are highly dependent on reporting by

¹³ This effect is also raised by Merton (1936) and more systematically elaborated on by Goffman (1959)

victims and witnesses. If campaigns successfully change public perceptions of an activity – for example, by stigmatising the purchase of sexual services – this can affect crime statistics. On the one hand, casual observers such as neighbours or parcel carriers could find it easier than before to report any suspicion that they may have that someone is being forced into prostitution. On the other hand, sex workers and clients of sexual services could find it more risky to report observations because they became witnesses while participating in a stigmatised activity. Depending on which effect is stronger, increases in crime statistics may indicate increasing detection rates rather than the greater existence of a crime; alternatively, decreases in crime statistics may indicate declining detection rates rather than decreases in crime.

Figure 2. Norm change and visibility of behaviour in surveys



Source: The authors.

The extent of the crime is nigh-on impossible to measure with a high degree of reliability. Measurement issues specific to trafficking in human beings have been repeatedly set out (Vogel 2014). A range of methods is available which give an idea of the approximate size of subpopulations of trafficking victims (Kangaspunta 2015), but it is doubtful whether campaign impacts could be measured by them, because they are not sufficiently precise and are not independent from visibility effects.

The problem of observing behaviour

Intentions are not identical to behaviour, and *reported* behaviour is not the same as *actual* behaviour. Including data from observations is often more difficult but not impossible. With regard to the purchasing of legal goods, behaviour change can be observed in sales statistics – at least in principle – provided by cooperating sellers. With regard to reporting to helplines, details of calls can be documented. Where the purchase is of stigmatised or illicit goods and services, informants can be used to document their observations in the field.

In individual investigations into suspicions of trafficking in human beings, efforts can be made to document why they are likely to be initiated as a consequence of the campaign. There could also be a follow-up of detected cases to show what happened to persons identified as trafficking victims and to those accused of being perpetrators. This is difficult, particularly with regard to transnational crimes. However, it is potentially crucial for assessing the deterrence effect. If the situation of potential victims and suspected perpetrators were to be documented over a longer period, assumptions about the likely incentives or disincentives that detection results in could be underpinned or questioned.

Defensible cases versus robust evidence

Through awareness of all these measurement issues, we can safely conclude that it will be virtually impossible to provide robust scientific evidence to prove that campaigns really had the intended impact in the real world. An empirical study reviewing research on cross-border trafficking for sexual exploitation following a rigorous standard of methodological quality similarly argues that it is impossible to provide evidence because many other factors interfere (van der Laan *et al.* 2011). However, this judgement does not mean that campaigns have no impact. Demanding strong evidence of the intended effects of campaigns in a consumption context would be asking too much. Atkin and Rice (2013) and Raab and Rocha (2011: 272) have argued that change can never be attributed to campaigns in complex contexts. However, evaluations can concentrate “on determining if a *credible and defensible* case can be made’ instead of attempting to prove a definitive causation (Coffman 2009: 5). In addition, evaluation should indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence presented and its meaning for conclusions and recommendations (European Commission 2015: 50).

3 Intervention logic – theoretical reflections on how campaigns are supposed to work

As the preceding section has shown, theoretical considerations of how a campaign is supposed to work should be an integral part of any campaign planning and evaluation. However, these aspects have been largely neglected thus far. This section therefore presents theoretical considerations of the working of campaigns in general and of demand-side campaigns in the anti-trafficking field in particular, distinguishing between the two types.

3.1 Campaign- and field-specific intervention logics

Campaign intervention logics can be divided into campaign-specific and field-specific logics. The campaign-specific logic addresses the assumed causal chain from output to final outcome. The field-specific logic addresses the assumed causal chain from the derived final outcome to the intended impact in the real world.


The campaign-specific logic is, in principle, similar for all campaigns aimed at behaviour change, independent of the topic, while the field-specific part refers to subsequent changes in a specific field – here the efforts to reduce or eliminate the exploitation and trafficking of human beings.

Effects on the outcome level can be divided into a sequence of steps (see Figure 3). For the sake of clarity, we have grouped them into immediate, intermediate and final outcome. The refinement and grouping of steps can vary according to the matter of interest. In the case of our study, we propose the following outcome stages:

- Immediate outcome: people are exposed to and take notice of the message, for example by reading it on the poster or by listening to it on the radio.
- Intermediate outcome: people understand the message, find it relevant for themselves, accept the message and form an intention to behave according to the message. For example, they understand that the message that they should not buy specific goods, they find it relevant because they have purchased them before, they accept that they should not buy them anymore and form an intention not to do so in the future.
- Final outcome: When they have the opportunity to behave according to the message, they remember their intentions and behave accordingly (e.g. the good is offered to them and they do not buy it.).

In other words: they notice the message, want to do something and do it.

However, even if the final behavioural outcome is attained, the subsequent question is whether behaviour change does have an impact on the underlying social problem. Problem analysis before conducting a campaign can indicate whether such an impact is likely and it can then be reconstructed by an evaluation after a campaign has been conducted.

Figure 3. Intervention logics of demand-side campaigns

Source: The authors.

In our case, we need field-specific theories of how behaviour change is supposed to reduce – according to the expectations of anti-trafficking campaigners – trafficking in human beings. Ongoing debates on anti-trafficking efforts are neither based on nor provide a consistent general model of factors affecting the demand-side of trafficking. This comes as no surprise, as the offence of trafficking in human beings potentially encompasses a wide range of social phenomena in different fields (Cyrus and Vogel 2015).

However, debates about the factors impacting on trafficking show one important commonality: a supply chain with (at least) three stages is assumed. For example, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT 2014: 4) differentiates three types of agent – consumers, employers and brokers or agents. Aronowitz and Koning (2014: 670) describe a ‘business chain’ with three distinct groups: the customers or clients of trafficked persons (primary demand), the employers of (trafficked) sex workers, and third parties involved in the trafficking process (recruiters, travel agents, transporters). Wheaton *et al.* (2010: 124–130) construct the ‘ultimate’ consumer as the ‘fautor’, the employer as the exploiter and the trafficker as the intermediary.

Adopting these ideas, we describe the three stages as the contexts of consumption, production and recruitment.

- In a *consumption context*, people spend money on goods that are produced with the input of persons trapped in exploitation, or receive services from such persons. Thus, consumers knowingly or unknowingly feed exploitation through their spending.
- *Production context* is here used, in a wide sense, as any context in which income is generated through activities usually within an organisation, with an organiser (manager, operator, entrepreneur, business owner, employer) and persons working on specific tasks in the organisation (employees, dependent workers, self-employed contractors).
- For the *recruitment context*, it is assumed that organisers can use intermediaries instead of directly recruiting workers. If the intermediary has control over a person and transfers this control to an organiser, this transfer is often called the ‘sale’ of persons. However, the transfer of persons without *any* agency options can also be considered as a special case, separate from the more general case in which intermediaries receive a payment for providing access to the labour force of persons with *limited* agency options. Depending on the circumstances, such recruitment actions can also be legally sanctioned as trafficking in human beings.

Demand-side campaigns do not directly address trafficking as the transfer into exploitation, because such transfers are usually not visible to consumers. The link between consumer demand and trafficking is indirect – the change in consumer behaviour should reduce exploitative relations in the production context so that, in production, organisers have no incentive to demand services from intermediaries who transfer easily exploitable workers to them.

Three conclusions can already be drawn from the theoretical analysis of the intervention logics of demand-side campaigns.

1. The campaign-specific logic draws attention to the fact that raising awareness is not sufficient if the campaign ultimately seeks to change behaviour.
2. The field-specific logic draws attention to the fact that a demand-side campaign can only have an effect on the reduction of trafficking if they have an effect on exploitation. Therefore, exploitation reduction is the more logical primary aim of campaigns, rather than the reduction of trafficking in human beings.
3. Even the simplified intervention logic consists of quite a long chain of effects. An interruption of the chain at any point means that the campaign has no impact on trafficking via the behaviour of the target group. Defects at any stage will water down the final impact on trafficking in human beings.

3.2 Assessing risks and side-effects

Campaigns usually have one key message about what a person exposed to the campaign should think and do, but they can actually convey more than this. Having introduced the supposed workings of demand-side campaigns, we now turn to the potential effects beyond the intervention logic.

Analysis of the side-effects of purposeful human action has a long tradition in the social sciences. Merton's definition of the *unintended* consequence of a purposeful human action (Merton 1936) is still often referred to. Unintended consequences occur in addition to the desired effect of an action, either to the detriment of this latter – an unexpected drawback – causing a perverse result contrary to what was originally intended (backfiring or a boomerang effect), but also as an additional positive and unexpected effect.

Moreover, side-effects can also be accepted *consciously* and appreciated as an *expected additional benefit* or can be deplored as seemingly unavoidable *collateral damage*. In the following discussion we distinguish between the side-effects of demand-side campaigns according to their desirability from the campaigners' point of view.

Desirable side-effects: If a campaign leads to side-effects which are seen as desirable by campaigners, it means it has delivered expected additional benefits. The occurrence of desirable side-effects may be invoked as an argument that a campaign is successful in spite of its having failed to realise the primary objective of behaviour change in a consumption context, particularly if it raises awareness of the issue at stake or increases support for a policy. In addition, it may promote a positive image of the campaigning organisation and increase donations for its services. Supporting *policy change* and encouraging *donations* are identified as the two most important desirable side-effects of campaigns.

Instead of speaking of desirable side-effects, nevertheless, we could have spoken of campaigns with multiple objectives. However, for the purpose of our analysis, we discarded this option as it distracts from the question of whether a campaign can impact on trafficking in

human beings through behaviour changes on the demand-side. We argue that a demand-side campaign should not be deemed successful when desirable side-effects were achieved *without* the primary behavioural objective being achieved.

Undesirable side-effects: In order to attract attention, campaigns set a stimulus, usually a concise image and a catchy slogan highlighting a particular aspect of it. If a campaign fails to attract attention, it has no chance of selling its message to the target audience. The choice of aspect presented unavoidably triggers a series of associations that contextualise the central message that campaigners intend to convey. The associations influence how the stimulus is received and the message understood and in which context the memory of the message is activated. A recipient initially exposed to a campaign stimulus responds in a spontaneous and unconscious way. These psychological mechanisms are conceptualised as ‘thinking fast’, in contrast to slow, systematic and deliberate consideration of a problem (Kahneman 2012). Spontaneous understanding can – and often does – deviate from the meaning which campaigners attribute to a verbal or pictorial message: ‘...all participants in communication processes always have potential freedoms to interpret, and thus, accept, resist, or reject “expertise” based on their own anchorings in material experiences’ (Dervin and Foreman-Wernet 2013: 147).

In the following section, we briefly outline how specific campaign features may lead to undesirable side-effects. Careful reflection on potential undesirable side-effects may help campaigners to reduce or contain the risk of them occurring, or to favour other actions for the same purpose – instead of a campaign – when the risk of collateral damage is not controllable.

1. *Extreme stories and imagery*

The prevalent visualisation in anti-trafficking interventions is the ‘stereotypical image’ of the victim as ‘a young, innocent, foreign woman tricked into prostitution abroad. She is battered and kept under continuous surveillance so that her only hope is police rescue (...)’ (Andrijasevic and Mai 2016: 2). Victims of human trafficking are often visualised through images of chains, locks or injuries. Often, young fragile-looking females are chosen as examples.¹⁴ When the life-history of a victim of trafficking is used as an intense storyline in a campaign, it is sending a clear and unambiguous message. This type of dramatic portrait is useful for attracting attention and triggering feelings of pity, pointing to the urgent need for help (Feingold 2010; Gopaldas 2014; Vance 2012). While being instrumental in attracting donors and support for policy change, these extreme stories and imagery in demand-side campaigns may also have unintended side-effects. *Victims may be overlooked or considered undeserving* if their situation is characterised by different or less-visible features to being trapped in exploitation, or because they are not able to tell their story in a coherent way. For example, stereotypical portrayals could imply that it is easy to categorise a person either as a powerless victim of trafficking or as an unworthy prostitute (Krsmanovic 2016). If his or her story is not believed, a person may be sanctioned as an irregular immigrant or an undeclared employee working illegally (Dottridge 2007a; Hoyle *et al.* 2011; Srikantiah 2007).

¹⁴ According to Lainez (2010: 135), a ‘close look at representations of “child prostitution” or “child trafficking” in South-East Asia reveals the existence of a standard portrayal of the sexually exploited child. Denunciation campaigns first target sex tourism involving children and then human trafficking has massively used stereotypes.’ These simplifier, anecdotal and tear-shedding clichés ‘have led to elaborating a polished image of the victim whose testimony has been presented as an irrefutable proof of a topic perceived as intolerable’.

Extreme portrayals of perpetrators as unscrupulous males who are part of a mafia-style international criminal organisation can have a similar effect. Empirical research found that the evidence-base for the assumption that organised crime is always involved in the trafficking of human beings is 'woefully inadequate. (...) The actors involved may be organised criminal groups, individual traffickers and smugglers, or even friends and family or trafficking victims' (Vermeulen *et al.* 2010: 247).

2. Gender stereotyping

As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicated in its global report on trafficking in human beings (UNODC 2009a: 6),

[a] disproportionate number of women are involved in human trafficking, not only as victims (which we knew), but also as traffickers (first documented here). (...) Female offenders have a more prominent role in present-day slavery than in most other forms of crime. This fact needs to be addressed, especially the cases where former victims have become perpetrators.

The UNODC went on to add:

Surprisingly, in 30 per cent of the countries which provided information on the gender of traffickers, women make up the largest proportion of traffickers. In some parts of the world, women trafficking women is the norm.¹⁵

Perpetrators who do not correspond to the stereotype may be overlooked – and thus their victims may also be (O'Brien 2016; Siegel and Blank 2010).

On the other hand, some studies indicate that most workers trafficked into labour exploitation are male (ILO 2014).¹⁶ However, men are rarely represented as potential *victims* of trafficking in human beings (Jones 2010). Consequently, campaigns following and promoting unsubstantiated gender stereotypes may have as effect that male victims and female perpetrators will be overlooked.

3. Sexualised images

Sexualised images can be used to attract attention. If they are used in advertising, the slogan 'sex sells' characterises strategies that use sex appeal to sell a particular product or service. Similarly, images of attractive naked females can be used to draw attention to anti-trafficking campaigns (Krsmanovic 2016), even though they compete with the frequent use of sexualised images in selling goods such as underwear, perfumes or drinks. They may backfire and have the effect of *confirming a perception of women as available sex objects*, even though the intention is to eliminate this view (Andrijasevic 2007).

4. Seemingly innocuous situations hiding extreme exploitation

This type of victim stereotyping can be avoided through a contrasting way of illustrating trafficking in human beings in campaigns. Trafficking is portrayed as an ubiquitous crime,

¹⁵ This is additional information provided on the related UNODC website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html>

¹⁶ For a discussion of the ILO study, see (Vogel 2016).

hidden behind seemingly innocuous facades and thus rendered invisible.¹⁷ Campaigns using this strategy suggest that trafficking victims can be encountered in a range of everyday life situations without anyone realising. Such portrayals can produce a general feeling of insecurity and mistrust (O'Connell Davidson 2006), either leading to the impression that nothing can be done or that the risk of reporting *false suspicions* is too high.

5. *Exhibiting undesirable behaviour*

Campaigns aimed at reducing undesirable behaviour have to find a visual or verbal representation of this behaviour. However, with this representation, a campaign may give the impression that a particular conduct is more widespread and thus more 'normal' and acceptable than it really is. For individuals who already abstain from such undesirable behaviour, these impressions can produce unintended and undesirable 'boomerang effects' (Byrne and Hart 2009). As one review found, '...a college campaign targeting alcohol consumption might motivate students who previously consumed less alcohol than the norm to consume more' (Schultz *et al.* 2007: 430). Similarly, the continuous representation of men as buyers of sexual services may create the impression that buying sex is quite common behaviour among men. This may have the effect of suggesting that young men need at least to try out the purchase of sexual services.

6. *Visualisations with a specific complexion or dress-code*

If campaigns work with one or two photos or more general pictures of victims, they unavoidably have to choose people with a specific complexion and clothing. Victims' representations in pictures are perceived by recipients as Asian, African or European, belonging to the majority population of a country or to an ethnic or immigrated minority. Women may be dressed in clothing suggesting that she is selling sexual services, or children may wear shabby skirts, thus portraying Roma children who are sent out to beg.

Depending on the national context of the campaign, this may have undesirable side-effects for those groups that show similar visual features as those used in the campaign (Hatzinikolaou 2015; Kuneviciute 2012), potentially resulting in members of these groups being associated with stigmatised activities and crime in general, and making their access to regular housing and jobs more difficult.

7. *Stigmatisation of specific types of spending*

Specific types of spending may generally be associated with trafficking in human beings – for example, spending on sexual services or cheap goods or donating to beggars. If the target group avoids this type of spending, this may have the undesired side-effect that persons who depend on the income from their sale of sexual services, cheap goods or begging may be deprived of it, without seeing any alternative action.

The simple removal of children from child labour does not work. It is important to ensure that systems are in place to ensure that children are not displaced into another form of child labour or worse, into a situation of the worst form of child labour (ILO 2016: 3).

¹⁷ For example, an anti-trafficking project in Germany produced cinema spots to draw attention to trafficking for labour exploitation. In three spots, hotel cleaning, building and restaurant work were presented as suspicious situations, with actors in workwear presented as ghost-like transparent bodies.

Their poverty may be aggravated, making them even more vulnerable to being trafficked into exploitation.

8. *Offering an easy behavioural solution*

The attractiveness of demand-side campaigns lies in the suggestion that everybody can contribute something to the reduction of major problems through simple actions. This impression is strengthened by the prevalent use of an emotional and alarming language and visualisation of ‘modern slavery’, suggesting ‘simplistic solutions to complex issues without challenging the structural and causal factors of inequality’ (Andrijasevic and Mai 2016: 1; O’Connell Davidson 2015). If a campaign achieves a behavioural objective – e.g. a suspicious observation is reported – but has no effect on the underlying social problem, the campaign could merely serve as a moral relief. Thus, campaigns may have the function of promoting symbolic actions or policies that do not improve the lot of exploited persons.

3.3 A typology of demand-side campaigns

The campaign-specific intervention logic is, in principle, similar for all campaigns. Therefore, the following section concentrates on theoretical considerations of the field-specific intervention. A heuristic typology of demand-side campaigns is presented, based on similarities and differences in the key behavioural messages of real campaigns (see Section 4).

Basically, we identified two distinct intervention logics. The first aims to change individual or public patterns of spending money (spending-shift campaigns). The second aims to motivate individuals to report suspicious observations to a competent actor (reporting campaigns). The basic logics are the following:

- *Spending-shift campaigns*: Actors in the consumption context stop spending money on goods and services produced through exploitative means. In response, there is less exploitative production and fewer incentives to recruit vulnerable persons into such production. Spending-shift campaigns are applied in three contexts.
 - First, campaigns can ask people to *abstain from giving money to specific groups of people*. Most importantly, campaigns send out the message that people should not give money when children are involved in begging or trying to sell petty goods like lighters, by supplying services like shoe-shining or playing music, or by being presented by adults in order to engender sympathy. Campaigners consider the giving of money in these situations as inherently harmful for children, keeping them away from school and providing an incentive for trafficking (Don’t-buy-from-children campaigns).
 - Second, a campaign can advise people to *abstain from buying a specific good or service entirely*. Most importantly, some campaigns promote the idea that men should not buy commercial sexual services as this consumption is considered inherently harmful to the women selling them and to society’s sense of justice, equality and morality as felt by the campaigners. They believe that society’s tolerance of the purchase of sex would be an incentive for trafficking (Don’t-buy-sex campaigns).
 - Third, campaigns can advise people to *shift spending within one category of substitutable goods and services* away from those that are deemed likely to include the exploitation or trafficking of human beings at some stage of production and towards those for which this latter is unlikely. These campaigns promote fair or responsible consumption (Buy-responsibly campaigns).

- *Reporting campaigns*: Members of the public observe suspicious situations usually in a consumption context. They report their observations to people who can help the victims. This help has a deterrent effect on others' intentions to traffick victims into exploitative situations. Reporting may be to:
 - NGOs offering assistance. They accept the information confidentially, try to communicate with the presumed victims and gain their perspective, and inform the police if they deem it necessary.
 - Specialised police agencies. The police investigate according to criminal law standards, seeking to stop the exploitation and provide evidence that will be acceptable in a criminal court. They refer victims to NGOs offering assistance if they think it necessary.

For each type, we will explore key ideas, a typical field of application, a policy context and the main objectives. We search for the intervention logic of a campaign, asking how it is supposed to work. Finally, we search for arguments ascertaining that the intended effects can not possibly be realised, or why they may have unintended consequences for the underlying problem.

Our analysis is partly based on the literature and partly on our own reflections¹⁸ whether a campaign aims at extending the scope of action for persons witnessing or experiencing vulnerable situations. In particular, we ask whether it becomes easier or more difficult for perpetrators to hide stigmatised or criminalised activities behind legitimate facades.

3.4 Spending-shift campaigns

This section deals with three variants of the spending-shift campaign type. As a common feature, spending-shift campaigns call on consumers to abstain from or to change their spending behaviour. These three variants can be distinguished as follows:

- Never buy from a particular group of people (i.e. begging children).
- Never buy specified goods or services (i.e. commercial sexual services).
- Never buy goods or services produced under particular (negative) conditions (i.e. buy responsibly).

In the following paragraphs we describe the ideal-typical notion of how intervention logic can be assumed to work for the three campaign variants.

3.4.1 Don't-buy-from-children campaigns

The message of the ideal-typical Don't-buy-from-children campaign concerns the direct interaction between consumers and children at or below the obligatory school age. Consumers are asked to stop remunerating children's effort to collect money in public spaces, be it through selling goods (typically small items such as toys, packets of paper tissues or matchboxes), through offering services or performances (such as shoe-shining,

¹⁸ More elaborate micro-theoretical considerations, referring among others to Hirschman and Goffman will be presented in a forthcoming paper by Albert Kraler and Dita Vogel.

tourist guiding or music) or through begging, with no goods or services in return. All these activities constitute work from the children's point of view, in the sense that they are time-consuming, income-generating activities.

The key objectives of Don't-buy-from-children campaigns are the reduction of child labour, school absenteeism and trafficking for child labour. Campaigns are compatible with all policies in favour of the reduction of child poverty, as well as with those that seek to abolish begging for person of all ages in public spaces, seen as a molestation of regular business consumers in shopping or tourist areas, for example.


The starting point of our analysis is the behaviour before the campaign (the baseline). Benevolent people remunerate children's effort to collect money in public environments. As a concrete context, imagine children who actively offer packets of paper tissues to tourists strolling around, charging the supermarket price plus a bit extra. When tourists buy these paper tissues, their demand is less driven by the wish or need for tissues than by the idea of helping the poor children who are selling these goods.¹⁹ The demand is dependent on the age of the seller, as adult street traders would not be able to achieve the same price (correspondingly, adult beggars would not receive the same volume of donations). Therefore, parents can increase the family's income by sending their children out on the streets to collect money through petty-sales, services or begging rather than by sending them to school or letting them relax and play. Poor families with many children have more to gain. As children are generally expected to obey their parents, on whom they are dependant, they are likely to comply. At the same time, the parents are deemed to be abusing their children's dependency and vulnerability. The latter may not realise that their future life chances are at risk if they do not attend school.

If parents entrust their child – for a charge – to a person who organises the petty-sale process, a third party comes into play. For example, poor parents from a village could give a child into the care of an uncle in the city so that the child can make money through petty sales or begging there. In this informal setting, the foster carers have a similar power over the children as the parents do. The behaviour of both sets of adults conforms to the definition of legal trafficking, as both parents and carers profit from the children's begging. In the terminology introduced above, the parents are the traffickers, transferring their child into exploitation, and the manager of the petty-sales operation is the exploiter, profiting from the organisation of the process. One such a case is described in a training handbook (von Hagen 2013: 30) based on a practitioners' guide (UNODC 2009b: 16–17): A father gives his 10-year-old son to a friend who sends him out to beg on the streets. The case description contains beating and threats to the child, but also emphasises that such treatment is not necessary for this scenario to be labelled as trafficking.

The campaign intervenes, inducing benevolent buyers or donors to reconsider and change their behaviour. The basic logic is as follows: if no one remunerates child labour as such, then the children's legal guardians cannot exploit them, either directly or by giving them into the hands of others who exploit them. The logic of the campaign is visualised in Figure 4.

¹⁹ A tourist may ignore beggars or donate with or without interaction, being motivated to help or to avoid the molestation (Andriotis 2016: 71).

Figure 4. The supposed field-specific intervention logic of a Don't-buy-from-children campaign



Source: The authors.

In a next step, the logical chain from behaviour change to impact is investigated in more detail in order to question the comprehensiveness and consistency of the argument. We ask whether the behaviour change can have alternative consequences.

Let us assume that a campaign has been successful in changing the behaviour of benevolent buyers and donators: they no longer give money to children involved in petty trade, services or begging, although the children still continue to offer their services or beg for a while afterwards. A short-term reaction could be that parents or foster carers threaten the children, believing that it is the latter's fault that they do not bring money home any more. However, if the campaign is successful, it is likely that the parents/carers have also become aware of it and realise that their children can no longer earn any money by working and begging on the streets. So the question becomes: How will parents react to this reduction in their income?

Consider the case of parents living in extreme poverty who have sent their children out to work. They have used the income generated by the children to feed the family. This situation does not change for the better by a reduction in income – on the contrary, the poverty is aggravated, for both the parents and for the children concerned (ILO 2016). As a consequence, parents have to find new coping strategies. If the campaign were to be embedded in a set of measures to reduce child labour, parents might, for example, realise that a new programme providing free school meals enables them to send their children to school without exposing the whole family to hunger.

If the campaign is run as a single, stand-alone measure, other strategies could come into play. These might include one of the parents going abroad to work, or the children having to turn to much harder income-generating activities hidden from public scrutiny, which would probably expose them to more risks than their earlier work in public. This new work could be in someone's household, in agriculture, or by accepting the offer of recruiters to find work for a child. In a situation of aggravated poverty, traffickers would no longer recruit children in order to force them to beg, but they might find it easier to recruit them into other forms of exploitation, including sexual exploitation.

If we consider children in informal fostering arrangements for the purpose of exploiting their earning capacity, a successful campaign eliminating the source of this income could result in children being sent back to their parents – leaving them once again in a situation of

destitution.²⁰ Alternatively, children could be directly transferred to other forms of exploitation outside the public gaze.

3.4.2 Don't-buy-sex campaigns

The message of ideal-typical Don't-buy-sex campaigns is directed at men who consider buying commercial sexual services provided by females. They are asked to stop having sexual intercourse or other sexual services or pornography in exchange for money. The key objective is the reduction, or ideally the elimination, of commercial sexual activities – considered as inherently exploitative – and any form of recruitment into them. Don't-buy-sex campaigns are placed in an environment of gender equality policies and the prohibition of prostitution. They are also compatible with enforcement activities against prostitution and outreach activities with the aim of supporting women's exit from commercial sexual activities.

In Don't-buy-sex campaigns, commercial sex markets are considered unacceptable by campaigners, either for moral or religious reasons or for reasons of gender equality. All sexual activities in exchange for payment are considered to be exploitative and humiliating – thus not in the best interests of women in general and the women providing sexual services in particular. Therefore, procurement into prostitution is equated with trafficking, and the client is seen as an accomplice in a trafficking relation (Waltman 2011: 156). The voluntary participation of women in sex work is presented as principally impossible or the rare exception, likely to be caused by prior experiences of abuse and violence, or by a lack of awareness of the long-run negative effects on the victim's physical and mental health. However, the campaign's final objective is a society in which sex only takes place in personal relations with respect for the needs of both partners.²¹

As a step in the direction of such a society, campaigns make moral appeals to men to stop buying sexual services and pornography. When all men change their behaviour in that way, sexual service markets in brothels, on the streets or on the internet close down as there is no longer an income to be gained. According to this logic, when such markets no longer exist, there is also no business to be done through recruiting women into enduring commercial sexual exploitation. Campaigns and educational programmes can be run either in countries where the purchase of sexual services is legal under certain conditions, or as accompanying measures to the criminalisation of demand for sexual services. Don't-buy-sex campaigns are compatible with the criminalisation of buyers of sex.


Don't-buy-sex campaigns seek to strengthen the social norm that buying sexual services is immoral behaviour and socially unacceptable. Clients, prostitutes and organisers of the sex industry are made aware that they participate in a stigmatised or criminalised business. As an unintended consequence, it is possible that the exposure to a message dealing with the sex industry may create – as a boomerang effect (Byrne and Hart 2009) when not carefully designed – the impression that it is not uncommon for men to purchase commercial sexual services and thus motivate some to try it. Another possible unintended consequence could be that men do not change their buying intentions, but seek commercial sex in more hidden forms (Jordan 2012). Establishments can be set up that make other services available to

²⁰ See, for example, observations on the difficult situation of Moroccan children and youth who were sent to Spain (Rogoz 2016). The article discusses, *inter alia*, situations of neglect in the family after minors are returned for 'family reunification' and problematic 'fosterage' arrangements in Spain.

²¹ 'The goal of the Swedish law is twofold: to convince people to abstain from committing the crime of buying sex and to establish norms under which no woman, man, girl or boy can be sold and no one has the right to sexually exploit another human being. This is a question of values' (Cyrus 2015b: 6).

which sexual services can be attached. Massage parlours or saunas, escorting or dating platforms may offer a front hiding the provision of sexual services backstage. Therefore, the question is whether markets really do disappear or whether they mutate into a more hidden form or are relocated abroad. If markets change, are fewer people are involved in these hidden markets, and do these people provide sexual services in more- or in less-secure conditions?

Figure 5. The supposed field-specific intervention logic of Don't-buy-sex campaigns



Source: The authors.

On the one hand, the women involved could perceive more possibilities for action, for example if they know the name of a client, they can expose the person to public shame or even criminal prosecution. On the other hand, they could see less space for action if commercial sexual encounters are removed from public scrutiny and arranged in an anonymous and hidden way. In order to avoid abuse by physically stronger male clients, women might be more inclined to accept pimps who promise to provide protection in return for payment.

Assuming that prostitution is officially prohibited and hidden service provision is kept to a minimum, what then happens to those who have been working in the sector? Women escaping prostitution would have to find new ways to earn a living. If they had taken up prostitution from a situation of poverty, this escape could aggravate their poverty and make them vulnerable to exploitation in other sectors, for example in domestic work.

3.4.3 Buy-responsibly campaigns

The message of the ideal-typical Buy-responsibly campaign contains two parts: Don't buy cheaply! and Buy responsibly! Basically, consumers are asked to look at more than just the price of their purchases. They should also be concerned about the conditions under which the goods or services are produced. To make this feasible, campaigns simultaneously advertise the purchase of goods and services that fulfil certified minimum criteria. Typical fields for Buy-responsibly campaigns are imported goods such as coffee (Moore 2007: 74), chocolate (Barrientos 2016) and 'clean clothes' [https://cleanclothes.org/] (Balsiger 2010). Meanwhile, efforts to promote fair production even seek to guarantee minimum standards for such complex goods as smartphones (Akemu *et al.* 2016). We are not aware of campaigns that encourage the responsible buying of goods which are produced and consumed in the same location, such as meals in restaurants. Campaigns promoting the purchase of regional products do not tackle labour conditions, although shorter supply-chains do enhance the opportunity for transparency.

There is a different type of campaign which is not primarily aimed at producers, but addresses local or national governments that tolerate wages and labour standards below the legal minimum in order to keep businesses in their region or country, and/or in response to

corruption. If campaigns propagating a boycott of the products of a specific country succeed in reducing their export, governments will have fewer incentives to tolerate abuse. This type of campaign is not further discussed here.

Key objectives concern the promotion of fair labour standards and the reduction of labour exploitation and trafficking into labour exploitation further down the supply chain. When imported goods are involved, the promotion of fair trading conditions between industrial and developing states constitutes the main policy environment. Campaigns are also compatible with environmental protection policies. Other interventions supporting the same aim are the legal regulations governing a contractor's liability for the specific working conditions of subcontractors.

The basic idea behind the Buy-responsibly campaign is to take the low prices of final products as indicators of potential labour exploitation (and environmental exploitation). If prices are very low, we should assume that wages and working conditions at certain stages of the supply chain are too low, otherwise such cheap prices would not be possible. 'People want their food to be cheap. Without a fair price, will there ever be fair working conditions?' This rhetorical question is asked in the United States Government's Report on Trafficking in Persons (US Government 2013: 28). Consumerism, with its search for the cheapest price, particularly in the rich industrial world, is considered from this angle to be the underlying problem behind an exploitation that is transferred to other countries via a globalised production chain, so that the globalisation of production goes hand-in-hand with consumerism.²²

It is assumed that traffickers take advantage of an 'increasing need for cost efficiency and cheap labor [fostered by] increased competition from non-domestic markets' (Aronowitz and Koning 2014: 673). Employers in such a setting are actors under pressure, threatened by cut-throat competition. They avoid bankruptcy by putting pressure on those workers who are the most vulnerable.

Campaigns usually offer 'responsible buying' options. Responsible buyers purchase goods and services produced under fair working conditions along the production chain and, if necessary, pay higher prices for fairly produced goods. Higher prices are usually necessary, as fair-trade goods are composed of a private, trust and public good dimension (BMFSFJ 2007: 735). Consumers ask for guarantees that the fair-trade price differential is not used for profit or the higher salaries of managers (BMFSFJ 2007: 738), and the production of guarantees involves costs – such as for monitoring the supply chain.


Campaigns aim to reduce the demand for goods felt to be unfairly produced and to increase the demand for goods certified as fair trade. The intended consequence is the reduction of unfair competition and price pressure for the producers of unfairly produced goods so that they do not feel the necessity to pass the price pressure onto workers using illicit means, resulting in exploitation being reduced. If a campaign results in less exploitation, it is also

²² Cheapness as a problem is mostly brought up in the context of government contracting and imported goods (Vogel 2015a: 17). Some authors also find it 'easy to see why the price of (services provided by) trafficked sex workers' is lower compared to voluntary sex workers (Aronowitz and Koning 2014: 678). However, this is far from being obvious. It implies that exploiters are marginal suppliers offering the services of the persons under their control for little more than their costs. However, they could also use force to supply services for which some clients are willing to pay more (e.g. sex without a condom) and thus get higher prices than their voluntary counterparts who are not prepared to supply services under such conditions.

expected to result in fewer incentives for employers to recruit vulnerable workers through traffickers and thus to result in less trafficking in human beings.

In a next step, the logical chain from behaviour change to impact is investigated in more detail in order to question the comprehensiveness and consistency of the argument. It is assumed that consumers can avoid goods that they consider too cheap to be fairly produced, or they can choose goods which they believe indicate responsible production – for example, certification processes – or preferring companies that promise responsible production. These alternatives are called ‘monitored’ goods.

Figure 6. The supposed field-specific logic of the Buy-responsibly campaign



Source: The authors.

So are there any arguments proning that the changes in the consumption, production and recruitment context do not take place as foreseen or intended? A higher price does not necessarily signal fairer or exploitation-free labour conditions. When exploiters are able to give the impression that their production process is fair and above board, but continue to make use of exploited labour in less-visible segments of the supply chain or in outsourced segments, claiming their lack of responsibility, then higher prices can even increase the profits of exploiters (Kaleck and Saage-Maaß 2016). If consumers only embrace the message that cheapness is a problem but then do not turn to the purchase of monitored goods, two counteracting effects have to be taken into account. On the one hand, producers are faced with *less pressure* to rely on exploitative practices while, on the other, they have *greater incentives* to rely on exploitative practices, as the scope for profits is widened. If they continue their exploitative practices, they can make higher profits.

If consumers turn to the buying of certified products, producers soon realise that they can get higher prices for their goods. They can take the opportunity to comply with certification standards, making a profit in spite of offering better and more expensive working conditions, or they can seek to achieve higher profits by becoming certified while continuing with and concealing their exploitative practices. Certification and audits are not necessarily a guarantee that exploitation will not occur. One strategy for concealing exploitation is the outsourcing of part of the production to subcontractors, which cannot be observed in the monitoring process (Kaleck and Saage-Maaß 2016).

Effects on the recruitment context are only likely when exploitation had been enabled by a supply of workers from other regions in the same country or from other countries, made available through intermediaries using illicit means. If the local workforce is desperate for jobs and sees a need to go along with exploitative practices, producers do not need to pay traffickers to recruit workers elsewhere. If we assume that labour exploitation has been

enabled by migrant workers recruited through traffickers, monitored supply chains could result in employers no longer demanding the services of traffickers – these intermediaries then no longer transfer vulnerable workers from elsewhere. This does not necessarily affect people in the origin region of the migrants in a positive way. We should bear in mind that trafficking for labour exploitation often does not imply that people gain *nothing*, only that they may get less than promised and have to work under harsher conditions (Fey 2012). People in the origin regions could become more vulnerable to local forms of exploitation because there are fewer options to earn abroad.

3.5 Report-suspicious campaigns

The basic intervention logic of Report-suspicious campaigns is the inclusion of a public audience or specific consumers in the surveillance and reporting of seemingly suspicious occurrences of sexual or labour exploitation. This type of campaign includes some variation with respect to the advertised operator to be contacted, the grade of anonymity allowed and the communication channel introduced. Principally, reporting campaigns inform the general public about how to report suspicions either by telephone, through an online platform or via email. In all cases, the operating agency will usually be either a law enforcement agency such as the police, or a private agency – usually an NGO. While contacting the police often implies the revealing of the informant's identity, reporting to an NGO can be done both confidentially and anonymously. A privately organised reporting mechanism implies the opportunity to leave the decision of what to do to the helpline provider. Finally, the reporting opportunities imply that the telephone number of a helpline can be given to the person perceived to be in an exploitative situation so that she or he can seek help for her- or himself.

The message of the ideal-typical report-suspicious campaign contains two parts: First, targeted groups are asked to watch out for signs of coercion. Secondly, they are asked to report their suspicions to a specialised helpline. The message to observe and report suspicions implies that informants should focus on work in the personal service sector and on local production for local consumption (e.g. in construction, catering or sexual services) where they consume or observe others consuming.


The key objective of this type of campaign is to identify forced labour or forced prostitution, to reduce these types of exploitation and the trafficking of persons into them, and to promote victim protection and perpetrator prosecution. This type of campaign is compatible with policies to promote labour rights as well as with policies accepting sexual services as a regular form of work. It is also compatible with services that encourage and support redress in labour courts and other empowerment actions, the provision of exit options for forced labourers and prostitutes and strict enforcement against perpetrators. Report-suspicious campaigns are discussed here for the sex sector, but some campaigns have also been launched asking people to report suspicions of trafficking for labour exploitation. The argument would be along the same lines but with some adjustments.

The basic assumption is that the women and men working in the provision of sexual services can undertake this work voluntarily or involuntarily. Exploitation is thought to be frequent in prostitution, but prostitution is not considered as inherently exploitative. It is assumed that clients could notice indications that someone is being forced to offer a sexual service, for example, if the person seems to be afraid or hurt. In this case, clients should not take the sexual service but should report their suspicions.

This course of action should directly reduce exploitation by freeing the victims and indirectly reduce perpetrators' incentives for and trafficking into exploitation. Due to the deterrence effect, other actors in the sex business are expected to respect sex workers' rights in order to avoid sanctions under criminal law. If a campaign were to result in

greater concern for sex workers' health and wellbeing, managers of sexual-service businesses would have fewer incentives to pay traffickers to forcefully deliver prostitutes into their power.

Figure 7. The supposed field-specific intervention logic of report-suspicious campaigns in the sexual-services sector



Source: The authors.

In the consumption context, the effect relies on the ability of clients to observe signs of coercion correctly. They could, obviously, be mistaken and inform on a sex worker who considers her or his service provision to be voluntary and who wants to continue earning a living in this way.²³ If that were indeed to be the case, the person concerned would not appreciate a raid. If the person is an undocumented migrant, a raid could result in deportation, as their collaboration in a police investigation in most cases would, at best, provide them with temporary relief from deportation during the court procedure. In another configuration, the person may be being forced to provide sexual services, but believes that the threats that force her or him to comply would not disappear following a police raid. For example, exploiters could harm victims' relatives in the country of origin, who cannot be protected by the receiving country authorities. It may also be that the exploitation in sex work is forced but partly paid, obliging the victim to send remittances to relatives in the origin context who do not know that these are the earned through enduring sexual exploitation. In such cases, too, the forced prostitute could consider her- or himself to be worse off following a criminal investigation that may lead to a loss of income for them, an inability to send remittances and the destruction of their reputation in the region of origin.

In cases of incorrect observation, the irregular residence status of the presumed victim or pressures that are not likely to disappear through police action, it makes a big difference whether the helpline is run by an NGO or the police. If NGO consultants can make inquiries and offer help without immediately informing the police, the victim can decide for her- or himself what they consider to be in their best interest. In one evaluation report, helpline officers recorded that women whom they perceived to be trafficking victims chose to remain in the forced situation after consultation with the NGO (FIM 2007: 45).

²³ '...critics usually conclude that workers were afraid of reprisals, but it could just as well be that the workers had nothing to denounce' (Vogel 2015b: 39).

When a forced prostitute is freed, this particular situation of exploitation ends. Whether freeing a forced prostitute leads to less exploitation in the sex business in general depends on the resulting sanction in the individual case and its deterrent effect on other sex business actors. Investigations leading to no or only to weak sanctions may have the opposite effect – instead of deterrence, they may send out a signal that the risks of disrespecting the rights of vulnerable people are few.

Even if increased reporting results in obliging sex business entrepreneurs to respect the rights of sex workers and offer them fair and secure working conditions, there could still be abuse in the recruitment context. Consider the case of a woman who borrows money from relatives to be smuggled into another country. The smuggler promises to take the woman to a hotel where she can work. Upon arrival, woman is told that the hotel work is no longer available, and that the provision of sexual services is the only alternative. This latter would provide the woman with the possibility to earn more money and therefore be a faster way for her to pay back her debt to her relatives. If the woman feels forced to accept this offer, there may be no further use for illicit coercive means in the production context, but it would remain an abuse of vulnerability in the recruitment context.

4 The effects of demand-side campaigns – insights from the analysis of monitoring and evaluation reports

In Chapter 3, theoretical considerations showed not only that the intervention logics of campaigns can be constructed, but also offered arguments as to why campaigns may fail to have the intended impact. Only empirical analysis can help to shed light on what actually happens in response to campaigns and why. Evaluations seek to assess this – ideally by searching for robust scientific evidence, as required by scientific quality standards, but more probably by making consistent arguments, supported by best possible evidence, as required in evaluation standards (see Section 2.2).

4.1 Search and selection strategy

Demand-side campaigns – as explained in the introduction – are defined here as coordinated communication activities seeking to influence the spending patterns of individual or institutional actors, particularly in the consumption of goods and services, or encouraging people to share suspicious observations they have made in a consumption context. Our analysis is restricted to target groups with the co-presence of the consumer/observer and the exploited person in the same area, with the exception of campaigns aimed at the monitoring of supply chains (see McGrath and Mieres 2017).

In order to identify such demand-side campaigns, a set of techniques was applied.

- The social-scientific and evaluation literature was screened for references.
- A web search with keywords (trafficking, campaign, demand) was conducted in 2015 in both English and German.²⁴
- The website of the EU coordinator²⁵ was systematically screened with keywords and by reading the prevention section in country reports.
- The DemandAT project partners and the office of the EU coordinator were asked to indicate relevant campaigns and to suggest which were worth analysing in 2015.
- Following up on the basic search, newsletters relevant to the field of anti-trafficking policies were screened for additional ongoing or new campaigns or the publication of evaluation reports.

The web search and the systematic screening of the prevention sections of the EU coordinator's website yielded the most results. Partners mainly indicated campaigns that had already been found in this way. A total of 55 leads to anti-trafficking interventions seemed, at first glance, to match the selection criteria.²⁶ These included references in reports without specification of any source for further information or a contact address (see Annex for a list of campaigns found).

²⁴ We are grateful to students Mona Schiele and Anna Schander for their web-search assistance.

²⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-projects/_en?solsort=ds_field_publication_date%20desc

²⁶ We cannot rule out the possibility that further campaigns exist that did not respond to the framing of the search.

After an intensive web-based search for additional information or a contact address, the sample was reduced to 21 campaigns, either because no contact could be identified or because they aimed at awareness-raising, policy change or donation-collecting without a message calling for the *behaviour change* of an individual in a *consumption context*.

The most important criterion for selecting a campaign for *closer* analysis was the availability of sufficient evaluative information.²⁷ In order to check for this availability, we contacted the office of the EU anti-trafficking coordinator and requested access to any available material they held about EU-sponsored projects. We were informed that the European Commission does not have a archiving policy or accessible database for evaluation reports for projects that it has funded.²⁸ Reporting to the Commission contains evaluative elements, but project reports could not be forwarded without the permission of the grant-holders, so we were advised to contact project organisers individually for reports.

Subsequently, we approached the project coordinators of the 21 campaigns asking for access to any relevant material. Our request received only a few answers, either with an indication of how/where we could access the requested material or with confirmation that no evaluation was conducted. However, most of our requests remained unanswered. We were finally able to access evaluation reports for eight campaigns or projects containing campaigns – four internal and four externals. These are described in the next section.

From the search and initial screening we learned that, in spite of the accounting efforts presented on the EU anti-trafficking coordinator's website, it is not easy to locate detailed and evaluative information. This is mainly because there is no repository and many anti-trafficking projects either did not respond to our inquiry or confirmed that such data are not available. The finding that most campaigns had never had a formal evaluation is in line – as already indicated above – with findings from a recent comprehensive study on EU-funded anti-trafficking interventions (see Section 2.1).

4.2 Characteristics of evaluation reports

In this section, we introduce characteristics of the eight evaluation reports identified. These evaluation reports refer to eight campaigns, six of them conducted in one country and two in more than one country (for a summary of campaign characteristics, see Table 1). The campaigns all began in the period 2006 to 2014. A few campaigns are still ongoing; the others are finished. While three campaigns were part of a larger project, in five cases they were the major content of a project. Accordingly, some evaluation reports not only addressed campaigns but also covered other activities performed in the project context. However, only the campaign-related content is analysed here. In our sample we decided to also include evaluation reports that devoted little space to or provided scanty information on the campaign when evaluators expressed a judgement on it.

Five campaigns addressed trafficking for sexual exploitation, one covered trafficking for exploitation in begging and two looked at all forms of exploitation. With regard to the campaign type, both spending-shift and reporting campaigns are represented. Most

²⁷ Originally, the idea was to focus on twelve campaigns that were indicated to us as being either particularly successful, unsuccessful or contested by partners and stakeholders in the field, including the coordinator. This turned out to be an unfeasible strategy, as respondents were unable or reluctant to make such statements. Therefore, the selection strategy had to be adjusted.

²⁸ The study on prevention initiatives suggests building a repository of project materials (Deloitte 2015: 90).

campaigns explicitly also pursued objectives other than those encouraging specific behaviour change, with most of them aimed in particular at awareness-raising about the fact that exploitation and trafficking in human beings exists. Policy change (2) or collection of donations (2) could also be identified as additional objectives. Only one campaign for which an evaluation report was available also drew attention to men who are exploited or trafficked; the others all focused on women and/or children.²⁹ The campaigns addressed people in their role as consumers and contractors, as tourists and travellers, as male buyers of commercial sexual services, as individuals donating to a begging child, as observers of a seemingly suspicious occurrence, as professionals encountering a suspicious case, or as members of the general public noticing seemingly suspicious occurrences in a consumption context.

Table 1. Characteristics of evaluated demand-side campaigns

	Campaign title	Lead organisation	Start year	Country	Campaign organisation	Field of exploitation	Victim group	Type of message	Other aims
1	Stop Forced Prostitution	FIM Frankfurt	2006	DE	Project	Sexual	F	Report	Policy change
2	Don't Be Afraid to Say It on Her Behalf	IOM Prague	2007	CZ	Part of a project	Sexual	F	Report	Awareness
3	Euro 08 Campaign against Trafficking in Women	FIZ Zürich	2008	CH	Project	Sexual	F	Report	Awareness
4	Don't Look Away (report sexual exploitation of children in travel and tourism!)	Ecpat	2012	DE	Part of a project	Sexual	C	Report	Awareness
5	Open Your Eyes, Be Aware!	Terres des Hommes	2012	XK	Project	Begging	C	Don't Buy from Children report	Awareness Donations
6	Buy Responsibly	IOM	2012	Various	Project	All	FMC	Buy Responsibly	Awareness Donations
7	Beer-Mat Campaign	Irish Immigrant Council	2014	IE	Part of a project	Sexual	F	Don't Buy Sex report	Policy change
8	Victims of Child Trafficking – our responsibility (Victor)	Smile of the Child	2014	Various	Part of a project	All	C	Don't Buy from Children report	Awareness

Source: Authors' compilation from evaluation reports.

²⁹ The gender- and age-specific emphasis of anti-trafficking campaigns is also indicated by O'Brien (2013).

4.3 Assessing the quality of evaluation reports

Interventions against trafficking in human beings usually refer to the UN definition of the trafficking offence. We therefore use the ‘norms and standards of evaluation’ drawn up by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG 2016)³⁰ as a basic frame of orientation for the assessment of the quality of evaluation reports and formulated ten core questions (see 2.3). The answer ‘Yes’ indicates a high quality of evaluation. In the following paragraphs, we compare these questions with the evaluation reports on projects consisting of or including demand-side campaigns.

1. *Status of the evaluator. Is the evaluator independent and impartial?*

Half of the evaluations were conducted internally and half were commissioned from independent external evaluators. Status – whether internal or external – turned out not to be a good predictor of impartiality and recognition of evaluation standards. While only one external evaluation explicitly referred to standards and addressed all the relevant questions (Berman and Marshall 2011), some internal evaluations outperformed external evaluation in terms of impartiality – for example, FIM (2007) compared to Pillinger (2014).

2. *Availability of the evaluation report. Is the evaluation available to the general public?*

Seven evaluation reports were uploaded to a website and were publicly available, although some reports could only be retrieved if those interested searched intentionally with the title of the campaign and varied the search terms several times. One report was provided by the project coordinating organisation on request. Our research indicated that no repository – instituted, for example, by the UN Women’s Gender Equality Evaluation Portal,³¹ by the UNODC’s Cybercrime Repository,³² by the UNODC’s overview on in-depth evaluation or programmes³³ and by in-depth evaluation of projects³⁴ – is available for EC-funded anti-trafficking interventions.

3. *Stakeholder participation. Are all relevant stakeholders involved, their participation described and their legitimate interests protected?*

Stakeholder descriptions are well developed with regard to the participating organisations and their staff, but less so with regard to other groups. For example, one external evaluation conducted interviews with representatives of all participating partner organisations. Other possible stakeholders were not included, although one line of activity looking into anti-trafficking efforts tried to include businesses but was unsuccessful. This issue was merely covered by statements by project partners who speculated about the possible reasons why

³⁰ For an earlier version of this study, previous UNEG publications were used (UNEG 2005a, 2005b).

³¹ ‘The Gender Equality Evaluation Portal makes available more than 350 evaluations on what works to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment. It serves as a tool to strengthen and promote the exchange of evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations with stakeholders and potential users in order to have a wider impact on learning and to contribute to improved policy design and programming in the area of gender equality’, see: <http://genderevaluation.unwomen.org/en>.

³² ‘The cybercrime repository is a central data repository of cybercrime laws and lessons learned for the purposes of facilitating the continued assessment of needs and criminal justice capabilities and the delivery and coordination of technical assistance’ (see <https://www.unodc.org/cld/index-sherloc-les.jsp?tmpl=cyb>).

³³ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/indepth-evaluations.html>.

³⁴ ‘Independent Project Evaluations are initiated and managed by Project Managers, and conducted by independent external evaluator(s). Independent Project Evaluations must be based on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime evaluation guidelines and templates, as well as UNEG Norms and Standards’ (see <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations.html>).

businesses kept their distance (Pillinger 2014). An external evaluation of a Do-not-buy-from-children campaign did not include the views and opinions of representatives of the ethnic minority that was visually exposed (Hatzinikolaou 2015; Kuneviciute 2012), and an internal evaluation of a Report-suspicious campaign included the views of organisations involved in anti-trafficking efforts but not those of representatives of sex worker organisations (Zimmermann 2008), as it was the case with FIM (2007).

4. Objectives of the evaluation. Are the objectives of the evaluation clearly stated?

While six reports provided at least a minimum description of the objectives pursued by the evaluation, two reports did not clarify them. An evaluation – with limited time and resources – can not be expected to address every potentially interesting question, but could realistically be expected to transparently describe the objectives and limits of the evaluation.

5. Intervention logic of the campaign. Are the project theory and intervention logic explicated or reconstructed?

In all but one evaluation, the intervention logic of a campaign was not explicated. As a rule, the expected outcomes and their causal relations to campaign activities were not defined. Accordingly, no indicators of achievements were determined. In the only evaluation that raised the issue of project theory of change, the evaluators found that no data were available with which to make an evidence-based judgement (Berman and Marshall 2011).

6. Output, outcomes and the impact of campaigns. Are these addressed and observable or are measurable indications determined?

All reports described the output of their corresponding campaigns, although with a high degree of variety. In some cases the report was restricted to the accounting of outputs (Pillinger 2014). Other reports also considered any immediate or intermediate outcomes in terms of describing the various audiences exposed to the campaign (Czarnecki 2016; Kuneviciute 2012). Although most campaigns use websites for the dissemination of information and contact details, the website traffic is rarely reported in such detail as it is in Czarnecki (2016).

In another case, the campaign included a telephone helpline-based reporting mechanism that generated a few hundred calls classified as related to human trafficking. This result was deemed a success although the external evaluator conceded that no baseline data were available. Moreover, since the evaluation report explains that the term ‘human trafficking-related’ includes not only notifications of suspicions of trafficking but also for example requests by students for information (Hatzinikolaou 2015), the reference to telephone calls as such is an inept indicator of achievement.

One report raised the issue of the extent to which campaign activities impact³⁵ on trafficking in human beings, concluding that the available data and information do not allow any judgement to be made (Berman and Marshall 2011: xix). Another evaluation provided details of the consequences of the notification of suspicions, including cases where prostitutes had been freed from sexual exploitation (FIM 2007: 45).

In another internal evaluation report, incoming calls were individually documented for their content. This allowed for a detailed specification as to how many of these calls warranted the

³⁵ The term ‘impact’ is used also in other studies, but refers to all sorts of potential consequences of a campaign, for example to the number of people who are made aware of the size of the phenomenon of child trafficking (Hatzinikolaou 2015: 35).

initial suspicion. However, the extent to which these calls led to a police investigation remained open (IOM Prague 2008).

7. *Reliability. Is the reliability of the results presented discussed?*

While all evaluation reports made use of data provided by the campaigning organisations, only a few dealt explicitly with the limits of data compilation and documentation. Any reservations mainly concerned the lack of baseline data (Hatzinikolaou 2015).

8. *Efficiency. Are costs transparent and related to outcome or impact?*

Efficiency in the most general sense refers to a 'measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results' (OECD 2002: 21). We refer to output efficiency if there are no signs of a waste of resources for a given output (OECD 2002: 20). Assessing output efficiency is an integral aspect of monitoring.

As an indicator for this *output efficiency*, evaluators pointed to declarations made by campaigners. In some evaluations, campaigns were considered to be particularly efficient because the performing organisations had invested additional resources. In these cases, a donor's viewpoint was taken (Hatzinikolaou 2015; Pillinger 2014).

While output efficiency provides information about the use of resources by the campaign organiser, it does not indicate the efficiency of the campaign results. Outputs such as printed leaflets or organised press conferences are ways of achieving results, but are not an end in themselves. Campaign organisers can deliver perfect output without achieving the intended outcomes or impacts. We suggest that the term *result efficiency* should be used for any measures relating results (outcomes and impacts) to costs (valuated inputs). They can be used for comparisons with other campaigns with the same aims, or with other measures, in a bid to identify out the most cost-effective way to obtaining a specific result (UNEG 2005b: 13–14).

This presupposes that costs are made transparent. Most evaluation reports provided no information on how much input was made in financial terms and what exactly was achieved in quantifiable terms (although details of costs and outcomes are included in IOM Prague 2008: 1, 6–8). With one exception, none of the evaluations even considered the relation between invested resources and outcomes achieved or impact, but the one evaluation which *did* concluded that an assessment of the result efficiency was impossible due to the lack of data (Berman and Marshall 2011).

9. *Risks and side-effects. Are the possible side-effects and unintended consequences considered?*

Three reports, all delivered by independent evaluators, did not address the campaigns' probable risks and side-effects. The two campaigns which sought to end the exploitation of begging children operated with images alluding to a marginalised ethnic minority without considering the risk of stigmatisation (Hatzinikolaou 2015; Kuneviciute 2012). The third campaign confronted pub visitors with information printed on beer mats about a young girl who was sold into prostitution without considering whether and to what extent this message may have the boomerang-effect of implying that buying sex is widespread and normal for many men (Pillinger 2014).

Five evaluations took a critical perspective, and also discussed possible side-effects and unintended consequences. For example, one internal evaluation reported on campaigners' concerns that a film sequence aiming to make the public aware of the situation of women trafficked into sexual exploitation may run the risk that visualising women in chains could be

replicating a perpetrator's gaze. Consequently, for the short trailer, the perspective of the camera captured – at least partly – the gaze of women who were offered for sale onto men bidding for them in a kind of market place. The internal evaluation thus recognised that campaigners were conscious of and had dealt with the risk of utilising possibly counter-productive or misleading images (Zimmermann 2008: 5). However, the conscious designing did not prevent observers from criticising the visualisation as stigmatising for the women concerned (Kafehsy 2014). Relating to this experience, one organisation launching a similar campaign reported, in its internal campaign evaluation, that the issue of how to visualise the message had been intensively discussed (FIM 2007). Another campaigning organisation was concerned that a suspicion reported to a confidential helpline could risk leading to a false accusation if not handled sensitively (Czarnecki 2016).

10. Final part. Are conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned explicitly linked to the findings presented?

The same five reports explicitly linked their judgement of the overall success of the campaign to the findings presented in the evaluation, while the others indicated a successful measure without sufficient substantiation. Recommendations were also not always related to the evidence-based arguments presented in the evaluation. In one case, the internal evaluation of a telephone helpline for the reporting of suspicions of trafficking for sexual exploitation recommended the distribution of information on trafficking in human beings within educational establishments for the entire population, including boys, but the campaign experiences did not deliver any evidence substantiating this measure (IOM Prague 2008). One report focused on the perspectives of the participating organisations and echoed their opinions when recommending the criminalisation of commercial sex. However, the effects of this type of legislation were not subject to evaluation (Pillinger 2014). Similarly, another report contained the recommendation that the publicity of reporting mechanisms should be enhanced without, however, specifying – based on the evidence and arguments of the evaluation – how this target might be realised in concrete terms (Czarnecki 2016).

A few evaluations focused on the improvement of internal processes of campaigning. For example, one report recommended improving data compilation in order to achieve a sound basis for judgement, although it also deemed the campaign to be successful and worth continuing (Hatzinikolaou 2015).

Only one report consistently produced recommendations which related to the explorative findings described in the evaluation report. The evaluators focused on the internal processes of the participating organisations and abstained from any other recommendations (Berman and Marshall 2011).

4.3 A jigsaw synthesis of the effects of reporting campaigns

Having exposed the shortages of data and the shortcomings in the description and interpretation of data about campaigns in evaluation reports, we could simply conclude that we do not know whether or not demand-side campaigns contributed to the reduction of exploitation and trafficking in human beings. We could only join the choir of evaluators in the demand for improved data compilation and documentation as a sound basis for judgement (Hatzinikolaou 2015). However, we have focused on exploring whether a combination of evidence retrieved from different reports is worth the effort.

Such learning-oriented explorations are also known as 'best-evidence syntheses'. In such syntheses, outcomes are mapped in a theoretically informed way (Alton-Lee 2004: 34). Information on the effects of the same type of intervention from different sources are brought together like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The fact that insights generated in

variety of contexts are juxtaposed gives the analysis a particular strength because systematic comparison – a basic technique in social-science methodology (Durkheim *et al.* 2014; Glaser and Strauss 2009) – is facilitated and some reliability is reached when a particular insight is found to occur in different contexts.

With the jigsaw synthesis approach, it is possible to present existing insights and knowledge gaps in a structured way. This approach is in line with a proposal recently published by ICAT and designed to improve measuring, evaluation and learning (MEL) in the field of anti-trafficking. ICAT called for a strategy to

capture, compile and operationalize what has been learned from the multiple counter-trafficking and related efforts employed to date – the accumulated knowledge of the sector. This knowledge is significant and can be put to work to inform design, development and decision-making about counter-trafficking strategies, policies, interventions, sectoral investments *and* MEL approaches (ICAT 2016: 5, italics in the original).

In Table 2 we demonstrate the application of the jigsaw puzzle approach. In fact, a best-evidence synthesis did not prove to be productive for spending-shift campaigns because there was insufficient information available. Thus, we present here our analysis of the reporting campaigns only. They delivered information revealing sufficient similarities and complementarities for a jigsaw presentation of results to be instructive. Then we visualise the jigsaw puzzle logic in Table 3.

Table 2. Availability of information on outcomes and impacts in reports

	FIM	ECPAT	VICTOR	IOM Prague
Exposure	No	Yes	No	Yes
Awareness	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Understanding	No	No	No	Yes
Behaviour	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Impact on the exploitative situation, the exploiter and the person exploited	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Impact on the trafficking situation, the trafficker and the person trafficked	No	Yes	No	No

Source: The authors.

In the table, the boxes signal whether or not any information was provided or was available. The table shows that, for the dimension of ‘behaviour’ in particular, all reports had something to say while for ‘understanding’, only one report offered some information. The content of this information is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Presentation of findings regarding outcomes structured by intervention logic

Exposure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All campaigns targeted the media and received considerable coverage • ECPAT addressed an estimated 15,000 persons with postings in and on social media (Czarnecki 2016) • IOM Prague (2008: 16) reported the distribution – at border crossings and at an exhibition of erotica – of 13,000 postcards. Advertisements on Prague’s public transport (serving, for example, 911,000 people a day), at the airport and in tunnels could potentially reach large numbers of people
Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECPAT recorded about 3,000 new visitors on the reporting website, with an average duration of 25 seconds. About one third reached it directly, probably responding to distribution of the contact details, and the remaining two-thirds via links; virtually no one accessed it via an Internet search (Czarnecki 2016). • IOM Prague received more than 9,105 visitors on the campaign's website during its seven-month duration (2008: 4) • FIM report 73,000 visitors to the campaign website, mostly reached via links from sex websites (2007: 41).
Under-standing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM Prague’s (2008: 6) reporting on the content of calls indicated that a number of callers (8 out of 32) thought it was sexual services that were being advertised – e.g. ‘A German client demands sex over the phone. After receiving an explanation of the helpline's purpose, he apologizes’.
Behaviour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM Prague received 32 telephone calls and 28 e-mails (9 per month), including repeat contacts with the same person, requests and comments, for example on the grammar of the message (2008: 6–8). • The VICTOR information desks at four organisations in different countries received 362 THB-related contacts in 10 months (an average of 8 per organisation per month), including requests and comments (Hatzinikolaou 2015: 25). • ECPAT received 58 notifications in 18 months (an average of 3 per month), with a baseline of less than one per month before the campaign. Approximately half (29) were considered relevant. In six cases the suspicion of child trafficking for sexual exploitation in Germany or abroad was well-founded (Czarnecki 2016). • In the seven months after the launch of the campaign, FIM received hundreds of information requests, 87 via the helpline (12 per month), of which 59 contained information about women in exploitative situations; 33 were considered as relevant suspicions compared to 1–2 relevant suspicions per year before the campaign (FIM 2007: 42).

Source: The authors.

Before we summarise the possible insights shown in Table 3, we present insights regarding impact in Table 4. In the first row, information is compiled on how the recommended behaviour impacted on exploitative situations, exploiters and people exploited. The second row provides information on how the campaign impacts on trafficking in human beings.

Table 4. Presentation of findings on impact structured by intervention logic

Impact on	
The exploitative situation, the exploiter and the person exploited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FIM reported 15 cases of confirmed forced prostitution. In 6, the women were freed by the police and decided to testify, which led to the arrest of the perpetrators. In one case, a woman freed herself and did not want to testify. In 8 cases, the women decided to stay in the forced situation after being contacted. Altogether 36 cases were classified as containing serious indications of forced prostitution, but investigations were still ongoing, and women either returned to their current situation or were not willing to provide any information. No woman was deported (FIM 2007: 45). • A handful of contacts led to discussion with the police and further investigation by NGOs, with two suspicions dismissed and other cases still open at the end of the campaign (IOM Prague 2008: 6–8). • ECPAT reported 13 cases in which the police were informed (Czarnecki 2016: 8).
The trafficking situation, the trafficker and the person trafficked	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECPAT reported 6 cases of suspicion of trafficking for the sexual exploitation of minors (Czarnecki 2016: 8).

Source: The authors.

Of course, it should be borne in mind that the campaigns were conducted in different countries under very varied circumstances. However, the structured presentation of the findings provides some added value by highlighting the relation between high input and modest impact on trafficking in human beings in the case of reporting campaigns, as they appeared in all circumstances.

Campaigns are known to have reached – in addition to groups believed to contain high proportions of the target group – large publics in the hundreds of thousands. Website clicks as an indicator of awareness of the message are in the thousands. Direct contacts via phone, post or website are in the range of 8 to 15 per month with, at best, half of them containing relevant suspicions and fewer initiating investigations. Only in one evaluation (FIM 2007) was information provided that prompted investigations leading to people being freed from a forced situation.

The funnel-shaped distribution we mentioned in the introduction implies that a campaign’s message begins by reaching many people, but their numbers are narrowed down as the majority never result in observations that could trigger a report. However, the campaign triggers other types of contact – such as requests for information, messages commenting critically or positively on the campaign or helpline, or offers of cooperation that require intervention by campaigning organisations. For us, however, this wide distribution triggers an issue. Public awareness is, as a rule, considered as a positive result of campaigns. However, it can also result in additional work for the campaign organiser, whose attention is then sidetracked away from more targeted action in favour of helping victims of exploitation.

5 Conclusions

Over the last decade, the European Commission has devoted considerable time and effort to the promotion of evaluation and to the development of coherent evaluation approaches in general. A recent EU document presents evaluation as important in judging ‘whether EU activities are fit for purpose and deliver, at minimum cost, the desired changes to European business and citizens and contribute to the EU’s global role’ and, at the same time, in contributing to the sharing of (good and bad) practice – the ‘unintended’ and ‘unexpected’ effects of EU action. Lessons learned from evaluation should be available throughout processes for further development and the design of policies, programmes and projects (European Commission 2015: 49), without requiring that all projects be evaluated. There ‘is no “one size fits all” rule’ (2015: 49). A series of EU-funded handbooks promote evaluations depending on the different circumstances and needs of their various users (Hughes and Nieuwenhuis 2005: 9).

In view of this commitment to evaluation, it is surprising how few anti-trafficking projects are evaluated. A review of EU-funded anti-trafficking interventions found that only about 5 per cent of the 321 projects reviewed were done so externally, and only around a third provided at least a narrative report by the principal grant-holder (Walby *et al.* 2016). Our study showed that evaluation is particularly rare for demand-side campaigns, and that those evaluations that are available often lack data or do not comply with established evaluation standards.

Against this background, it seems obvious that we need to call for more intensive and professional evaluation efforts. Already some years ago, Helga Konrad, the former OSCE Special Representative on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings (2004–2006) pleaded for widespread professional external evaluation:

What is needed, is independent external objective evaluation; evaluation that is based on professional methodology and standards, informed by trafficking expertise. Evaluation is the single most critical addition necessary to strengthen anti-trafficking work; resources for evaluation must be an integral part of all anti-trafficking projects (Konrad 2011: 3).

Contrarily, our study does not support this ambitious claim for the *external* evaluation of *all* anti-trafficking projects. Our empirical observation of completed and ongoing evaluation efforts in the field of anti-trafficking interventions reveals that some internal evaluation reports were more instructive than commissioned external evaluation. We found instances in which external evaluators have offered affirmative statements of success without any empirical foundation, while internal evaluators have critically assessed and shared problematic experiences. An external evaluation policy which follows a watering-can principle of showering time and resources on each and every project is not sustainable because each evaluation will then be poorly resourced and findings will be accordingly limited. In view of the results presented, it is more convincing to select a share of funded projects for a more intensive external evaluation. In order to ensure organisational learning from *all* projects, we suggest support for internal evaluation and project applicants in the development of evaluable projects. For the latter purpose, we have developed a manual the aim of which is to act as an instrument of support for NGOs in the design of evaluable anti-trafficking campaigns (Cyrus and Vogel 2017).

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8 Annex: List of anti-trafficking campaigns with reference to a demand-side

Availability of evaluative information	No.	Short name of campaign	
External evaluation	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop Traffick! Beermat campaign (ICI); • VICTOR (Smile of the Child) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open your eyes – be aware (TdH); • Buy responsibly (IOM);
Internal evaluation	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Don't look away (ECPAT); • Stop Forced Prostitution (FIM); 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EURO 08 (FIZ), • Don't be afraid to say it for her (IOM Prague);
Fragmented evaluative information	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blue Blindfold IE; • Appearances are deceptive (Crimestoppers NL) • Victime ou témoin de Traite d'Etres Humains (City of Geneva) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abpffiff – final whistle blow (German Women's Council), • Red Card for sexual Exploitation and Forced Labour (SOLWODI), • Used in Europe (LSI)
Campaigns addressing behaviour change without evaluative information	7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What do you know about trafficking? (BBGM) • Taxis against trafficking (Stop the Traffik) • Combatting Trafficking in Women for Labour Exploitation in Domestic work (EDEX Cyprus) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action Against Forced Prostitution (Diakonie Germany) • BRISEIS (Portuguese Association for victim support (PT) • Prostitution without coercion and violence (Ban Ying), • Be a Hero (Diakonie Bremen)
Interventions and campaigns not addressing behaviour change	9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive Corporate Toolkit (SAMILIA Foundation); • Applied-indepth research (IOM Finland); • GenderIS (Giacomo Brodolino Foundation IT) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitizing People (GCV); • GIRL (CPE Romania), • If you hire a prostitute (Luxemburg), • Safety Compas (Marta Centre Latvia), • Third sector (CNCA) • Unsichtbar (Projekt Unsichtbar)
No available information	25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dignity (ICI), • Please Disturb (Roel Simons), • Way out with you (CATW), • The no project • Be a responsible traveller • Blue Heart Campaign • Not for sale • You can delete trafficking 2009 (Italy), • Trafficking does not forgive (Italy); • To Exploit Work is a crime (Hungary), • The way out 2006 (Hungary), • People are no good (Bulgaria), • People are no good (Denmark), • Who is paying the price 2008 (Denmark) • Begging Handicaps my Future (BKTF Coalition Albania), 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Begging – if it concerns a child, it concerns all of us (City of Milano), • <i>'Dając pieniądze odbierasz dzieciństwo'</i> ['When you give money you deprive children of their childhood'] (Cracow), • Stop begging [<i>Stop żebractwu</i>] (Warsaw), • <i>Dając pieniądze nie pomagasz</i> ['When you give money you don't help](Wroclaw), • <i>'Killing with Kindness'</i> (City of London), • 'Your money will not help begging children. It will only help those who force them to beg' (IOM). • <i>'Your money makes the traffickers rich... Your money kills souls!'</i> (ANITP Romania), • <i>'You can back out but she?'</i> (Hungary, Ministry of Interior), • <i>We don't buy it</i> (Reach, Ireland) • CITES

About the authors

Dr Norbert Cyrus was appointed senior research fellow at the Viadrina Center B/ORDERS IN MOTION at University Frankfurt (Oder) in 2017. From 2014 to 2016, he was a researcher at the University of Bremen, in the Unit for Intercultural Education, working on the EU-funded project Addressing Demand in Anti-Trafficking Efforts and Policies (DemandAT). He holds a diploma in social and cultural anthropology (Free University Berlin, 1992) and received his PhD on Labour Migration and Social Work from the University of Oldenburg in 2007. Previously, he held research positions at the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (2008–2013) and the University of Oldenburg (2000–2007).

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Addressing demand in anti-trafficking efforts and policies (DemandAT)

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