Executive Summary

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February has resulted in the displacement of more than 14 million people, representing one quarter to one third of the entire population. Up to two thirds have been displaced internally with another 6 million people fleeing to neighbouring countries, mostly to the EU, but also Russia and Turkey. As of late March, following the withdrawal of Russia’s forces from the north and northeast, people also began returning. This Policy Brief first develops six scenarios of the outcome of the war. Second, it identifies key drivers of forced migration as well as the opportunity/constraints structure including pre-war migration networks and migration aspirations that influence migration decisions among displaced persons from Ukraine. Third, it suggests six post-war migration scenarios investigating the propensity for people to remain in their current host countries or return to Ukraine. The resulting scenarios suggest that fewer than 1.65 million to 21 million people will stay in host countries. The most probable scenario suggests that around 2.9 million will remain in destination countries, and could be joined by 580,000 family members. Any scenario, however, would be affected and can be manipulated by respective policy measures.

The latest data cited in the document stems from May 2022.
Current situation

On 24 February, Russia invaded Ukraine. The Russian army targets the more densely populated east of Ukraine: four of the five largest cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Odesa), the industrial and economic heartlands of Ukraine, the entire coast with the two key ports (Mariupol, Odesa) and most international airports. The invasion and subsequent prolonged fighting resulted in widespread destruction of residential areas, various types of infrastructure, including the critical ones, as well as the closure of businesses with the subsequent loss of income of the population. According to UNDP, from 53.8% and up to 90.5% “could be facing poverty and vulnerability to poverty”. Moreover, “Ukraine’s economic ruin is one of the war’s important, if less visible, outcomes”. Significant parts of Ukraine could be destroyed, large parts of the economy devastated, large parts of society will be torn apart, and many people will almost certainly be traumatised and possibly demoralised.

By 15 May, 14.2 million Ukrainians have been displaced: 8 million internally as IOM claims, though only 1 million were registered, and 6.2 million internationally. The EU received 5.3 million (primarily Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia), Moldova – 396,000, Russia - 850,000 (however, many were rather deported, plus another 105,000 who were evacuated, partly involuntarily from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk in the week before the invasion), Turkey – over 70,000 and Belarus – 27,000. Hence, 85% of the internationally displaced fled to the EU and 13.7% to Russia (half as many as in 2014).

From the end of week two, displaced Ukrainians also began arriving in countries not bordering Ukraine. By 11 April, the EU member states located further from the border with Ukraine registered or reported some 1.35 million persons (see Table 1). Hence, at least 32.4% of all arrivals in the EU’s peripheral member states travelled onward. By mid-May this share had already increased to 45%. Germany, the Czech Republic and Spain reported the largest numbers. 65% of the Ukrainians arriving in Germany first arrived in Poland. Several sources reported that some host countries would have much higher capacities; for example, France accepted 30,000 but could host 100,000. The numbers are expected to increase in accordance with the existing migration networks in many countries and due to previous migration experiences of Ukrainians. To date, destinations are chosen based on self-selection and the move is self-organised; no compulsory dispersal took place.

In contrast, in six weeks, 67.6% of displaced persons still stayed in the countries bordering Ukraine, which may also signal return aspirations. Indeed, there are increasing reports of return migration, notably since the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the northeast at the end of March 2022, whilst an attack on Odesa was no longer imminent. By 13 April, up to 870,000 are reported to have returned, 1.26 million by mid-May, though this number may well include pre-war migrants, for instance, men joining the defence efforts as well as temporary visits back home.

By mid-May, the different data sources conflate stocks and flows, i.e. arrival and residence, and net migration is obscured. In most EU member states and Moldova, there are only statistics on arrivals of Ukrainians in the EU but not on stays, while net migration figures are not available. For example, Poland registered 2.8 million arrivals whilst only 846,000 million ID numbers were issued by 13 April. Only around 90,000 out of 466,000 arrivals in Hungary applied for some kind of permit. Most arriving persons move on to other countries, and authorities are criticised for inflating numbers. Since 2.4 million have meanwhile registered in other EU and EFTA countries and Turkey, accordingly there will be fewer Ukrainians in the EU member states bordering Ukraine and Moldova, reaching approximately 1.9 million. Due to the visa-free travel, Ukrainians have not always registered in their (temporary) host countries. Moreover, because of frequent onward migration, many Ukrainians could have been double-counted, in particular at the beginning of the crisis upon arrival in the EU or another transit or destination country. Finally, returns as well as repeated journeys need to be deducted from the total number of arrivals.

1. Within the first three weeks of the invasion, “at least $100 billion worth of infrastructure” were destroyed, some “50% of Ukrainian businesses shut down completely, while the other half forced to operate well below their capacity”. Accordingly, “53% ... who were employed before the war are currently unemployed” and thus lost their source of income and live of their savings.

Post-war scenarios

There are signs that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is part of a broader long-term plan. The invasion has been prepared for at least one year, since March 2021, when Russia held first large-scale military exercises to the east of Ukraine; at that occasion, Russia already set up the infrastructure for an invasion. The invasion follows from the previous 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea and the intervention in eastern Ukraine and the subsequent occupation of roughly one third of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. By 2020, Russia had finally completed the modernisation of its armed forces, though rearmament continues; this so-called New Look reform began after the 2008 war against Georgia. In retrospect, the annexation of Crimea turns out to be a strategic precondition for the current invasion of Ukraine because it facilitates a two-pronged attack from north and south to cut the country in half and encircle the Ukrainian army in the Donbas. Simultaneously, Ukraine, too, modernised its army, expanded its personnel to 255,000 active-duty soldiers and 900,000 reservists and was supplied by the west with strategic know-how, arms and training. However, Ukraine did not anticipate the invasion and thus did not mobilise its reserves or prepare adequate defences in the north, northeast and south of the country.

At several occasions, Russia demonstrated some key strategic aims, notably, pushing back NATO in Eastern Europe, and installing a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. Publications that are more recent suggest a more radical plan with the complete eradication of Ukraine, its culture and people. It is not clear what economic plans Russia has for Ukraine and whether this has changed over the past weeks against the unexpected Ukrainian resistance. With the plan for quick victory fading and Russian losses becoming significant, Russia seems to aim at destroying the economy and infrastructure as well as the social structure and depopulate the territories it is targeting. Given the far-reaching Russian policy goals and the present-day limited military success, the tension in the region will likely continue for several years or even decades.

Six possible post-war scenarios

The scenarios developed below and the assessment of their probability is based on the assumption that Russia will not give up its plan easily. Various sources (RUSI, ISPK, ISW, IM, FPRI, Foreign Affairs, McKinsey, The Guardian, BBC) offer various scenarios; from these, six main types of possible outcomes of the war become apparent (also see Map 1). Four main dimensions are considered: duration of the fighting, the proportion of Ukraine that would be occupied or controlled (in a repressive and authoritarian fashion) by Russia or respectively remain sovereign, the level of destruction and security situation in the various territories and the reconstruction efforts including economic recovery.

Map 1: Map of Ukraine with oblasts and population in million, rounded (mio.); lines indicating scenarios of outcome of war; oblasts GRP per capita rounded in 100.000 UAH (2017), and percentage of ethnic Russians (2001)

Source: Free Map from D-Maps.com and additional features added by the author. The lines indicate the various scenarios depending on the outcome of the war. Numbers above the name of Oblast indicate GRP (Ukraine’s average GRP is 70,000,000 UAH/2.221.390,51 Euro), numbers below the name of Oblast indicate the population in million, and percentage refers to the proportion of people identifying themselves as Russian in the last 2001 census.
1. The war will continue until autumn/winter ending with a defeat of Russia (e.g. FPIR). Russia withdraws its troops and also gives up the territory occupied or annexed in 2014 (status quo before 2014). Ukraine remains a sovereign country. However, large proportions of territory within 100 kilometres of the Russian border will be ravaged by war, military and civilian casualties will be limited whilst the rest of the country is largely intact. The security situation in all parts of Ukraine will be stable. A large amount of western aid will be made available to rebuild the country; economic recovery is fast.

This scenario is unlikely to be achieved without western intervention in the foreseeable future.

2. The war will continue until autumn/winter 2022. The Russian army will be pushed back and/or largely withdraws its troops. No or only small parts of Ukraine, in addition to Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk will be occupied, ruled or determined by Russia (status quo after 2014). Most parts of Ukraine remain sovereign. However, large proportions of territory within 100 kilometres of the Russian border will be ravaged by war, military and civilian casualties will be limited whilst the rest of the country is largely intact. In the Russian occupied parts, the security situation will be precarious. All high gross regional product (GRP) provinces will remain sovereign. A large amount of western aid will be made available to rebuild the country; economic recovery in the government-controlled territory is fast.

This scenario is a possibility (e.g. ISW), though unlikely as it would mean that Russia fails to achieve any of its aims.

3. The war will continue until autumn/winter 2022. Russia will occupy a stretch of Ukraine within 100 kilometres of the Russian border including the entire oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, possibly parts of Kharkiv oblasts and a land bridge between Russia and Crimea including the oblasts of Zaporizhia and Kherson. Nevertheless, the majority of the country remains sovereign. However, large proportions of territory within 100 kilometres of the Russian border will be ravaged by war, military and civilian casualties will still be limited whilst the rest of the country is largely intact. This results in yet another frozen conflict. In the Russian occupied parts, the security situation will be precarious. Two high GRP provinces will be lost to Russia diminishing the country’s absorption capacity of IDPs. Significant western aid will be made available to rebuild the sovereign parts of the country, economic recovery is fast. Also, in the occupied parts, some limited reconstruction will take place.

This scenario (e.g. RUSI, IM, Globsec, FPIR) reflects Russia’s minimum aims of gaining full control of Donetsk and Luhansk and overcoming the isolation of Crimea, which might be achievable given the limits of Russian resources and is thus a realistic possibility.

4. The war will continue until winter 2022 or summer 2023. Russia occupies large parts of Ukraine east of the line Kyiv-Mykolaiv. A sub-scenario (4.1) would be the occupation of the entire southern coast including the ports of Odesa cutting sovereign Ukraine from the Black Sea and thus almost all international trade. Hence, most large cities, most industries, infrastructures and economic hubs and most natural resources come under Russian control. The country will be divided with only a small part of it remaining sovereign. Whilst some guerrilla activities and civil disobedience continues in the occupied territory, Russia enforces a repressive regime and persecutes Ukrainian government officials and pro-Ukrainian actors. In the Russian occupied parts, the security situation will be precarious. Only the smaller western parts of Ukraine remain sovereign. Large proportions of territory including most major cities will be ravaged by war, military and civilian casualties will be high whilst only the west of the country is largely intact. Only below average GRP provinces with limited IDP absorption capacity remain sovereign severely diminishing the country’s absorption capacity of IDPs. Western aid only benefits unoccupied western Ukraine; however, it remains structurally and economically weak. Meanwhile, reconstruction in the occupied parts will be limited to some strategic and highly visible locations.

This scenario is a possibility (e.g. IM) but looks increasingly less likely as Russia lacks resources for sustaining the war and a sustained occupation of such a vast territory with a largely hostile population.
The war in Ukraine: Post-war scenarios and migration repercussions

5. The war will continue until winter 2022 or summer 2023. Russia takes the capital, the Ukrainian army will be defeated affecting 0.5 to 1 million soldiers and volunteers, the government capitulates, most fighting ceases and Russia installs a pro-Russian administration and de-facto controls the whole of Ukraine. Some guerrilla activities and civil disobedience continue, Russia enforces a repressive regime and persecutes Ukrainian government officials and pro-Ukrainian actors. For a long period, the security situation will be precarious in the entire country. Most major cities will be ravaged by war, military and civilian casualties will be very high whilst only the west of the country is largely intact. Only some Western aid is delivered but is limited to humanitarian aid. Reconstructions begin but are slow. Significant parts of the economy will not recover in the near future.

This scenario is a possibility (e.g. IM) but less realistic, notably because Russian resources are limited whereas Ukrainian resistance continues to receive western military aid and is stiff and people will not give in to Russian ruling, least so in the west.

6. The war will become protracted similar to the situation in Syria; Russia continues attacking, bombing and shelling at the current intensity the parts of Ukraine that are still under government control, fighting continues along the frontline and there will be guerrilla fighting in the occupied territories. In the Russian occupied territories, repression is widespread and violent. Most major cities will be ravaged by war, military and civilian casualties will be very high. Reconstruction is stalled, the economy remains weak and the security situation remains precarious in most parts of the country.

This scenario (e.g. IM, Foreign Affairs, FPIR, BBC) is unrealistic as neither the Russian side nor the Ukrainian side has the resources for affording a protracted war.

A couple of key features can be identified: Notably, the economically structurally weak provinces in the west host the most IDPs, whereas the structurally strong provinces in the south-east except for Donetsk and Luhansk are hardest hit by the invasion. Moreover, in the regions and cities affected by the fighting, the level of destruction will be widespread. Russia seems to lack resources for sustaining a long war, full control and occupation. Whereas Ukrainian resistance will continue so that the stability and security situation in the occupied territories will remain precarious. Economic support for all parts not under Russian control will be substantial. However, “Putin will remain dangerous in the long run” and the geopolitical situation will remain unstable though “the days of Putin’s regime are numbered” (Institut Montaigne).

Migration scenarios

To develop migration scenarios, this Policy Brief considers, first, the pre-war situation, notably the existing migration networks and the migration aspirations of Ukrainians. Second, key drivers or causes of forced migration are identified and the scope for individual and collective decision-making, in other words, the human agency discussed. Third, the resilience of the current host countries for Ukrainian displaced persons is considered. On that basis, six migration scenarios are developed corresponding to the six scenarios on the outcome of the war.

Conditions and drivers

Before the outbreak of the war and thus the outset of forced migration from Ukraine there were a little over 2 million registered Ukrainians in the EU, EFTA and Turkey (Table 1). To this, one needs to add some level of irregular immigrants. This represents a vast migration network, within which Ukrainian displaced persons migrate and which determines the choice of destination.
In the situation of protracted displacement, displaced persons also consider drivers typical for voluntary migration, and relocate to other countries as denoted by the concept of secondary migration.

Table 1: Ukrainian-born residents and refugees in the EU, EFTA and Turkey (rounded), 2020, 2021, resp. 2022 (11/4/2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pre-war immigrants</th>
<th>Registered refugees</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pre-war immigrants</th>
<th>Registered refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>&gt;1,100,000 (2018)*</td>
<td>844,000*****</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>&gt;159,000</td>
<td>360,000****</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechia</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>272,000+</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>102,000 (2019)</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>90,000 (31/3)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>68,000+</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>9,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>29,000 (2020)**</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3,000 (2016)*****</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>41,900</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18,000 (2021)***</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>15,000****</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>12,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat; * Review of World Economics (only labour migrants); ** Portuguese American Journal; *** Statistika; **** ELIAMEP 2015; *****Ireland Examiner; ****** Bundesministerium des Inneren, (19/4/22, 313,000 on 11/4); ******* 13/4/22

Before the war, migration aspirations among Ukrainians were high though decreasing. According to the findings of the FP7 project Eumagine, in 2012 around 49% of all Ukrainians of working age in four different areas in the East, West, Centre and the capital aspired to migrate. In the meantime, the Delmi report suggests that some 26% held migration aspirations in the period 2006–2021. The most attractive countries or regions included the EU (47%), the US (15%), Russia (13%) and Canada (6%). Within the EU, the most stated aspired destinations are Germany (35.6%), Poland (15.4%), Italy (10.4%), France (7.3%), the Czech Republic (7%) and Spain (5.3%). However, migration aspirations need to be treated with caution; notably, the first Gallup survey suggests that only 3% of those who have migration aspirations finally prepare for migration.

The key drivers and decision-making processes of forced migration are distinctly different from drivers of voluntary migration. The latter group leaves by choice, in an orderly fashion and prepares in advance to seek education, employment, business and love abroad, either short or long-term. Meanwhile, displaced persons and refugees, compelled by force, violence, persecution or war, flee unprepared and in a disorderly manner, thereby leaving most of their possessions and oftentimes necessary documents behind. For this reason, it can be assumed that their return aspirations are high. However, in the situation of protracted displacement, displaced persons also consider drivers typical for voluntary migration, and relocate to other countries as denoted by the concept of secondary migration.
The case of persons displaced from Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 can help to develop migration scenarios. At the time, only some 18%-20% IDPs returned to the occupied territories, while almost all remaining IDPs resettled within Ukraine and half of them in the government-controlled part of the occupied provinces near the place from where they were displaced.

In the current situation, there are only few surveys that provide insights on return aspirations. A Ukrainian survey suggests that 93% of internally displaced Ukrainians wish to return. An IOM survey found that 80% of Ukrainian refugees in Poland aspire to return, 5% - aspire to stay and 4% - aspire moving to another country. Meanwhile, the majority of Ukrainian refugees in Germany (62%) wish to stay, with only 32% willing to return. Moreover, in the case of Germany, the desire to stay is highest among single men (50%), whereas the desire to return is more widespread among the elderly (age 60+) and women with children (44% and 33% respectively). This implies that the further Ukrainians fled from the war zone the less likely is their aspiration to return. It has been observed, that the equivalent of 13.4% of all Ukrainian nationals in the EU or 19.3% of Ukrainian refugees have returned within seven weeks since the beginning of the war and as soon as fighting ceased in some parts of the country. Furthermore, Ukrainians with the aspiration to stay in the current host country are likely to develop aspirations for family reunification. In Germany, women with children represent around half of the people who fled the war; of these, 41% aspires to stay. This group is most likely to have left husbands behind and is thus most likely to aspire family reunification.

However, the final behaviour in the current conflict will be determined by a range of macro-level and micro-level drivers:

(a) the duration of the war (the longer the war lasts, the less likely people are to return);
(b) the scope of the destruction; notably the loss of the home in Ukraine (the higher the level of destruction is, the lower are the chances for people to return);
(c) the political situation in Ukraine (which parts will be occupied, ruled by Russia and which parts will be free) (people are less likely to return to an occupied territory);
(d) the Gross Regional Product (GRP) of the free provinces (this contributes to the absorption capacity of IDPs);
(e) the economic outlook of Ukraine including the reconstruction efforts and speed thereof (people are less likely to return to poverty and more likely to return if there is a reconstruction boom maybe even similar to a Marshall plan for Ukraine);
(f) the family status and whereabouts of other family members, notably forced separation from family members, loss of close family members in the war, such as husbands, wives, children, parents etc. (people are less like to return if they have lost core family members, notably husbands, wives and parents);
(g) ethnicity (ethnic Ukrainians are less likely to return to Russian occupied or controlled territory, not the least due to fear of persecution);
(h) the duration of stay in the EU (the longer people stay in the EU the less likely return is a realistic option);
(i) their legal status in the EU and the related political situation (the less stable their status is the more likely they are to return);
(j) the integration in the host community, city and country, notably with regards to the labour market, housing market, education system and language acquisition (the better people and their children are integrated, the less likely they are to return);
(k) the need to generate remittances for family members still in Ukraine (the greater the need to generate remittances for those left behind in Ukraine is, the less likely they are to return);
(l) the perceptions of migration and perceptions of Ukraine before the war (the more critical their perceptions of Ukraine and the more positive their perceptions of the host country are, the less likely they are to return);
In the case of protracted displacement, durable solutions, notably local integration, become inevitable.

(m) the perception of Ukraine after the war (the more critical their perception of Ukraine after the war is, the less likely they are to return); and

(n) the perception of life in the EU (the more positive they are about life in the host country the more likely they are to stay).

In social terms, there are three options possible: 1) remaining in the current host country; this includes possible reunification with family members still in Ukraine; 2) returning and reintegrating to the country of origin, either to the place of origin or elsewhere; 3) or resettlement to a third country within the EU or beyond. To some extent, this is congruent with the politically defined durable solutions, notably return, local integration or resettlement to a third country.

The legal situation represents an important driver of migration. It will be decisive whether the EU’s temporary protection directive is implemented in a restrictive or generous fashion; for instance, whether the recognition of skills and certificates will be simplified to actually enter the labour market. Another factor is whether temporary protection will expire, whether Ukrainians are expected to return and to what extent and by what means return will be enforced. In the case of protracted displacement, durable solutions, notably local integration, become inevitable. Ultimately, the outcome of the individual’s decision will be determined by the balance between human agency, the aspirations of the displaced Ukrainians and structure i.e. the solution(s) offered by the host countries.

Finally, there are only a few signs that suggest that resilience among the countries hosting Ukrainian displaced persons is fading. All EU host countries experience population ageing and potentially shrinking populations. Furthermore, key host countries such as Poland lost significant proportions of their populations due to emigration. All host countries currently enjoy economic growth and all report a significant number of job vacancies. In addition, to date, no country reported unrest or conflict due to the inflow of Ukrainians.

Map 2. The observed dynamics of migration from and to Ukraine in 2022
**Post-war migration scenarios**

According to the scenarios of the outcome of the invasion and taking into account the drivers of forced migration, six scenarios of post-war migration are possible:

1. No part of Ukraine is occupied by Russia, some Eastern parts are destroyed. The overwhelming majority, up to 93% of IDPs as the Rating Group survey suggests will return. Only a small proportion may opt not to return, notably because their homes are destroyed. Of the international refugees, 20% to 50% - depending on whether they are in a country bordering Ukraine or another EU member state - may take the opportunity to realise their pre-existing or newly developed migration aspirations. This means that 550,000 may remain in the peripheral EU countries and 824,000 - in other EU member states. However, migration aspirations will be diminishing with Ukraine’s economic recovery and growth and potentially even with the EU membership. Of those aspiring to stay in the EU, 20% or more will pursue family reunification attracting at least another 275,000 persons. As a result, less than 1.65 million Ukrainians would settle in the EU, a trend decreasing.

2. No or small additional parts of Ukraine are occupied apart from already occupied Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. However, some parts of eastern Ukraine are devastated. As above, the majority of currently displaced persons would return though 1.65 million or more Ukrainians would settle in the EU.

3. Russia occupies some parts of Kharkiv province, the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk and the provinces forming a land bridge between Russia and Crimea. This would affect 7.9 million people of whom 4.5 million, but possibly more, would be displaced. Of these, 1.44 million would flee to the EU. As of April 2022, an additional 7.2 million were displaced who would no longer be affected by the occupation. Of these, around 2.2 million are in the EU, of which 1.4 million are in the peripheral and 720,000 in other EU MS, of which 484,000 and 497,000 aspire staying in the peripheral and other EU MS respectively. Under this scenario, around 2.9 million could stay in the EU, 20% would aspire family reunification and thus could be joined by 580,000 family members. Therefore, a total of 3.48 million Ukrainians could settle in the EU longer term.

4. This scenario largely reflects the situation as of 31 March before Russia withdrew from Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumi provinces. In this case, 21.3 to 24.8 million Ukrainians (the latter including Mykolaiv and Odesa) would be or would have been affected. Of these, 12 to 14 million would be displaced, 484,000 would become international refugees, and 4.5 million would be in the EU. Of the latter, only 56.3,000 could return to occupied territory. Of the remainder, 20% would aspire for family reunification bringing in at least another 900,000 Ukrainians. Thus, the total number of Ukrainian refugees in the EU increases to 4.8 million.

5. The entire territory of Ukraine comes under Russian control; most parts are directly occupied, whilst the west is ruled by a pro-Russian puppet regime. This affects the entire population of Ukraine, 37 million people. It can be expected that 20.9 million will aspire to flee the country. The figure can also be higher because the western part of Ukraine is distinctly less Russian than the Donbas region, which saw 56.5% of its population flee in 2014. This also includes the army and territorial defence personnel amounting to 0.5-1 million men and women. However, up to 10% or 2.2 million people, the most resilient and those more tolerant towards the Russian ruling, will also return. Hence, more than 18.8 million Ukrainians could seek a new home abroad. Due to continuous guerrilla warfare and occasional fighting, persecution and precarious economic situation, annually several ten thousand Ukrainians will seek refuge in the EU.

6. The last scenario is similar to scenario 5 but very few Ukrainians will have the aspiration to return.
The war in Ukraine: Post-war scenarios and migration repercussions

Table 2: Overview migration scenarios, Ukrainians remaining in the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
<th>Scenario 4</th>
<th>Scenario 5</th>
<th>Scenario 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1.65 mio.</td>
<td>&gt;1.65 mio.</td>
<td>3.48 mio.</td>
<td>4.8 mio.</td>
<td>18.8 mio.</td>
<td>&gt;21 mio.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above scenarios can be compared with two other cases: Yugoslavia in the 1990s and Syria in the 2010s. During the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995 and 1998-1999), 3.4 million out of 24 million population were displaced: 1.3 million represented Bosnian IDPs, 500,000 were refugees in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, 700,000 refugees in the EU, and 690,000 from Kosovo. Since then, the hostilities have ceased, the state building was completed and the countries and economies largely recovered. Ten years later, there were only 296,000 refugees and IDPs. Germany hosted 700,000 refugees (500,000 from the former Yugoslavia and 200,000 from Kosovo). Initially, refugees were granted the right to work and the free choice of residence, although family reunification was restricted and thus insignificant. As of 1997, return policies were developed and enforced resulting in the return of up to 80% within 2-3 years.

In Syria, violence continues since the outbreak of the war in 2011 until the present day. Large parts of many cities are destroyed (Aleppo 33%, Damascus 24%, Homs 13%, Raqqa 12%, Hama 10%; data for 2017), the repressive Assad regime remains in power and the reconstruction is stalled. Over 12.6 million continue to be displaced (5.7 million refugees and 6.9 million IDPs), 58.4% of the total population of 21.4 million (2010). Of these, 70% hope to return but very few did. This demonstrates that under adverse conditions (persecution, violence, economic hardship) and even despite political pressure (as in Lebanon and partly also Turkey) return rates are very low. Germany hosts 660,000 Syrian refugees, who attracted another 140,000 persons via family reunification, hence roughly another 21%, which is similar to the estimate of the family reunification potential of Ukrainians. Only about 1,000 have returned.

In the case of Ukraine, the proportion of people aspiring to flee may increase depending on the duration of the war, the size of occupied territories, the degree of destruction, the loss of human lives, the difficulty in terms of provisioning and economic situation of occupied territories. The greater the listed factors are the higher will be the proportion of Ukrainians seeking shelter abroad and the lower the proportion of those aspiring to return. The above calculations take into account the war of 2014 and its patterns of displacement, where 56.6% were displaced permanently and only 12.5% of all displaced returned to occupied territory. In the current situation, some 32% of all displaced persons have already fled abroad, but this figure could increase significantly. Accordingly, the figures in the scenarios 4, 5 and 6 could also increase significantly. By the time of writing, a combination of scenarios 2 and 3 seemed most likely.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Under any scenario, a significant number of Ukrainian displaced persons, from 1.65 million to over 21 million, will be settling in the EU more or less permanently. A figure of around 2.5 to 3.5 million Ukrainians including 400,000 to 600,000 joining family members seems rather realistic. However, the lack of language proficiency, protracted improvised housing arrangements and practical problems in entering the labour market as well as sentiments will also drive significant return migration. Meanwhile, current mobility patterns facilitated by available transportation and easy border crossing suggest that migration between Ukraine and the EU increasingly features transnational patterns meaning that people are not “either here or there” but engage in circular migration. Most drivers of forced migration, as listed above, can be addressed by political measures such as active labour market integration, reconstruction of Ukraine or return incentives. Notably, transnationality requires specific policy interventions, for example, concerning remittances, development or children. Under any scenario, the EU’s temporary protection directive will only serve those who are returning within three years of arrival; it will be the majority under scenarios 1, 2 and 3, whereas under scenarios 4, 5 and 6 the majority will aspire to stay in the EU. This implies, that in any case, the temporary protection directive will require an exit option, converting temporary into long-term protection.