SURVEY OF MIGRATION EXPERTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE AND MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL MIGRATION PARTNERSHIPS IN THE SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN
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INTRODUCTION

Senén Florensa
Julien Simon
The Mediterranean region is confronted with various forms of migration challenges, instability and deepening socio-economic cleavages. The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated these challenges, drastically curtailing mobility and endangering the region’s fragile economic foundations. In light of this, devising comprehensive cooperation frameworks which genuinely build on the specific aspirations of each country and their populations should be a priority for the region. This ambition is reflected in the EU’s proposal to forge what may become “mutually beneficial and sustainable” partnerships with partner countries in the framework of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum¹.

Ran jointly under the EUROMED Migration V (EMM5) and “EuroMeSco: Connecting the Dots” projects, the survey “Towards sustainable and mutually beneficial migration partnerships in the South Mediterranean” aims at reflecting on migration partnerships between the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries. This report analyses the main results from this exercise, which was conducted amongst experts on migration from the EU’s South Partner Countries (SPCs) in June and July 2021. It provides new evidence on each country’s understanding on how migration partnerships should be achieved in view to advance cooperation for the benefit of migrants and all communities involved in the process.

A prevailing view throughout the survey is that migration is inexorably linked to countries’ broader socio-economic trajectories. Accordingly, it reminds us that migration cannot be effectively tackled in isolation from other areas of joint engagement. In the fast-changing context of the South Mediterranean, this assessment lends support to calls for partnerships in the region that are more ambitious in scope and holistic in nature.

In general terms, the survey indicates that, amongst the five cooperation areas outlined in the Pact, building economic opportunities and addressing root causes of irregular migration, together with countering smuggling and trafficking of human beings, are viewed as the most influential policy areas for SPCs when cooperating with the EU or EU Member States. Additionally, these two policy areas are also considered utmost priorities when engaging countries further upstream on the migration routes, as in Sub-Saharan Africa for example. This consensus on overarching policy objectives raises hopes for the future of regional cooperation between the EU and its partners.

Significantly, the survey also brings to light a distinctive regional cleavage in the assessment of the current state of cooperation with the EU. Respondents from Maghreb and Mashrek countries tend to perceive cooperation with the EU quite differently, reflecting of course widely different ground realities but also an equivocal impact of the EU’s policy toolbox. Throughout the survey, respondents from the Mashrek (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine) assess EU cooperation rather positively,

¹ Communication from the Commission on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609.
whereas answers from the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) tend to be more sceptical or even negative. More than anything, these findings show that the current frameworks for governing migration still fall short of meeting expectations for many of the region’s inhabitants.

To shed light and help explain these nuances in opinion, the report is accompanied by a series of expert articles. Sara Benjelloun invites crossing North and South perspectives to overcome divergent priorities on migration and cooperation in the Mediterranean. Matteo Villa’s analysis suggests avenues to revamp partnerships on irregular migration across the Mediterranean. In her article, Gabriella Sánchez makes a compelling case for rethinking narratives around migrant smuggling in the region as a pre-requisite to effectively uphold fundamental rights. Taking a historical approach, Sandra Lavenex looks closer at EU external migration policy towards the Southern Mediterranean and analyses how contextual developments in the region have shaped EU policy in the area. Agnieszka Kulesa offers an analysis on the challenges in developing pathways for legal migration to Europe in the near future.

Four additional articles adopt a country or sub-regional focus. Shaza Al Jondi and Meredith Byrne offer an analysis on employment and social cohesion in the context of forced displacement in Jordan and Lebanon. Nabil Ferdaoussi focuses on the present state of EU-Moroccan cooperation. Kheira Arrouche provides an assessment of the current migratory framework of Algeria, analysing the country’s challenges, interests and future prospects. Finally, Pauline Veron’s analysis focuses on striking the right balance for cooperation gains amid the precarious political situation in Tunisia.

With the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU has created the necessary space to reflect on partner countries’ key interests in the process of defining migration partnerships. This welcome development is expected to set a more balanced and pragmatic policy course which responds effectively to communities’ needs around the region, in countries of origin, transit and destination. This is essential to achieve substantial progress on the region’s intertwined challenges: reducing incentives for irregular migration, providing adequate protection for displaced populations and tackling root causes in a conducive manner.

In this respect, it is the responsibility of policy-makers from both sides of the Mediterranean to capitalise on this opportunity and keep investing in channels for exchange and fruitful crossing of perspectives. By throwing light on partner countries’ considerations, this survey makes a timely contribution towards grappling with migration-related priorities in a horizontal manner. The responses provide a robust reference framework to contextualise further action and guide, in an evidence-based way, the establishment of migration partnerships that are genuinely rooted in a spirit of mutual benefits.
We hope you will find in this most interesting read a useful source of information and look forward to accompany the next steps of international cooperation on migration in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Julien Simon  
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Regional Office for the Mediterranean  
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Amb. Senén Florensa  
Executive President  
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Migration and Cooperation Priorities

The introductory block of the survey tackled the most important migration policy areas from the perspective of the South Partner Countries (SPCs). Additionally, and to invite considerations on the cross-regional dimension of migration flows, it asked respondents to indicate which of the same areas should be prioritised in the relations with neighbouring countries (other than the EU or EU Member States). The options proposed to respondents are taken from the terminology and areas of action envisaged in the EU Pact’

Main findings:

• There is a consensus amongst respondents of the survey that building economic opportunities and addressing root causes of irregular migration is the most important policy area, closely followed by countering smuggling and trafficking of human beings.

• In relation to priority areas of cooperation with (non-EU) neighbours, respondents rank counter-smuggling activities first. Building economic opportunities and addressing root causes of irregular migration comes second.

• Maghreb respondents consider that building economic opportunities and addressing root causes of irregular migration is both the most important policy area and a cooperation priority.

• Mashrek respondents consider that addressing the needs of migrants and forcibly displaced persons in vulnerable situations is as important as addressing root causes of migration, while the cooperation priority is countering smuggling and trafficking of human beings.
The first two questions of the survey were designed to assess, respectively, i) migration priorities in the South Partner Countries and ii) cooperation priorities between them and their neighbours (other than the EU or EU member states). The overall results show that “Building economic opportunities and addressing root causes of irregular migration” is considered to be, in aggregate, the most significant area of migration policy for the concerned countries (Graph 1). Besides, the survey indicates that actions related to “Countering smuggling and trafficking of human beings” and “Building economic opportunities” should drive cooperation with third countries (other than EU or EU member states) (Graph 2).

**GRAPH 1**

Q.1 To what extent do you consider that the following areas of migration policy are important for your country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Migration Policy</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations and of forcibly displaced persons, including asylum seekers, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostering regular migration and mobility</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving return and reintegration mechanisms</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic integration of immigrants and refugees</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening border management</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
Results by geographical origin point to some nuances on the perceived importance of policy areas. Maghreb respondents followed the aggregate result pattern for this question while Mashrek respondents considered “Addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations and of forcibly displaced persons, including asylum seekers, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)” as the first option with the same % of answers as “Building economic opportunities and addressing root causes of irregular migration” (see Graph 1 bis).
In terms of cooperation areas with their respective (non-EU) neighbours, answers from the Maghreb and the Mashrek differ sensibly. Mashrek participants considered “Countering smuggling and trafficking of human beings” as the first area to prioritise, while for Maghreb participants it came in second place right after “Building economic opportunities and addressing root causes of irregular migration” (see Graph 2 bis). Interestingly, the entry on “improving return and reintegration mechanisms” was ranked last as a priority cooperation area for Maghreb participants. Respondents from the Mashrek viewed the option “Fostering regular migration and mobility” the least important area to develop with neighbours.
Open comments highlighted some complexities but also mentioned potential mechanisms to enhance cooperation:

*For many complicated political and other reasons, the cooperation with our relevant neighbours is considered irrelevant and unfruitful.*

- Lebanese respondent -

*The Arab countries should build the common market and the Maghreb countries should organise an easier flow of migration with a national identity card, the African countries should build more transportation infrastructure.*

- Tunisian respondent -

*Additional partners need to be included in cooperation on immigration management.*

- Moroccan respondent -
A breakdown of answers by kind of institutions show some group specificities in terms of importance granted to priority areas, while in terms of cooperation, perception follow the overall survey trend with some slight differences.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most important area in the country</th>
<th>Main cooperation area with your neighbours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Fostering regular migration and mobility</td>
<td>Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes or irregular migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes or irregular migration</td>
<td>Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes or irregular migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-Makers</td>
<td>Countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings</td>
<td>Countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

Table 1 shows how answers differ according to the respondents’ group considered. In stark contrast to the overall trend discussed above, civil society respondents perceive issues related to regular migration as the most important area of migration policy in their countries. Experts and policy-makers are more aligned on the overall sentiment that economic opportunities or countering smuggling activities deserve the most attention.
Protecting Those in Need and Supporting Host Countries

This section of the survey aimed to define which challenges countries encounter while dealing with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons. It also shed light on the respondents’ perception of the EU’s action in supporting the host country’s management of irregular migration.

Main findings:

• A clear majority of respondents consider that addressing vulnerable migrants’ basic needs (i.e., shelter, food, and health) is the main migration challenge encountered in their country.

• Improving access to health services and education were among respondents’ top suggestions concerning the implementation of strategies to deal with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons.

• Overall, respondents evaluated the EU’s contribution in helping countries deal with migrants in vulnerable situations or forced displaced persons as insufficient.

• The EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa and EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund) instruments to support management of irregular migration and forced displaced people are perceived as ineffective. In contrast, the European Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection’s effectiveness was positively evaluated.
**Question 3** turned to the main challenges a country may encounter while dealing with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons. Out of nine options, respondents considered [addressing the basic needs of migrants in vulnerable situations (i.e., shelter, food, and health)] as the primary challenge, followed by “addressing the broader socio-economic impact of the presence of forcibly displaced people in the country.” The remaining options had a lower percentage of answers (Graph 4).

A breakdown of answers by region indicates diverging views. Maghreb respondents prioritised the challenge of “addressing the broader socio-economic impact of migrants in vulnerable situations” to a much larger extent (45%) than Mashrek respondents (28%) (see Graph 5). In a similar way, 25% of Mashrek respondents had no particular view on the issue, while only 3% of Maghreb ones chose this option. Conversely, the remaining options presented only slight differences in percentage terms between the two sub-samples.
Question 4 invited respondents to identify the main measures in place in their country to deal with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons. Consistently with the results of Question 3, more than one-third of all respondents (36%), including most respondents representing civil society, prioritized “Addressing basic needs (i.e., shelter, food, health)” as the primary measure. Regarding other categories, 29% of respondents believed that limited resources hinder efficient measures and another 19% said that their countries lack a clear strategy to address this challenge.
In their comments to the open-ended questions, some respondents highlighted persisting difficulties in dealing with this challenge:

**Security protection should be provided to migrants to prevent kidnapping, abduction, blackmail or rape. But currently the country is unable to provide this due to severe political divisions and also old processes and measures, there are no adequate facilities to provide work opportunities and economic integration of migrants.**

- Libyan respondent -

**Despite the UNHCR intervention in Tunisia, the treatment of irregular migrants, especially sub-Saharan, is below the minimum standards of international laws and conventions. The government does not seem to enhance its intervention to improve its treatment towards irregular migrants.**

- Tunisian respondent -

**In the Moroccan context, the observance of international convention is of immediate concern to ensure the protection of people on the move. At national level, the gap between migration policy outputs and policy outcomes can be attributed to the issue of non-compliance. Morocco’s current geostrategic interests in the Euro-Mediterranean are bound to both its traditional and West African allies. As such, genuine cooperation between the two blocs is key to not only establish firm diplomatic ties but also to ensure the protection of vulnerable people on the move.**

- Moroccan respondent -
Due to the deteriorated situation in our country and the total collapse on all levels, the tensions between the displaced and the hosting community are increasing daily, and the measures taken by the relevant authorities become insufficient.

- Lebanese respondent -

Lack of socioeconomic empowerment is an issue. Both asylum seekers and refugees have no rights to work according to national law. That means they are working in the informal sector with no security nor fair salary and are facing exploitation and abuse, particularly women.

- Egyptian respondent -

Many respondents made suggestions regarding what kind of measures could be adopted to improve living conditions among migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons, underlining the importance of education and access to health:

Essential services must be made more accessible (migrant children’ education, guaranteed access to social housing, vocational training.

- Moroccan respondent -

Firstly, cooperation mechanisms with UN agencies and international NGOs need to be established, in particular in the case of (displaced from) the western Sahara. Second, crossborder cooperation with Sahel countries need to be strengthened. Third, particular measures must be adopted to protect the most vulnerable migrants.

- Algerian respondent -

Ensuring this population has equal access to the public health infrastructure, in the same terms as nationals, and promote children’ inclusion in the education system.

- Moroccan respondent -

Question 5 aimed to assess to what extent the European Union (EU) helped the Mediterranean countries deal with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons. Almost 40% of the respondents believe that the EU’s contribution in helping countries face this challenge was neither low nor high. Respondents evaluating EU efforts as low or very low constitute more than one-third of the whole sample, while only 23% evaluate EU interventions positively.
GRAPH 7

Q.5 To what extent has the EU helped your country deal with this challenge so far?

Considering the regional breakdown of answers, Graph 7 shows that, overall, the majority of Maghreb respondents negatively assessed EU help in dealing with this challenge, with unfavorable and very unfavorable opinions amounting to 47% of opinions expressed on this particular issue. Perceptions in the Mashrek differ significantly. 45% of this sub-sample indicated very favourable opinions of the EU contribution in helping their countries address migrants’ vulnerability.

Open comments gave further insights about perceptions on the EU’s support to deal with migrants in vulnerable situation:

*EU assistance must be targeted towards covering this population’s essential needs, in particular health, education and jobs.*
- Moroccan respondent -

*The EU has been providing financial support that was very important, but more could be done at the level of supervising how the government is spending the resources.*
- Lebanese respondent -

*Funding may not solve this problem, but a follow-up on the implementation of integration mechanisms is of cardinal significance to ensure the compliance of Morocco with international law. Another way to ensure compliance is to foster the freedom of expression of dissent voices addressing violations of migrants’ rights in the country.*
- Moroccan respondent -
Building on Question 5, Question 6 explored to what extent the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) in neighbourhood partner countries, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (MADAD Fund), and the European Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection have been effective in supporting countries in managing irregular migration and forced displacement and in assisting those in need.

The majority of respondents considered the three instruments’ effectiveness as "Neither low nor high." Nevertheless, the European Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection is better perceived than the other two instruments, as 31% of respondents evaluated it as highly effective (27% “High” and 4% “Very high”).

Significantly, one third of respondents didn’t have enough information to assess these instruments, see Graph 8.

Question 7 was an open-ended question on what is expected from the EU to help deal with forced displacement and better assist those in need. The most frequent answers recognized the importance of acting on root causes in origin countries, whether political or economic. In second place respondents highlighted “Capacity building programmes” (see Graph 9).
In the open comments, some respondents, mostly representing civil society, highlighted the necessity of the European Union to tackle push factors of migration:

*My country is at the receiving end of internal and regional problems. The best thing for the EU to do is firstly, tackle root causes of the problems driving people away from their countries by helping establish peace and security: in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. The EU should be more proactive in the quest for peace, particularly with Israel. Secondly, it should help these countries establish proper rule of law mechanisms and democracy, along with good governance and oversight mechanisms. And thirdly, it should help these countries achieve economic prosperity and ensure a better future for generations to come.*

- Jordanian respondent -

*The EU has to concentrate its aid on the roots of irregular migration and establish at least a 10-year program to tackle all issues. Short-term projects or programmes with a narrower focus risk only addressing the symptoms and not the causes. The major cause is mismanagement of development aid and inefficient allocation of resources.*

- Tunisian respondent -

*It must insist on reforms in partner countries: promotion of democratic reforms, religious freedom, freedom of movement, of opinion, gender equality, recognition of minorities’ rights and of sexual minorities, etc. Any other measure doesn’t achieve much.*

- Moroccan respondent -
Comments also called on the EU to help countries deal with this challenge through financial and logistical support.

*I hope that the European Union can provide financial assistance as well as advice to help bear the humanitarian burden associated with irregular migration.*
- Egyptian respondent -

*Increasing financial resources and enhancing migration management capacities.*
- Moroccan respondent -

*The European Union must work to support both civil society and NGOs to provide real opportunities in the areas of economic development and entrepreneurship to limit the emigration of countrymen abroad.*
- Egyptian respondent -

*Increasing financial support towards responding to vulnerable populations’ needs (women, children and sick). Supporting re-integration.*
- Tunisian respondent -
Building Economic Opportunities and Addressing Irregular Migration

Questions in this block aimed to reflect on critical factors driving irregular migration and to understand respondents’ perceptions of the future of irregular flows. Also, it invited respondents to evaluate cooperation between the EU and their countries in tackling drivers of outwards irregular migration.

Main findings:

• The lack of socio-economic perspectives is considered the main critical driver of irregular migration for migrants departing from the Southern Mediterranean. For irregular transit migrants however, conflict and instability were underlined as the primary driving factor.

• Overall, respondents considered that irregular migration is likely to continue to increase, although this forecast varies depending on the driving factors considered.

• Most respondents assessed the EU’s contribution towards tackling driving factors of outward irregular migration as insufficient, particularly when assisting third country migrants.

• In a regional breakdown of responses, the evaluation of the EU’s contribution diverges across the two sub-samples considered in this survey. Mashrek respondents expressed less negative opinions.
**Question 8** of the survey invited respondents to assess the main drivers of outwards irregular migration. This was assessed for both migrants transiting through their country and for citizens from their own country in order to grasp the motivations of migrants and the implications for countries which are specific to each type of flow. For the latter, Graph 10 shows that more than two-thirds of respondents (67%) ranked “Lack of socio-economic perspectives” as the primary driving factor, followed by “Conflicts and instability” and “Joining family/residents living abroad.” Conversely, respondents were less inclined to choose “Lack of socio-economic perspective” as the first determinant of irregular migration when considering migrants transiting through their country, prioritizing instead conflict and instability as the main pushing factor. It is worth noting that the impact of climate change was not considered an important driver in either case.

**GRAPH 10**

**Q.8 What is the main driver of outwards irregular migration from your country?**

- **Lack of socio-economic perspectives**: 33% (Migrants), 67% (Citizens)
- **Conflict or instability**: 15% (Migrants), 49% (Citizens)
- **Joining family/relatives living abroad**: 4% (Migrants), 10% (Citizens)
- **Impact of climate change**: 1% (Migrants), 4% (Citizens)
- **Other**: 3%
- **I have no particular views on this matter**: 11%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
In relation to the main drivers identified in the previous question, **Question 9a** and **Question 9b** went on to ask respondents whether they think that irregular migration is likely to continue to increase. In the case of irregular migration from the same country as the respondents’ one, 81% of the total views expressed, considering all the driving factors, were affirmative. Additionally, at a more disaggregated level, Graph 11 shows that a significant majority of respondents who chose conflict or instability or lack of socio-economic perspectives agreed that these drivers were likely to continue to increase.

GRAPH 11

Q.9 In relation with the main driver you identified in Q.8, do you think that irregular migration is likely to continue to increase?

Citizens from your country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All drivers</th>
<th>81%</th>
<th>19%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict or instability</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining family/relatives living abroad</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no particular views on this matter</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this question, respondents were also asked to share their point of view on the possible reasons why irregular migration is likely to continue to increase. This question was open-ended, meaning that respondents formulated their answers without choosing among pre-established categories. Graph 12 was built from the analysis of all responses. It shows that over half of the open-ended answers (55%) suggest that irregular migration of citizens from their country is likely to continue because of the negative socio-economic perspectives. In comparison, 17% of answers hinted at political instability and violent conflicts as the primary cause.
GRAPH 12

Q.9 In relation with the main driver you identified in Q.8, why is irregular migration likely to continue to increase for the citizens from your country? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity of violent conflicts/political instability</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and insatisfaction with government</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of future perspectives among youth</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

In their comments, some respondents provided further details on the reasons why irregular migration is likely to continue to increase. In many instances, they stressed the socio-economic dimension as a determinant factor:

- **Economic and social conditions are worsening, and young people are looking for opportunities to build a better future with better education and health care. Social disintegration and weakening social links after all these conflicts have encouraged people to leave their countries. Many people have lost hope of an improvement in the political, economic and security situations.**
  - Libyan respondent -

- **Poverty has been rising through the past 5 years, and the labour market has been unable to create enough adequate jobs due to a weak institutional environment. In addition, the water conflict with Ethiopia could threaten the livelihood of millions.**
  - Egyptian respondent -

- **Hope that things might change is fading and stark inequalities in access to socio-economic opportunities.**
  - Algerian respondent -
Comments also emphasized other driving factors:

To find freedom, human rights, and security.
- Palestinian respondent -

Due to the lack of an international will to resolve the Syrian conflict.
- Syrian respondent -

Insufficient development programs targeting the youth, limited capacities and mandate of civil society organisations, corrupted political and economic integration systems.
- Algerian respondent -

**Question 9b** addressed the primary driver of irregular migration in the case of migrants transiting through the respondent’s country. Again, the graph shows a similar pattern to the one presented in Graph 11.

**GRAPH 13**

Q.9 In relation with the main driver you identified in Q.8, do you think that irregular migration is likely to continue to increase?

Migrants transiting through your country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All drivers</th>
<th>81%</th>
<th>19%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict or instability</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining family/relatives living abroad</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no particular views on this matter</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
Furthermore, Question 9b invited respondents to share their thoughts on the possible reasons why irregular migration of migrants transiting through the respondent’s country is likely to continue to increase. Over half of their answers (59%) hinted that irregular migration is expected to continue because of political instability and the surge of violent conflicts. In comparison, 26% stressed the importance of negative socio-economic perspectives as the main driver.

GRAPH 14

Q.9 In relation with the main driver you identified in Q.8, why is irregular migration likely to continue to increase for migrants transiting through your country? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuity of violent conflicts/political instability</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and insatisfaction with government</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of future perspectives among youth</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

In their comments, respondents provided some detailed insights on the main drivers of irregular migration they identified in Question 8:

*Economic conditions have deteriorated internationally after the pandemic, and the worst impacted were the poorest countries who are also least safe. Thus, the number of people escaping for a better future will increase.*
- Libyan respondent -

*As long as the socioeconomic situation does not improve, people will always look elsewhere for job opportunities and better standards of life.*
- Tunisian respondent -

*Conflict and absence of life perspectives.*
- Algerian respondent -

*Many countries close to and neighbouring Egypt suffer from conflicts and prospects for stability are still far away.*
- Egyptian respondent -
Again, taking into account the drivers of Question 8, the open-ended Question 10 aimed to grasp respondents’ suggestions on which type of state interventions can help reduce irregular migration. Respondents highlighted the need to improve conditions in countries of origin (45%). Job creation, access to housing, education and healthcare reform as well as infrastructure development are the recurring areas for improvement mentioned. Participants call for development strategies and increased investment on behalf of the government as well as international development aid. As second line of action, one third of the answers (30%) suggested that the EU should foster better governance, followed by conflict resolution and the creation of mobility opportunities.

Some of the open-ended answers elaborated on possible measures and mechanisms which could generate better development outcomes in the region:

*It would be necessary to implement proactive policies involving significant European economic investment in the countries of the region, especially those that enjoy political and security stability. Such an approach will probably only bear fruit in the medium term, but it is the ideal strategy for a real development boom in the region, which will inevitably reduce, in the long term, the migratory flows to Europe.*

- Algerian respondent -

*Direct support can be provided through civil society organisations through integrated programmes that include health, educational, humanitarian, medical and food care, under the supervision of donors. Small productive industrial cities can be established so that they produce their daily needs and sell the surplus in local markets so that they are not high on their host countries.*

- Jordanian respondent -
Better management of the visa system and support for local economic development to create well-paid job opportunities.
- Moroccan respondent -

Technical cooperation as in the 70s with Europeans actively participating in development projects and infrastructure building; similar projects could trigger a new development effort and gain back cooperation efficiency. The current soft technical cooperation has left the host county with the same level of development.
- Tunisian respondent -

Finally, to conclude block 2, Question 11a and Question 11b asked respondents to assess the EU’s contribution in helping their country tackle the drivers they identified in Question 8. The majority of the opinions expressed unfavourable assessments on the issue, regardless of the sub-group considered.

In a regional breakdown of answers, Mashrek respondents gave a less unfavourable opinion concerning the EU’s contribution in helping their countries in both cases. On the contrary, Maghreb respondents expressed an unfavourable assessment of the EU help received in this specific domain of international cooperation.

GRAPH 16
Q.11 To what extent has the EU been successful so far in assisting your country to tackle the driver/s you identified in Q8?
Citizens from your country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb respondents</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashrek respondents</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
The EU has intervened and, in many cases, proposed good projects, however I believe some of the work done was overlapping and many of the projects were looking at short term impact, not to mention bureaucratic challenges (both at the level of the EU organisations and their local partners) and diplomatic consideration (the constraints of working with a government and a political establishment as corrupt as the Lebanese one). All these were factors contributed to diminishing the impact and potential that could have been reached.

- Lebanese respondent -

The EU has been more involved in stabilizing the situation of migrants rather than solving the root causes. The attitude of the EU has been just giving money to keep the migrants from crossing over to the EU.

- Lebanese respondent -
Strengthening Migration Governance and Management

This block aimed to grasp respondents’ perceptions of the cooperation between the EU and their countries in the field of migration governance and management up to this day. As part of this assessment, it notably collected their point of view on the most effective way to fight migrant smuggling as a common challenge for both shores of the Mediterranean and on the added value of cooperating with EU in the future with regards to immigrants’ integration.

Main findings:

• Respondents showed very favorable opinions of their countries’ cooperation with the EU in the field of institution building and fighting migrant smuggling, especially amongst Mashrek respondents.

• Overall, respondents considered that creating economic alternatives and creating legal and safe pathways are the best ways to fight migrants smuggling, although Maghreb countries respondents gave more importance to developing cooperation with non-governmental and community-level stakeholders beyond the law-enforcement realm than Mashrek respondents did.

• On the topic of migrants’ integration, most respondents thought that the EU should provide help to their respective countries through targeted investments.
Question 12 invited respondents to give an assessment of the cooperation between their respective countries and the EU in different fields related to migration governance and management. Out of the five policy areas outlined in the question, institution building, fighting migrant smuggling, and border management had more positive assessment than negative.

Integration of migrants in the respondent’s country was the area for which the largest share of unfavorable assessments was expressed, with unfavorable and very unfavorable opinions representing altogether 43% of opinions on this particular issue (see Graph 18).

GRAPH 18

Q.12 Based on your country’s experience, how do you assess cooperation with the EU concerning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting migrant smuggling</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution building</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of migrants in your country</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation support</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

It is worth noting the share of Mashrek respondents who expressed a very favorable opinion concerning cooperation in the field of institution building, which was nine times superior to that of Maghreb respondents. In a similar way, but to a lesser extent, the share of Mashrek respondents who expressed a very favorable opinion about cooperation in fighting migrant smuggling was more than five times superior to that of Maghreb respondents (see Graph 19).
Q.12 Based on your country’s experience, how do you assess cooperation with the EU concerning: (% of good and very good answers)

The respondents were also asked to explain in what way they consider cooperation could be improved. In many instances they stressed the need to include civil society stakeholders in the cooperation frameworks:

The current disputes between Morocco and Spain and between Morocco and Germany show the extreme fragility of the current cooperation and indicate the need to rebuild on new foundations marked by shared respect and complementarity of interests as well as the inclusion in the elaboration of development or migration management policies of all partners concerned, including civil society (academics/researchers, political parties, civil society and trade unions).

- Moroccan respondent -
Question 13 asked respondents to choose the most effective way, in their opinion, to fight migrant smuggling. Among the total of views expressed, 29% of respondents chose “creating economic alternatives to smuggling” as their preferred option. [Developing legal and safe pathways to migration as an alternative to resorting to irregular migration] was in second place (representing 25% of overall answers to this question).

It is worth noting that Mashrek respondents display a clear order of preference, with 30% of them designating creating economic alternative to smuggling as their preferred option and 25% opting for developing legal and safe pathways to migration. In contrast, Maghreb respondents opted for both options to the same extent (with a share of 28% for each). With regards to developing cooperation with non-governmental and community-level stakeholders beyond the law-enforcement realm, although it is ranked as the third priority overall, respondents from Maghreb countries chose it by a significantly larger share (26%) than Mashrek respondents (8%).
GRAPH 21

Q.13 What is the most effective way to fight migrant smuggling?

In their comments, respondents explained why such options could prove effective in tackling migrant smuggling. In many instances, they stressed the community dimension of migrant smuggling and highlighted the essential need to provide pathways at community level, through dialogue and participation:

*Smuggling is a community issue that rises in certain conditions of precarity. Accordingly, a community-based solution with civil society collaboration will create longer lasting results than authority-based measures.*

- Tunisian respondent -

*This would prevent migrants from turning to the services of traffickers, through the establishment of a legal and regulated procedure to rely on.*

- Algerian respondent -
A number of respondents also highlighted the multidimensional nature of the issue and stressed the complementarity of the proposed solutions:

*The problem is very complex, multidimensional and multifactorial. It requires several solutions at both national and international levels.*

- Algerian respondent -

*In my opinion, all the options you mentioned above are complementary to each other and are all needed.*

- Jordanian respondent -

*Creating economic alternatives to trafficking is certainly the best solution. But the demand is enormous and, in the end, all means, except coercion, are to be advocated.*

- Tunisian respondent -

Finally, **Question 14** concluded the block by inviting respondents to share their thoughts on the ways the EU could help their respective countries with regards to the integration of (third country) immigrants. Over a half of their answers (51%) suggested that the EU should make use of targeted investments (such as job creation, housing, education and local projects) while 24% of answers hinted at the EU establishing a political and legal framework for the specific issue of integration in these countries.

**GRAPH 22**

Q.14 How could cooperation with the EU provide help on the integration of immigrants in your country? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

Targeted investments: job creation, housing, education, local projects

Establishing a political and legal framework for the integration

Specific support for countries hosting refugees

Enhance the role of NGOs

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
Through their written answers, respondents provided explanations as to how targeted investments could be effectively put in practice:

*Through participative programmes, putting migrants at the heart of their design. It has to be multi-sectorial and should not be conceived in a unilateral and predominantly Eurocentric way.*
- Tunisian respondent -

*Support for institutions, support for the entrenchment of democracy, support for advanced regionalisation, support for training and vocational training, support for civil society, rethinking the approach, establishing an efficient and effective monitoring system, cooperation with small and medium-sized enterprises and small and medium-sized industries, establishing a more open and win-win cooperation with African countries.*
- Moroccan respondent -
Fostering Cooperation on Returns and Reintegration

Block four focused on assessing current cooperation on return and reintegration as well as identifying main issues in this field and looking into further ways to improve this cooperation.

**Main findings:**

- Perceptions on current cooperation on returns and readmission with the EU tend to differ widely. Consistently with previous observations, Maghreb respondents express significantly more negative views on the state of cooperation than their Mashrek counterparts.

- The lack of policy standards to manage return and reintegration of migrants in the country of return is considered a key obstacle.

- EU support on return would be most beneficial if it focuses on post-return reintegration assistance to countries of return and if it also involves civil society and other community-level actors.

- Bilateral visa facilitation mechanisms are the first option when considering policies that could contribute to improve cooperation on return and reintegration. Post-arrival provisions have a significant acceptance as well.

**Question 15** invited respondents to assess the current cooperation on return and readmission with EU countries. Results show a significant percentage of “don’t know” answers (22%). Apart from this, views reflect a predominantly negative opinion of the ongoing cooperation on returns (Graph 23). However, when looking at the answers by geographical origin, there is a clearly differentiated assessment: Maghreb respondents are skeptical on the relationship, reporting 40% of low or very low answers. Contrastingly, about 40% of answers from the Mashrek indicate a positive assessment (graph 23).
In the open-ended question that followed (Q16), respondents were asked to identify the main issues plaguing cooperation on returns. The input collected is summarised in three categories (see Graph 24). A significant share of comments underline the need to develop more policy standards allowing for an effective return and reintegration in countries of the South Mediterranean.
Some of the open-ended answers referred to the lack of policy standards:

One of the most important issues is to have programmes to rehabilitate refugees to return to their countries, protect them and take care of them after their return through international charters and an oversight that does not allow the authorities of their countries to re-displace them or exert various pressures on them.
- Jordanian respondent -

Human Rights capacity development for legal professionals, including support to national training institutions.
- Libyan respondent -

Forced readmission always creates sociopolitical problems, especially in a nascent democracy like Tunisia because public opinion does not want to see its authorities act like "police of frontiers". They see it as an encroachment on its sovereignty.
- Tunisian respondent -

The willingness of some EU member states to dictate the conditions of return and reintegration to countries of transit (mainly in the Maghreb).
- Algerian respondent -

**Question 17** turned to those areas of the cooperation on return where EU support has been beneficial. The most mentioned area was “Providing post-return reintegration assistance to countries of return” with a 25% of responses followed by “involving civil society and community-level organisations in post-return and reintegration processes” which accounted for 19% of all answers. A breakdown by geographical origin and by kind of institution allows further insight on this result. In the case of Maghreb respondents, three options are equally important, the formerly mentioned ones together with “investing on pre-return assistance”. For Mashrek respondents the second-preferred option is “promoting capacity-building amongst responsible authorities” (see Graph 25).
When looking at the answers by kind of institution, experts follow the survey average while civil society answers consider the EU’s support on involving civil society and the local government in post-return and integration processes the most beneficial. Finally, according to policy-makers, it is the European support on voluntary return procedures that is the most beneficial for SPCs.
**Question 18** was focused on the assessment of different options that could contribute to improve cooperation on return and reintegration. Interestingly, all three provided options have an important turnout of positive or very positive answers. Out of three options, respondents indicated an overall preference for the bilateral visa facilitation mechanisms.

**GRAPH 27**

Q.18 To what extent do you consider that the following avenues could contribute to improve cooperation on return and reintegration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>High (%)</th>
<th>Very High (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral visa facilitation mechanisms</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The provision of post-arrival reintegration assistance to partner countries in line with development-related activities at country and community levels</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The full implementation of existing bilateral agreements on readmission and the negotiations of new ones</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

Comments on this question show a variety of arguments on how bilateral visa facilitation mechanisms could improve the cooperation on return and reintegration:

*Facilitating legitimate alternatives is always the shortest way to eliminate illegitimate parallel alternatives.*  
- Egyptian respondent -

*The mechanisms currently adopted, both in their conditions and processes, for granting visas do not respect the essence and philosophy of true cooperation. They need to be thoroughly revised to be compatible with the terms of international human rights conventions.*  
- Moroccan respondent -

*Visa facilitation will help those who have already spotted some real job opportunities in receiving countries to benefit from these opportunities through legal means. Establishing some shortlists of jobs where there is a shortage of labour in the EU is recommended.*  
- Syrian respondent -
The second option considered as a positive avenue to improve cooperation is the provision of post-arrival reintegration assistance to partner countries. In the open comment section, respondents have pointed out how to optimise chances of successful reintegration:

*Giving prospects for integration with concrete support can considerably facilitate the reintegration of the migrant in the country of origin, provided that adequate accompaniment is provided until the desired result is achieved.*

- Algerian respondent -

*It can convince returnees that there is in fact a good reason for them to stay in their country. Training is also very important in this respect because many illegal migrants have abandoned school early and have not made any training, so they see migration as their only way out.*

- Syrian respondent -

Open answers commenting on the “Full implementation of existing bilateral agreements” shed interesting light on these agreements’ importance, improvement or limitations:

*In order to improve cooperation in terms of return and reintegration, both civil society and those affected must be involved in the implementation of bilateral agreements.*

- Moroccan respondent -

*This will contribute to the development of government policies - as it represents a good mechanism for follow-up and provides better protection for returnees- enhancing confidence in the intervention, protection, and support systems.*

- Libyan respondent -

*As long as conditions in the country of origin are not improved, agreements have a limited effect on the determination and desperation of migrants.*

- Algerian respondent -

Finally, results sorted by geographical origin depict a similar pattern than previously described, with answers from the Mashrek being generally more positive than Maghreb ones. This divergence can be very significant: Promoting the “Full implementation of existing bilateral agreements on readmission and the negotiations of new ones” gathers twice as many positive answers from Mashrek respondents than from the Maghreb in percentage points (see Graph 28).
GRAPH 28

Q.18 To what extent do you consider that the following avenues could contribute to improve cooperation on return and reintegration? (% of answers as first option)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashrek respondents</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashrek respondents</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashrek respondents</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashrek respondents</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
Developing Pathways for Legal Migration to Europe

This block of questions tackled respondents’ assessment of initiatives between Europe and Southern Mediterranean partner countries in the field of labour mobility cooperation and collected views on the policy improvement needed. In addition it questioned participants on the recently proposed Talent Partnerships and other similar potential cooperation initiatives.

Main findings:

• Respondents acknowledged the fruitfulness of several initiatives proposed by the EU in the field of labour mobility cooperation.

• International skills and diploma recognition, preventing brain drain and domestic labour market disruptions, as well as circular schemes of labour mobility are considered priority areas for improvement.

• Overall, respondents welcomed the development of Talent Partnerships, primarily in their potential to generate domestic market opportunities through business creation and development.

• Visa facilitation as well as professional and university training schemes were among respondents’ top suggestions with regards to developing further legal mobility pathways to the EU.

Question 20 invited respondents to choose which of the proposed domains of cooperation with the EU should be improved. Overall answers reveal that international skill/diploma recognition should be improved as a matter of priority to a similar extent as preventing brain drain and labour market disruptions, as well as promoting circular schemes of labour mobility (each of these three options represent approximately 18% of the views expressed).
Consistent with other areas of the survey, the answers to these questions show a certain divergence between Maghreb and Mashrek respondents. The answers of Mashrek countries respondents largely reflect the overall ranking of priorities whereas for Maghreb countries respondents, circular schemes of labour migration stands as the first domain. Additionally, sharing labour market information between origin and destination countries is considered as much of a priority as international skill/diploma recognition. Furthermore, preventing brain drain and labour market distortions appears as less of a priority than sharing labour market information between origin and destination countries according to Maghreb respondents’ answers.
In Question 19 respondents were asked to share their viewpoint on the initiative which, based on their experience and in their country, has been the most fruitful in the area of labour mobility cooperation with the EU and/or EU Member States. Many respondents recognised the work carried out by the EU and EU Member States and highlighted the following initiatives: “Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa” (THAMM), “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future” initiative and the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The mobility partnerships signed by the EU with Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan and involving some EU Member States are also recognised by respondents, although further efforts are needed according to the following answer:
All mobility agreements signed and involving Morocco, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, since the framework agreement signed on this subject between Morocco and the EU in 2013. However, the number of beneficiaries should be more important and their follow-up in Europe as well as after their return to Morocco should be both effective and reliable.

- Moroccan respondent -

**Question 21** asked respondents to pinpoint what could be the main benefits related to Talent Partnerships in their respective countries. Almost one third of expressed opinions opted for the generation of domestic market opportunities through business creation and development as the main possible benefit. Maghreb and Mashrek respondents both chose this as the top option, although Mashrek respondents did with a larger margin (see Graph 32).

**GRAPH 31**

Q.21 Talent partnerships is a paradigm that the EU wants to pursue as a channel to support legal migration and mobility cooperation with your country. In your opinion, what could be the main benefits for your country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generate domestic market opportunities through business creation and development</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance the transfer of professional qualifications, skills and experience acquired abroad</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster potential for international networks and supply chains through diaspora linkages</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve vocational training and build capacities of related institutions</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not think that talent partnerships constitute a conducive framework for better cooperation in the field of legal mobility</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no particular views</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
Q.21 Talent partnerships is a paradigm that the EU wants to pursue as a channel to support legal migration and mobility cooperation with your country. In your opinion, what could be the main benefits for your country?

Overall, respondents expressed favourable opinions related to these schemes, with only 6% of them denying the idea that Talent Partnerships could be a conducive framework for better cooperation in the field of legal mobility.

In relation to these Talent Partnerships, Question 22 went on to ask respondents to explain, as a matter of priority, which complementary steps should be taken beyond Talent Partnerships to further develop legal pathways of mobility to the EU. Among the recurring answers, visa and mobility facilitation was put forward by respondents to the largest extent. Many respondents also insisted on the need to foster professional and university training and exchanges between southern Mediterranean and European professionals in order to ensure that the skills of their countries’ professionals match the needs of the European labour markets.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
QUALITATIVE REPORT
Migration and Cooperation in the Mediterranean: Beyond Divergent Priorities

Sara Benjelloun
Research associate at LPED and LMI-MOVIDA social science research centres

Migration policies developed in the Euro-Mediterranean region are strongly influenced by the image of a fortress Europe that is under siege and that seeks to control and counteract migratory movements in the Mediterranean. Reinforced by the rise of right-wing and extreme right-wing populism in recent years, this view has largely shaped the European Union’s relations with its Mediterranean neighbours, to the extent that migration is arguably one of the most important issues shaping Euro-Mediterranean relations today.

The current Euro-Mediterranean migration governance system reflects the European security-migration nexus in which different forms of cooperation interact and intersect with each other, creating a complex regulatory regime (Alter & Meunier, 2009; Betts, 2011; Ahouga, 2013). The aim of this analytical article is to shift the focus away from the European Union (EU) in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the priorities of the southern Mediterranean countries, which are grappling with complex migration realities.

It is important to cross perspectives of the North and South of the Mediterranean on migration so as to grasp the issues at stake in their entirety and to allow for a mutually beneficial partnership in this area.

European perspective on main policy areas and cooperation priorities

Since the introduction of free movement in the 1980s, the EU has become involved in the processing of the entry and exit of non-nationals, which had previously been a matter of sole state discretion. Migration and asylum issues have since become areas of shared competence between the EU and its Member States. The Europeanisation of migration management has been mainly directed towards the fight against irregular
immigration, which is widely perceived as a security threat (Bigo, 1998; Gabrielli, 2007). This conception is formalised in the Schengen agreements themselves, in which migration seems to have been viewed from a security perspective in the same way as terrorism or organised crime (Brochmann, 1999). The development of this perception owes much to the amalgams that often associate illegal immigration with jihadist terrorism and trafficking of all kinds (Alami M’chichi, 2005). The attacks of 11 September 2001 reinforced this European security approach and consolidated the security conception and treatment of migration (Rakkah, 2009). In the aim of rationalising incoming migration flows, European states have sought to involve third countries of origin and/or transit of migration flows in migration management and control through various national, bilateral, or multilateral initiatives.

A series of multilateral mechanisms involving countries on both sides of the Mediterranean has been developed by European states over the past two decades to form what is now the Euro-Mediterranean system of migration governance. The latter is the result of various exploratory attempts by European states to contain irregular migration.

The Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which constitutes the founding act of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, aims to create a free trade area. It does not mention free movement of persons, which is enshrined as one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU. The Barcelona Declaration betrays the primacy of a Eurocentric logic by devoting two paragraphs to migration in which it is notably foreseen to “establish closer cooperation in the areas of illegal immigration” and to “adopt the relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit [partners’] nationals who are in an illegal situation” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995).

It is from the 2000s onwards that migration has become a salient issue in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. This was reflected in the re-launch of the 5+5 Dialogue in 2001¹, which established regular meetings between foreign ministers and interior ministers. Migration issues are an integral part of the Conference of Ministers of the Interior of the Western Mediterranean (CIMO), notably through the working group on the movement of persons and the fight against irregular migration. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2004 complements the EU’s Mediterranean policy by proposing to neighbouring countries the deepening of political relations and greater economic integration. These two European initiatives crystallise the issues of cooperation in the fight against irregular immigration.

¹ The Forum for Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean, better known as the 5+5 Dialogue, is the oldest Mediterranean meeting framework. Launched in 1990 in Rome, this subregional forum, which is intended to be informal, was not very active until the early 2000s. It brings together five countries on the northern shore (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, and Malta) and the five countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania).
In addition to these, regional dialogue frameworks on migration have been created, such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes, which are intended to be spaces for dialogue and consultation in order to respond together to development and migration-related issues. In reality, these are more mechanisms aimed at influencing the framework of representation of the migration phenomenon towards a greater securitisation and judicialisation of the migration fact. This is because the various works within the framework of these processes focus much more on the means to combat irregular migration than on the organisation of legal migration and the strengthening of synergies between migration and development.

Through its various initiatives, the EU has been, unsuccessfully, trying for more than two decades to conclude readmission agreements with the southern Mediterranean neighbourhood. The fears aroused by the events that have shaken some Arab countries have led the European states to develop a new partnership offer: the Mobility Partnerships. This proposal, which targeted Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan², is not legally binding. They are commonly perceived as a declaration of intent for an exchange of concessions: visa facilitation for nationals in exchange for the signature of a readmission agreement for nationals and third-country nationals. Although readmission is a main European priority, it is clear that negotiations on these agreements have stalled due to resistance from southern Mediterranean countries.

Southern Mediterranean countries are only timidly participating in the numerous European initiatives. In order to address the lack of cooperation on migration, the EU seems to be gradually introducing a certain “migration conditionality” (Perrin, 2009; El Qadim, 2018). Indeed, the European Council held in Seville in June 2002 already provided for the insertion of a clause on the joint management of migration flows (as well as on compulsory readmission in the event of irregular situation) in any future EU agreement with a third country.

Faced with the rise of populism and the various electoral deadlines, European actors are engaging in various strategies to prompt the southern Mediterranean countries to become more involved in the external management of migration flows. At the end of September 2021, France decided, for example, to drastically reduce the issuance of visas to Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian nationals. This decision was made to sanction their governments, that were considered uncooperative in granting the consular passes necessary for the readmission of people back to their countries of origin.

² Only Morocco (June 2013), Tunisia (March 2014) and Jordan (October 2014) have signed the Mobility Partnership with 9, 10 and 12 EU Member States respectively.
Southern Mediterranean countries’ perspective on main migration policy areas and cooperation priorities

The external migration governance of the EU since the 2000s has strongly influenced the political framework of the migration phenomenon in the southern Mediterranean countries. This was reflected in the adoption in the early 2000s of restrictive legislation. For example, Law 02-03 relative to the entry and stay of foreigners and to irregular emigration and immigration, which was adopted by Morocco in 2003, heavily criminalises irregular migration and transit. Similar security provisions were subsequently adopted in other Maghreb countries, notably Tunisia (Law 2004-06 of 3 February 2004), in Libya (amendment in 2005 of Law 6 of 1987) and finally in Algeria (Law 08-11 of 25 June 2008 on the conditions of entry, residence and movement of foreigners in Algeria) (Perrin, 2009).

The external dimension of European migration policies seems to ignore the migration realities of the southern Mediterranean countries and their priorities (Del Sarto, 2010). Contrary to the prevailing perception, the Maghreb and Mashrek countries are not only countries of origin or transit, they are also countries of settlement for many migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. This can be illustrated by the 2 million foreigners who were living in Libya under Gaddafi, for example (Perrin, 2011). Also, the population movements generated by the consequences of the events that have shaken the Arab world in the last decade have mainly been towards neighbouring countries. Of the 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, 5.6 million are hosted in countries neighbouring Syria — mainly Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (UNHCR, 2021).

The EMM5-EuroMeSCO survey “revealed that the area of migration policy considered by the respondents as the most important for their respective countries is “Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration”. Indeed, 75% of respondents rated this area as being of high or very high importance.
This indicates that respondents want to limit irregular migration. To this end, they prefer substantive work to be carried out upstream, by addressing the root causes of the phenomenon through the creation of economic opportunities, rather than through the strengthening of border management or downstream through the improvement of return and reintegration mechanisms. The latter area is considered the least important (55% of respondents considered it as high or very high vs. 20% low and very low).

The data broken down by country, however, reveals important differences in the assessment of this area between countries. Indeed, return and reintegration mechanisms enjoy a high degree of interest for respondents in countries hosting large foreign populations such as Lebanon (90% of high or very high answers) where a high number of Palestinian and Syrian refugees live. Return and reintegration schemes are also an important issue for Palestinian respondents (75% of high or very high answers), as the right to return is one of the main demands of the Palestinian people.
Through their answers, the respondents call for a rethinking of migration management by placing the treatment of human beings at the centre of migration-related issues. Indeed, the second and third most important areas for respondents were “Countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings” and “Addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations and of forcibly displaced persons, including asylum seekers, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)” (see graph 1).

This approach was really manifested by Morocco in 2013 when they initiated a new migration policy to promote a humanistic treatment of migration and migrants. The national strategy on immigration and asylum adopted by Morocco is unique in the region and has resulted in concrete progress, such as two large-scale regularisation operations for migrants carried out in 2014 and 2017 and the adoption of a law...
against human trafficking. Even though driven by geostrategic interest and suffering from incomplete implementation, the launch of the Moroccan migration policy marks a major paradigm shift in the Mediterranean region (Benjelloun, 2021).

The survey also addressed cooperation between Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and their neighbours — other than the EU or EU Member States — in areas of migration policy. The received results show broadly the same levels of perceived importance for areas of migration policy. This again reveals the willingness of policymakers, experts and civil society representatives from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to cooperate, together, to tackle the root causes of irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings in addition to addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations.

**GRAPH 3**

Important migration policies and cooperation priorities (% of high and very high answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Cooperation priority with your neighbours</th>
<th>Important areas of migration policy for your country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations and of forcibly displaced persons, including asylum seekers, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostering regular migration and mobility</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening border management</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic integration of immigrants and refugees</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving return and reintegration mechanisms</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
Beyond divergent priorities

From the above, it appears that northern and southern Mediterranean countries have divergent views on priority areas of cooperation in migration management. While Europe continues to focus on the security approach to migration, southern Mediterranean countries call for the adoption of policies that are more comprehensive and more in line with their migration profiles. Indeed, a number of countries in the southern Mediterranean have become in recent years, partly as a result of European migration policies, countries of settlement for migrants. These new realities require that Mediterranean cooperation frameworks be particularly concerned with the reception and integration of migrants.

It seems necessary for the EU to operationalise, in collaboration with its southern partners, cooperation instruments for the conduct of a constructive dialogue that will allow for a better understanding and reconciliation of the priorities of both sides. These actions will enable all stakeholders to be fully involved in finding common solutions and thus contribute to the construction and redefinition of comprehensive migration management policies in the Mediterranean area (Papagianni, 2013).

The recent actions of the European Commission in favour of a New Pact on Migration and Asylum as well as the New Agenda for the Mediterranean can constitute adequate frameworks for cooperation and dialogue. Indeed, one of the objectives of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposed by the European Commission in September 2020 is to address the concerns of third countries. To this end, the EU promotes the conduct of tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships. Furthermore, the new Mediterranean agenda, presented in February 2021, calls on countries on both shores to jointly address the challenges of forced displacement and irregular migration and to promote legal and safe channels for migration and mobility. Adequately mobilising this new framework for migration partnership is key to reconcile diverging priorities.
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Irregular Migration Across the Mediterranean: The Long Road Ahead to Revamp Partnerships

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Irregular migration is here to stay

Over the past year and a half, as the pandemic wreaked havoc on the global economy and forced most of the world into lockdowns, migration has taken a back seat in policymakers’ agendas. Yet, migration across the Mediterranean region has not “disappeared”: despite all odds, it is already on the rise and can be expected to rise further in the near future.

The respondents of the survey, who all hail from Southern Mediterranean countries, seem to be deeply aware of this fact. Asked whether they believed if irregular migration is likely to continue to increase in the future, over 80% of them answered affirmatively, both when they were asked about migrants from other countries, and about intentions to migrate of their fellow citizens. Those respondents who identified the main driver of irregular migration as conflict or instability, or as a lack of socio-economic perspectives, were the most adamant in believing that migration was also likely to increase, with over or close to 90% of the interviewees answering positively.

This comes as no surprise to observers of migration trends. Years before the 2015 “refugee crisis” that brought 1.2 million irregular migrants to Europe in the span of eight months, irregular migration across the Mediterranean had been rising slowly but steadily. According to own data compiled from official sources, between 2002 and 2008 irregular crossings across the Mediterranean and Western African (i.e., Canary Islands) routes averaged around 39,000. These numbers roughly doubled between 2009 and 2013, as irregular border crossings detected by Frontex along the Western, Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes, plus Western Africa averaged 78,000 per year (Frontex, 2021).
Over the past five years, as the “refugee crisis” subsided and previous trends resumed, irregular border crossings by sea increased by another 67%, averaging roughly 130,000 each year (Frontex, 2021). Moreover, a number of forecast models predict that (regular or irregular) migration from Africa, Asia, or Southern Mediterranean countries into Europe will continue to slowly but steadily rise over the next two decades (Villa 2020, European Commission, 2019, Bijak, 2016).

Within this context, the pandemic has only exacerbated previous trends. The collapse in regular migration, as border crossings closed and lockdowns ensued, was soon offset by a noticeable increase in irregular flows along certain routes, particularly from Africa. This increase highlights the paradox of the pandemic: while its public health effects were prompting governments to restrict regular travel, its economic effects were driving irregular cross-border mobility further up. At the same time, the pandemic further “regionalised” irregular migration, with the average distance travelled by irregular migrants to reach Europe becoming shorter compared to 2014-2019 trends (Villa, 2021).

All in all, in the post-pandemic period (since March 2020 until September 2021) more than 165,000 irregular migrants managed to reach EU countries by sea.¹ At least another 40,000 were intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard and brought back to Libya,² and less complete data from the Turkish, Moroccan, and Tunisian coast guards suggest that, overall, close to a quarter of a million of irregular migrants attempted the risky Mediterranean sea route.

Meanwhile, regular migration channels to EU countries shrunk to the lowest level since at least 2008. Last year, first residence permits released by 25 EU countries that have disclosed this information so far dropped by a staggering 30% compared to 2019, from 2.8 to less than 2 million (Eurostat, 2021). This drop, that Camie (2020) estimated as the steepest since the start of the Second World War, was even more dramatic for some large EU countries such as Italy (-75%) and Germany (-68%) which, alone, made up almost a quarter of all residence permits released by EU countries in 2019.

Further instability is increasing irregular migration pressure

When respondents to the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey were asked about the drivers of irregular migration, they provided different answers depending on whether the migrant was fellow citizen or a person travelling from a third country. Respondents largely ascribed migration of their own citizens to a lack of socio-economic

¹ Author’s calculations on monthly data released by UNHCR (Operational Data Portal, Mediterranean Situation, accessed on 13 October 2021).
² Author’s calculations on weekly data released by IOM (Libya Maritime Update, 3-9 October 2021).
perspectives or joining relatives living abroad (for a total of 67% of respondents choosing either), and just 15% to conflict or instability. On the other hand, they also responded that transiting migrants were driven to move around half of the time (49%) by conflict or instability, and 33% of the time by a lack of socio-economic perspectives or to join relatives.

**GRAPH 1**

**Q.8 What is the main driver of outwards irregular migration from your country?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driver</th>
<th>Migrants transiting through your country</th>
<th>Citizens from your country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict or instability</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining family/relatives living abroad</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of climate change</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no particular views on this matter</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMMS-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

This belief coincides with reality, reflecting quite closely what we know from data on irregular migration from Tunisia and Morocco, on the one hand, and Libya and Turkey, on the other. Most if not all Moroccans and Tunisians who arrive at Spain’s or Italy’s shores move for economic reasons. Very few of them are granted asylum or any other kind of international protection, such as the EU-level subsidiary protection or some other nationally-mandated third level of protection. Contrary to this, migrants reaching the EU irregularly from Libya or Turkey are overwhelmingly transiting migrants and have a much higher likelihood to be granted some form of international protection. These two separate drivers impacted in separate but interacting way on the dynamics of post-pandemic irregular migration, and as such deserve closer scrutiny.
**Tunisia**

For years, Tunisia has been plagued by chronic unemployment, compounded by a volatile socio-political climate in the years after the Jasmine Revolution of 2011. During the pandemic, border closures and the collapse of air traffic struck a serious blow to a country whose economy is heavily dependent on tourism, which accounts for about 8% of national GDP and employs close to 400,000 people, i.e. about 10% of the workforce. This serious blow has come just a few years after the terrorist attacks that had already been reducing the country’s attractiveness as a tourist destination since 2015.

According to official data, tourist arrivals in Tunisia suffered an almost total wipe-out between April and June last year, and in December were still down by 90% if compared to the year before (UNWTO, 2021).³ Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Tunisian seasonal migrants found themselves unable to reach Italy and other European destinations through regular channels. This was followed by a rapid increase in irregular sea arrivals from Tunisia to Italy. In the period January-September, migrants reaching Italy from Tunisia rose from 1,800 in 2019, to 8,800 in 2020 (a five-fold increase), and then again to 14,600 in 2021. What is more, between July 2020 and September 2021, over two thirds of these arrivals were Tunisians, whereas between 2013 and 2019 arrivals were composed by a mixture of different (mostly Sub-Saharan) nationalities.

**Morocco and the Canary Islands**

Irregular arrivals to Spain rose significantly in the second half of 2018, only to collapse in the first half of 2019. This was in great part thanks to the cooperation of the Moroccan government, which stepped up the level of patrols carried out by its coast guard and deepened its coordination with EU counterparts.

The irregular route via the western Mediterranean almost closed in March-April 2020, at the height of the first wave of the pandemic in Europe, only to grow busier again and reach 2019 levels by September 2020. In the meantime, a second route – the direct route from West Africa to Spain’s Canary Islands – reopened. The high number of arrivals recorded in 2020 (over 23,000, 82% of which were concentrated in the last four months of the year) is reminiscent of the “Cayucos crisis” which brought around 35,000 irregular migrants to the archipelago between 2005 and 2006, at the time prompting the Spanish government to create detention and repatriation centres that have been reopened in recent months.

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**Libya**

In Libya, a number of migrants living in the country face dire conditions. Sub-Saharan African migrants reaching Libya with the explicit purpose to cross to Europe irregularly probably face the worst conditions, regardless of whether they are held in detention centres or live in urban environments (Council of Europe, 2021). It is not surprising, therefore, that even in March 2020, at the peak of the pandemic in Italy, many migrants and asylum seekers in Libya boarded boats just the same, in the hope of reaching north. This trend only increased over the months, and has reached levels not seen since 2017. In the period January-September 2021, irregular migration from Libya to Italy rose from just 1,400 in 2019 to 7,800 in 2020 (a five-fold increase), and then more than doubled again to 18,100 in 2021.

**The EU policy toolbox – a precarious balancing act?**

Half a decade on since Europe’s “refugee crisis”, European governments are still looking for a shared solution to the problems of internal solidarity, coordination and harmonisation of migration and refugee policies. In 2020, the package of European Commission proposals branded the “New Pact on Asylum and Migration” was first pushed back for more than six months from its original release schedule, and after its launch it was for the most part overlooked by Member States unable to find common ground on the solidarity part of the package (i.e., how to receive irregular migrants and handle asylum applications within the EU). As often happened in the past, common ground between EU countries was largely to be found in improved (and more financed) border management, as well as in increased cooperation with third countries (especially in the fields of return and reintegration).

These are largely a continuation of policies established since 2015, when the Trust Fund for Africa was launched as a financial instrument designed to foster development, strengthen trust, as well as leverage aid for cooperation of third countries in the control of irregular transits through their territory. Reinforcing external borders is also a continuity policy: while 2016 saw the approval of a proposal to transform Frontex from the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, in 2020 proposals focused on further tightening the screening of any irregular migrants entering the EU, and on strengthening the mechanisms for their repatriation.

Yet, the scarcity of essential workers during the pandemic has shown that labour migration has become crucial for both northern and southern Mediterranean countries (Kumar et al., 2021). Indeed, current estimates show that, on average, 13% of migrant workers are employed in essential occupations in EU countries (Fasani and Mazza, 2020). Moreover, the recent increases in irregular crossings are evidence that, by closing down regular channels, irregular ones are poised to swell – especially when the propensity to migrate increases, such as during local or regional recessions.
Despite the clear need for mending a “limping” intra-Mediterranean migration system, the debate over migration governance across the two shores of the Mediterranean has grown increasingly polarised. While European policymakers focus their attention on discouraging irregular migration and furthering returns, countries from the southern shore have called for widened regular migration channels (regarding benefits from remittances as being larger than the “brain drain”), and for opportunities for dialogue that do not necessarily revolve around migration. This risks harming the relations between countries from the two shores, and to further entrench positions.

Results from the survey are quite adamant: Southern Mediterranean respondents do not think the EU has been very successful in assisting their country to tackle the drivers of irregular migration. In fact, 52% of respondents rate the EU’s success in this area as “low” or “very low”, while just 11% rate it “high” or “very high”. While only marginally, this poor result further drops in the specific region of Maghreb (56% rate the EU’s success as “low” or “very low”), despite – or, possibly, exactly because – the region has been often targeted by the EU’s efforts to reduce irregular border crossings over the past decade.

Wither from here? Surely, while positive steps in migration dialogue have been few and far between as of late, they have not been absent. In fact, some proposals stand out for pointing in the right direction, striving to move towards mutually beneficial partnerships. When asked what should be done to reduce irregular migration, survey respondents single out enhancing migration governance (32%) and increasing international cooperation for development (25%), focusing especially on education and health. Another 24% points at developing strategies for job creation or creating mobility opportunities.
All this seems to fall within the remit of skills partnerships, cooperation projects that aim to address skills shortages in destination countries, while benefiting origin countries with technical and vocational education and training targeted to prospective migrants. Last June, the European Commission launched Talent Partnerships, which aim to match “the skills of workers from countries outside the EU with the labour market needs inside the EU” (European Commission, 2021). Presenting them as an explicit way to “replace irregular migration with legal pathways”, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson stroke all the right chords, emphasising that the need for legal migration is there, and that investing in education and training in third countries presents benefits that clearly outweigh the costs.

A second project worth mentioning is the EU Global Diaspora Facility (EUDIF), a pilot project launched by the European Commission in 2019, working to consolidate efforts of diaspora engagement for development. There is a sore need for strong initiatives on migration diplomacy, especially those that could help addressing the fragmentation of diaspora engagement for development purposes, given that diasporas play an increasingly important role for the co-development of destination and origin countries (Villa et al., 2021). At the design, planning and implementation levels, diaspora engagement often remains quite strictly tied to bilateral relations, with one host and one origin country at its core. In this context, the EU is right to leverage regional initiatives to coordinate and support diaspora engagement, coordination, and the dissemination of best practices, and should work to strengthen such initiatives moving forward.
Finally, a third initiative that could be explored is the revamping of the EU Blue Card. In order to make it useful to shift irregular migration towards legal channels, the EU Blue Card (currently aimed at, and limited to, high-skill workers) should move “down” the human capital chain, and offer ways to enter the EU to mid- and low-skill workers. The share of migrant essential workers shows the benefits of such a move: on average, in EU countries, around 36% of key workers in the low-qualification “cleaners and helpers” profession are foreign born, and around three quarters of these are non-EU citizens. A similar share of the 24% key migrant workers in “mining, construction, manufacturing and transport” occupations were born outside of the EU (Fasani and Mazza, 2020).

To conclude, there are ample opportunities to enhance migration partnerships across the two shores of the Mediterranean. The best way forward to restore confidence in migration policy dialogues is to explore ways to strengthen legal migration pathways, and to do so at all skill levels. By working on positive incentives to regular migration, Mediterranean countries could go back to tackling irregular migration from a position of strength, while at the same time moving towards a future in which migration along the two shores of the Mediterranean really becomes a “triple win”.
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The Danger of a Single Story: the Migrant Smuggling Narrative

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There is a deep-rooted and well-defined set of ideas at the core of the EU’s migrant smuggling discourse. These ideas’ resilience is evident in the very ease in which whenever asked about what migrant smuggling stands for, most people can easily articulate how it is carried out by ethnic mafias and other foreign groups pertaining to transnational organised crime, and that the thousands of deaths involving migrants on route to Europe can easily be traced to the despicable actions of the members of these heinous organisations.

Many of the responses to the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Survey Report regarding migrant smuggling echoed these claims. In fact, the narratives of the facilitation of irregular migration for profit as a crime in the hands of transnational criminal groups, and the implications this has on migrants’ lives appear consistently in the language that everyone from politicians to academics to policy makers and civil society use to describe migrant smuggling across Europe, the Mediterranean and beyond.

The solutions some of the survey’s respondents made to counter smuggling are also strikingly similar to those proposed by politicians and policy makers at large. For example, in the survey, respondents called for the need to dismantle the smugglers’ business model and to counter the spread and influence of the groups behind it (key components of the EU’s 2021-2025 Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling). Others argued that the only way to curtail the heinous crimes of smugglers requires counteracting the drivers behind migration, and called for the implementation of even more information campaigns that could communicate to vulnerable and naïve migrants the risks inherent to irregular migration, another common proposition made by policy makers. Other responses did make reference to smuggling’s role as a pressing security issue afflicting cross-border cooperation, and to the need to identify its impacts on the interactions of countries throughout North Africa and the Sahel with the EU, yet another recommendation present in policy briefs and research reports.
It would be a mistake not to recognize that migrant smuggling—the facilitation for profit of the irregular entry of a person into a country different from their own—does constitute a pressing security issue afflicting Europe and its neighbours in the Southern Mediterranean. Despite the pandemic, the number of migrants arriving irregularly to EU’s coasts reached record numbers. An often-quoted Europol-INTERPOL report (2016) emphasized that most irregular entries by sea into the EU are in fact facilitated by smugglers. It is also undeniable that many of smuggling’s actors—including those working for the state—often engage in criminal and violent acts that compromise the lives of migrants and their communities (Euromed Monitor, 2021).

And yet, a quick review of the literature on smuggling reveals that these claims and plenty of the articulated solutions to counter smuggling’s reach have remained almost intact during the last twenty years. In other words, from the time the very term entered the international security lexicon, migrant smuggling has been largely articulated as a form of transnational threat (Kuschminder & Triandafyllidou, 2020) or under the control of greedy and violent racialised men constituted into gangs (Maher, 2018). The almost uncontrolable reach of these foreign gangs, we are told, constitutes an

The articulated solutions to counter smuggling’s reach have remained almost intact during the last twenty years. So does the narrative on smuggling as it has also hardly changed, and is readily redeployed whenever a tragedy involving migrant deaths occurs.
extreme threat to the stability of the global north for the other forms of crimes it can unleash—from terrorism to sex trafficking to the drug trade (Achilli & Tinti, 2019).

The narrative has proven to be quite dependable, for it has again hardly changed, and is readily redeployed whenever a tragedy involving migrant deaths occurs. (As this contribution is being drafted, the world mourns the deaths of at least 27 migrants who lost their lives while trying to reach the UK from France, deaths that politicians and academics alike immediately attributed to “ruthless criminal gangs” and their “business model”).

Fortunately, over the years many researchers have come forward, demonstrating that many of the claims long taken for granted in regard to smuggling have in fact scant empirical backing, tend to exaggerate the realities on the ground, or are simply un plausible. Irregular migratory journeys, we now know, are not merely the result of the actions of organised criminals. Quite often we find out that those who facilitate migrants’ journeys are men, women and children (UNDOC 2021a) organised in multiple fashions (Aziani 2021), at times migrants and refugees themselves having to pay bribes to other state and non-state actors to use specific corridors (UNODC 2018). Smuggling facilitators also deploy their own knowledge as long-standing residents of marginalized communities, and even their own experiences as irregular migrants on behalf of others seeking to reach destinations elsewhere (UNDOC 2021b). They do it with the hope of generating an income that allows them to survive, but also often to continue with their journeys (Achilli 2018). And while their actions are often depicted in reports from international organizations as yielding enormous profits, most smuggling facilitators remain living under the same conditions that led them to become facilitators in the first place, their mobility and income remaining rather limited aside from registering occasional spikes (Moussaoui 2015).

While the smuggling’s security narrative has a strong hold in our collective consciousness, there is also growing recognition of the need to examine the implications of counter-smuggling policy and practice. Multiple EU counter-smuggling initiatives, rather than dismantling smuggling networks, have had devastating impacts on the livelihoods of people within Europe, North Africa, the Sahel and beyond. For example, a growing number of countries is introducing migrant smuggling statutes and other initiatives aimed at criminalising the facilitation of migrants’ mobility. Evidence shows processes of these nature have effectively disturbed when not destroyed the transportation systems that for decades had allowed people to move within their countries and to others within Africa (Brachet, 2018). The designation of the transportation of migrants as smuggling in Niger forced out of the market experienced, long-standing transporters who feared being labelled as smugglers, human traffickers or enslavers, while stripping them of their sources of income (Fakhry, 2021). This led people on the move to have no other option than to entrust...
their journeys to less skilled, unreliable agents or facilitators, who in order to avoid enforcement turned to relying on longer and more dangerous routes, which have repeatedly been correlated to increases in the number of migrant deaths.¹

Researchers have shown that despite the allegations concerning smugglers’ technological sophistication, the core strategies that they rely on for their journeys have hardly changed—granted, facilitated to a degree by the availability of smart phones and apps—when and if available (Diba, Papanicolau & Antonopoulus 2019). Examinations into the law enforcement practice of demanding access to migrants’ social networks on the grounds these can reveal communications with smugglers that can help dismantle smuggling networks, reveal scant effectiveness. Instead, it appears that the threat of collecting social media data constitutes more of an intimidatory tactic against migrants than an effort to curtail smuggling operations (Dimitriadi, 2021). Ultimately, the risks inherent to irregular migration and its facilitation can only be countered through the effective implementation of mechanisms that allow for equally accessible paths to regular, orderly and safe migration for all people regardless of their place of birth, residence or transit.

The prior paragraphs do point toward the growing awareness in research and policy circles of the need to examine the implications that migration controls allegedly aimed to counter-smuggling have had on the lives of migrants, the communities they travel through and the facilitators of their journeys—quite often also migrants themselves. This certainly provides much hope among those who have for a long time raised concerns over some of the official claims surrounding migrant smuggling, and opens a path towards accountability (an element to this day not present in counter-smuggling strategy).

The growth of the critical, empirical scholarship on migrant smuggling and the analytical eye of increasing numbers of other stakeholders on the implications of smuggling and counter-smuggling policy and practice is definitely a cause for excitement. Junior researchers—among which women and scholars of migrant origin themselves figure prominently—have been at the forefront of calls for improved and critical understandings of the processes behind the facilitation of irregular migration, questioning the state-centric discourse that has systematically silenced those at the receiving end of counter-smuggling policy (that is, not only migrants but smugglers and those construed as such).

And yet it is important not to let our guard down. At a time when calls to decolonize migration research have re-emerged and demands for gender mainstreaming seem ubiquitous in migration policy and research circles, few researchers and policy

¹ To this it is important to add that there is growing consensus among researchers that migrants are increasingly forgoing the services of smugglers unable to afford their costs, and relying instead in collective knowledge and resources to propel their journeys with varying and often times lethal results. See Arrouche, forthcoming.
From its inception in the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, neither migrant smuggling nor smugglers have been neutral concepts. The very articulation of smuggling as a threat relies on the construction and on the persona of the smuggler as a racialized and gendered foreigner.

Counter-smuggling becomes operationalized against racialized groups, exempting states of responsibility over their roles at creating violent migratory conditions for migrants.

Few researchers and policy makers have raised concerns over the racialized, gendered nature of smuggling enforcement and discourse (Sanchez, 2018). From its inception in the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, neither migrant smuggling nor smugglers have been neutral concepts. The very articulation of smuggling as a threat relies on the construction and on the persona of the smuggler as a racialized and gendered foreigner.

Official communications from the EU and international organizations consistently blame smugglers (racialized as African or Arab men) of deceiving migrants to pursue irregular migratory channels, of forcing them to rely on dangerous routes or on knowingly embarking them on means of transportation destined to fail (Johansson, 2021). Smugglers with “Arab” or “African-ness” surnames are also consistently emphasized the single-handed perpetrators of the quite graphic (if by now rather prototypical) acts of violence migrants face (Alagna, 2020). There is in fact an overabundance of all-too detailed texts and images that allegedly seek to document the violence and abuse migrants experience on the migration pathway.

However, devoid of socio-political context and of migrants’ own perspectives, academic and policy depictions of suffering, racialized bodies on the migration pathway reduce migrant’s experience to voyeuristic representations of black and brown bodies victimized by no other than people like themselves. This in turn distracts the readers from engaging in a real critique of how migration controls, and in particular, counter-smuggling become operationalized against racialized groups, exempting states of responsibility over their roles at creating violent conditions for migrants.

The troubling nature of racialized depictions of violated black bodies becomes even more evident in the EU narratives concerning the forms of violence women encounter in the context of migration. The clear focus of academic and policy literature to document the forms of sexual violence on the migration pathway as afflicting only Black African women, constitutes a stark reminder of the way black African female bodies have been fetishized for centuries (Holmes, 2016). One must not forget how black bodies, and in particular those of women have historically been portrayed as both primitive and mysterious yet sexually available. In smuggling policy and research, the experiences of black African women on the migration pathway have been systematically reduced to a handful of highly sexualized and voyeuristic narratives. Most reports on smuggling and irregular migration in the Southern Mediterranean depict them as sexually available women, condemned to a life as sex workers, sexual slaves, or as the voiceless targets of smugglers’ uncontrollable libidos (UNODC, 2021b). Representations strip Black women of any agency or even intelligence, while simultaneously rendering the experiences of non-black woman virtually invisible.
The hyper-sexualization of black African female migrants in much of the academic and policy literature on smuggling reduces the possibility of readers to consider the complexity of women’s experiences in irregular migration, leading them to focus instead on voyeuristic representations of sexual violence and desire built around black bodies. At a time when gender is recognized as central to the migratory experience and a required component of migration-related analysis, the lack of engagement of academics and policy analysts with the way it is operationalized in smuggling, results in female migrants’ bodies being rendered ultimately as sexual objects only. The dynamics and complexities of survival, friendship, love, care and intimacy that are essential in the migratory journeys becoming trivialized (Vogt, 2018) for their fall out of line with colonial, imperialistic perceptions tied to women of colour as sexually available.

Where can we go from here? Certainly, one answer is not to give up and to continue questioning the impact of smuggling discourse and counter-smuggling policy and practice in communities within Europe and beyond. Another is to demand accountability of the impacts specific to EU counter-smuggling efforts. However, we must simultaneously remember smuggling and counter-smuggling strategies are not neutral in terms of race, class or gender. These are essential elements of the way in which irregular migration is experienced, but also of how it is managed and brought under control.
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The Southern Mediterranean Countries: Target and Motor of EU External Migration Policies

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The Southern Mediterranean neighbours are usually seen as a targets of EU migration policies. This is because of their geographical situation on the major transit routes, and because many migrants and asylum seekers originate from these countries. Partly due to the now three decades of EU external migration policy, the Maghreb and Mashreq countries have seen a rapid transformation from being countries of origin and transit for migrants to being destination countries themselves. To designate these countries only as targets would however be short-sighted. A look back onto the evolution of now three decades EU external migration policy towards the Southern Mediterranean countries highlights that developments in the region have very much shaped EU policy.

The responses that migration experts from these countries give to the EMM5-EuroMeSCO survey attest very well this changed reality, and the extent to which these experts perceive the migration policy challenges in their country in response to both EU priorities and their own needs. This short contribution reflects on the results of the survey in the light of the influence that cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries has had on the evolving EU external migration policies and the various instruments that have been put into place to structure the cooperation (summarized in the table below). In doing so, the article distinguishes three main phases in the EU’s external migration policies: the period from the early 1990s until the launch of the Global Approach to Migration in 2005, then the phase up to the revamped Global Approach to Migration and Mobility in 2011, and finally the latest period including the crisis of the Common European Asylum System and the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2020.
The initial impetus: migration control and readmission

The external dimension of EU migration policies was officially embraced with the Tampere European Council in 1999. However, EU-Mediterranean relations addressed migration policy well before. A look at the association agreements concluded with the southern neighbours from 1992 onwards (starting with Lebanon) shows that the EU systematically included provisions on migration control cooperation in these overarching agreements already well before the development of an external competence on the matter. Thus, the 1992 Agreement with Lebanon already provided for the launch of a dialogue on migration, including irregular migration, and cooperation on readmission. The Agreements concluded with Tunisia (1995) and Morocco (1996) also included a dialogue covering migration control but excluded cooperation on readmission and irregular migration. In contrast, they contain a clause on cooperation on migration and development and on the return of migrants. The 1997 agreement with Jordan and the 2002 agreement with Algeria finally are the most comprehensive and include all of these provisions (see Table 1 below and Lavenex, Lutz and Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2021).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Agreement</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue on migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation on readmission</td>
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<td>Cooperation on return of migrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation on irregular migration</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation on migration and development</td>
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<td>Regulatory dialogue on migration</td>
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</table>

TABLE 1: Overview of EU External Migration Policy Instrument towards the Southern Mediterranean Countries
The granting of an EU exclusive competence for the negotiation of readmission agreements in 1999 reinforced the focus on migration control and readmission (Coleman 1999). In 2000, the EU received the mandate to negotiate a readmission agreement with Morocco, and later also with other countries. The only Mediterranean country which has so far signed a readmission agreement with the EU however is Jordan (see Table 1). The main point of contention over the conclusion of readmission agreements is the EU’s enduring insistence on an obligation to take back also non-nationals of the signatory parties staying irregularly in the other party. Not only has such an obligation no basis in international law, it is also uniquely in the interest of the EU and would have potentially very costly implications for the Southern Mediterranean countries (Carrera et al. 2013).

Against this background the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCO survey provide interesting insights into the contested issue of readmission. Given the absence of a formal EU readmission agreement with all but one country it is not surprising that most experts indicate having no opinion regarding their “assessment of current cooperation on return and readmission with EU countries” (Q15), even if bilateral readmission agreements with individual EU countries exist.

GRAPH 1

Q.15 What is your assessment of current cooperation on return and readmission with EU countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb respondents</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashrek respondents</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet the responses show that Maghreb respondents are clearly more critical of this cooperation (24% having a very low and 16% a low opinion) than Mashreq respondents (only 7% indicating a very low and 18% a low opinion). Conversely, 39% of Mashreq respondents have a positive opinion compared to 14% of Maghreb respondents. A similar pattern can be observed in the answers to the question whether respondents consider “the full implementation of existing bilateral agreements on readmission and the negotiations of new ones” as an avenue to “improve cooperation on return and
reintegration” (Q18), which 56% of Mashrek respondents answer positively versus 37% of Maghreb respondents.

This difference is possibly linked to the fact that the only existing formal EU readmission agreement in the region so-far is that with Jordan, a Mashreq country. Another possible explanation which also affects other questions in the survey is the profile of respondents: the majority of Mashreq respondents are public officials who are more likely to utter response that are perceived as politically desirable than the civil society and academic experts who form the majority of Maghreb respondents.

The turn towards partnership

Difficulties with the negotiation of readmission agreements, enduring migration pressure in particular via the western Mediterranean route, and the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2005 inspired a reconsideration of the one-sided focus on irregular migration and readmission and today the – enduring – EU interest in readmission co-exists with other priorities in external migration cooperation. The tipping point to a policy reform was the escalation at the borders towards the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005. Media and NGO reports of Spanish and Moroccan authorities brutally deterring irregular migrants from climbing over the fences and later deporting them as well as other migrants and refugees to the Moroccan desert acted as an external shock and provoked a re-thinking of the repressive focus of prevailing external migration policies (Lavenex and Nellen-Stucky 2011). The reorientation came with the adoption of the “Global Approach to Migration”
(GAM, see COM(2007) 247) which stipulated a three-pronged approach including the fight against irregular migration, development cooperation and the promotion of legal migration as part of a comprehensive external migration policy.

The results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCO survey underscore partner countries’ strong interest in the legal migration and development cooperation aspects of the GAM. When asked “in which domains should cooperation with the EU be improved in priority” (Q20) the majority of respondents call for legal pathways to economic migration including “circular schemes of labour mobility”, “international skill/diploma recognition” while “preventing ‘brain drain’ and labour market distortions” (each receiving 18% of votes).

Theoretically, these priorities should have materialized under the EU’s “global approach” – in particular also after its reform in 2011 which launched “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” (GAMM, see COM (2011)743). This reform expanded the conclusion of so-called Mobility Partnerships that had previously been offered to a few Eastern European countries and Cape Verde to the Southern Mediterranean neighbours. As process-oriented fora for bilateral discussions
and cooperation between the EU, interested EU member states and selected ENP countries, the Mobility Partnerships were thought as promising vehicles for realizing the various objectives of the GAMM. To date, three Southern Mediterranean Countries have concluded Mobility Partnerships: Morocco (2013), Jordan and Tunisia (2014). Notwithstanding the interest in economic migration highlighted in the survey projects realized under the Mobility Partnerships fall short of introducing new legal pathways. On the contrary, they concentrate on measures receiving less support in the EMM5-EuroMeSCO survey, such as pre-departure training or labour market information sharing (see Q20) (Reslow 2018).

The challenge of refugee protection

Apart from widening the scope for Mobility Partnerships to the Mediterranean countries, the GAMM adopted in 2011 also reflected new priorities in the region. This concerns first and foremost the addition of refugee policy as a fourth element of the global approach next to cooperation on irregular migration, legal migration and development. If the GAM was a response to the shortcomings exemplified through the tragic events in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, its reformulation into the GAMM was a reaction to the massive displacements engendered by the Arab uprisings and subsequent wave of destabilization in the region.

The latest reforms of the EU’s external migration policy, the 2016 New Partnership Framework and the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum reflect these changed realities (Lavenex 2018, Carrera et al. 2019). Once more, these reforms responded to developments in the Southern Mediterranean, and in particular the refugee movements engendered by the war in Syria. While giving stronger priority to refugee protection in the region, these reforms moved away from the more process-oriented partnership approach of the GAMM. Marked by the failure of the Common European Asylum System and the deep divisions over the question of refugees within the Union, the new policies give a clear priority to the externalization of refugee protection and migration control. Calling for the mobilization of “the full range of policies and EU external relations instruments “ implementing “a mix of positive and negative incentives” using “all levers and tools” (European Commission 2016: 6), these latest reforms also introduce a strong language of conditionality.

An early example for this new cross-cutting approach are the “compacts” that were offered to Jordan and Lebanon in 2016 in which the EU offers trade facilitation (mainly a relaxation of rules of origin for exports) in exchange for these countries’ investment in the hosting of refugees including their integration into local labor markets. These compacts were flanked by ambitious funding instruments such as the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund) for Jordan and Lebanon.
For the Maghreb and other African countries the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was launched, and European Civil protection and humanitarian aid was stepped up (see table 1 and Lavenex and Fakhoury 2021).

The EMM5-EuroMeSCO survey highlights how serious the challenge of refugee policy has become in the Southern Mediterranean countries, and in particular in the Mashreq countries of Jordan and Lebanon. When asked about the main challenge their country is encountering while dealing with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced (Q3), 45% of Mashreq respondents indicate “addressing the basic needs (shelter, food, health)”, compared to 28% Maghreb respondents.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
This is the first priority for all experts surveyed, followed by the need to address the broader socio-economic impact the presence of these persons have on their country. Unlike the EU’s emphasis on access to local labour markets, the longer-term socio-economic integration of these persons is not perceived as a priority (only 10% resp. 6% of respondents). This reflects the fact that most Southern Mediterranean countries perceive the hosting of refugees as a temporary and primarily humanitarian issue and not as a long-term commitment (Fakhoury 2021). Meanwhile, the responses to the question “What do you expect from the EU to do or to do differently in order to help your country deal with forced displacement and assist those in need?” (Q7) underscore how much migration experts in the Southern Mediterranean countries share the concerns of a destination country.

The need for acting on the political and economic root causes in countries of origin is the first priority mentioned by over a third of respondents (34%). This concern is all the more important as most respondents indicate that they expect the causes of forced migration to intensify further in the future - both in their own country and elsewhere (Q8 and Q9).

The need for balance

Whether they like it or not, the Southern Mediterranean countries are today part and parcel of the EU’s expanding regime of migration control. In the thirty years of the EU’s evolving external migration policy, they have shifted from being primarily countries
Questions on what the EU could or should do in these countries to help them face their new immigration reality can therefore not be separated from the question of what the EU could or should do internally to contribute to a more humane and sustainable migration policy.

of emigration to being countries of transit and now being countries of destination themselves. Throughout this process, the Maghreb and Mashreq countries have not only been targets of EU action – developments in these countries have had an impact on all major reforms of the EU’s external migration policy (see also Okyay et al. 2020). As the responses to the EMM5-EuroMeSCO survey show, migration experts from these countries share many of the concerns we know from EU member states. With its invigorated focus on curbing unsolicited immigration and externalising refugee protection, the EU is not without influence on these developments. Questions on what the EU could or should do in these countries to help them face their new immigration reality can therefore not be separated from the question of what the EU could or should do internally to contribute to a more humane and sustainable migration policy.
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Developing Pathways for Legal Migration to Europe – Challenges for the Nearest Future

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Cooperation on labour migration between the European Union (EU) member states and partner countries in the Mediterranean has been predominantly based on bilateral agreements, including those relating to circular migration. This trend will most likely be continued, regardless of any dedicated solutions introduced at the EU level. If new EU initiatives such as Talent Partnerships are to complement and diversify the member states’ portfolios of legal measures, they have to take into account the needs of all sectors of the EU economy, including those which require low-skilled workforce. Still, no legal migration pathway, irrespective of its comprehensiveness, will work without an agile visa policy in place as well as strong and trusted implementing partners on the end of the sending countries.

Bilateral agreements as fruitful initiatives

Despite ongoing efforts to create European platforms for cooperation on labour migration with non-EU partner countries, in practice most EU member states prefer bilateral solutions on organising labour migration. In view of the fact that there has been little harmonisation of regulations governing the entry and stay of foreign workers in the EU, countries interested in cooperation on labour migration often decide to conclude various types of formal bilateral agreements or less formal documents, such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (ILO, 2017).

As reflected in the answers to the EMM5-EuroMeSCo survey “Towards sustainable and mutually beneficial migration partnerships in the Southern Mediterranean” (Q.19), these are significant tools also for countries of origin. When asked about the
most fruitful initiative in the area of labour mobility cooperation with the EU and EU member states, some respondents from Morocco pointed out “Moroccan women workers in agricultural fields in Spain”. Such travels abroad, in particular to work in the strawberry harvest, have been organised in the framework of the Morocco-Spain Agreement on Labour of 25 July 2001. The agreement permits thousands of seasonal Moroccan workers – so-called temporeras – to support the annual harvest in Spain, and especially in Huelva province. Surprisingly, the agreement was indicated as a fruitful initiative despite the alleged violations of workers’ rights and sexual abuse (Gianaris, 2020; women’s link worldwide, 2019), although some respondents noted that “working conditions should be improved”.

A related initiative mentioned in the context of organising seasonal migration to Spain was the Framework Partnership Agreement between the Moroccan National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC, Agence Nationale de Promotion de l’Emploi et des Compétences) and the Municipality of Cartaya of July 2006. The agreement had its origins in the 2005 project of Cartaya, one of the main strawberry-producing villages in the province of Huelva, called “Comprehensive and Ethical Management for Circular Migration” (Aeneas-Cartaya) and funded by the European Commission (EC). With this project Cartaya proposed to take a leading role in the establishment of a system to manage the flow of temporary labour between the province of Huelva and Morocco. The project, which lasted from late 2005 to mid-2008, facilitated issuing of more than 21,000 work and residence permits for seasonal workers (González Enríquez, 2013, p. 129).

In case of Tunisia the respondents pointed out as fruitful initiatives the agreements signed with Germany following the 2011 revolution when both countries began to look for new opportunities to promote labour mobility to meet their employment needs (ILO, 2017, p. 24). The agreements signed to date by both countries concern especially the health and technological sectors. In addition to that, the need for suitable solutions facilitating circular migration between Tunisia and the EU was also underlined.

Responses provided by the surveyed representatives of the government, civil society and academia from Morocco and Tunisia indicate the importance of initiatives related to organising circular migration. Yet, the legal solutions adopted in the EU completely ignore provisions which may stimulate circular migration. The exception is the seasonal directive (Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers), where some elements aimed at promoting this type of migration can be found. This presumably reinforces even more the willingness of the countries concerned to introduce bilateral solutions.
Noteworthy, none of the answers provided by respondents from Morocco and Tunisia referred to migration and mobility partnerships concluded by those countries with the EU and its member states (Morocco – in 2013, Tunisia – in 2014) (European Commission, 2013, 2014). Main objectives of the partnerships, as stated in the adopted documents, were to organise legal migration, to effectively fight against irregular immigration and to work towards strengthening the positive effects of migration. Regarding the implementation, the main focus has been, however, on the fight against irregular migration, while the objective of facilitating legal migration of third-country nationals in the EU was effectively neglected.

Significantly, respondents from such countries as Algeria, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Jordan had difficulties in naming fruitful initiatives on labour migration with the EU or its member states. The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and its ambitious Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa” (THAMM) programme¹ were mentioned. The latter lasts from late 2019 to late 2022 and thus was difficult to evaluate at the moment of conducting the survey.

Talent Partnerships – a remedy for current ills?

In June 2021 Talent Partnerships were launched under the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum as a key initiative to enhance legal pathways to the EU. The aim of the effort, as stated by the EC, is “to provide a comprehensive policy framework, as well as funding support to boost mutually beneficial international mobility based on better matching of labour market needs and skills between the EU and partner countries” (European Commission (a)). Talent Partnerships are planned to be open to students, graduates and skilled workers. Their main idea is to match job offers in EU countries with skills of migrant workers. They will be modelled on existing pilot projects under the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) and the above-mentioned THAMM programme.

The expectations towards Talent Partnerships on the end of sending countries are mainly that those instruments would generate domestic market opportunities through creation and development of businesses, enhance the transfer of professional qualifications, skills and experience abroad and foster potential for international networks and supply chains through diaspora linkages (Q.21).

Q.21 Talent partnerships is a paradigm that the EU wants to pursue as a channel to support legal migration and mobility cooperation with your country. In your opinion, what could be the main benefits for your country?

- Generate domestic market opportunities through business creation and development: 31%
- Enhance the transfer of professional qualifications, skills and experience acquired abroad: 26%
- Foster potential for international networks and supply chains through diaspora linkages: 14%
- Improve vocational training and build capacities of related institutions: 9%
- I do not think that talent partnerships constitute a conducive framework for better cooperation in the field of legal mobility: 5%
- Other: 1%
- I have no particular views: 13%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

They are largely coherent with the responses to the question on priority domains of existing cooperation with the EU on legal migration, which according to the survey should be improved (Q.20) – except for one: “circular schemes of labour mobility” (see graph 2). As such schemes can to relate to high skilled workers, most frequently they facilitate mobility of low-skilled migrants, including to the farming sector. In fact, many migrants in the EU are now employed in low-skilled professions, and Talent Partnerships – an instrument which is not addressed to this group – will have to face the challenge of matching demand in sectors requiring such workforce.
At the same time, the analysis of the survey responses indicates a pressing need to operationalise Talent Partnerships and to provide partner countries with a more comprehensive information on this instrument. Indeed, when asked about initiatives which could improve cooperation on developing pathways for legal migration to Europe beyond Talent Partnerships (Q. 22), many respondents pointed out ideas and actions that could potentially be included in the Talent Partnerships package. They included: training, youth mobility, exchange of information on market needs, “offering job opportunities”, “improving the transfer of professional qualifications”, etc.

This “operationalisation” is again dependant on the member states’ willingness and ability to invest in Talent Partnerships and related long-term projects. As exemplified by the implementation of migration and mobility partnerships and the experiences of MPF, only a narrow group of EU states have been interested in developing larger initiatives with partner countries, while some have not been able to take up such initiatives.

The implementation of migration and mobility partnerships and the experiences of the MPF [shows that] only a narrow group of EU states has been interested in developing larger initiatives with partner countries.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
endeavours due to structural shortcomings of their administrations (e.g. lack of staff experienced in project development and management, lengthy procedures etc.).

Talent Partnerships would allow, however, to tailor the offer to differentiated needs and expectations of partner countries. When considering the groups of the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, the survey indeed revealed differences in relation to the priority areas of cooperation and expected benefits from Talent Partnerships.

Beyond Talent Partnerships

One of the areas which impede the mobility of migrant workers is still the visa policy and related rigid and complex procedures. Although research results unequivocally confirm that a (Neumayer, 2011, p. 901–907), the EU visa regime remains quite strict. Its effectiveness is further undermined by the divergent visa practices of member states (which retain in parallel the right to issue national visas), stringent requirements and a lack of alignment with the economic needs. Additionally, the expenses related to applying for a visa and the high price of its issue increase the cost of travel for all third-country nationals. Noteworthy, the EU visa policy was the common issue for respondents when asked about initiatives which would develop legal pathways to the EU other than Talent Partnerships (Q. 22), with respondents from Algeria being the most vocal group on that matter.

Other responses related to support for civil society, engagement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and actions towards cultural rapprochement. The postulates expressed in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the area of social, cultural and human partnership – such as cultural exchanges, knowledge of other languages, implementation of educational and cultural programmes – are thus still valid for the partners in third counties. Democratisation programmes which intend to promote the rule of law, human rights, transparency and fairness of elections, the development of free media, the building of civil society and encouraging wide citizens’ participation in public affairs are no less important. Implementation of any project under MPF or prospect Talent Partnership would require the involvement of various stakeholders in the country of origin. The stronger they are and the more stable and transparent the political and legal environment is, the more chances for success.

Last but not least, respondents from partner countries highlighted the need to invest in education and training in the countries of origin. This could be done, among others, through the involvement of South Mediterranean counties in Erasmus+ projects.
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Employment and Social Cohesion in the Context of Forced Displacement: The Cases of Jordan and Lebanon

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Introduction

The Mashreq region has experienced an unforeseen level of forced displacement since the onset of the Syria crisis in 2011. Economic downturn, political instability and rising social tensions in Iraq, Gaza and Yemen have only added to the number of women, men and children fleeing conflict. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 7.8 million refugees and asylum seekers fled the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region between 2010-2020, alongside an estimated 2.9 million persons who have become internally displaced each year (IDMC, 2021). Jordan and Lebanon host some of the largest numbers of refugees in the region, having jointly received an estimated 2.8 million refugees from Syria (UNHCR, 2021, Government of Jordan 2020). While the two countries were not in a socio-economic position to receive such large numbers of refugees, their geographical locations, cultural similarities, and openness made them destinations for many.

Lebanon, in particular, has experienced multiple crises in recent years, including the collapse of the financial sector, an economic crisis, political instability, the harsh consequences of COVID-19, and the blast that hit the country’s capital in 2020. While Jordan has maintained its socio-economic and political stability, it has nonetheless
experienced rising levels of unemployment, increasing pressure on public services and the inevitable economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both countries are also facing reductions in international humanitarian assistance for displaced populations, as part of the general trend towards investment in development.

With mounting domestic concerns, Jordan and Lebanon have both instituted regulatory frameworks that aim to control access to the formal labour market for non-nationals, including refugees. While the levels of restrictions vary, both stem from the stark reality of strained economies and high levels of unemployment. Economic circumstances have powerful influence over the willingness and ability of host communities to accommodate the displaced. The survey carried out by EMM5-EuroMeSCo highlights the most commonly perceived challenges of host communities. Unsurprisingly, these include the inability of host countries to cover the basic needs of displaced populations, while also providing for their own citizens. Survey respondents also perceive the international community as having a responsibility to respond not only to the needs of displaced populations, but also to the pre-existing weaknesses of the countries that host them.

### GRAPH 1

**Q.3 What is the main challenge that your country encounters while dealing with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressing the basic needs (shelter, food, health) of migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing the broader socio-economic impact of the presence of forcibly displaced in the country</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government compliance with legal obligations (including international and national law on refugee protection)</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic integration of forcibly displaced</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing emergency situations</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensions between forcibly displaced and hosting communities</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative management including refugee registration</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onward resettlement to third countries</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no particular views on this matter</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
This article analyses the perceptions of host communities expressed in the EMM5-EuroMeSCo survey, against the labour market realities of Jordan and Lebanon. It further considers the use of international trade and investment opportunities to address underlying development challenges in main host countries, while also acknowledging their limitations. Finally, it draws some conclusions and presents a set of recommendations to address the short- and long-term impact of forced displacement crisis in Lebanon and Jordan.

Socio-economic and labour market challenges

When compared to surrounding countries, both Jordan and Lebanon are resource poor. Their economies lack diversification and are primarily driven by the services sector as opposed to high value-added production and, as such, have failed to create labour demand and generate large numbers of jobs. In Lebanon, the labour market has considerable deficits in the quality of work, underutilization of labour, and high rates of informality. According to an ILO Diagnostics Assessment in 2020, “some 55 percent of all workers in Lebanon were informally employed in 2018–19, prior to the COVID-19 crisis” (ILO, 2021).

The situation is bleaker amongst disadvantaged groups. A recently published survey that was carried out in Lebanon by the ILO with support from the Ford Foundation revealed significant rates of unemployment and informality among both displaced populations and vulnerable host community members. Just 22.2 per cent of the population surveyed reported formal employment, and notable differences emerged between Lebanese and Syrian refugee respondents (ILO, 2021). Ninety-five per cent of Syrians were in informal employment, while the figure was 64.3 per cent (still considerably high) for vulnerable Lebanese. This was highest among youth of both refugee and non-refugee backgrounds.¹

While the overall macroeconomic situation is less dire in Jordan, job-poor growth and skills mismatches have manifested themselves in poor labour market outcomes, particularly for youth. Despite extensive efforts by the government and international community to address labour market challenges, youth unemployment has remained persistently high and has even increased in recent years, reaching 37.3% (amongst youth aged 15-24) compared to 30.9% in 2015 (ILO STAT, 2021).

¹ 91.9 per cent for those 15-24, and 65.3 per cent for those 25 and above. Furthermore, an alarming 62.3 per cent of youth in the sample were not in employment, education or training (NEET).
International Response

It is well recognized that the vast majority of the world’s refugees are hosted in low or middle-income countries. Jordan and Lebanon have two of the highest rates of refugees per capita in the world (UNHCR, 2020). However, these countries also have few resources at their disposal to provide for displaced persons, while also securing adequate standards of living for citizens.

The concept of responsibility sharing is premised by the idea that the consequence of geography should not dictate the load individual countries have to shoulder in response to displacement crisis. This is traditionally seen in the allocation of humanitarian assistance from countries in the global North, to those hosting larger numbers of refugees. Nonetheless, internationally financed humanitarian assistance to host countries has diminished as displacement crises have become protracted. Instead, international investments have been increasingly redirected to spark economic growth in the host countries. Agreements that provide concessional trade and finance have been leveraged as such mechanisms. For example, the European Union and Jordan leveraged the European Free Trade Agreement and relaxation of the Rules of Origin to try to generate jobs for displaced persons by increasing export opportunities.

However, the experience of the Rules of Origin scheme in Jordan demonstrated the limitations of such indirect approaches to addressing displacement. The logic skips the underlying macroeconomic weaknesses that determine job poor growth. Leaving structural challenges aside, the impact of such investments remains limited. Without tangible benefits - in this case job creation and export opportunities - perceptions that international actors fail to meet the needs of host communities and live-up to commitments are bound to persist.

Perceptions and Responses of Host Communities

Extensive research has been conducted in host countries to better understand the impact of forced displacement on social cohesion. Higher rates of unemployment have been found to be linked to lower levels of social cohesion. They also drive a lack of trust among social groups, as well as perceptions of social injustice and exclusion (ILO, UNDP, PMSO, World Bank, 2016). While Syrian refugees share cultural similarities to their neighbors in Jordan and Lebanon, dwindling resources have generated social tensions.
This is further reflected in the different responses between Jordan and Lebanon in the EMM5-EuroMeSCo survey. Unsurprisingly, with the continuously worsening socio-economic situation in Lebanon and ensuing rise in both income and multidimensional poverty reaching an unprecedented 74% and 82% in 2021, respectively (ESCWA, 2021), Lebanese respondents were more likely to report the greatest challenge as meeting basic needs. While no Jordanian respondents noted tensions with forcibly displaced populations, 17% of Lebanese respondents reported this as a main challenge (EMM5-EuroMeSCo, 2021). Those from Jordan on the other hand assigned greater importance to addressing broader socio-economic challenges. When asked what the international community should specifically do, a respondent in Jordan placed value on “interventions that help the livelihood of the communities and women in particular.”

The EMM5-EuroMeSCo survey also shows that host communities expect direct support from the international community to boost their economies and support their societies, but do not necessarily perceive that this has been sufficiently delivered. Jordanian and Lebanese respondents acknowledged support provided specifically
from the European Union, but for reasons of internal governance, spending had not necessarily had an impact. This is particularly evident in the justifications provided by Lebanese respondents, who see little capacity to receive and channel such support. One Lebanese respondent noted that “chaos dominates,” and the “EU is lost among the complicated Lebanese rules pertaining to refugees” (EMMS-EuroMeSCo, 2021).

The quality of jobs should also be at the forefront of discussion, as it has been an issue of concern prior to the displacement crisis. Decent employment can provide income and reduce stressors that risk creating an “us vs. them” scenario. One positive example of enhancing decent work through investment in trade and development is the explicit reference to the ILO in the relaxed Rules of Origin scheme. In this scenario, ILO is responsible for monitoring and advising firms certified to export to the European Union, to improve their compliance with decent work principles.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in the context of forced displacement and support to host countries, foreign investments have increasingly been earmarked for economic growth. While focus has shifted to a development perspective, and increasingly away from a humanitarian approach, both have important roles to play. Humanitarian and development stakeholders can work together to address pressing and immediate needs, while equally investing in upstream, policy interventions that build a foundation for longer-term change. Specifically, such interventions need to be grounded in broader macroeconomic reforms and comprehensive national employment policies that promote more diversified economies and create decent jobs for all in host countries.

Several new initiatives aimed to leverage the strengths of the humanitarian and development sectors are starting to bear fruit in creating a more enabling environment for sustainable livelihoods in displacement contexts. The PROSPECTS partnership, spearheaded by the Government of the Netherlands, is one such example, that brings together the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the ILO, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Bank to devise approaches for inclusive job creation, education and protection in the context of forced displacement².

At the heart of the success of such initiatives lies the importance of responsiveness to actual needs in the host countries, while ensuring that both vulnerable host communities and refugees benefit from these interventions equally. Many other examples of programmes implemented to operationalize the humanitarian-

² The PROSPECTS partnership is implemented across eight countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Horn of Africa.
development-peace nexus (HDPN) exist, including in the Arab region. Improved cohesion and solidarity occurs when communities of concern feel their voices are heard, and needs addressed. The humanitarian sector cannot be absent in such contexts, when acute needs require immediate responses, while development actors provide insight to set countries on an inclusive and socially just development trajectory.

3 One such mechanism introduced in the Arab region is the HDPN Issue Based Coalition (IBC) established in 2020 by the Regional UNDG group. The main task of this IBC is to provide a platform for sharing research, tools, and experiences on the operationalization of the HDPN in the Arab countries. One initiative that the HDPN IBC in Arab States is considering to pilot for its own members and later on for the broader stakeholders is the global UN Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Dialogue Group Nexus Academy initiative.
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Turning the Euro-Moroccan Tide: A Reappraisal of Migration Cooperation beyond Existing Areas of Engagement

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In February 2021, the European Commission launched the New Agenda for the Mediterranean on a Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood. The motto that runs through the fabric of this agenda is a cooperation that is premised on “tailor-made comprehensive, balanced and mutually beneficial partnerships” (European Commission, 2021). Apropos the EU’s migration cooperation with southern neighbours, Morocco holds the largest migration portfolio in North Africa and has long-standing relations with EU countries (Hadji, 2021; M’hamdi, 2021). Yet as the year of 2021 draws to a close, the EU-Moroccan migration cooperation has been in the doldrums—starting with the diplomatic logjam between Spain and Morocco in May to the more recent move by France in halving the number of visas for Moroccans (Ferdaoussi, 2021). Similar measures have been taken against Algeria and Tunisia—presented as a punitive response to the countries’ alleged refusal to facilitate the return of their undocumented nationals from France (Bloomberg, 2021). To be sure, this simmering geopolitical scenario reignited the as yet unsettled EU-Moroccan negotiations over the joint agreement of readmission and visa-facilitation, which were suspended by Morocco in 2015.

Though negotiations over a readmission agreement with Morocco started in the 2000s, it was not until the two parties signed the Mobility Partnership (MP) in 2013 that visa facilitation policy gained momentum (Carrera et al., 2016). This policy instrument is regularly criticised as a mere bargaining chip meant to foster greater migration...
cooperation from southern neighbours, by offering a relaxation of visa restrictions and developing legal pathways through the launch of Talent Partnerships (TPs).

In October 2021, a draft of the European Commission’s Action Plan on migration was leaked, revealing the urgent need of maintaining a “partnership of equals” with Morocco through “dialogue, responsibility sharing, mutual trust, and respect”. Owing to its geopolitical importance and longstanding cooperation, Morocco is considered by the EU as “a key partner in the shared challenge of preventing and tackling irregular migration, countering the smuggling of migrants, and thereby saving lives”. The existing areas of cooperation listed in the Commission’s draft include (1) asylum and support to the hosting countries, (2) addressing the root causes of migration, (3) migration governance and management, (4) cooperation with EU agencies, (5) the joint agreement of readmission and visa facilitation, (6) legal mobility and regional, (7) south-south migration cooperation.

How Does the EU-Moroccan Migration Cooperation Look Like Up-close?

As to asylum and protection in host countries, the EU encourages Morocco to adopt pending legislations with regards to asylum and human trafficking. It promised to strengthen the Moroccan National Strategy of Immigration and Asylum (SNIA) with “operational support” and “capacity building” provided by the European Asylum Support Office (now ‘European Union Agency for Asylum’), aiming to foster better integration of migrants stranded in Morocco and as well as the reintegration of Moroccan migrant returnees. 15,755 refugees and asylum seekers are registered with UNCHR from more than 48 countries in Morocco (UNCHR, 2021). And yet law enforcement frameworks to process applications have not been put place since the launch of SNIA. In December 2021, migrant communities and activists sent a memorandum to the recently elected government, wherein they underline the legal and socio-economic conditions of migrants and refugees. In particular, they urge the government to adopt the legal arsenal on asylum and immigration and racial discrimination provided by SNIA (ENASS, 2022). The development of a legal arsenal for national asylum was dedicated a budget of €35 million under the support programme MFF 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2021b). Reforms included in the SNIA should amend the discrepancies that pose legal hurdles for migrants to renew their residence permits (particularly law no. 02-03), as well as the promulgation of specific laws that penalize racial discrimination and those that ensure the socio-economic integration of vulnerable migrants, including women and children.

On the emigration aspect, 8,421 arrivals from Morocco to Spain and Canary Islands were registered on a yearly basis as early as August 2021, compared to 5,709 in the same period of 2020. As of September 2021, 6,775 applications for asylum have
been lodged by Moroccan nationals (European Commission, 2021b). This trend places Morocco among the 10 main origin countries in the EU, most of which are war-torn. To address the root causes of clandestine migration, the EU offers to support “the migration legislative and institutional framework of Morocco,” promoting social inclusion, reducing socio-economic disparities at the regional level, enhancing employability of the Moroccan diaspora and migrants settling in Morocco. For instance, the ENABEL-implemented programme ‘Déploiement des politiques migratoires au niveau régional’ was awarded a budget of €8 million under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (2018-2022) to tackle these objectives.

A partnership that is premised on real institutional democracy, rule of law and creation of socio-economic opportunities for desperate youth is a promising instrument to tackle clandestine migration. While these areas of engagement are important, most of the funding disbursed to address and redress the root causes of irregular migration is handled by European organizations, giving short shrift to local civil society and migrant communities who have direct influence on the lives of vulnerable migrants. It is the onus of Morocco to ensure the socio-economic welfare of its citizens all the same. As revealed in the Commission’s draft, a total of €21.1 million is allocated to these programmes, while €144 million is allocated to the border management package alone. This imbalance reflects the persistent tendency of the EU to keep the ‘migration problem’ at bay. The externalization of the EU border control, along with the readmission of migrants from all EU Member states, purports that the most controversial responsibilities in the areas of migration management will keep being shifted to international partners such as Morocco (Lemberg-Pedersen et al., 2021). In principle, this approach contradicts the motto of “partnership of equals”, while it may also result in grave violations of international and EU law, notably illegal pushbacks which are covertly orchestrated by border patrols and southern neighbouring countries (EPRS, 2021).

Fostering Migration Cooperation beyond Existing Bilateral Agreements

Morocco has signed readmission agreements with Spain, Germany and France. The Commission’s draft wishes that Morocco would sign readmission agreements with all EU Member States. While countries have legal obligations under international law to readmit their nationals, the EU’s insistence to include a clause relating to the readmission TCNs has frozen negotiations and caused deep friction with Morocco. On this aspect, Morocco seems unwilling to compromise its engagement vis-à-vis African partners to satisfy European interests. It is important to note that Morocco’s migration policies are driven primarily by diplomatic considerations, counterbalancing the geopolitical interests of its traditional African allies, on the one hand, and its domestic interests on the other hand (Norman, 2020).
This joint agreement is far from being cost-effective for Morocco due to its unfair share of responsibilities, and EU efforts on the readmission of TCNs are likely to fall short of an all-encompassing agreement. For a start, Morocco is home to at least 40,000 West African migrants, not to mention the ever-fluctuating number of those transiting its territory to enter Europe. Besides being subject to socio-economic exclusion and structured illegality, West African migrants are victims of racial discrimination which remain unsanctioned in Morocco, given the incomplete adoption of law enforcement frameworks of the SNIA. As such, the readmission of TCNs contributes to intensify this xenophobic trend and results in further racial tensions. These trends of containment and abandonment are amplified by the rampant racism against black migrants in Morocco even after the latter’s New Migration Policy reforms (Gross-Wrytzen, 2020). Furthermore, the sensationalist media coverage of black migrants in Morocco favours xenophobic representations in the public discourse.

The joint communication of the European Commission all the more stressed the importance of exploring south-south cooperation in migration governance. However, cooperation with African southern neighbours in migration governance may negatively affect Morocco’s overall engagement on the continent. More worryingly, the EU’s failure to systematically conclude agreements with countries of origin suggests that all West African migrants transiting through Morocco face limited prospects of being taken back to their countries of origin (Abderrahim, 2021). Indeed, as the situation in the Western Mediterranean keeps drawing policy-makers’ attention (Frontex, 2018), it is likely EU pressure on Morocco to ensure border control and cooperate on TCNs will remain high. Long-term reception of TCNs demands solid institutional, legal and infrastructural frameworks, which Morocco can barely provide to fix the socio-economic ills of its nationals (Carrera et al., 2016).

The findings of the survey conducted by the EMM5-EuroMeSCos show that 46% Moroccan respondents consider the absence of policy instruments on return and reintegration as the stumbling-block for Euro-Moroccan cooperation. Along with these legal infrastructures, 31% of Moroccan respondents consider the weak socio-economic infrastructures no less an issue to Euro-Moroccan cooperation in terms of readmission of nationals and TCNs alike. Furthermore, while 34% of Moroccan respondents suggest that the EU support to Morocco should be directed towards post-return reintegration assistance in the country, only 4% of respondents consider capacity building for local authorities responsible for voluntary return programmes as needful of EU support.

What we glean from such metrics is that it is far-fetched to believe Morocco can effectively assume the role of the ‘waiting room’ of Europe’s gated communities in light of such infrastructural absence. The EU should reconsider its cooperation with Morocco in migration governance through humane and democratic policy instruments.
that are sketched out in the Joint Communication on the renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood. While only 12% of Moroccan respondents assessed the Euro-Moroccan cooperation on return and reintegration as positive, 28% of respondents consider it as negative. A balanced and mutually beneficial Euro-Moroccan migration partnership should go beyond the existing agreements that rely solely on financial assistance and unequal division of responsibilities.

Meanwhile, it is noteworthy to weigh the incentives of the visa facilitation against the structural challenges arising from the readmission of TCNs. Safe and orderly migration through visa facilitation favours primarily skilled labour, thus benefiting exclusively the privileged citizens who are already internationally mobile. As such, it is unclear how such policy instrument will gain traction in the case of Morocco.
This implies that disfranchised social categories in Morocco will not benefit from such policy instruments and might keep envisaging clandestine channels to enter Europe. As such, while the EU has been successful in deploying visa facilitation as a negotiation incentive with Turkey, such incentive is less popular within Morocco (El Qadim, 2018). As evidenced by the EMM5-EurMeSCo public survey, 50% of Mashrek respondents assessed the visa-facilitation negotiation mechanism as effective, whereas only 31% of Moroccan respondents are positive about it. Along with the financial and logistical resources, visa facilitation is far from being an enticing incentive for Morocco when weighed against the otherwise burdensome repercussions of acceding to the EU’s demand of TCNs readmission.

Redressing Migration Governance: Steering Euro-Moroccan Cooperation away from Security-driven Approaches

The stringent border control that followed the outbreak of the pandemic reshuffled the entire migratory landscape. New migratory trends keep arising, with distinctive patterns of mobility for families, women and unaccompanied minors from Morocco, sub-Saharan Africa and further afield, which have been propelled by the contingency of the pandemic. Such trends in North Africa have brought the EU’s counter-smuggling policy in North Africa under critical scrutiny (Sanchez, 2020; Sanchez et al., 2021, Fakhry, 2021). Whilst migrants fall prey to acts of violence, threats and scams at the hands of smugglers, a copious body of literature challenges the moral economy attached to smuggling, moving...
away from the dominant Western narratives that peg smugglers as villains, criminals and law-breakers (Achilli, 2018; Brachet, 2018; Achilli et al., 2019; Zhang, 2019).

Similar narratives surround the EU’s counter-trafficking policy, producing polarised discourses of vulnerability and criminality (Serughetti, 2018; Tyszler, 2020; Ferdaoussi, 2020). These stacks of literature contest ill-informed policy studies with little to no empirical evidence to support claims of existing nexus between smuggling, crime and terrorism. Forced and clandestine migration is driven by socio-economic and stability factors, as is evidenced by the findings of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo survey. 79% of Moroccan respondents suggest that lack of economic prospects as the main driver of Europe-bound Moroccans, 69% of the same respondents consider political instability as the main driver of sub-Saharan migrants transiting through Morocco.

### GRAPH 3

Q.8 What is the main driver of outwards irregular migration from your country? (Moroccan respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict or instability</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining family/relatives living abroad</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of climate change</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no particular views on this matter</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

Sub-Saharan migrants transiting through Morocco undergo double displacement, induced by a combination of lack of economic prospects and political instability.

Indeed, the abrupt socio-economic repercussions that followed nationwide lockdowns have had a clear effect in terms of border crossings. The resurgence of community-based migration propelled a large number of migrants to engage in auto-smuggling of their friends and families, with no criminal or lucrative intentions whatsoever. In fact, turning to clandestine means is the last resort for North Africans who have been...
denied a visa and are distrusting of the EU member states’ claims of encouraging regular, safe and orderly migration (Capasso, 2021). Sub-Saharan migrants transiting through Morocco undergo double displacement, induced by a combination of lack of economic prospects and political instability.

Quite recently, a dozen of West African countries have witnessed a comeback of military coups, harking back to the ‘coup culture’ of the 1970s (Campbell, 2021). A large number of sub-Saharan migrants are forced to escape such politically unstable contexts, and many of them transit through or sojourn in Morocco before reaching Europe. As part of the EU’s externalization strategies, indiscriminate clampdowns on sub-Saharan migrants by authorities, sometimes by local communities, fuel racism and result in the expulsion and dispersal of vulnerable groups such as women and children. Although these measures set out to combat smuggling and trafficking networks, little substantial evidence has been brought forward.
Addressing the root causes of forced displacements should be the centerpiece of the EU’s cooperation area with transit and origin countries. Without such a step Mediterranean neighbours, including Morocco, will not assume the responsibilities of countries of origin, nor will they be able to cooperate with them, given their own ongoing political turbulence. More than that, the EU would benefit from reconsidering its approach to cooperation assistance. Fostering multi-level governance of urban migration by building capacities of local authorities, NGOs and migration communities through resources and legal competences should be a priority in this regard, since they are stakeholders who have more tangible impact on the lives of vulnerable migrants. This strategy is more likely to bear fruit than the current focus on security-driven programmes.
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Migration Governance in Algeria: Challenges, Interests and Future Prospects

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Introduction

In EU migration dynamics, Algeria holds a significant role as a departure, transit and destination country. It has maintained its national approach to address what constitute shifting migration dynamics during the recent decade. Algeria has also been confronted by a range of migratory challenges, ranging from irregular migration, forced displacement, and brain drain. The current context requires Algeria to step out of its comfort zone and establish sustainable and strategic cooperation with neighbouring countries (i.e., sub-Saharan countries) as well as the European states. This article provides an assessment of the current migratory framework of Algeria. It also highlights the priorities, interests and future promising realms of cooperation in line with the Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. This aims to inform and set ahead migration dialogue with the EU for a future mutually beneficial and sustainable partnership. The article draws on the findings of the survey “Towards sustainable and mutually beneficial migration partnerships in the Southern Mediterranean” launched within the framework of the project “EuroMeSCo: Connecting the dots”, led by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and the “EUROMED Migration V” project, coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).
Algeria’s policy position

Despite being a significant actor in the region, Algeria’s engagement regarding migration with the EU remains very limited. The country’s migration profile has shifted in the recent two decades and it is no longer solely a country of departure: it has become a transit and highly attractive destination. The outbreak of the conflict in Mali and Libya has also triggered further displacement and change in the patterns of migration (Musette & Khaled, 2012). Overall, there is a strong deficit in terms of the evidence-based data and statistics on migration into and from Algeria.

Algeria remains of particular interest to the European Union member states regarding migration governance. However, the EU has not been successful in constructively engaging Algeria in migration management cooperation. Algeria signed the Association Agreement in April 2002 with the EU that entered into force in September 2005. This agreement sets out a framework for the EU-Algeria relationship in all areas including trade. Algeria has also been part of the Valletta Summit between the EU and the AU as from its Action Plan (2015). It has failed to meet the recommendations under the framework of the Trust Fund and the African Union Protocol on the Free Movement of People (2018) (Boubakri et al., 2021) and there is a lack of transparency on what has been implemented so far from these agreements particularly concerning the issue of migration.

In fact, Algeria has not engaged in any structural reforms of its migration governance strategy. Rather, it has opted for an autonomous approach to migration governance. In other words, its approach is based on the national policy implemented by its ministerial departments, yet this approach suffers from inconsistency and less systematic coordination among the different sectors in charge of migration management (Boubakri et al., 2021).

The public survey conducted highlights key areas of migration policy. Algerian respondents place countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations or forcibly displaced persons at the forefront of migration policy for Algeria. It is also worth mentioning, that border management as well as fostering and strengthening regular migration and mobility are considered key areas of migration policy.
The current challenge impeding this new phase of cooperation with the EU as well as other regional states is to mutually identify the orientation of this new partnership. The remaining challenge for Algeria is that there is currently both a repressive and indifferent approach towards migration that disregards the complex composition of the migration flows and adopts a securitisation perspective that considers irregular migration a threat to the national order. It is also more likely that Algeria will prefer to manage migration outside any legal or institutional framework. Ultimately, this approach is less effective at managing migration flows while nurturing serious concerns in terms of migrants’ fundamental rights (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).

Irregular migration

Given the current devastating socio-economic and political situation in Algeria compounded by the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank, 2020) which...
blurred the future of youth in the country, irregular migration is quite likely to continue. Additionally, Algerian nationals face increasing difficulties to secure legal pathways to migration. Despite efforts to travel and provide all necessary documents during visa processes, Algerians – particularly young Algerian men – are systematically denied visas (Sanchez et al., 2021). The EU’s visa facilitation agreements remained less satisfying for the Algerian partner. This has in part led to an increase in the irregular departures from Algeria towards Spain and Italy (TSA, 2021).

The findings of the survey show that the main driver of outward irregular migration from Algeria is the lack of socioeconomic perspectives, while conflict and instability are the main trigger factor for irregular migration from the sub-Saharan countries and West and Central Africa.

GRAPH 2
Q.8 What is the main driver of outwards irregular migration from your country? (Algerian respondents)

- Lack of socio-economic perspectives: 70%
- Conflict or instability: 56%
- Joining family/relatives living abroad: 19%
- Impact of climate change: 7%
- I have no particular views on this matter: 4%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMMS-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey
The Algerian authorities found their policy arsenal on irregular migration by introducing a repressive law that aims to regularise the entry and exit of foreign nationals. To counter irregular migration, the state adopted Law 08-11 in June 2008, which criminalises the irregular migration of both its citizens as well as foreign nationals (Journal Officiel, 2008; Souiah, 2016). Overstaying is also considered a crime and subject to expulsion from the Algerian territory. Irregular migrants, mostly from Central and West Africa represent an important labour force in Algeria. However, there are little or no instruments in place for them to regularise their status or secure work permits. The migrants find themselves living under a constant threat of deportation to the southern borders of Algeria and reports have alerted on the critical human rights implications of such practices (Arrouche, forthcoming, Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).

The implications of the pandemic of COVID-19 on the fragile Algerian economy impose a further burden on the government to ensure economic recovery. According to the survey findings, irregular migration is more likely to continue.

**GRAPH 3**

Q.9 In relation with the main driver you identified in Q.8, why is irregular migration likely to continue to increase for migrants transiting through your country? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and insatisfaction with government</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of future perspectives among youth</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity of violent conflicts/ political instability</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

Furthermore, West and Central African migration to Algeria is more likely to increase also due to the instability and conflicts, lack of economic opportunities and gloomy outlook, corruption and discontent with governments in the region. A fundamental factor that has not been raised in the survey results and requires a timely and serious consideration is climate change. According to the World Bank’s new Groundswell Africa reports, climate change represents a great challenge to the African continent in
the upcoming years leading to the internal displacement of up to 86 million Africans by 2050 (World Bank, 2021). Thus, urgent concrete climate and development action is needed.

**GRAPH 4**

Q.9 In relation with the main driver you identified in Q.8, why is irregular migration likely to continue to increase for migrants transiting through your country? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuity of violent conflicts/ political instability</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and insatisfaction with government</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of future perspectives among youth</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

Within the European Union, efforts to counter irregular migration and smuggling are key priorities for both EU member states and Algeria. The survey findings highlight that the most effective ways to fight migrant smuggling are as follows: developing cooperation with non-governmental and community-level stakeholders beyond the law-enforcement realm (prevention, assistance in the area of counter-smuggling) and developing legal and safe pathways to migration as an alternative to resorting to irregular migration (Graph 5). Accordingly, counter-smuggling policies introduced in the Renewed Action Plan against smuggling must not criminalise smuggled migrants, and rather they have to protect the rights of the irregular migrants, refugees, those who use the service of the smugglers, and who independently engage in facilitating their irregular movement (see Arrouche, et al., 2021).

The findings also refer to creating economic alternatives to smuggling and enhancing cross-border cooperation through dialogue, confidence-building actions and pragmatic cooperation mechanisms. These findings support the recent recommendations under the EuroMeSCo policy study “Beyond networks, militias and tribes: rethinking EU counter-smuggling policy and response” based on empirical findings of the current trends and dynamics of facilitation of irregular migration (Sanchez et al., 2021).
Despite the uncertainties around the data on voluntary and mandatory return, it is clear that Algeria (as an origin country) is not willing to cooperate on readmissions agreements.

Return and Reintegration

Algerians are among the top nationalities ordered to leave the EU; their returns account for 8.6% of the total based on the EU’s recent figures (European Commission, 2020). The rate of return to Algeria is particularly low since 2018, and it slowed down due to the border closure enforced in the wake of the pandemic and other difficulties that impede carrying out return operations (European Commission, 2020). Despite the uncertainties around the data on voluntary and mandatory return, it is clear that Algeria (as an origin country) is not willing to cooperate on readmissions agreements. According to the EU report (2020, p. 15), “one of the major obstacles is that the EU has had a ‘mandate to negotiate a readmission agreement since 2002’, and ‘Algeria has so far not confirmed its agreement to start negotiations’.
According to the EMM5-Euromesco survey findings, the main issues impeding Algeria’s cooperation at the national level are the lack of policy standards on return and reintegration along with the weak mechanisms, infrastructure. Also, the absence of post-return reintegration assistance for returnees is a problematic obstacle considering the deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions in the country. Additionally, these limitations and lack of capacity reflect the government’s inadequate approach that excludes crucial actors such as civil society instead of supporting their activities and engagement on the issue of migration overall and return in particular.

At the international level, the survey echoes concerns that “Cooperation on return and reintegration aims to solve the problem in the host country while ignoring the problems of the countries of origin and the problems of migrants.” (Academic statement). In addition, the findings also point out that “some EU member states dictate their conditions of return and reintegration on the countries of passage-Maghreb and mainly Algeria” (Civil society statement). These perspectives on EU-Algeria relations are broadly consistent with Algeria’s cautious stance on cooperation initiatives, particularly those that might be perceived as undermining the state’s sovereignty.

This stance has not changed so far. During his visit to Spain to discuss the relaunch of the bilateral relations between the two countries, the foreign minister Boukadoum expressed the significant role of the Euro-Mediterranean relations as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 5+5 dialogue and the Union of the Mediterranean (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, 2021). The issue of migration has been one of the topics of discussion between the two partners. However, Boukadoum expressed that Algeria is facing considerable pressure from EU member states to quell migration flows from the south. Having become a country of origin and destination, Algeria must protect itself and cannot act ‘as the policeman for Europe’ (Redondo, 2021). This statement shows that Algeria still frames migration as a threat to be apprehended through a security-oriented approach (see Werenfels, 2018; Zardo & Loschi, 2020). Indisputably, the ‘externalisation’ of EU borders in the region remains a very prominent point of discord.

In retaliation to Algeria’s lack of engagement in bilateral readmission agreements, some EU member states have pressed for more conditionality in relations. France’s recent declaration to significantly reduce the quotas of visas for North African countries provides a case in point (Le Parisien, 2021). This threatening approach is likely to further complicate and impede the emergence of a solid partnership on migration.

As noted above, migrants in irregular situations face constant risk of deportation. The procedures entail collective expulsions that often fail to meet humanitarian standards.

Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that migrants find their way to the country despite being deported several times (Arrouche, Forthcoming). Thus, the return has less impact on deterring the migrants’ aspirations to migrate again or return to Algeria (Arrouche, et al., 2021). Algeria also increased its cooperation with IOM recently to organise voluntary return flights of sub-Saharan migrants to their countries of origin (IOM, 2021).

Protection of Forcibly Displaced People

Algeria is a signatory of several conventions regarding refugee and asylum governance such as the 1951 Geneva convention signed in 1963, the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (UNTC, 1969) and the 1994 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries (Teevan, 2020). The national constitution of 2016 and the reformed one of 2020 also state “The treaties ratified by the President of the Republic under the conditions foreseen by the constitution shall prevail over the law” (Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, 2016; Journal Officiel, 2020). Yet, despite taking part in all these conventions, Algeria still has not established an asylum system to meet its international commitments. A reform initiative aimed at creating an asylum system was introduced in 2012. However, the latter has not seen the light.
According to the survey results, Algeria still struggles to address the basic needs of migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced people. In light of the absence of a comprehensive national asylum and protection framework, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has assumed the provision of protection for displaced people, conducting registration, facilitating access to health care, and enrolling children in education (UNHCR, 2021). Access to the UNHCR registration in Algeria remains very limited with no arrangements in place for vulnerable individuals’ reception and protection. This is due to the government’s reluctance to allow international organisations to engage with the migrants or access the border areas of the first entry points of migrants for example the city of Tamanrasset and Ain Saleh in the south (Teevan, 2020). The situation was exacerbated by the COVID-19 outbreak (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).
UNHCR’s activities remained constrained to the city of Algiers or the Refugee camps of Western Sahara in the city of Tindouf (UNHCR, 2021). Consequently, displaced people are unaware of the presence of UNHCR, find it difficult to register with them, or are unable to travel to their office in Algiers as they are subjected to detention and forced deportation (Arrouche, forthcoming). The support of the EU and the effective implementation of their cooperation are still unclear and less transparent. In Algeria there are very few asylum projects indirectly funded by the EU through the UN agencies and the budget dedicated to Algeria is quite small as opposed to Morocco and Tunisia (Teevan, 2020). According to the European Commission report on the state of EU-Algerian relations between 2018-2020, two actions have been implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) regarding the voluntary returns to Algeria, and for capacity building and protection of most vulnerable categories of refugees and asylum seekers in Algeria, implemented by the UNHCR (European Commission, 2020, p. 16). To keep up and assist with the health situation, the EU introduced the programme entitled “Fast track emergency response to COVID-19” that would provide support to Algeria. The programme may be implemented through the UN agencies such as IOM, UNHCR and The World Health Organisation (WHO) (European Commission, 2020, p. 16).

In light of the current situation, there is an urgent need to adopt a systematic framework to govern forced displacement in compliance with national and international legal obligations. The survey findings suggest that an important area of support from the EU is to strengthen the state’s development of tools, mechanisms, and procedures to introduce an accessible asylum system. However, the prospects of a fully-fledged system emerging soon are limited. Thus, urgent mechanisms for basic humanitarian support of the most vulnerable and forcibly displaced individuals are a priority currently. Further support to UNHCR services as well as other international organisations is highly recommended.

The New EU Agenda: Prospects for Algeria

Algeria’s interests in the area of international migration appear to differ from those of the EU. Despite this, Algeria needs to face the issue of migration and take steps towards building a new strategic partnership to address implications arising from its limited approach and lack of capacity. Initiating a constructive dialogue with partners in the region, including the EU and Member states, is essential to bring about lasting solutions and a more conducive policy environment.

The survey respondents suggest different areas of cooperation regarding migration such as providing legal and technical support, strengthening state agents, civil society actors through training and knowledge exchange, develop new pathways for legal
migration. These would allow Algeria to autonomously develop a legal framework to manage migration. However, addressing the principle of sovereignty and non-interference is highly important between the two partners. Sovereignty remains an absolute hallmark of Algeria's international engagement, and this consideration needs to guide partners in the formulation of potential cooperation initiatives.

Fostering regional cooperation among North African countries, with West and Central Africa as well as in the Mediterranean, is a key step towards better migration management. However, this is more likely to be difficult due to the current political instability in Libya and Tunisia as well as the tension between Algeria and Morocco.

Another area of cooperation lies also in establishing diverse economic and industrial avenues such as in the sector of agriculture, health, energy, pharmaceutical industry, and mining. These are among the top priorities for Algeria. The European Union already provides support through diverse programmes that aim to promote the participation of young people in socio-economic life. The EU has implemented the Training-Employment-Skills Support Programme (AFEQ), the Youth-Employment Support Programme (PAJE) and the Social Action Support Programme and for Sustainable Local Development in North-West Algeria (PADSEL-NOA) (European Commission, 2020, p. 9). Additionally, a programme that supports the engagement and employability of young people in the sector of tourism (Jil-Siyaha) (European Commission, 2020, p. 9). Further support also can be seen in the sector of transport, agriculture, fishing ...etc. Although these are important initiatives, there is still a need for long-term projects that generate wide-scale employment, consolidate industries and strengthen local development and economy during these challenging times of the pandemic.
GRAPH 7

Q.20 In which domains should cooperation with the EU be improved in priority?

- Circular schemes of labour mobility: 13% (Algerian respondents), 22% (Mashrek countries), 24% (Maghreb countries)
- Sharing of labour market information between origin and destination countries: 6% (Algerian respondents), 8% (Mashrek countries), 19% (Maghreb countries)
- International skill/diploma recognition: 18% (Algerian respondents), 19% (Mashrek countries), 29% (Maghreb countries)
- Preventing ‘brain drain’ and labour market distortions: 12% (Algerian respondents), 14% (Mashrek countries), 25% (Maghreb countries)
- Enhancement of Pre-Departure Orientation (PDO) measures (training, language course …): 10% (Algerian respondents), 9% (Mashrek countries), 12% (Maghreb countries)
- Mainstreaming of private-sector-led initiatives: 3% (Algerian respondents), 7% (Mashrek countries), 12% (Maghreb countries)
- Fulfilment of emigrant workers’ rights: 6% (Algerian respondents), 7% (Mashrek countries), 5% (Maghreb countries)
- Other: 0% (Algerian respondents), 5% (Mashrek countries), 0% (Maghreb countries)
- I have no particular views: 3% (Algerian respondents), 15% (Mashrek countries)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

Stronger migration cooperation is also expected to benefit Algeria’s education infrastructure, in need of radical reform and modernisation. Enhanced mobility can foster knowledge exchange, support and building capacity in the area of digital transformation and research and innovation. This happens already through different programmes such as the Erasmus programme. This programme is considered a successful initiative that has considerably strengthened Algerian institutions. These developments are noticeable. For this reason, survey respondents suggest creating
research collaboration and training between the European educational institutions and Algeria ones to strengthen the Algerian educational field. Creating sustainable circular mobility as well as student migration for Algerians is an empowering approach, while also preventing brain drain and labour market distortions. Algeria should seize the opportunity to create legal channels to attract and engage the diaspora abroad to support the country’s development and prevent brain drain.

Furthermore, the European Commission has recently introduced its Talent Partnerships which may open more opportunities for labour migration (such as circular schemes), support international skill/diploma recognition that would strengthen the Algerian educational system. Sharing of labour market information between origin and destination countries can boost the domestic market via a system of training that ensures transferable skills needed to diversify and consolidate the country’s development trajectory.

Finally, conducting empirical research that allows to assess the current situation and point to the policy gaps to be addressed is crucial. There is a lack of official statistics and evidence-based data on the realities of both regular and irregular migration flows. Enhancing the collection of empirical evidence on irregular migration from and to Algeria, forcibly displaced people, smuggled migrants is essential to achieve effective policies. Evidence-based research on migration flows needs to be promoted in a future partnership as it generates nuanced knowledge on the migrants’ perspectives, conditions, and impact of the current policies on their lives.
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UNHCR GLOBAL FOCUS. ALGERIA. https://reporting.unhcr.org/algeria


Finding the Right Balance: The Conundrum of Building a Mutually-Beneficial Partnership with Tunisia

Pauline Veron
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Tunisia’s complex political context and migration landscape

Tunisia’s migration profile has shifted fundamentally since the early 2000s as it is becoming an important country of origin, transit and destination. As a result, Tunisia faces a range of migration challenges including growing mixed migration flows, irregular sea crossings, and brain drain (Abderrahim, 2021). The country has made some progress toward reforming migration governance since the 2011 revolution and the war in Libya, albeit at times under external pressure (Abderrahim, 2021; Veron, 2020). Yet practical political and economic challenges stand in the way of reform (Abderrahim, 2021). The country has faced a succession of weak governments, a sclerotic economy, high unemployment¹ alongside corruption in the past ten years (Fox 2021a). In July 2021, President Kais Saied announced that he was dismissing Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, suspending Parliament and governing by decree, a move described by many as unconstitutional and a coup (Fox 2021a). These measures exacerbate the country’s complex crises and prevent it from focusing on the social and economic challenges that have been amplified by the COVID-19 crisis, which may lead to social unrest and instability.

This context makes it complicated for the country to prioritise questions related to migration. However, European interest in Tunisia and its migration policies has increased substantially in recent years (Abderrahim, 2021), as illustrated by the fact that the European Union (EU) has doubled its financial assistance to the country (Council of the EU 2021a). This can be partly explained by the rise in sea arrivals to Italy from Tunisia since 2017 (around 40% of all sea arrivals). Migration management

¹ 18% overall and 42% among the youth in the second quarter of 2021 (Saleh, 2021a; Saleh, 2021b).
and border control thus remain key priorities for the EU (Abderrahim, 2021) – yet those trying to leave Tunisia irregularly are Tunisians seeking economic opportunities they lack at home (Veron, 2020).

In this context, it is worth reflecting on the current EU approach in Tunisia and what the EU’s ambitions to develop “mutually beneficial migration partnerships” with countries in the Southern Mediterranean would mean for its partnership with Tunisia in the future.

The EU’s concept of mutually beneficial partnerships in the Neighbourhood

In September 2020, the European Commission (EC) proposed a New Migration and Asylum Pact (European Commission, 2020a), which it described as a “fresh start” (European Commission, 2020b). A core element of the new Pact is the concept of mutually beneficial partnerships with key third countries of origin and transit², which are meant to be “comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made” (European Commission 2020, p. 2) and to cover “relevant aspects of migration and forced displacement” (Council of the EU, 2021b, p.3). The Pact sees migration as central to the EU’s overall relationships with these partner countries (European Commission 2020, p. 17). Tunisia has been identified as one of the priority countries for these partnerships.³

This partnership should be based on a “tailor-made dialogue with partners centred on respective interests and common priorities”, with the acknowledgement that the EU and partner countries inevitably have different interests, commitments and priorities (Council of the EU 2021: 3). Yet, the focus on returns and readmissions of the past few years is very present in the rationale behind the Pact. On the other hand, according to a Presidency discussion paper on the implementation of the Pact in Tunisia, “Tunisian authorities express interest in a comprehensive approach to migration issues, encompassing not only security aspects, but also the possibility of developing further legal migration channels as a response to their young people’s needs, whilst addressing demographic challenges in Europe.” (Council of the EU, 2021a, p. 5).

² The Joint Communication on a Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood ("A new Agenda for the Mediterranean") is also centered around these comprehensive, tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships to address the challenges of forced displacement and irregular migration (European Commission & HR/VP 2021).

³ These priority countries take into consideration geographical balance; the relevance of migration flows towards Europe; the potential for expanding existing cooperation on all relevant aspects of migration policy; as well as current challenges, including returns and readmissions (Council of the EU, 2021c; Council of the EU, 2021d; Council of the EU, 2021a).
Experts have overwhelmingly expressed their doubts about the “change of paradigm” – as described by the Commission (European Commission, 2020b) – in these partnerships, especially in light of the increased use of conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries. To improve cooperation on readmission, the Pact, similarly to the new Agenda for the Mediterranean, promotes the use of a wide range of policy tools (e.g. development cooperation, security, visa, trade, investment and employment) (European Commission, 2020, p.17). This conditionality relies inter alia on the revised Visa Code (Official Journal of the EU, 2019), which allows for visa restrictions for countries that are considered not to be cooperating sufficiently on the readmission of irregular migrants. Interestingly, 69% of Tunisian survey respondents considered that bilateral visa facilitation mechanisms could contribute to improve cooperation on return and reintegration. Furthermore, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe, the EU’s new external action instrument for 2021-2027, provides that indicatively 10% of the budget for the Southern Neighbourhood shall be dedicated to rewarding progress in a series of thematic areas, including migration cooperation (Official Journal of the EU, 2021).

Conditionality is far from new and was always part of the attempts to establish a partnership with Tunisia (Romeo, 2021). The 2014 EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership, for instance, includes the opening of negotiations for readmissions in exchange for a visa facilitation agreement (European Commission, 2017; Rouland, 2021). However, EU pressures have not yielded much success so far and incentives remained below the expectations of Tunisia (Abderrahim, 2021). One may thus wonder whether such an approach leads to a balance of power in favour of the EU that is ultimately ineffective and detrimental to the relationship. With this in mind, we will look at the focus of EU-Tunisia cooperation on migration in the last few years in more detail.

EU-Tunisia cooperation in practice: What does it focus on and where are the gaps?

The EU had a key role in steering migration policy-making in Tunisia in recent years, translating into a plethora of projects, with a focus on supporting Tunisia in: i) border management ii) managing the mobility of people iii) irregular migration (Council of the EU, 2021a). Interestingly, strengthening border management was considered as the lowest priority for migration policy by survey respondents (see graph 1).
Despite some major progress in reforming migration governance since 2011, Tunisia does not have a formal national asylum system, as a comprehensive asylum law drafted in 2014 (with financial support from the EU) has yet to be formally adopted and implemented. The National Strategy on Migration (Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs, 2017) similarly has yet to be formally adopted and implemented, although it is already being operationalised (including through EU support) (Abderrahim, 2021; Veron, 2020). As highlighted by one survey respondent, “the treatment of irregular migrants, especially sub-Saharan Africans, is below the minimum standards of international law and conventions.” The lack of access to legal documentation leaves them in very precarious situations, as they often end up in situations of informal labour and exploitation and lack access to basic services.\(^4\)

\(^4\) UNHCR carries out registration of asylum-seekers and refugee status determination on behalf of the government. Yet the documentation provided by UNHCR is not formally recognised by authorities (Veron, 2020).

\(^5\) These challenges have been greatly reinforced by COVID-19 (Veron, 2020).
Despite these challenges, the priorities of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) in Tunisia focus heavily (80%) on the governance of migration policies, institutional support and capacity-building; management of migration flows and mobilisation of the diaspora. Little focus (20%) on the protection of vulnerable migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in Tunisia as well as supporting the socio-economic integration and entrepreneurship of immigrants and refugees in Tunisia (Veron, 2020). This might explain why 67% of survey respondents rated cooperation with the EU on integration of migrants in Tunisia as bad or very bad (see graph 2). Socio-economic integration of immigrants and refugees was however considered as a high or very high priority for migration policy by 59% of survey respondents (see graph 1).

GRAPH 2
Q.12 Based on your country’s experience, how do you assess cooperation with the EU concerning (Tunisian respondent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Very bad</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Neither good nor bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting migrant smuggling</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution building</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of migrants in your country</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation support</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey

This balance is in line with Tunisia’s own priorities in the area of migration (as set out in the National Strategy on Migration), namely the mobilisation of Tunisians abroad for investment in the country, providing social and economic assistance to Tunisian returnees, supporting young Tunisians prone to migration in regions most affected by emigration (Veron, 2020).

* These percentages refer to the breakdown of funding between the priorities of the EUTF, according to the EU, referred to in more details in “Tunisia: Possibilities for reform and implementation of migrant reception and protection”
According to experts, the fact that the law on asylum has not yet been adopted can be explained by political leaders’ fear that Tunisia would be designated a ‘safe third country’ and that it would create a ‘pull factor’ or that the authorities would be bound by obligations to which they cannot respond (Veron, 2020). Furthermore, Tunisian authorities fear that it would further facilitate the externalisation by the EU and its member states of asylum and asylum processing (Veron, 2020). Pushing the country on these aspects might thus be ineffective and counterproductive, as it hardens Tunisia’s position and incentivises it not to establish any formal protection system.

As irregular arrivals to the EU increased, the EU tried to place migration at the top of the political agenda in Tunisia. Yet migration is still not a priority for the government nor for society and is virtually absent from the political and public discourse (Abderrahim, 2021). Socio-economic development, the lack of economic opportunities, political instability, corruption, and security are much more pressing issues for the country (Abderrahim, 2021). This was largely confirmed by the survey results. The current focus in EU–Tunisia cooperation on European security-oriented priorities (Roman and Pastore, 2018) thus represents a risk not only for Tunisia as it overlooks some other important policy issues, but also for the EU-Tunisia partnership as it creates an imbalance in interests and priorities.

A delicate balance: Building a win-win partnership with Tunisia

“Only partnerships that take the interests and needs of both sides into consideration and benefit all parties involved are likely to succeed.” (Council of the EU, 2021, p.6). In spite of many differences, Tunisia, as much as Europe, has an interest in securing its borders and shares similar challenges as European countries. Yet its migration interests are much broader and should be taken into consideration for a win-win partnership.

If the EU is serious about its commitment to establish a comprehensive, balanced and mutually beneficial partnership with Tunisia, it should resist the temptation to pressure Tunisia to overhaul its migration policy (Abderrahim, 2021). Given the little progress on legal and policy reform in past years, it is unclear whether additional efforts in support of the adoption of pending laws and strategies will have immediate benefits without the buy-in of national actors (Veron, 2020). Most openings take place in areas benefiting Tunisians (Veron, 2020). This does not prevent the EU from increasing its support to the protection of refugees and migrants at local level (e.g., through the provision of basic services by civil society, international organisations, local authorities) (Abderrahim, 2021).

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7 Such as setting up refugee status determination structures, reception, assistance for asylum-seekers, integration of recognised refugees etc.
The EU will also have to overcome its current Eurocentric and transactional approach and avoid placing migration too high on the agenda as long as it is not a high political priority for Tunisia (Abderrahim, 2021). Yet, the Tunisian Government also has a responsibility, namely to provide opportunities to its citizens as well as to migrants living on its territory. Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration was indeed perceived as the highest priority of migration policy by survey respondents, while fostering regular migration and mobility was the second highest priority. The EU can help by promoting legal migration pathways and circular migration (to attenuate the challenge of brain drain*). This could build on existing member states’ and EU-funded pilot projects (Abderrahim, 2021; Council of the EU, 2021a). Talent Partnerships (European Commission 2021) – a key initiative under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum for which Tunisia will be a pilot country – could also be a useful entry point, as they are meant to match the skills of Tunisian workers with the labour market needs inside the EU. Yet legal migration initiatives have long been neglected in the EU’s partnership with third countries, and it is unlikely that incentives to make these initiatives successful will change significantly in the short term (Martín 2021).

Any intervention in this field will have to take into account the acute political crisis in the country. Beyond financial assistance, and as it is still in the process of developing its democracy and building strong and durable institutions, institutional support (e.g. on cross-government coordination) has to remain a key part of the EU’s approach (Veron 2020; Abderrahim, 2021). This will deliver positive outcomes, including on migration. However, it requires a longer term perspective that the EU is not used to adopting (Abderrahim, 2021).

A mutually beneficial partnership is primarily based on trust and dialogue. Bilateral political consultations could be a good mechanism to frame a broader dialogue on issues of mutual interest. But a more pragmatic and less ambitious approach might be needed to build trust, e.g. through a focus on uncontroversial areas (Abderrahim, 2021). Such a sustainable and mutually beneficial partnership would most definitely generate incremental gains that recent approaches and high-level political frameworks have not been able to generate anymore.

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* Regular departures of the highly skilled are on the rise, putting the spotlight on brain drain and its long-term impact on the country’s development (Abderrahim, 2021).
References


Methodology

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was divided into six thematic blocks including in total 22 questions on key aspects of migration partnerships as envisaged in the Joint Communication on a renewed partnership with the Southern neighbourhood and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The first block included 2 general questions on migration and cooperation priorities. Subsequent questions were divided into 5 blocks, (i) Protection of those in need and support to host countries, (ii) Building economic opportunities and addressing irregular migration, (iii) Strengthening migration governance and management, (iv) Fostering cooperation on returns and reintegration and (v) Developing pathways for legal migration to Europe.

The questionnaire combined open-ended questions and multiple-choice questions with predefined answers offering respondents the possibility to choose and rank among several options or the possibility to grade on a “very low” to “very high” scale. For those questions, an optional type-in space was provided to elaborate on the answer. This open part was considered of great importance for a survey of this kind as it contributes to improving the interpretation of its overall results and provides additional valuable material.

Survey Sample

To conduct the survey, 2,000 experts, actors and policy-makers from the European Neighbourhood Instrument’s South Partner Countries (ENI SPC) (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia) were identified. All received an invitation to participate. Geographical distribution, institutional affiliation, field of knowledge and expertise and gender balance were factored in the selection of respondents.

Concerning the distribution by geographical origin, participants from Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) accounted for 59% of all answers, participants from Mashrek countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria) 37% and respondents from Israel 4%.
GRAPH 1

Breakdown of respondents by geographical origin

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Survey
The country breakdown indicates that Morocco and Algeria gather a significant share of total answers received, with around 20% each.

In preliminary questions, in addition to providing their country of origin, respondents were asked to indicate their gender and the type of institution to which they belonged¹. As shown in graph 3, the majority of respondents are “experts”, an aggregated category that includes respondents from think tanks and academia. Altogether, this group accounts for 49% of the total number of responses. The other categories are “civil society” (encompassing companies and NGOs) which accounts for 32% of responses and “policy-makers” (embracing responses from international institutions and governments) with 19% of the total number of responses.

---
¹ Governmental, international organisation, think tank, academic, NGO, company (business sector).
In the Mashrek, policymakers represented one third of submitted answers against 11% in the Maghreb. Civil society representatives amounted to 40% of Maghreb respondents, against almost 25% in the Mashrek. The expert category represented a similar proportion of respondents in the two sub-regions (43% versus 48%). Graphs 3, 4 and 5 provide indications on participants by target group.

GRAPH 3
Breakdown of respondents by type of institution

Graph showing the breakdown of respondents by type of institution with:
- Civil Society: 32.4%
- Policy makers: 18.7%
- Experts: 48.9%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Survey

GRAPH 4
Breakdown by kind of institution (Maghreb-Mashrek respondents)

Table showing the breakdown by kind of institution:
- Experts: 43.1% in Mashrek, 48.8% in Maghreb
- Civil Society: 23.5% in Mashrek, 40% in Maghreb
- Policy makers: 11.3% in Mashrek, 33.3% in Maghreb

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Survey
The country-level analysis reveals similar divergences in the profiles of participants. Lebanon displays the highest percentage of respondents from the policy-making group, followed by Jordan. Israel and Algeria display the highest proportion of experts while Libya, Palestine and Tunisia have the highest percentages of civil society representatives. Graph 5 provides the target group breakdown for each country.

Finally, to complete the description of the sample on which the survey is based, it is important to note that 20% of respondents were women. When analysing by countries, Libyan, Syrian and Jordanian women participants are clearly above the overall gender ratio.
GRAPH 6
Breakdown of respondents by gender

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Survey

GRAPH 7
Profile of respondents by country

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the EMM5-EuroMeSCo Survey
List of respondents

Respondents could participate in the survey appearing as an institution or as an individual. 42 answered as an institution and 97 answered as individuals. Respondents had the option of not appearing on the final list of participants. 20 out of the 139 that answered chose not to be included; therefore, this list has a total of 39 names of institutions and 80 individual names.

List of organisations that have answered the survey

Civil Society

AGDZ VOLUNTEERS WITHOUT BORDERS. Morocco
AGENCE DE DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL BENI ABBES. Algeria
ASSOCIATION ALFIDA POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SOLIDARITE SOCIALE (AFDESS). Morocco
ASSOCIATION FEMININE AICHA OUM EL MOUMININE - AFLOU (AFAOM). Algeria
ASSOCIATION MAROCAINE D’ETUDES ET DE RECHERCHES SUR LES MIGRATIONS (AMER M). Morocco
AZJAR. Libya
CLUB UNESCO POUR LE SAVOIR ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT Durable (CUASDD). Tunisia
COLECTIVE SPACE FOR PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT. Morocco
COOPERATION ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. Palestine
DARAJ MEDIA. Lebanon
DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITY ASSOCIATION (DAA). Lebanon
FEDERATION ALGERIENNE DES PERSONNES HANDICAPÉES (FAPH). Algeria
GROUPEMENT INTERPROFESSIONNEL DES PRODUITS DE LA PECHE. Tunisia
HUSSEIN ALSHGAIRAT DART ALEGHWAN. Jordan
MANUFACTURES ASSOCIATION OF ISRAEL. Israel
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STUDENTS EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT. Libya
RESEAU EUROMED DES ONGs MAROC. Morocco
SARP ASSOCIATION POUR L’AIDE, LA RECHERCHE ET LE PERFECTIONNEMENT EN PSYCHOLOGIE. Algeria
STUDIO MASR. Egypt
THE EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR YOUTH AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. Egypt
THE JORDANIAN HASHEMITE FUND FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (JOHUD). Jordan
TUNISIAN ACTIVE NETWORK FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY. Tunisia
Experts:

AL-AHRAM CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (ACPSS). Egypt
ASSOCIATION DES ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES. Tunisia
BUSINESS SOLUTIONS. Tunisia
CENTER OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL RESEARCH & STUDIES. Egypt
CENTRE EL KADIRIA POUR LA FORMATION ET LA COMMUNICATION. Algeria
COOPERATION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN Coop4Med. Algeria
CENTRE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE APPLIQUEE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT (CREAD). Algeria
PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR MEDIA, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (PCMRD). Palestine
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY. Israel

Policy makers

COWATER INTERNATIONAL - SEED PROJECT. Jordan
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Tunisia
PALESTINIAN CIVIL POLICE. Palestine
THE JORDANIAN NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR WOMEN. Jordan

List of individuals that have answered the survey

ABDELAZIZ, MAHMOUD. Founder & CEO, DevisionX. Egypt
ABDELLI, MOHAMED AMOKRANE. Chercheur doctorant. Université de Perpignan. France/Algeria
ABER, NAIMA. Algeria
ABOUDI, BILEL. Expert in Culture and Development. Tunisia
AIT ALI, HASSAN. Professeur. University hassan II. Morocco
AL ACHKAR, RANI. Lebanon
AL SHARIF, OSAMA. Jordan
AMEUR, MOSTAFA. Administrateur-principal. DGCT. Morocco
AMMOR FOUAD. Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherche sur la Méditerranée (GERM). Morocco
ASKAR, AHMED. Researcher. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. Egypt
BARHOUM, SAMIR. Communication Consultant. UN Women Palestine Country Office. Jordan
BELGAID, MOHAMMED AMINE. Morocco
BENDRIOUCH, ABDELGHANI. Morocco
BENHAJ, HAMID. Directeur Général. Agence A2Z Communication. Morocco
BENYAMINA, BATOUN. Algeria
BLINDA, MOHAMED. Consultant-Fondateur, VOSPro. Morocco
BOUASSIDA, ADNEN. Président. Fédération Nationale des Communes Tunisienne. Tunisia
BOUGHZALA, MONGI. Professeur Emérite. Tunisia
BRAHIM, RIDHA. Chef de département. Agence Nationale de gestion des déchets. Tunisia
CHABAAN, HASSAN. Advisor; Safety, Security and Marine Pollution Prevention. DGLMT - M.o.T. Lebanon
CHAIB, BOUNOUA. Algeria
CHATER, MOHAMMED. Professeur. Morocco
DAGHEFLI, OMAR. Algeria
DANDASHLY, ASSEM. Maastricht University. Lebanon
DEQUIUEC, JAOUAD. Ex-Directeur au Ministère chargé de la diaspora et des migrations. Morocco
ECHKOUNDI, MHAMMED. Enseignant chercheur,IEA. Morocco
EL BIKRY MOHAMMED. Chief of project. Agency of social development. Morocco
EL KHAYAT, GHTA. Chercheure indépendante. Morocco
EL OUAJJI, NOUreddine. Président. Afak Tanger. Morocco
EL MAGHRABY, MOHAMED. Assistant Professor. Institute of National Planning. Egypt
EL-MELIGY, HASSAN. Consultant. EJB. Egypt
ELSHAARAWY, EMAD. Policy and Program Manager, JPO-Justice and Peace-building Organization. Egypt
ENNAJI, MOHA. Morocco
FARES, RACHID. Chercheur. Morocco
FARRAH, RAOUF. Senior Analyst. Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). Algeria
FERDAAOUSSI NABIL. PhD Candidate. University of Cape Town, Department of Anthropology. Morocco
GAFREJ, RAOUmongodb. Gérant. L’univers de l’eau. Tunisia
GALAI, AHMED. Membre commission scientifique, Institut Arabe des Droits de l’Homme (IADH). Tunisia
GHOMARI, TAIBI. Enseignant. Université de Ain Temouchent. Algeria
HAJLAOUI, KHALED SGHAIER. Responsable de la coopération internationale, Association AMDT. Tunisia
HAMMAD, MAHMOUD. Senior Protection Assistant (Resettlement Unit), UNHCR. Egypt
HEDIA, MHIRI SELLAMI. Associate Professor, Institut Supérieur de Gestion de Tunis. Tunisia
JAOUANI, ABDELAZIZ. Senior expert on human capital development ETF. Morocco
JAYOUSI, NEDAL. Country Representative, National Erasmus Office. Palestine
KACEM, ABDELAZIZ. Association des études internationales. Tunisia
KAMEL, HAMDI. Chef de projet. ADS MOBADARA. Algeria
LAMMA, HAETIM. Director of the Office of Public Relations and Media, Al-Salam Bani Walid Charitable Association. Libya
LAZEREG, MESSAOUD. Researcher, Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée pour le Développement. Algeria
LINDENSTRAUSS, GALLIA. Senior Research Fellow, INSS. Israel
BESSEDIK, MADANI. Enseignant chercheur, Université de Tlemcen. Algeria
MEDZINI, ARNON. Professor of geography, Oranim College of Education. Israel
LAHLOU, MEHDI. Professeur. INSEA - Haut Commissariat au Plan. Morocco
MUSBAH, SALIMA. Chairman of the Board of Directors, Women and Youth Empowerment Forum. Libya
MUSSE, ADULKADIR. Libya
MZID, NOURI. University Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Sfax. Tunisia
NADER, MANAL. Director Institute of the Environment, University of Balamand. Lebanon
KHAOUA, NADJI. Professeur, Université Badji Mokhtar Annaba. Algeria
OURABAH, ADEL. Algeria
QUABBAJ, RENAD. General director, Tamer Institute for Community Education. Palestine
RABAH, BENZINA. Algeria
RAHEL, SCHOMAKER. Professor. Jordan
RIVLIN, PAUL. Israel
RITAB, FATIMA ZAHRA. Board member. FOMEJE MOROCCO. Morocco
SAADI, MUSTAPHA. Algeria
SAID, MOUFTI. Président, Centre marocain de recherches et d’études internationales. Morocco
SALEM, ANIS. Egypt
SALHI, SALAH EDDINE. Enseignant Chercheur, Université Abou Bekr Belkaid. Algeria
ELGHARBI, SALIMA. Algeria
SASSI BOUDEMAGH, SOUAD. Directrice de laboratoire de recherche/ enseignante chercheur, Université Constantine 3. Algeria
SIDI, MOHAMED MABROUK. Morocco
SOUSSI, MOUEZ. Professeur. IHEC Carthage. Tunisia
SULEIMAN, HUSSEIN MOHAMMED. Researcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. Egypt
TORJMANE, SALMA. Post-graduate student, College of Europe. Tunisia
TOUBAL, NAZIH. Researcher, Autonomous University of Barcelona. Algeria
EL CHIDIAC, YOUSSEF. Head of external security section, General Directorate of State Security. Lebanon
ZEITOUN, ANAN. Jordan
ZOUHIRI, NABILA. Conseillère technique dans une organisation internationale. Morocco
ZUREIQAT, HALA. Consultant, Roya TV. Jordan
# Questionnaire

## Composition of the sample

### Gender

- Male
- Female

### Nationality

- Algeria
- Egypt
- Israel
- Belgium
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Morocco
- Palestine
- Tunisia
- Other

### Sector

- Civil society organisation
- Think tank
- Academic
- Government
- International organisation

### Position (optional)


### Institution (optional)


## Block 0. Migration and cooperation priorities

**Q.1 To what extent do you consider that the following areas of migration policy are important for your country.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Very low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Neither high nor low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations and of forcibly displaced persons, including asylum seekers, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Fostering regular migration and mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Improving return and reintegration mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Socio-economic integration of immigrants and refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Strengthening border management</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Other:</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**

I have no particular views on this matter
Q.2 To what extent should cooperation with your neighbours (other than the EU or EU member states) in the following areas of migration policy be prioritised?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Neither high nor low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Addressing the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations and of forcibly displaced persons, including asylum seekers, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Countering smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Fostering regular migration and mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Improving return and reintegration mechanisms</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Strengthening border management</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Other:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter
### Block 1. Protecting those in need and support to host countries

#### Q.3 What is the main challenge that your country encounters while dealing with migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons?

Please choose one option

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Addressing the basic needs (shelter, food, health) of migrants in vulnerable situations and forcibly displaced persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Addressing the broader socio-economic impact of the presence of forcibly displaced in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Administrative management including refugee registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Government compliance with legal obligations (including international and national law on refugee protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Managing emergency situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Onward resettlement to third countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Socio-economic integration of forcibly displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Tensions between forcibly displaced and hosting communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Others (please specify):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter

#### Q.4 What are the main measures in place in your country to address this challenge?

Please describe these measures:

I have no particular views on this matter

#### Q.5 To what extent has the EU helped your country deal with this challenge so far?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Neither high nor low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.  

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter
Q.6 More specifically, to what extent have the following instruments been effective in supporting your country manage irregular migration and forced displacement and provide assistance to those in need?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Very low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Neither high nor low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) in neighbourhood partner countries¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (MADAD Fund)²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. European Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other (please specify):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How did they help (or not)?:

I have no particular views on this matter

---

Q.7 What do you expect from the EU to do or to do differently in order to help your country deal with forced displacement and better assist those in need?

Please share your thoughts:

I have no particular views on this matter

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¹ Regional ETUF programmes, and in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia

² Regional MADAD projects, and in Jordan and Lebanon

³ European Civil protection and humanitarian aid in: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine
### Block 2. Building economic opportunities and addressing irregular migration

#### Q.8 What is the main driver of outwards irregular migration from your country?  
Please choose one option:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For citizens from your country</th>
<th>For third country nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Conflict or instability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Impact of climate change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Joining family/relatives living abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Lack of socio-economic perspectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter

#### Q.9 In relation with the main driver you identified in Q8, do you think that irregular migration is likely to continue to increase?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Citizens from your country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Migrants transiting through your country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Q.10 Taking into account the main driver/s you identified in Q8, what should be done to reduce irregular migration?

Please share your thoughts:

I have no particular views on this matter
### Q.11 To what extent has the EU been successful so far in assisting your country to tackle the driver/s you identified in Q8?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Neither high nor low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. For citizens from your country</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. For third country nationals</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter
## Block 3. Strengthening migration governance and management

### Q.12 Based on your country’s experience, how do you assess cooperation with the EU concerning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very bad</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Neither good nor bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Border management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fighting migrant smuggling</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Institution building</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Integration of migrants in your country</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Legislation support</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

How could it be improved?

I have no particular views on this matter

### Q.13 What is the most effective way to fight migrant smuggling?

**Please choose one option:**

1. Creating economic alternatives to smuggling
2. Developing cooperation with non-governmental and community-level stakeholders beyond the law-enforcement realm (prevention, assistance in the area of counter-smuggling)
3. Developing legal and safe pathways to migration as an alternative to resorting to irregular migration
4. Enhancing cross-border cooperation through dialogue, confidence building actions and pragmatic cooperation mechanisms
5. Law-enforcement response (whether through an improvement of your country’s legal framework or of its operational capabilities)
6. Other:

Why:

I have no particular views on this matter
Q.14 How could cooperation with the EU provide help on the integration of immigrants in your country?

Please share your thoughts:

I have no particular views on this matter
## Block 4. Fostering cooperation on returns and reintegration

### Q.15 What is your assessment of current cooperation on return and readmission with EU countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very bad</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Neither good nor bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1.

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter

### Q.16 Based on your experience, what are the main issues?

Please share your thoughts:

I have no particular views on this matter

### Q.17 In which of the following areas is EU support most beneficial? Please choose one option:

1. Facilitating the administrative processes related to voluntary return procedures
2. Investing in pre-return assistance aimed directly at the concerned migrant person
3. Involving civil societies and the community level in post-return and reintegration processes
4. Promoting capacity-building amongst the authorities responsible for the implementation of voluntary return programmes in your country
5. Providing post-return reintegration assistance to countries of return
6. Other:

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter

---

4 Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration: programmes designed originally by the IOM to assist migrants to return to their home countries when they do not have the means to do so and which also support their reintegration.
Q.11 To what extent has the EU been successful so far in assisting your country to tackle the driver/s you identified in Q8?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Neither high nor low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The full implementation of existing bilateral agreements on readmission and the negotiations of new ones</td>
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<td>☐</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Why so?</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Bilateral visa facilitation mechanisms</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Why so?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The provision of post-arrival reintegration assistance to partner countries in line with development-related activities at country and community levels</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Why so?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Why so?</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter
## Block 5. Developing pathways for legal migration to Europe

**Q.19 Based on your knowledge or experience, what has been the most fruitful initiative in your country in the area of labour mobility cooperation with the EU/EU Member States?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please share your thoughts:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have no particular views on this matter</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Q.20 In which domains should cooperation with the EU be improved in priority?**

**Please choose one option:**

| 1. Circular schemes of labour mobility |
| 2. Enhancement of Pre-Departure Orientation (PDO) measures (training, language course ...) |
| 3. Fulfilment of emigrant workers’ rights |
| 4. International skill/diploma recognition |
| 5. Mainstreaming of private-sector-led initiatives |
| 6. Preventing 'brain drain' and labour market distortions |
| 7. Sharing of labour market information between origin and destination countries |
| 8. Other: |

**Comments:**

I have no particular views on this matter
Q.21 Talent partnerships\(^5\) is a paradigm that the EU wants to pursue as a channel to support legal migration and mobility cooperation with your country. In your opinion, what could be the main benefits for your country? Please choose one option:

1. Enhance the transfer of professional qualifications, skills and experience acquired abroad

2. Foster potential for international networks and supply chains through diaspora linkages

3. Generate domestic market opportunities through business creation and development

4. Improve vocational training and build capacities of related institutions

5. I do not think that talent partnerships constitute a conducive framework for better cooperation in the field of legal mobility

6. Other:

Comments:

I have no particular views on this matter

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Q.22 Beyond talent partnerships and considering other segments of the population, what should be done as a matter of priority to further develop legal pathways to the EU?

Please share your thoughts:

I have no particular views on this matter

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\(^5\) The European Commission seeks to open the way for cooperation on labour migration schemes, looking for a mutually-beneficial international mobility in line with the Global Skills Partnerships. That is, bilateral agreements through which a country of destination gets directly involved in creating human capital among potential migrants in the country of origin prior to migration. Therefore, Talent Partnerships are formulated as an improved commitment to support legal migration and mobility with key partners.
EMM5-EUROMESCO EUROMED SURVEY

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IRREGULAR MIGRATION ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE LONG ROAD AHEAD TO REVAMPING PARTNERSHIPS.
Matteo Villa

THE DANGER OF A SINGLE STORY: THE MIGRANT SMUGGLING NARRATIVE.
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THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: TARGET AND MOTOR OF EU EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICIES.
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