ICMPD
International Centre for
Migration Policy Development



ICMPD
Migration Outlook 2023

Ten migration issues to look out for in 2023

Origins, key events and priorities for Europe

International Centre for Migration Policy Development

Ten migration issues to look out for in 2023

2023 will again be a challenging year for EU migration policy. Below is a non-exhaustive list of trends and developments that will be high on the agenda of decision makers and analysts alike.

1. High migration pressures in times of global polycrisis

The world faces a number of crises that interact with increasing velocity and impact, a situation that is described as a state of "global polycrisis". It also marks a turning point in global and European migration history. A new migration environment is shaped by the continued effects of long-term trends and drivers, increasing economic and demographic imbalances, climate change, growing geopolitical competition and the instrumentalisation of migration as a means of hybrid aggression. It is characterised by growing levels of mobility, both voluntary and forced, both legal and irregular. The EU member states recorded a 64% increase in detections of irregular border crossings in 2022 and a 46% increase in asylum applications in 2022. The EU was not alone in this; other regions of destination observed similar developments. The United States recorded an increase of 41% of cases at its southern border and almost seven times more attempted arrivals by boat than in 2021. There is little to suggest a trend reversal in 2023. Migration pressures will stay high and destination countries will have to deal with flows of refugees and irregular migrants.

2. A focus on the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean migratory routes

In 2022, the Western Balkans Route and the Central Mediterranean Route recorded 75% of all detections of irregular border crossings into the EU. This was caused by increasing migratory pressures in important origin and transit regions due to growing instability and conflict, the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine, the increasing significance of Tunisia as a point of departure alongside Libya, and visa-free access for important nationalities of origin to neighbouring countries and the subsequent attempts to cross into the Schengen Zone. A tightening of visa regimes and route-specific EU action plans in the second half of the year have the potential to reduce the numbers in 2023 but will not fully outweigh the impact of other powerful drivers shaping migration along the two routes.

3. A possible second wave of refugees from Ukraine

Since the beginning of Russia's invasion on 24 February, 7.9 million Ukrainians have fled to Europe and 4.9 million have registered for Temporary Protection or similar schemes in the EU and other European countries. The attacks on critical infrastructure as of October destroyed 50% of the energy system and put immense strains on Ukrainian society but did not result in significant numbers of people leaving. 18 million Ukrainians, however, are considered in urgent need of humanitarian support inside the country. Host countries have to anticipate scenarios of increasing and perhaps sudden inflows of Ukrainian refugees in 2023. The different scenarios range from 500,000 to 4 million persons and contingency plans must prepare for such high numbers.

4. The labour market integration of Ukrainians and exit strategies from temporary protection

The Ukrainian refugees who arrived last year will start to enter into employment more strongly in 2023. Positive labour market outcomes require more targeted support in the areas of language training, childcare, skills acknowledgement and on-the-job training. This challenges host countries' systems with a shorter immigration tradition and less experience in integration policies. At present there is little hope for an early end to hostilities. This should, however, not prevent a discussion on the necessary steps to exit from temporary protection in a well-prepared way. Temporary protection will be extended until March 2024. This will give sufficient time to consider what is necessary in developing post-temporary-protection strategies and to develop an approach that is thoroughly coordinated between the member states but also with the Ukrainian authorities who have a strong interest in the return of their citizens as soon as hostilities end.

5. The work on instruments to address the instrumentalisation of migration

The EU will have to deal with attempts to instrumentalise migrants as a means of hybrid aggression in 2023 too, as confirmed by the Russian government announcing that flights will be launched from North Africa and the Middle East to the exclave of Kaliningrad, which borders the member state Poland and easily serves as a springboard for irregular movements towards the EU. The EU's draft Instrumentalisation Regulation, initiated in 2021 and intended to serve as a main instrument addressing instrumentalisation, did not find a majority at the Interior Ministers Council in December, also driven by concerns about a weakening of the Common European Asylum System standards. It will be important to revisit the regulation and continue the work on commonly agreeable instruments in 2023, keeping in mind that instrumentalisation is likely to continue, requiring coherent responses from the EU together with its partners in regions of origin and transit.

6. The debate over visa regimes in the EU and beyond

In 2022, irregular arrivals and new asylum applications in the EU (other than Ukrainians) comprised, in their majority, applicants from war- and conflict-ridden countries. But they also included a considerable share of nationalities with very low prospects for a positive decision on their claims who at the same time benefited from visa-free or facilitated access to EU member states or neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, Serbia has committed to tightening its visa regulations, the recently launched European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) should help to identify irregular migration risks linked to specific origin countries, and the newly concluded migration and mobility partnerships will facilitate legal migration but also enhance the cooperation on preventing irregular migration. In view of the high attention paid to irregular migration and asylum in the political debate, the review of existing visa regimes will, however, stay high on the political agenda also in 2023.

7. The effects of the global supply and cost-of-living crisis on migration

It is difficult to identify soaring living costs or food insecurity as single factors stimulating migration flows but, when seen in conjunction with other factors, their relevance is not contested either. The increase in irregular migration flows observed in Europe and other world regions in 2022 is at least partly attributed to factors related to living costs, food insecurity and climate events. Against this backdrop, the extent to which the international community pays attention to related developments and the degree to which the countries of the global north provide support to the countries most affected by higher food prices, boosting food production and making agricultural sectors more resilient will be an important factor in controlling irregular migration flows in 2023.

8. Economic downturn, labour shortages and the discussion on legal migration channels in Europe

The debate over shortages on European labour markets continued throughout 2022 despite the economic uncertainties resulting from the war in Ukraine. Almost all European countries reported a lack of skilled workers and labour shortages across most sectors. Around six million jobs were waiting to be filled throughout the year. As fallout from the war in Ukraine, the EU economy will be weak in 2023. GDP growth is forecast to reach only 0.3% and inflation will remain high at 7.0%. The outlook on labour markets, however, is less pessimistic. Unemployment rates should rise moderately from 6.2% in 2022 to 6.5% and employment growth is expected to increase again in 2024. It is therefore quite likely that the reduced labour market demands due to the economic downturn will not outweigh the structural labour force losses due to demographic change. Labour migration issues will stay on the European agenda in 2023.

9. A growing number of migration partnerships between EU member states and non-European partners

Not least because of growing labour supply needs, European governments have stepped up their efforts to actively recruit workers in countries of origin or to enter into comprehensive migration and mobility partnerships in 2022. Portugal concluded agreements on employment and residence of workers with India and Morocco, while Germany and India signed an Agreement on Migration and Mobility, intended as a model for further agreements in this field. India has concluded similar agreements with Finland, France and the United Kingdom and will sign one with Austria as well. A main benefit of these agreements is that they do not solely focus on the labour market needs of destination countries, but ensure a broad political basis for cooperation on training issues, migrants' rights, combating illegal migration and ensuring the return and reintegration of illegally staying migrants. In 2023, it will be interesting to see how much the numbers of such agreements will grow and how quickly they will move to the level of practical implementation.

10. The last opportunity to finalise the Pact on Migration and Asylum

In September 2020, the European Commission presented the so-called New Pact on Migration and Asylum, supposed to initiate a fresh start in the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The pact included a number of legislative proposals that were contested from the beginning due to long-standing disagreement among Member States over fundamental directions of the CEAS. There has been considerable progress since then but divisions persist. Next year will provide the final opportunity to complete the work and to agree the pact or at least some of its legislative proposals before the next European elections in 2024. It remains to be seen whether the extraordinary European summit in February, devoted to important migration issues and the approval of the pact, will achieve a final breakthrough.

Introduction

ICMPD's Migration Outlook presents a brief analysis of recent migration and policy trends and provides an outlook on developments and events to watch out for in 2023. Thus, the outlook does not claim to foretell the future or to cover all relevant trends. It aims to use past experience and highlight what might happen and is important to consider.

Europe and the EU are experiencing perhaps the most challenging times since the end of the Second World War in terms of the geopolitical situation but also in terms of migration, flight and displacement. During the last one and a half years, Afghanistan fell to the Taliban and hundreds of thousands fled the country. At the same time Belarus started to pull thousands of migrants from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan to its capital, only to organise their subsequent entry to Poland and Lithuania with the intention to destabilise the EU and sow divisions among the member states. In February 2022, Russia started its aggression against Ukraine, displacing millions of people who found protection in neighbouring countries and the EU. In June, heavy rains triggered the most severe flooding in the recent history of Pakistan, leaving behind a crisis of a scale that is hard to even imagine. Around the globe, millions of people are on the edge of famine because of the fallout from the war in Ukraine, the disruption of supply chains and the effects of climate change. Soaring inflation and a looming global recession endanger stability and social peace and make the international community fall behind on its development goals.

The world faces a number of crises that interact with increasing velocity and severe impact, a situation that has been described as a state of "global polycrisis". It also marks another turning point in European migration history. International migration is a complex phenomenon influenced by a variety of factors and causes. Conflict, instability, economic imbalances, globalisation, demographic developments, labour force demands and supplies, new means of communication and the increasing effects of climate change result in growing levels of mobility, both voluntary and forced, both legal and irregular. Recent events, however, make obvious that new challenges add to existing ones, leading to unforeseen situations that evolve rapidly, involve a complex interplay of drivers or are rooted in other States' deliberate and hostile action. This new migration environment is shaped by a number of factors: the continued effects of long-term trends and drivers, the impact of growing geopolitical competition, the direct and indirect impacts of war and conflict, and the instrumentalisation of migration as a means of hybrid aggression. In reality, these factors cannot always be clearly distinguished. The fact that they occur simultaneously and reinforce each other constitutes a large part of the challenge the EU is faced with.

For many observers, the war in Ukraine is much more than a regional conflict. Instead, it heralds the end of the post-Cold War era and marks a turning point in the global order that could bring even greater uncertainty.[1] Some argue that this development dates back to the economic shocks in the

---

[1] Gowan, R., Peacemaking 2.0: Conflict resolution after Russia's war in Ukraine, SDG Action, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://sdg-action.org/peacemaking-2-0-conflict-resolution-after-russias-war-on-ukraine%EF%BF%BC/.

aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, which exacerbated existing social and political tensions in many regions of the world and affected the size and dynamics of international migration as well. Eroding state stability and aggravating conflicts spurred violence and led to ever increasing levels of displacement within States and across borders. Notwithstanding the complex and multifaceted nature of migration in all its forms, war, civil war and violent conflict are of particular relevance as triggers for sudden and large-scale cross-border movements. A recent report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) pointed out that the number of state-based armed conflicts, not least because of growing geopolitical competition, nearly doubled between 2010 and 2020, resulting in a doubling of the number of forcibly displaced people in the world over the same period.[2]

Thus, geopolitics also affect regions geographically far removed from the conflict as such. As a beacon of freedom and stability in an increasingly volatile global environment, the EU has developed into a main destination of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants. All evidence suggests that the significance of the drivers that cause displacement and irregular migration will gain rather than lose in significance. The number of people who see themselves forced to leave their home and make it to another country will continue to grow, in the European neighbourhood and further afield. Many of them will regard Europe and the EU as the only option offering protection and perspective and will try to reach it as their preferred destination.

Focus regions

In 2022, the situation in the wider European region will be shaped by migration-related developments in the Near and Middle East, South Asia, African regions and Eastern Europe (for a detailed discussion of the Ukrainian displacement crisis see page 20 of this report). This does not mean that other geographic areas deserve less attention, but the major migration movements towards Europe will be linked to the situation in these regions.

Afghanistan

The Taliban takeover in August 2021 prompted a surge in displacement in Afghanistan and beyond. An estimated 1.3 million Afghans had fled to the neighbouring countries of Iran (approx. 1 million persons) and Pakistan (approx. 240,000) by December 2022.[3] Due to a drop in hostilities, the pace of internal displacement reduced significantly from a total of 704,000 new IDPs in 2021 to 32,000 new IDPs in 2022. An estimated 762,000 Afghan nationals returned from Iran and another 76,000 from Pakistan. This notwithstanding, Afghanistan will remain one of the largest displacement situations in 2023. There are 2.7 million Afghan refugees, most of them hosted in neighbouring countries and Türkiye, and 3.5 million Afghans displaced inside the country. 24 million people in Afghanistan are in urgent need of

[2] SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Institute), Environment of Peace: Security in a New Era of Risk, May 2022.
[3] OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan. Snapshot of Population Movements (January to November 2022), Accessed 5 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-snapshot-population-movements-january-november-2022-23-november-2022?_gl=1*iqrbpc*_ga*MTIyNTY2NjY0Mi4xNjczMDgzNDU1*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTY3MzA4MzQ1NS4xLjAuMTY3MzA4MzQ1NS42MC4wLjA.

humanitarian assistance. The Afghan authorities' decision to ban women from working for non-governmental organisations providing relief and humanitarian assistance forced many actors to cut down on activities, which in turn might lead to an upsurge in displacement. The ongoing exclusion from the economic and educational systems is likely to lead more women (and their spouses) to look for less oppressive environments abroad. Globally, Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by natural disasters and the adverse effects of climate change. High dependency on traditional livelihoods together with little agricultural resilience have caused additional displacement in 2022 and will most likely do so in 2023 as well. Although the neighbouring countries further restricted the movement of incoming Afghans in 2022, about 8,000 to 9,000 Afghans arrived in Pakistan[4] and up to 2,000 in Iran[5] every day. Worsening economic conditions in the main host countries for Afghan migrants and refugees – Iran (3.6 million refugees, family members and head-counted persons), Pakistan (3.3 million refugees, citizenship card holders and undocumented) and Türkiye (380,000 Afghan refugees) – together with increasingly hostile attitudes towards migrants from these populations will increase the potential for secondary movements towards Europe and the EU. Asylum applications by Afghan nationals in the EU has gone up by 34% in recent years and there is little to suggest that this trend will reverse in 2023.

Pakistan

Pakistan is both an important origin and destination of international migration in its various manifestations. More than 11 million Pakistani nationals work abroad as labour migrants, mainly in the Gulf countries. Pakistan itself hosts an estimated 3.4 million immigrants from India, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Iran and Sri Lanka. In addition, about 2.5 million Afghan nationals reside in the country as refugees or undocumented migrants. An uptick in terrorist attacks, soaring inflation and a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Imran Khan turned 2022 into a year of increasing political and economic uncertainty. Pakistan's economy is forecast to slow to 3.5% in 2023, not least because of the devastating floods throughout the summer, which destroyed 2 million homes, displaced 8 million people and left 20.6 million in need of humanitarian aid.[6] Next year's dire economic outlook will affect both emigrants from Pakistan and vulnerable immigrant populations in the country. The expected economic downturn is likely to reduce the prospects for taking up work abroad, an important component of Pakistan's policy to address the country's youth bulge and to mitigate unemployment and poverty, but also an indicator of the dependency of millions of households on migrant remittances. Refugee and undocumented populations inside Pakistan will see their income opportunities deteriorate even further. Both factors increase the potential for primary and secondary movements from the country, which in face of lacking legal channels will have to largely rely on irregular patterns.

[4] IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix on Afghanistan, as of 8 December 2022, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://dtm.iom.int/reports/movement-and-out-afghanistan-snapshot-16-30-november-2022.

[5] UNHCR (2022), Afghanistan Situation Update #22, as of 4 December 2022, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/97760.

[6] UNDP (2022), Pakistan Floods 2022: Resilient Recovery, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction Framework, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.undp.org/pakistan/publications/pakistan-floods-2022-resilient-recovery-rehabilitation-and-reconstruction-framework-4rf.

India

India is considered the country with the world's largest emigrant population. An estimated 17.9 million Indian nationals lived abroad permanently in 2020, mainly in the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Oman. Due to historical ties, the United Kingdom is the main destination of Indian migrants in Europe with an Indian migrant population of 835,000.[7] Other European destinations saw significantly lower immigration levels from India, a situation that has started to change in recent years. The number of work permits issued for Indian nationals in the EU has increased by almost 190% over the last 10 years and the number of residence permits for researchers and students by almost 400%. Thus, the share of Indian nationals among all irregular migrants in the EU had consistently decreased from 2.2% in 2010 to 1.2% in 2020. Last year, however, saw a spike in detections of irregular border crossings (up 1,600% in comparison to 2021) and asylum applications in the EU (up 120%). This trend had its roots in the more intense migration relations outlined above and the increasing desire of Indian nationals to reach destinations inside the EU without having access to legal opportunities. It was, however, also driven by another set of opportunities, namely the possibility to travel to Serbia on a visa-free basis and to organise the subsequent journey towards the EU after entry. Serbia had previously lifted visa requirements to attract more business travellers from India. This had come to the attention of people-smuggling networks operating in the Western Balkans who then started to develop corresponding schemes. Since 1 January 2023, Serbia has requested a visa from travellers from India. Together with the increasing numbers of migration and mobility partnerships between India and major EU destination countries, which regularly include cooperation on countering irregular migration and fostering return and readmission, it can be expected that Serbia's policy change will contribute to a clear reduction of irregular arrivals from India in 2023.

Syria

2022 again saw hardly any progress towards a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Syria Constitutional Committee ceased to meet and the UN Special Envoy for Syria asserted that there were no serious efforts to solve the conflict politically.[8] The humanitarian situation in the country worsened even further. 15.9 million Syrians will require humanitarian assistance in 2023, the highest number since the start of the conflict in 2011. Consequently, the Syrian crisis will remain one of the largest global displacement crises in 2023, including 5.4 million refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries, mainly Lebanon and Jordan, including 3.5 million Syrians under temporary protection in Türkiye, and 6.9 million internally displaced. The situation is further aggravated by a recent spread of cholera and political dispute over the continuation of the cross-border aid mechanism that had provided a lifeline to Syrians since the early days of the conflict. Migration will be high on the agenda in the run-up to the Turkish general elections scheduled for May and the debate will revolve around migration control, integration and the return of Syrians to their home country. Already in 2022, Türkiye

---

[7] Singh, R., Origin of World's Largest Migrant Population, India Seeks to Leverage Immigration, March 9, 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/india-migration-country-profile.

[8] Security Council Report, Syria. January 2023 Monthly Forecast, 29 December 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-01/syria-51.php.

tightened its border control and return policies, prevented the irregular entry of over 280,000 persons, apprehended over 236,000 irregular migrants within the country, returned more than 124,000 migrants and facilitated the voluntary return of almost 59,000 Syrian nationals throughout the year. According to official sources, a total of 539,332 Syrians have returned voluntarily by the end of 2022.[9] In the EU, irregular arrivals of Syrian nationals increased by 120% and Syrian asylum applications by 41% in the course of last year. The above factors suggest that this trend will hardly change in 2023.

Iran

The crackdown on anti-government protests and the worsening economic situation as a result of the global economic climate but also of the lasting effects of the international sanctions regime in response to Iran's nuclear programme are likely to have a high impact on migration trends from and inside Iran. In recent years, emigration from Iran has been rather limited, with an estimated 50,000 persons leaving the country every year. But this mainly related to the young and highly educated, a population most likely to react to increasing restrictions by leaving the country. Recent research suggests that up to 85% of Iranian university students are seriously considering moving abroad, preferably to Germany, Canada or the United States.[10] At the same time, Iran is an important host country to refugees in the region. Approx. 800,000 refugees, mostly Afghans, live in the country in addition to an estimated 2.1 million undocumented Afghans and nearly 600,000 Afghan regular migrants. In the aftermath of the Taliban takeover another 500,000 to 1 million Afghans have newly fled to Iran, requiring humanitarian assistance in face of the country's tense political and economic situation. As is the case in other major refugee-hosting countries in the region, political and economic uncertainty yield a high potential for primary and secondary movements from Iran in 2023, the majority of which would head towards Türkiye and the EU.

Iraq

The formation of a new coalition government in October eased the political tensions that had led to repeated unrest and clashes between protesters and security forces in the first half of 2022. In contrast to many other countries in the region and due to the increase in oil prices, Iraq's economic outlook is quite positive for 2023. Oil price volatility, however, is also one of the central weaknesses of the Iraqi economy, which largely depends on revenues from oil exports. Oil price dependency, political division, sectarianism and instability in the region have hampered economic transition. Despite the country's oil wealth, large parts of the Iraqi population find themselves without prospects for a better future. Youth unemployment, for instance, rose from 16.1% to 27.2% during the last decade[11] and only 33% of the working age population were employed in 2021. Lacking capacity to provide sufficient opportunities for large parts of the population is further aggravated by the fact that Iraq has to cater for almost 1.2 million IDPs and almost 5 million IDP Returnees. Moreover it is host to more than

---

[9] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management, Accessed 18 January 2023, https://twitter.com/Gocidaresi/status/1609957713756446749?s=20&t=a_Sm97DhFYCCG88y3Y09vw.

[10] Bizaer, M., Escalating emigration and the "drought" in Iran's IT industry, July 2022, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/escalating-emigration-and-drought-irans-it-industry.

[11] The World Bank, Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15 – 24)(modelled ILO estimate – Iraq, Accessed 11 January 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=IQ.

260,000 Syrian refugees.[12] In recent years, irregular migration from Iraq towards the EU has decreased. However, also in 2022 over 70,000 Iraqis left the country to seek protection, about half of them in a European country. Political tensions, high youth unemployment and the presence of IDP, returnee and refugee populations suggest that primary and secondary movements from Iraq to Europe will continue in 2023 as well.

Lebanon

With 1.5 million mostly Syrian refugees, Lebanon hosts the largest per capita refugee population in the world.[13] The country with a population of 5.6 million people not only has to bear the burden of an overwhelming displacement situation but for three years has also faced the deepest multifaceted crisis in its modern history. The economic and financial crisis which started in 2019 was further aggravated by the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Beirut harbour blast in August 2020. As a result, Lebanon's GDP per capita dropped by more than 36% between 2019 and 2021, a contraction that is hardly ever seen outside of a war situation. The economic crisis not only weighs heavily on the Lebanese people but on the refugee population as well. Nine out of ten Syrian refugees live in extreme poverty, which sees them widely restricted in accessing basic services, education, health, shelter, water and sanitation. Although Lebanon has been without a government since the May elections, President Michel Aoun announced in October that Lebanon would soon begin returning Syrian refugees to their home country. The dire economic situation and the threat of deportation have already led to an increase of irregular departures from Lebanon by boat to Cyprus and Italy, with the latter replacing the former as the desired destination. Costs for the journey are high, averaging 5,000 USD per passenger, and so are the dangers of crossing the Eastern Mediterranean in an irregular way. High costs, low financial means of refugees in Lebanon and the restricted capacities for organising crossings by boat will limit overall arrivals via this route in 2023, at least in comparison to other routes and means of transportation. The particularly fragile situation in Lebanon, however, and the dangers that refugees encounter should they decide to leave by boat are reason enough to consider the Lebanese situation a major priority of the EU's external cooperation on migration and refugee issues in 2023.

Libya

Libya is both a major host to a large and mixed migrant population and an important point of departure for refugees and irregular migrants headed towards the EU along the Central Mediterranean Route. This route gained further importance in 2022, with a 49% increase in irregular arrivals in the EU departing from Libya, Tunisia and Türkiye (according to the latest Mixed Migration Centre analysis, 47% of departures left from Libya in 2021, followed by Tunisia with 31%).[14] Libya's migration situation is complex. It includes an estimated 680,000 migrants (mainly from Niger, Egypt, Sudan, Chad and

[12] UNHCR, Iraq Factsheet, December 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/unhcr-iraq-factsheet-december-2022.

[13] UNHCR, Lebanon Fact Sheet, October 2022, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/3918.

[14] Forin, R. and Frouws, B., What's new? Analysing the latest trends on the Central Mediterranean mixed migration route to Italy, Mixed Migration Centre, 9 February 2022, Accessed 29 December 2022, https://mixedmigration.org/articles/whats-new-analysing-the-latest-trends-on-the-central-mediterranean-mixed-migration-route-to-italy/.

Nigeria) who came to the country for labour purposes,[15] 43,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers, 143,000 IDPs, 688,000 IDP returnees and 4,500 persons currently held in detention.[16] 803,000 people in the country are believed to be in need of humanitarian assistance. As regards the nationalities of migrants transiting Libya towards the EU, 2022 confirmed the previously observed shift from Sub-Saharan to North African and Asian countries of origin. The main nationalities detected along the Central Mediterranean Route (including Tunisia as a point of departure) came from Egypt (19%), Tunisia (19%), Bangladesh (14%), Syria (7%) and Afghanistan (7%). Libya's economic outlook is fairly positive for 2023. The national election process, however, has been stalled for more than one year. The ceasefire held throughout 2022 and there was progress in the area of security. But disagreement between the two rival governments could turn the situation again in 2023, influencing the Libyan authorities' capacity to cooperate with the EU and the international community on resolving migration issues. The humanitarian situation for certain migrant categories in Libya is precarious and reports on the violation of migrants' and asylum seekers' rights are frequent, prompting migrants to seek safer environments abroad. In conjunction with its geographic position, increasing migration pressures in regions of origin of transit and the fragile security environment, it is rather unlikely that migration pressures along the Central Mediterranean Route will decline. The new Italian government seeks to deepen cooperation with North African countries on migration control and it remains to be seen how quickly these efforts translate into decreasing numbers of irregular crossings.

Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

Last year saw the continuation of a trend that had started two years ago, namely a significant relative increase in irregular arrivals from North African countries of origin in the EU. In comparison to 2022, the number of apprehended Tunisian nationals increased by 59% in 2022 (23,406 cases in total) and the number of apprehended Egyptian nationals by 179% (18,497 cases). The number of apprehended Moroccan nationals remained stable at plus 0.7% (12,879 cases). Asylum application figures reflected the increase in irregular migration flows from the three countries as well. As the most important African country of origin, Tunisian applicants ranked 12th in the application statistics (a total of 21,055 applications, up 148% in comparison to 2021), followed by Moroccan applicants (ranking 13th with 20,224 applications, up 45%) and Egyptian nationals (ranking 17th with 14,364, up 139%). Observers widely agree that contrary to other countries of origin, irregular migration from the three countries is mainly caused by economic reasons. Egypt experiences a severe economic crisis.[17] Tunisia is faced with a protracted dire economic situation and lacking perspective, which in conjunction with a tense political situation prompts especially the young and well-educated to look for better opportunities abroad.[18] Other factors that come into play are travel opportunities like the visa-free access for Tunisians in Serbia, the activities of people-smuggling networks like those reported for Egypt or the

[15] IOM, Libya Migration Report Round 43, July – August 2022, p. 4, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://displacement.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/DTM_Libya_R43_Migrant_Report.pdf.
[16] UNHCR Update Libya, 15 November 2022, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unhcr-update-libya-15-november-2022-enar.
[17] European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Egypt as a Country of Origin, July 2022, p. 9.
[18] ICMPD Trend Assessment, Fine-Grained. Exploring the link between food security and migration in Tunisia, November 2022, p. 4.

large Egyptian migrant population in Libya that, faced with worsening economic and security conditions, partly decided to move on to Europe. At the same time, the three countries are important partners in the so-called external dimension of the EU migration policy. Morocco reported that it had prevented 56,000 migrants from crossing the Mediterranean in the period from January to August 2022. In July, the European Commission launched a first anti-smuggling operational partnership with Morocco (in addition to a similar agreement with Niger). Already in 2016, Egypt started to crack down on irregular migrant boats leaving its shores and since then there have hardly been any departures from the country towards the EU. Still, when economic factors are the main driver for irregular departures from the three countries, the overall situation is unlikely to change in 2023. Against the background of geographic proximity, existing good relations and already established formal cooperation, a further extension of the migration partnership approach that relates to broad cooperation on migration governance to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia yields a high potential for addressing one particular challenge of the irregular migration challenge in a mutually beneficial way.

African countries

Globally, 44% of all internally or externally displaced persons originate from an African country. According to the African Center for Strategic Studies, their total number stood at 36 million in 2022, a 12% increase (or an increase of 3.7 million persons) in comparison to 2021. 75% of them are displaced inside their home country, 19% are hosted in a neighbouring country and 6% have sought asylum further afield. Thus, the number of Africans displaced has more than tripled over the last decade.[19]

There are more than 20 active refugee situations in Africa, many of them protracted over long time periods and simultaneously including inflows and outflows of refugees but also involving large-scale internal displacement. The East Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region hosted 4.95 million refugees and asylum seekers in mid-2022, mostly from South Sudan, 5% more than the year before. Moreover, the region recorded more than 12 million IDPs, mostly in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Burundi.[20] The surge in displacement was amongst others caused by the outbreak of war in Tigray in November 2020 spilling over to Eritrea and heightening tensions with Sudan. An estimated 500,000 people have been killed in the course of the conflict, 3 million displaced inside and outside the country and 20 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia.[21] On 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) agreed to end hostilities and to return to constitutional order but Eritrean forces have not withdrawn yet and atrocities continue. In West Africa, instability increased across the Western Sahel, further fuelling one of the world's worst humanitarian and fastest growing displacement crises. France's withdrawal from Mali, Russia's increasing involvement and the military coup in Burkina Faso in September have made the situation

[19] Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Record 36 Million Africans Forcibly Displaced, July 19, 2022, Accessed 28 December 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-36-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-is-44-percent-of-global-total-refugees-asylum/.

[20] UNHCR Operational Update, East and Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes Region, April – June 2022, Accessed 8 January 2023, file:///C:/Users/hofmannm/Downloads/EHAGL%20Operational%20Update%20April%20-%20June%202022.pdf.

[21] European Parliament Research Service, Briefing: Ethiopia, War in Tigray. Background and State of Play, December 2022, Accessed 8 January 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)739244.

even more volatile. Violence and instability have displaced another 420,000 people, resulting in a total of 1.64 million refugees in the region (mainly hosted in Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria) and 7.68 million internally displaced. An easing of the situation is not expected for 2023; the observed increase in terrorist attacks in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin rather point towards a worsening of the security situation that is likely to trigger further displacement. War and conflict will drive displacement in African countries in 2023 as well and together with the effects of the global supply crisis, an expected economic downturn and natural disasters aggravated by climate change will most likely lead to increasing numbers. The drought in the Horn of Africa alone has forced 1.1 million people to flee for survival; similar events can be expected in many other parts of Africa as well. African migration (and displacement) is overwhelmingly regional and the spillover to other world regions is small. This also relates to irregular arrivals and asylum applications in Europe and the EU. In terms of asylum seekers in the EU from Southern African countries, Nigeria ranked only 14th among all countries of origin, clearly behind applicants from Georgia, India or Iraq. The factors driving African migration will gain in significance in 2023 but will not necessarily translate into big numbers in European migration and asylum statistics.

Latin and Central American countries

The displacement situation in the Americas is one of the largest and longest protracted worldwide. For 2022, the UNHCR reported a total of almost 20 million people displaced, mainly in the Central and Latin American (LAC) countries, representing a 9% increase compared to the previous year.[22] Historically, displacement and migration in the region are driven less by war or state persecution than by demographic imbalances, high crime levels, food insecurity, state fragility, collapse of livelihoods, widespread informal work, income inequalities, lacking social security coverage and the increasingly adverse effects of climate change. Like in other regions of the global south, LAC countries seem to be disproportionally affected by global economic shocks; this was the case during the Covid-19 pandemic and it is also the case for the global supply and inflation crisis as a result of the war in Ukraine. The 7.1 million displaced Venezuelans, most of them hosted in the region with close to 2.5 million Venezuelans in Colombia alone, represent one of the largest protracted refugee situations in the world. In Colombia, El Salvador and Honduras, UNHCR assists over 7 million IDPs. Over 971,000 of the displaced Venezuelans have sought asylum worldwide, about 49,000 of them in the EU in 2022, representing a 198% increase compared to 2021. The worsening of living conditions prompted about 148,000 Venezuelans (together with 12,300 Haitians and 5,000 Cubans) to move across Central America in an attempt to reach the United States. Increasing irregular arrivals are not exclusive to European destinations. In the fiscal year 2022, the United States recorded an increase of 41% of "encounters" at the southern border compared to 2021 (from 1.96 million cases to 2.77 million cases) and interdicted 638% more Cubans attempting to arrive by boat (5,396 cases in 2022 compared to 838 in 2021). The US administration reacted by enforcing the return of unauthorised Venezuelans to Mexico, by stepping up border control measures but also by discussing enhanced legal pathways with Latin American countries. The number of new arrivals went down in the last few months of 2022 but it remains to be

[22] UNHCR Fact Sheet The Americas, 1 December 2022, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://reporting.unhcr.org/americas.

seen how sustainable this development will be in 2023 in view of a global economic crisis that hits Latin and Central American countries even harder than other world regions. In a similar vein, Europe and the EU will see arrivals from Latin American countries in line with last year's pattern as long as asylum seekers from these countries can enter EU member states on a visa-free basis.

Migration trends in the EU

Two major developments shaped the European migration debate in 2022: the war in Ukraine followed by the largest inflow of refugees since the end of the Second World War and the increasing numbers of irregular arrivals and asylum applications by nationals from other world regions. Two sets of indicators provide information about related developments: **the detections of illegal border crossings** and the total numbers of **asylum applications** submitted in the EU.

Irregular migration and asylum applications

Between January and December 2022, Frontex registered a total of **327,131 illegal crossings**[23] at the external borders of the EU. This figure is the **highest since 2016**. It corresponds to an **increase of 64%** in comparison to **2021** and an increase of **162%** in comparison to the end-of-year figure for **2020**, the year when Covid-19-related containment measures had limited all forms of mobility, including irregular migration movements. Apprehension figures were, however, still clearly below the ones recorded during the height of the "refugee crisis" (1.3 million in 2015 and 511,000 in 2016).



Source: Frontex

[23] Frontex, Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics, preliminary figures January 2022 – December 2022, https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/.

The observed overall increase did not affect the main migration routes in similar ways. Most of them recorded increased irregular crossings; however, in line with previous trends, detections continued to concentrate on the **Western Balkans Route** and the **Central Mediterranean Route**. Taken together, these two routes recorded **75% of all detections in 2022**. Their significant role can be attributed to a number of factors: generally increasing migratory pressures in important origin and transit regions due to growing instability and conflict; the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine and the continued effects of the Covid-19 pandemic; the increasing significance of Tunisia as a point of departure alongside Libya;[24] visa-free access for some nationalities to countries of the Western Balkans and subsequent attempts to cross into the Schengen Zone; and the continued effects of the strict Greek asylum policy since 2020/2021, which prompted many irregular migrants and asylum seekers to avoid the Eastern Mediterranean Route in favour of alternate routes.

Detections at main migratory routes 2019 - 2022



Source: Frontex

Between January and December 2022, the Western Balkans Route recorded a total of 145,600 cases (up 136% compared to 2021), the Central Mediterranean Route a total of 102,529 cases (up 51%), the Eastern Mediterranean Route a total of 42,831 cases (up 108%), the Western African Route a total of 15,462 cases (down 31%), the Western Mediterranean Route a total of 14,582 cases (down 21%) and the Eastern Border Route a total of 6,127 cases (down 25%).

[24] Forin, R. and Frouws, B. What's new? Analysing the latest trends on the Central Mediterranean mixed migration route to Italy.

In terms of the nationalities moving along the respective routes, the picture remained complex in 2022 as well. The geographic position of countries of origin, proximity and distance, primary or secondary movements, migration strategies and patterns, available means of transportation, activities of people-smuggling networks, state control measures and the specificities of reception and the visa system are only some of the factors that influence individual irregular migration trajectories. Generalisations will never do full justice to the complexity of the phenomenon but the available data and information do allow for the identification of a number of general developments.

The nationalities that dominated the numbers of irregular arrivals and asylum applications in previous years saw increases in detections. Including October 2022, Syrian nationals accounted for 82,659 detected cases (up 122%) and Afghan nationals for 31,761 cases (up 165%). The observed increase in detections of nationals from North African countries continued in 2022 as well. 23,406 cases were recorded for Tunisian nationals (up 59%) and 18,497 cases for Egyptian nationals (up 179%). Migrants from Bangladesh (15,502 cases, up 92%), Türkiye (10,959 cases, up 208%) and Pakistan (10,652 cases, up 280%) followed on the list. Notably, detections of Moroccan nationals did not increase (12,879 cases, up 0.7%) and there was even a decrease in the case of Iraqi (4,364 cases, down 44%) and Iranian nationals (2,980 cases, down 22%).

Irregular migrants from Syria (82% of all cases detected at the external borders) and Afghanistan (66%) moved mainly via the Western Balkans and so did other nationals. Significant irregular arrivals by Indian nationals in the EU are a rather recent trend. The absolute number of detections is still comparatively low (5,988 cases in 2022) but the more than 16-fold increase in comparison to 2021 was by far the highest among significant nationalities of origin. Similar to citizens from Tunisia and Türkiye, Indian nationals did not require a visa to enter Serbia throughout 2022 and used the country as a stepping stone for onward attempts to enter the EU without the necessary permits. Consequently, 98% of all detections of Indian nationals and 73% of all detections of Turkish nationals were recorded along the Western Balkans Route. Tunisian nationals still accounted for 28% of all detected irregular crossings, as many Tunisian migrants moved via the Western Balkans, which they considered a safer option than the direct but dangerous journey across the Mediterranean.

On the Central Mediterranean Route the highest numbers of detections were reported for Egyptian and Tunisian nationals (19% of all detections respectively) and migrants from Bangladesh (14% of cases), on the Eastern Mediterranean Route for Syrian nationals (20% of cases) followed by Afghan (11% of cases) and Nigerian nationals (10% of cases), on the Western Mediterranean routes for Algerian nationals (49%) followed by Moroccan nationals (41% of cases) and Sudanese nationals (5% of cases).

Asylum applications in 2021

In **2022, a total of 923,991 asylum applications** were submitted in Member States of the European Union. This represents a **46% increase in comparison to 2021** (632,405 applications in total) and the **highest number since 2016** (1.26 million).[25] Asylum figures had seen a significant drop in 2020 as a result of the strict mobility restrictions imposed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic but caught up to pre-pandemic levels throughout 2021. The figures below refer to the most recent country statistics available at the time of writing and allow for the depiction of a number of general trends. A final assessment of asylum migration in 2022 will, however, not be possible until final EU application statistics are available in March 2023.



Source: Eurostat

Two out of the three most important countries of origin for asylum seekers over the last couple of years (Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq) showed significant increases in applications in 2022. Asylum applications from Syria increased by 41% (to a total of 116,912) and those from Afghanistan by 34% (to a total of 115,206 applications). Notably, applications from Iraq went against the trend and remained almost stable at a total of 24,526, also meaning that for the first time in years Iraq did not rank among the top 10 countries of origin of applicants in the EU. As stated above, Syria and Afghanistan led this ranking, followed by Venezuela (a total of 49,017 applications, up 198%), Türkiye (48,575 applications, up 139%), Colombia (41,461 applications, up 224%), Pakistan (33,977 applications, up 57%), Bangladesh (29,921 applications, up 73%), Ukraine (27,303 applications, up 400%), Georgia (25,992 applications, up 120%) and India (24,717 applications, up 619%). Contrary to

[25] Eurostat, Asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex - monthly data (January 2019 – November 2022).

widespread perceptions, the number of submissions from African country nationals was further down the list. Tunisia ranked 12th as the most important African country of origin of asylum seekers in the EU (a total of 21,055 applications, up 148%), followed by Morocco (20,224 applications, up 45%), Nigeria (16,811 applications, up 17%), Somalia (15,768 applications, up 16%) and Egypt (14,364 applications, up 139%). As regards relative increases, India topped the list (an increase of 619% and a total of 24,717 cases) followed by Peru (up 312% with 12,176 cases), Colombia (up 224% with 48,575 cases) and Venezuela (up 198% with 49,017 cases). The high relative increases in applications from Latin American nationals represents a return to pre-pandemic levels. Flight restrictions had brought almost a full halt to this migratory pattern, which, as connections resumed to normal schedules, returned to previously observed trends in the course of last year. Notably, asylum applications from Russian nationals, for instance fleeing conscription, have not increased significantly in 2022 (15,017 applications in total).



Source: Eurostat

As in previous years, applications concentrated on a minority of Member States, with **91% of all asylum applications submitted in 10 EU Member States**: Germany (a total of 226,467 applications or 24.5% of all applications submitted in the EU), France (154,597 applications or 16.7%), Spain (116,952 applications or 12.7%), Austria (108,490 applications or 11.7%), Italy (82,603 applications or 8.9%), Greece (36,803 applications or 4.0%), Belgium (36,529 applications or 4.0%), the Netherlands (35,173 applications or 3.8%), Cyprus (21,302 applications or 2.3%) and Bulgaria (20,199 applications or 2.2%). Application figures do not tell the full story as they do not distinguish between primary and secondary movements within the EU and do not reveal whose systems will ultimately have to administer procedures, refugee integration or return in the case of negative decisions. As broad indicators, however, they show that the year 2022 disproportionally affected those EU Member States that were either first countries of entry along the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean Routes and/or aspired final destinations of asylum seekers in the EU.



Source: Eurostat

An outlook for 2023 has to take into account both the heterogeneity of flows and the opportunity structures along the migratory routes. Violent conflict, political instability and worsening economic conditions in many regions of origin or current residence of migrants will drive the numbers of irregular arrivals and applications for protection. As in previous years, however, their actual volume will also depend on the level of cooperation with countries of origin and transit and the efficacy of migration management systems.

This applies to border control, return and readmission but also to the impacts of entry and visa regimes. Asylum applications regularly include a number of nationalities with very low prospects for the actual recognition of their claims who at the same time benefit from visa-free or facilitated access to EU Member States or neighbouring countries. Last year, this related for instance to Colombia, India, Georgia, Peru and Tunisia. All of them ranked among the top 20 countries of origin of asylum seekers in 2022 but had had a share of positive first instance decisions of 10% or less in previous years.

Certainly, visa regulations must not result in cutting off people in need of protection from access to asylum procedures or in hurting States' interests in relation to mobility, migration and economic cooperation with their respective partners. In view of the high attention paid to asylum application numbers in the political debate, it is still worthwhile to review existing regimes against their impact on the annual statistics. Serbia has already committed to tighten visa regulations for nationals who had transited the country before entering the EU in an irregular manner. The European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) was launched in November, requiring visa-exempt visitors from non-EU countries to apply for a travel authorisation through the ETIAS system prior to their journey. Amongst others, ETIAS is also intended to identify irregular migration risks linked to specific countries of origin. Last but not least, the increasing number of migration and mobility partnerships concluded between EU member states and non-EU countries will not only facilitate legal migration but also enhance the cooperation on preventing irregular migration and on effecting return and readmission.

Taken together, the measures outlined above have the potential to reduce the numbers of irregular arrivals and asylum applications from certain nationalities of origin. Whether they will outweigh the impacts of the other powerful drivers on related flows from other regions remains to be seen.

The Ukraine refugee situation and temporary protection

The war in Ukraine is not only a turning point in terms of the global order but also in terms of European migration history and the migration situation. The Ukrainian refugee crisis is the largest human displacement crisis in the world today. And it is the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. According to the UNHCR, one third of all Ukrainians have been displaced since Russia's invasion on 24 February. 6.5 million Ukrainians were displaced internally. 7.9 million fled to the EU and Western European countries, Moldova, Türkiye and Russia, the latter including forcibly transferred individuals. On 3 March, the EU member states agreed to activate the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time. The swift decision prevented a border crisis from happening and provided millions of Ukrainians with immediate access to protection, job markets and specific support measures. Other countries followed this approach and 4.9 million Ukrainians have registered for Temporary Protection or similar schemes up to this point.[26]

A considerable number of Ukrainians have returned to their home country following the withdrawal of Russia's forces from the north and north-east in March.[27] Russia's attacks on critical infrastructure, which started in October and destroyed 50% of the energy system, have put immense strains on Ukrainian society but have not yet resulted in significant numbers of people leaving. 18 million Ukrainians, however, are considered in urgent need of humanitarian support inside the country[28] and the Ukrainian economy is forecast to shrink 40% in the course of 2022.[29] Analysts expect moderate economic growth in 2023 but see no possibility for a return to pre-war GDP levels. Against the backdrop of severe war damage, a wounded critical infrastructure and enormous economic and humanitarian challenges, and despite the resilience displayed by the Ukrainian people, a second large-scale outflow of refugees cannot be ruled out during winter or the rest of the year.

In 2023, the EU and other receiving countries will have to address three main challenges in the refugee context of the war in Ukraine. First, they will have to anticipate scenarios of increasing and perhaps sudden inflows of Ukrainian refugees. The numbers depicted in the different scenarios range from 500,000 to 4 million persons and contingency plans must be adapted accordingly. This will be anything but easy, as the capacities for reception and accommodation as well as the health care, welfare and educational systems are severely stretched by last year's arrivals from Ukraine and other parts of the

[26] UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Situation, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.
[27] Düvell, F., The war in Ukraine: Post-war scenarios and migration repercussions. Prague Process Policy Brief, June 2022, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.pragueprocess.eu/en/resources/repository/34-briefs/332-the-war-in-ukraine-post-war-scenarios-and-migration-repercussions.
[28] UNHCR, Ukraine Emergency, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/ukraine-emergency.html.
[29] Shahal, A., Ukraine Minister: Blackouts could lead to bigger GDP contraction in 2022, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ukraine-minister-gdp-contraction-39-expected-2022-vs-earlier-forecast-35-2022-11-09/.

world. Swift coordination and functioning solidarity, as the EU member states, other partners and the Ukrainian authorities have demonstrated throughout 2022, will be vital to address a potentially very difficult situation successfully once again.

Second, States will have to expand their policies and programmes for the – at times temporary – inclusion and integration of the Ukrainian refugees that have arrived so far. Their socio-demographic composition differs significantly from other refugee cohorts, resulting in specific challenges and opportunities. The majority are women and children, do not speak the respective national language and – in most host countries – cannot rely on the support of established social networks. On the other hand, they have on average high educational qualifications, usable work experience and immediate access to the labour market because of their temporary protection status. On the basis of previously observed trajectories it can be expected that those who arrived last year will start to enter into employment to a greater extent in 2023. In order to maximise labour market outcomes, States will have to provide targeted support in the areas of language training, childcare, skills acknowledgement and on-the-job training. This poses particular challenges for countries' systems which have a shorter immigration tradition and less experience in integration policies and programmes.

Inclusion and integration are linked to a third priority for next year. At present there is little hope for an early end to hostilities. This should, however, not prevent a discussion on the necessary steps to exit from temporary protection in a well-prepared way. In October, the EU announced that it will extend temporary protection under the Directive for a period of one year until 4 March 2024, ensuring the status of Ukrainian refugees for another 12 months. This will give sufficient time to consider what is necessary in developing post-temporary-protection strategies and to develop an approach that is thoroughly coordinated between the member states but also with the Ukrainian authorities. Unlike in other cases, Ukraine has consistently expressed a strong interest in the permanent return of her citizens after the end of the war, highlighting their role in recovery and reconstruction. It is therefore argued that integration measures for Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection should pursue a "dual intent" and promote skills that allow for economic participation in the host society and enhance the prospects for successful return at the same time.[30] Ultimately, the available options for an exit from temporary protection are return, the granting of another type of international protection or a shift to other categories of residence. A timely start to the discussion on the preferred way ahead will benefit States' planning but most importantly give clearer perspective to the millions of Ukrainians who had to flee their country or might have to do so in the course of the next year.

The effects of the global supply crisis on migration

The war in Ukraine has led to the largest shock on global commodity in recent years. The increase in energy prices has been the highest since the 1973 oil crisis, the increase in food commodity prices the highest since the global financial crisis in 2008. Thus, it is expected that the disruptions of production,

[30] OECD, How vocational education and training (VET) systems can support Ukraine, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/how-vocational-education-and-training-vet-systems-can-support-ukraine-e8e86ce2/.

supply chains and trade will keep prices at historically high levels at least until the end of 2024.[31] The outlook for the world's economy is bleak as well. Global growth is expected to slow from 6.0% in 2021 to 3.2% in 2022 and 2.7% in 2023. Global inflation is forecast to rise to 8.8% in 2022 and to decline only slowly to 6.5% in 2023 and 4.1% in 2024.[32]

All indicators for 2023 point towards a continued or even worsening cost-of-living crisis in most parts of the world, disproportionally impacting the countries of the global south. Last year, food insecurity affected 345 million people in 82 countries, a number that had increased by 200 million in comparison to pre-Covid-19-pandemic levels, largely driven by the fallout from the war in Ukraine.[33] Global food and fertiliser exports are regularly concentrated in a small number of countries. Before the war, Ukraine and Russia ranked among the top three global exporters of wheat, rapeseed, sunflower and sunflower oil, but also different types of fertiliser. Until 2021, many countries of the global south, in particular African countries, imported 50% or more of their total wheat purchases from Ukraine and Russia. In 2022, global expenditures on imports of fertiliser, seeds, pesticides and energy used in agriculture were 48% higher than in 2021 and this trend will most likely continue in 2023. Together with continued trade disruptions, it means that poorer countries will be simultaneously faced with higher food-related expenditures and lower volumes of imports.[34] The situation will be further aggravated by the effects of climate change. Extreme climate events have become a new normal, be it La Niña conditions causing crop and livestock losses in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and Asian and Caribbean countries, the year-long droughts in many parts of Africa or severe flooding in the Sahel or Pakistan.[35] It is difficult to identify soaring living costs or food insecurity as single factors stimulating migration flows but, when seen in conjunction with other factors, their relevance cannot be contested either. The protests leading up to the Arab Spring in 2011 and subsequent migration movements were amongst others triggered by soaring wheat prices. Food insecurity caused by an El Niño drought is seen as the main reason for an increase in irregular migration movements towards the US in 2014.

ICMPD's own research, amongst others in North African countries, concluded that the link between food security and migration is both complex and context-dependent. In contexts where political and economic instability already determine the prevalent migratory dynamics, soaring food prices and food insecurity can indeed drive migrant decisions. In affected countries, vulnerable immigrant populations that find their livelihoods cut short might consider secondary movements to other countries as a means of "survival migration". For domestic populations, food and cost-of-living-related factors will

[31] The World Bank, Food and Energy Price Shocks from Ukraine War Could Last for Years, 26 April 2022, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/26/food-and-energy-price-shocks-from-ukraine-war.
[32] IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2022, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO.
[33] World Food Programme, War in Ukraine Drives Global Food Crisis, 24 June 2022, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140700/download/?_ga=2.124539279.443183150.1672823162-1403441784.1672823162, p. 2.
[34] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the War in Ukraine, Information Note, 5 December Update, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.fao.org/3/cb9013en/cb9013en.pdf.
[35] World Food Programme, War in Ukraine Drives Global Food Crisis.

rather work as a catalyst to decisions that are based on a broader range of aspects.[36] Last but not least, rising living costs make households in low-income countries more dependent on migrant remittances, prompting primary migration but also secondary movements to countries and regions where higher revenues can be expected.

It is safe to say that the increase in irregular migration flows observed in Europe and other world regions in 2022 can at least partly be attributed to factors related to living costs, food insecurity and climate events. Against this backdrop, the extent to which the international community pays attention to related developments and the degree to which the countries of the global north provide support to the countries most affected by higher food prices, boosting food production and making agricultural sectors more resilient will be an important factor in controlling irregular migration flows in 2023.

Addressing the instrumentalisation of migration

The instrumentalisation of migration for non-migration-related political purposes is perhaps one of the most visible expressions of a new era in which human mobility and geopolitics are closely intertwined. The phenomenon as such is not entirely new. Analysts have counted more than 60 historical cases in which States have used forced migration to put other States under pressure and to achieve foreign policy goals.[37] What could be seen as a novelty, however, is the systematic integration of migration into hybrid warfare strategies; and in the event of an actual war, the equally systematic attempt to force third parties to make concessions by means of forced migration.

The prior was the case during the Belarus border crisis in 2021/2022. The deliberate creation of a migration crisis at the EU's external borders, instigated and controlled by the Belarussian authorities, added a dimension different from previous instances. Named authorities stimulated the demand, organised travel, entry, accommodation and transport to the EU external borders, and established standing cooperation with smuggling networks operating in countries of origin and along the routes. All of this aimed at a destabilisation of the European Union and could only be seen as an act of hybrid aggression. Using migration as a means of actual warfare is a fundamental pillar of Russia's aggression in Ukraine, both in its initial but also in its current phase where a constant barrage against civilian infrastructure intends to set in motion a second exodus of Ukrainians, breaking the country's resilience and undermining the EU's support.[38] Igniting migrant flows towards Europe, for instance from Syria, seems to have become a standard feature of Russian foreign policy. In 2022 it was applied again, by forcing displacement of Ukrainians towards Western Europe but also by disrupting Ukrainian grain exports towards African countries under the assumption that a looming food crisis would undermine political support for Ukraine but also trigger irregular movements towards the north. A recent announcement to launch flights from North Africa and the Middle East to the Russian exclave of

[36] ICMPD Trend Assessment, Fine-Grained. Exploring the link between food security and migration in Tunisia.
[37] Greenhill, K. M., Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. 1st ed. Cornell University Press, 2010.
[38] Rasche, L., The instrumentalisation of migration. How should the EU respond? Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre, Visions for Europe Policy Paper, 16 December 2022, p. 2.

Kaliningrad, bordering the member state Poland, is a clear indication that the EU will have to deal with attempts to instrumentalise migrants as a means of hybrid warfare in 2023 too.[39]

Last year, the EU and the member states took different approaches in countering attempts at instrumentalisation, depending on the respective situation. The erection of effective barriers at the external borders together with extensive migration diplomacy involving close cooperation with non-European partners and country of origin authorities put a halt to Belarus' scheme. The activation of the Temporary Protection Directive allowed for an orderly handling of millions of entries from Ukraine in a very short time period and prevented an overstretching of heavily burdened reception and migration management systems. At the same time, member states at the eastern and southern borders continued the building of fences to prepare for future attempts to push irregular migrants towards their territories.

Aware that the instrumentalisation of migration by third countries will remain a key challenge in the future, the member states discussed a set of measures that are considered effective and which, taken together, should form a new EU policy to counter related risks and threats. This is deemed both necessary and demanding, taking into account the decisive influence of migration issues on election outcomes in European democracies as well as the simultaneous public expectations and legal obligations to fulfil certain humanitarian standards. As a consequence, the inevitable tension between security needs on the one hand and legal or humanitarian obligations towards people in need of protection on the other shaped the European debate in 2022 as well. Already in December 2021 the European Commission had tabled an "instrumentalisation package" with the intention to replace European ad hoc responses with a more solid basis for joint European action. The package consisted of a revised Schengen Borders Code, defining what an incidence of instrumentalisation should be and granting member states the right to take necessary security measures when migrants attempt to force entry in massive numbers and by use of violent means; a proposal for a new Instrumentalisation Regulation, setting the frame for derogations from EU asylum law that member states may request in the case of instrumentalisation; and an "Instrumentalisation Toolbox", providing a list of concrete measures thought to be effective in response to instrumentalisation.[40] Typical toolbox measures include early warning, migrant information campaigns, humanitarian support, reinforced border management, accelerated border procedures and detention (in line with relevant EU legislation) but also reinforced and more balanced migration partnerships with countries of origin and transit.[41]

While the Council adopted its common position on the reform of the Schengen Borders Code in June, member states remained divided over the draft Instrumentalisation Regulation and a compromise

---

[39] Kochis, D., Russia's Weaponization of Migrants Hasn't Gone Away, Commentary Global Politics, The Heritage Foundation, Nov 18, 2002, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-weaponization-migrants-hasnt-gone-away.

[40] Rasche, L., The instrumentalisation of migration. How should the EU respond, p. 6.

[41] Sie Dhian Ho, M. and Wijnkoop, M., The instrumentalization of migration. A geopolitical perspective and toolbox, Clingendael Report, December 2022, p. 4.

proposal by the Czech EU Presidency did not find a majority at the Interior Ministers Council in December,[42] also driven by some member states' concerns about a weakening of the Common European Asylum System standards. It remains to be seen whether the Swedish EU Presidency will prioritise the file in the first semester of 2023. It is, however, recommendable to continue the discussion. Regardless of the question whether the existing proposals go too far or not far enough, it would be good to revisit the regulation and continue the work on a commonly agreeable text, keeping in mind that instrumentalisation, however it may be defined concretely, is likely to continue and will surely require coherent joint responses of the EU together with its partners in regions of origin and transit.

Labour shortages, migration partnerships and legal migration channels

The debate about increasing shortages on European labour markets continued throughout 2022 against the backdrop of longer-term developments and despite the economic uncertainties resulting from the war in Ukraine. According to a McKinsey Global Institute forecast, Europe's working age population is expected to drop by more than 13 million (or 4%) by 2030, meaning that even a significant loss of jobs because of automation and digitalisation would lead to ever increasing labour shortages by the end of the decade.[43]

Already now, many vacancies cannot be filled by domestic applicants or the intra-EU workforce. In 2022, almost all countries in Europe reported a general lack of skilled workers and labour shortages across most sectors. Around six million jobs were waiting to be filled throughout the year. The EU-wide job vacancy rate stood at 2.9% in the third quarter of 2022, almost twice as high as 10 years ago.[44] The EU employment rate of people aged 20 to 64 years was 74.7%, almost 8 percentage points higher than in 2012. The unemployment rate of 6.0% was almost 50% lower than the 11.5% rate recorded in 2012. A recent study by the European Labour Authority reported shortages of a high magnitude for a total of 28 occupations, which together currently employ 14% of the total EU workforce.[45] Such shortages were identified for STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) occupations, health and care professions and IT and communication experts. These developments are consistent with the impact of the socio-economic megatrends of demographic ageing and digitalisation. At the same time, shortages persist in the transport and hospitality sectors, as well as in retail, manufacturing and construction. Manual work will stay in demand, but is expected to require additional digital, cognitive and social skills in the future.[46]

---

[42] European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ECRE Reaction: No Majority for Instrumentalisation Regulation, 8th December 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://ecre.org/ecre-reaction-no-majority-for-instrumentalisation-regulation/.
[43] McKinsey Global Institute, The future of work in Europe, June 10, 2020, Discussion Paper, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-in-europe, p. IV.
[44] Eurostat, EU Statistics Explained, Job Vacancy Statistics, 15 December 2022, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Job_vacancy_statistics.
[45] European Labour Agency (ELA), 2021 Labour shortages surpluses report, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.ela.europa.eu/en/media/725.
[46] Hofmann, M., Getting Ukrainian refugees into work: The importance of early competence checks, ICMPD Commentary, 28 March 2022, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2022/getting-ukrainian-refugees-into-work-the-importance-of-early-competence-checks.

Thus, it is widely agreed that immigration alone cannot compensate for demographic ageing and decline but can form part of comprehensive strategies that rest on the mobilisation of non-active populations, qualification and upskilling, later retirement and enhanced intra-EU mobility. Many European governments, however, also acknowledge the need to promote targeted immigration from third countries as a central pillar for successful economic transition. In 2022, they reinforced their efforts to reform their labour migration policies. Since labour market needs vary and national governments have the prerogative to set the volume of admissions of third-country nationals entering for labour purposes, member states' approaches differed to a certain extent. This notwithstanding, a number of general trends could be observed.

First, Member States emphasised their commitment to align their immigration policies more closely to current and future labour market needs and make their systems more receptive and welcoming towards the much needed third-country workers. In view of an estimated annual need for 400,000 additional workers, the German government announced an immigration reform for next year with the aim to attract more skilled workers. It plans to amend the 2020 Skilled Immigration Act in 2023, introducing a points system that provides candidates who fulfil certain requirements towards qualifications, language skills, age, professional experience and existing ties to the country with the opportunity to come to Germany to seek employment even without an existing job offer.[47]

Second, European governments aimed at expanding entry opportunities provided by existing legislation. Slovenia, for example, was set to issue the highest ever number of work permits for third-country nationals in 2022. Austria included additional jobs in a number of sectors in its occupation shortage list for 2023, will exempt certain third-country national categories from seasonal quotas and facilitate the application process for work-related residence permits.[48] The United Kingdom turns to Central Asian countries to replace Eastern European seasonal workers that did not come back in the aftermath of Brexit and Covid-19 related mobility restrictions.

A third approach, as planned by Spain and France, is the creation of specific residence permits to enable already resident yet undocumented immigrants to legalise their status, should they work in an understaffed sector and have a contract with an employer.[49]

As European governments, however, largely assume that simplified entry conditions alone will not be sufficient to meet increasing demands for foreign labour, they have also stepped up their efforts to actively recruit workers in countries of origin or to enter into comprehensive migration and mobility

[47] Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany seeks looser immigration rules for non-EU workers, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-seeks-looser-immigration-rules-for-non-eu-workers/a-63942098.

[48] Fragomen, Austria: Shortage Occupation List Expanded and Beneficial Rules for Seasonal Workers Implemented, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.fragomen.com/insights/austria-shortage-occupation-list-expanded-and-beneficial-rules-for-seasonal-workers-implemented.html.

[49] European Commission, European Website on Integration, Spain: Government adapts immigration law to include migrant workers in the labour market, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/spain-government-adapts-immigration-law-include-migrant-workers-labour-market_en.

partnerships. The latter was a fourth major trend to be observed in the area of labour migration in 2022. Portugal concluded agreements on employment and residence of workers with India and Morocco, while Germany and India signed an Agreement on Migration and Mobility, intended as a model for further agreements in this field.[50] India has concluded similar agreements with Finland, France and the United Kingdom and will sign a Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (MMPA) with Austria as well.

A main benefit of these agreements is that they do not solely focus on the labour market needs of destination countries, but ensure a broad political basis for cooperation on training issues, migrants' rights, combating illegal migration and ensuring the return and reintegration of illegally staying migrants. In 2023, it will be interesting to see how quickly these agreements can be moved from the level of political agreement to the level of practical implementation. In the past, the execution of policies that were supposed to simplify and speed up the recruitment of third-country nationals was regularly hampered by a lack of institutional capacity or overly complex bureaucratic procedures. Facilitated labour migration from third countries will require more than changed policy and legal frameworks, namely procedures that are genuinely more simply administered and institutions that are truly committed to a more welcoming culture towards applicants.

Last but not least, the debate on labour migration will not only be affected by long-term structural aspects but also by the effects of the war in Ukraine, the supply and commodity crisis and a looming global recession on labour market needs. The EU is among the most affected economies globally, with a GDP growth reaching only 0.3% and inflation remaining high at 7.0% in 2023.[51] The outlook on labour markets, however, is less pessimistic. Unemployment rates should rise moderately from 6.2% in 2022 to 6.5% in 2023. Employment growth is expected to come to a halt next year but should increase again in 2024. It is therefore quite likely that reduced labour market demands due to the economic downturn will not outweigh the structural labour force losses due to demographic change. Labour migration issues will stay on the agenda. And this also relates to the question whether asylum seekers, particularly those with a high chance of receiving a positive decision on their claim, should have facilitated access to employment. European governments have been reluctant towards openings in this regard in order not to create additional incentives for irregular migration. Empty labour markets, however, might prompt employers to push harder for such openings, at least in sectors and occupations with the most pressing demands.

The finalisation of the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum

The Ukraine refugee crisis and the increasing inflows of asylum seekers and irregular migrants along the other migratory routes dominated the 2022 migration year in Europe and tied up most of the EU member states' political attention and administrative capacities. Thus, they somewhat distracted from

[50] BMI, PRESS RELEASE · 05 DECEMBER 2022, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2022/12/migration_agreement.html.

[51] European Commission, Press Release, Autumn 2022 Economic Forecast: The EU economy at a turning point, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_6782.

other important developments like the aforementioned new accents in labour migration and migration partnership or the work on the finalisation of the so-called New Pact on Migration and Asylum. 2023 will provide the final opportunity to complete this work and to agree the pact and its accompanying legislative proposals before the next European elections in 2024.

The pact had been presented by the European Commission in September 2020 with the aim to initiate a fresh start in the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). It included a number of accompanying legislative proposals on which the actual implementation should be based but which were contested from the beginning due to long-standing disagreement among Member States over fundamental directions of the CEAS. The proposals under consideration included a new Screening Regulation, an amended proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation, an amended proposal revising the Eurodac Regulation, a new Asylum and Migration Management Regulation, and a new Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation.[52]

In political terms, the most contested issues were – and continue to be – the questions of solidarity, responsibility sharing and a formal allocation key for asylum seekers among EU member states. There has been considerable progress since the presentation of the pact, in 2022 for instance the adoption of Council negotiating mandates on the Screening and Eurodac regulations or the endorsement of the Solidarity Declaration under the French Presidency establishing a voluntary solidarity mechanism among 18 EU member states and 3 Schengen-associated states. The persisting divisions over said issues, however, prevented the conclusion of negotiations on many legislative proposals linked to the pact.

In September 2022, the European Parliament and the Rotating Presidencies of the Council presented a roadmap that the negotiations on all files should be concluded by February 2024 and before the end of the parliamentary term. In order to support this process, the roadmap agreed that regular meetings should take place between the Presidencies and the Parliament's Asylum Contact Group to monitor progress and the timetable. The incoming Swedish EU Presidency vowed to work hard on advancing the pact but does not see it finalised before the spring of 2024.[53] It remains to be seen whether the extraordinary European summit scheduled for early February 2023, devoted to discussing the most important migration issues and the steps towards the finalisation of the pact, will achieve a political breakthrough that might be necessary to meet the set 2024 objective.

---

[52] Carrera, S. et al., The European Commission's legislative proposals in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 03 September 2001, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-european-commissions-legislative-proposals-in-the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum/.

[53] Foy, H., No EU migration deal under our watch, says Swedish presidency, 4 January 2023, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/ae2dded3-bff2-42b6-bec2-be3c5542f4fa.

Conclusions for 2023

In 2023, the situation in the wider European region will be shaped by migration-related developments in Ukraine, the Near and Middle East, South Asia, African regions and Eastern Europe. This does not mean that other world regions deserve less attention, but the major migration movements towards Europe will be linked to the situation in these regions.

The war in Ukraine, a global supply crisis and a worsening security situation in many countries and regions of origin will drive mobility, both voluntary and forced, both legal and irregular. The European host countries have to prepare for a potential second wave of Ukrainian refugees, depending on the course of the war and the degree of destruction of the civilian infrastructure. Even if this is not the case, the assistance and economic participation of the Ukrainian refugees who arrived last year will put enormous strains on the host states' systems. Temporary protection will be prolonged, which safeguards the status and access to labour markets and support systems for Ukrainian refugees and gives sufficient time for a sound debate on exit strategies that are in the interest of host countries, the home country Ukraine and most importantly the Ukrainian citizens affected by displacement.

Irregular arrivals from other world regions will most likely focus again on the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean Routes. Migratory pressures will not decrease due to aggravating violent conflict, political instability and worsening economic conditions in many regions of origin but also because of the effects of a global supply and cost-of-living crisis. As in previous years, however, their actual volume will also depend on the level of cooperation with countries of origin and transit and the efficacy of migration management systems. This applies to border control, return and readmission but also to the impacts of entry and visa regimes. Newly concluded migration and mobility partnerships, soundly based on the interests of member states and their non-EU partners, will not only facilitate legal migration but also the cooperation on preventing irregular migration. Their full potential will, however, be shown only in the years to come.

The development of migration partnership is linked to other main aspects that will drive the European migration debate in 2023, namely the recent labour supply crunch and the structural needs for labour migration. The forecast economic downturn is not expected to translate into severe negative labour market effects. The decrease in working age population will continue and structurally increasing demands for foreign workforce will stick.

Finally, next year will be the last opportunity to finalise the European Pact on Migration and Asylum before the end of the parliamentary term in 2024. Presented in September 2020, the pact included a number of legislative proposals that were contested from the beginning due to long-standing disagreement among Member States over fundamental directions of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). There has been considerable progress since then but divisions persist. It remains to be seen whether the extraordinary European summit in February, devoted to important migration issues and the approval of the pact, will achieve a final breakthrough.

Sources

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Record 36 Million Africans Forcibly Displaced, July 19, 2022, Accessed 28 December 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-36-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-is-44-percent-of-global-total-refugees-asylum/.

Bizaer, M., Escalating emigration and the "drought" in Iran's IT industry, July 2022, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/escalating-emigration-and-drought-irans-it-industry.

BMI, PRESS RELEASE · 05 DECEMBER 2022, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2022/12/migration_agreement.html.

Carrera, S. et al., The European Commission's legislative proposals in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 03 September 2001, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-european-commissions-legislative-proposals-in-the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum/.

Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany seeks looser immigration rules for non-EU workers, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-seeks-looser-immigration-rules-for-non-eu-workers/a-63942098

Düvell, F., The war in Ukraine: Post-war scenarios and migration repercussions. Prague Process Policy Brief, June 2022, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.pragueprocess.eu/en/resources/repository/34-briefs/332-the-war-in-ukraine-post-war-scenarios-and-migration-repercussions.

European Commission, European Website on Integration, Spain: Government adapts immigration law to include migrant workers in the labour market, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/spain-government-adapts-immigration-law-include-migrant-workers-labour-market_en.

European Commission, Press Release, Autumn 2022 Economic Forecast: The EU economy at a turning point, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_6782.

European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ECRE Reaction: No Majority for Instrumentalisation Regulation, 8th December 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://ecre.org/ecre-reaction-no-majority-for-instrumentalisation-regulation/.

European Labour Agency (ELA), 2021 Labour shortages surpluses report, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.ela.europa.eu/en/media/725.

European Parliament Research Service, Briefing: Ethiopia, War in Tigray. Background and State of Play, December 2022, Accessed 8 January 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)739244.

European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Egypt as a Country of Origin, July 2022.

Eurostat, Asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex - monthly data (January 2019 – November 2022), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.

Eurostat, EU Statistics Explained, Job Vacancy Statistics, 15 December 2022, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Job_vacancy_statistics.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the War in Ukraine, Information Note, 5 December Update, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.fao.org/3/cb9013en/cb9013en.pdf.

Forin, R. and Frouws, B., What's new? Analysing the latest trends on the Central Mediterranean mixed migration route to Italy, Mixed Migration Centre, 9 February 2022, Accessed 29 December 2022, https://mixedmigration.org/articles/whats-new-analysing-the-latest-trends-on-the-central-mediterranean-mixed-migration-route-to-italy/.

Foy, H., No EU migration deal under our watch, says Swedish presidency, 4 January 2023, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/ae2dded3-bff2-42b6-bec2-be3c5542f4fa.

Fragomen, Austria: Shortage Occupation List Expanded and Beneficial Rules for Seasonal Workers Implemented, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.fragomen.com/insights/austria-shortage-occupation-list-expanded-and-beneficial-rules-for-seasonal-workers-implemented.html

Frontex, Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics, preliminary figures January 2022 – December 2022, https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/.

Gowan, R., Peacemaking 2.0: Conflict resolution after Russia's war in Ukraine, SDG Action, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://sdg-action.org/peacemaking-2-0-conflict-resolution-after-russias-war-on-ukraine%EF%BF%BC/.

Greenhill, K. M., Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. 1st ed. Cornell University Press, 2010.

Hofmann, M., Getting Ukrainian refugees into work: The importance of early competence checks, ICMPD Commentary, 28 March 2022, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2022/getting-ukrainian-refugees-into-work-the-importance-of-early-competence-checks.

ICMPD
International Centre for
Migration Policy Development

ICMPD, Trend Assessment, Fine-Grained. Exploring the link between food security and migration in Tunisia, November 2022.

IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2022, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO.

IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix on Afghanistan, as of 8 December 2022, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://dtm.iom.int/reports/movement-and-out-afghanistan-snapshot-16-30-november-2022.

IOM, Libya Migration Report Round 43, July – August 2022, p. 4, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://displacement.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/DTM_Libya_R43_Migrant_Report.pdf.

Kochis, D., Russia's Weaponization of Migrants Hasn't Gone Away, Commentary Global Politics, The Heritage Foundation, Nov 18, 2002, Accessed 2 January 2023, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-weaponization-migrants-hasnt-gone-away.

McKinsey Global Institute, The future of work in Europe, June 10, 2020, Discussion Paper, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-in-europe.

OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan. Snapshot of Population Movements (January to November 2022), Accessed 5 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-snapshot-population-movements-january-november-2022-23-november-2022?_gl=1*iqrbpc*_ga*MTIyNTY2NjY0Mi4xNjczMDgzNDU1*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTY3MzA4MzQ1NS4xLjAuMTY3MzA4MzQ1NS42MC4wLjA.

OECD, How vocational education and training (VET) systems can support Ukraine, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/how-vocational-education-and-training-vet-systems-can-support-ukraine-e8e86ce2/.

Rasche, L., The instrumentalisation of migration. How should the EU respond? Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre, Visions for Europe Policy Paper, 16 December 2022

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management, Accessed 18 January 2023, https://twitter.com/Gocidaresi/status/1609957713756446749?s=20&t=a_Sm97DhFYCCG88y3Y09vw.

Security Council Report, Syria. January 2023 Monthly Forecast, 29 December 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-01/syria-51.php.

Shahal, A., Ukraine Minister: Blackouts could lead to bigger GDP contraction in 2022, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ukraine-minister-gdp-contraction-39-expected-2022-vs-earlier-forecast-35-2022-11-09/.

Sie Dhian Ho, M. and Wijnkoop, M., The instrumentalization of migration. A geopolitical perspective and toolbox, Clingendael Report, December 2022.

Singh, R., Origin of World's Largest Migrant Population, India Seeks to Leverage Immigration, March 9, 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/india-migration-country-profile.

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Environment of Peace: Security in a New Era of Risk, May 2022.

The World Bank, Food and Energy Price Shocks from Ukraine War Could Last for Years, 26 April 2022, Accessed 27 December 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/26/food-and-energy-price-shocks-from-ukraine-war.

The World Bank, Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15 – 24)(modelled ILO estimate – Iraq, Accessed 11 January 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=IQ

UNDP, Pakistan Floods 2022: Resilient Recovery, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction Framework, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.undp.org/pakistan/publications/pakistan-floods-2022-resilient-recovery-rehabilitation-and-reconstruction-framework-4rf.

UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Update #22, as of 4 December 2022, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/97760.

UNHCR, Iraq Factsheet, December 2022, Accessed 5 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/unhcr-iraq-factsheet-december-2022.

UNHCR, Lebanon Fact Sheet, October 2022, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/3918.

UNHCR, Operational Update, East and Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes Region, April – June 2022, Accessed 8 January 2023, file:///C:/Users/hofmannm/Downloads/EHAGL%20Operational%20Update%20April%20-%20June%202022.pdf.

UNHCR, The Americas Fact Sheet, 1 December 2022, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://reporting.unhcr.org/americas.

UNHCR, Ukraine Emergency, Accessed 4 January 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/ukraine-emergency.html.

UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Situation, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.

UNHCR, Update Libya, 15 November 2022, Accessed 7 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unhcr-update-libya-15-november-2022-enar.

World Food Programme, War in Ukraine Drives Global Food Crisis, 24 June 2022, Accessed 3 January 2023, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140700/download/?_ga=2.124539279.443183150.1672823162-1403441784.1672823162.