ICMPD Working Paper 08
Integrated Border Management and Development
Martijn Pluim and Martin Hofmann
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International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)
Gonzagasse 1
A-1010 Vienna
Austria
www.icmpd.org

International Centre for Migration Policy Development
Vienna, Austria

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Abstract

This paper explores the link between border management and development by putting it in the context of the global debate on development goals and examining the approaches to border management that could contribute to development. The paper first assesses the current development debate, the role of borders in the context of the nation state and the present global political order, as well as the global agenda that provides the politically endorsed objectives for development. It then examines border management in more detail with a view to identifying its links to other policy areas/goals and as a concept and policy in its own right in order to determine how it is an enabler for development.

The absence of comprehensive and functioning border management does not mean facilitated movement of people, goods and services across state borders. It means the opposite: delays, harassment, violation of rights and corruption. Its absence hampers development. On the contrary, comprehensive and functioning border management encompasses both aspects of security and of facilitation. Both aspects should not contradict but complement each other.

Efficient borders improve the recognition of rights of the persons crossing a border, the regulation and inspection of passengers and the management of migration. They improve the flow of goods and the collection of revenues, reduce the threat of crime and terrorism and improve law enforcement. All of this leads to improved respect for human rights, enhanced mobility of people, trade facilitation, more competitive private sectors, increased revenues for the state, and improved public safety and national security. The national, regional and global impacts, which follow this intervention logic, are very much in line with the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Developments Goals of the United Nations.
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Introduction

In the public debate, border management (or border control) is often seen only in terms of security. This rarely questioned assumption leads to the notion that border management – at least implicitly – is an obstacle to the free movement of people, goods and services and consequently a potential hindrance to the full development potential of such mobility.

This notion, however, is wrong. Borders have no existence of their own. They are the physical and visible distinctions between nation states (or as with the European Union, between integrated groups of states), including nation states’ respective legal systems. Citizenship and nationality are the most obvious expressions of these distinctions. Individuals have by birth the right to reside on the territory of their citizenship; if they wish to enter and stay on the territory of another state, such a transfer is subject to specific types of legislation and to practical control. Borders are the points of transfer from one legal system to another, and border management/control is the process which confirms that the crossing is in line with the underlying rules and regulations. The same refers to the crossing, i.e. the transfer from one legal system to another, of goods and services.

The border environment is complex and is comprised of a variety of actors with conflicting interests. Borders are ‘places of economic and political opportunity for nations and states as well as for a host of other interest groups and agencies, legal and illegal’. Borders have lost their primary function as barriers, and have acquired a new ‘bridging’ function. Therefore, there is growing pressure on all border agencies to carry out their role more effectively and efficiently, as illegal activities might contribute to the weakening of a state, threaten consumer health and safety, reduce income to the state budget normally obtained through duties and taxes, and have a direct impact on security in the region due to the way those activities are conducted or goods are being traded.

Our world is becoming more and more international, which implies that the interaction and interdependence between states, economies and societies will continue to intensify. The significance of international and non-state actors will increase even more in the future, but the nation state as a ‘territorially-based political organisation’ will remain a key actor in international relations. Regardless of globalisation and the increasing relevance of sub-, supra- and non-state actors, such as large corporations, the number of states has increased significantly during the last fifty years, implying a similar increase in distinct legal systems and state borders. These will not go away; the question is to what extent they will facilitate or hinder exchange, cooperation and development.

Border management plays a crucial role in this regard. The absence of comprehensive and functioning border management does not mean facilitated movement of people, goods and services across state borders. It means the opposite: delays, harassment, violation of rights and corruption. Its absence hampers development. On the contrary, comprehensive and functioning border management encompasses both aspects of security and of facilitation. Both aspects should not contradict but complement each other.

This paper seeks to explore the link between border management and development, to put it in the context of the global debate on development goals, and to examine which approaches to border management could actually contribute to development. Considering that these connections are less than obvious and that ‘development’ is not unambiguously defined, the first section of the paper discusses the current development debate, the role of borders in the context of the nation state and the present world
order, and the current global agenda which provides the politically endorsed objectives for development. The second section turns to the issue of border management as such. It discusses border management as an institution with a view to its links to other policy areas/goals and as a concept and policy in its own right in order to determine how it can be an enabler for development.
1. What is development?

When analysing possible links between border management and development, it has to be clear what is meant by the latter. The simplest definition of development is the ‘notion of good change’. This is not a bad concept, but it does not define what the ‘change’ should be or what ‘good’ means when it occurs. As these questions have not been fully answered yet, all broad understandings of development that have evolved or changed over the years have been regularly met with severe criticism, which in turn have led to continued refinements of the underlying concepts. The debate has not resulted in a globally accepted definition; development continues to have a different meaning to different people and in different contexts. For example, annual changes in GDP per capita in a given country were and still are used as an indicator for development. But if GDP growth is accompanied by a trend towards unequal allocation of the acquired wealth, a majority of the population might be in an even worse situation than before. Both development discourse and policymaking have reflected such criticism and have moved away from a purely economic paradigm to the concept of ‘human development’, which emphasises the well-being of the individual and uses life expectancy, literacy, access to primary, secondary and tertiary education and the average income as indicators of development. The well-being of current generations, however, might negatively impact that of future generations when human development overuses the planet’s finite resources. Thus, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ calls for development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the needs of the future. Therefore, in order to be sustainable, development might require an approach that is exactly the opposite of one that favours economic development above all other aspects.

What is understood as development depends on the person’s (or group of persons’) perspective, which in turn is based on their values. Values reflect an individual’s or a society’s standpoints, which are subjective by definition. For example, a country with a high GDP could be considered by some as ‘rich’ even if it has high environmental degradation. Others would view a country that preserves natural resources and traditional lifestyles, but has a low GDP, as ‘rich’. Any position taken demonstrates that development is not a fixed notion but rather a relative condition. Development needs comparison to have meaning, either with a previous situation or with another subject or object in a similar situation. Thus, development can be perceived from a descriptive or an interventionist perspective. The former sees development as a long-term and structural societal transformation, while the latter sees development as an intended, induced and steered process with desirable outcomes. It is based on the conviction that positive interventions in development are possible and that their impact can be measured. Closely linked to the difficulty of defining what such ‘desired outcomes’ of development should be, a third perspective characterises development as a process of ‘bad change’ imposed by the countries of the Northern hemisphere on developing states to achieve their own objectives. Consequently, and under the conditions of the current world order, proponents of this perspective tend to principally reject the possibility of positive intervention in development.

Since development cannot be defined objectively, a discussion of the topic and its links to other policy areas must first be framed by a chosen perspective, and it has to be clear what this perspective is. In

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1 Andrew Summner ‘What is development’, http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/18296_5070_Sumner_Ch01.pdf p. 10.
2 Ibid. p. 7.
4 Andrew Summner ‘What is development’, p. 13.
determining whether there is a link between border management and development and how the former can positively influence the latter, the present paper rests on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the current world is based on the nation state. As it is not likely that it will be replaced by another type of political entity in the foreseeable future, any concept of development will be anchored to this context. Given that protecting the integrity of its territory and its external borders is one of the main functions of the nation state, border management and control has an influence on development. The second assumption is that positive interventions in development are possible but that the related ‘desirable outcomes’ will always be the result of a political process and not the result of an application of a pure scientific development concept. Many criticisms of the global development agenda are well argued; however, in the absence of a commonly accepted definition of development, broad political consensus on development goals might serve as the best basis for characterising them as desirable or not. Thus, the present article uses the broadest political agreement on development objectives on a global scale as a point of departure for the discussion, namely the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations and the so-called post-2015 development agenda.

1.1 Border control, border management and the nation state

In the introduction, it was argued that the terms border control and border management often trigger reactions in which they are considered as obstacles to positive globalisation, international integration and the exchange of goods, services and people between states. Such a notion implies that borders are literally ‘in the way’ of desirable international integration and that ‘a world without borders’ would be more conducive to development than our current one. This notion does not stand up to scrutiny as will be shown later. But even if it did, how realistic is it that a world without borders would ever become a reality or a reality we should wish for?

Our world is a world of nation states and the link between borders and development is directly related to the existence and future role of nation states. The link only exists as long as states do as autonomous geopolitical entities with defined territories, national jurisdictions and external borders. Internationalisation and globalisation might suggest that the borders between nation states will increasingly diminish and that the nation state as a model will become more and more obsolete and be replaced by other modes of governance. However, as discussed in more detail below, such changes are not likely for the foreseeable future.

The nation state is defined as a ‘form of political organisation which is based on a population nominally sharing a distinctive national identity and territory, governed by unitary bureaucracy’. Its global dominance does not necessarily mean that it is the best model of political organisation. Many other types of political organisation have existed throughout history that were not based on a population’s shared identity, territory and governance and did not require clearly defined external borders. The dominance of the nation state is based on a concept of ‘European statehood’ and the result of European and American hegemony, colonialism and the related state-forming and state-fragmenting processes over the last two centuries. Its disappearance, however, could only result in two developments. It could lead to a return to pre-state political formations, which given the size of the world’s population and the

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6 John Agnew, Borders on the mind, Ethics/ Global Politics. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v1i4.1892, (p. 7)
corresponding requirements for societal organisation, would most likely not contribute to the well-being of current or future generations. A second possible scenario is the establishment of a world state, which by definition would no longer require borders. Regardless of whether a world state is a desirable form of political organisation, one has to conclude that it is unlikely to become a reality. There is little evidence to suggest that the nation state will disappear in the near future. Between 1946 and 2011, the number of states almost quadrupled from a total of 55 to 193.\(^8\) Today’s world is one of continued dissolution of traditional territorial units and formation of new and smaller states, and will likely continue to be so for a long time. The nation state as a ‘territorially-based political organisation’ will remain a, if not the, key actor in international politics.

Borders are never ‘natural’, neither geographically nor socially. Rather, they are man-made. But they represent ‘key mechanisms of state control’, and even those critical of their role, who see them as having rather negative political and economic effects, do not expect them to disappear but to become more complex and differentiated despite intensifying international integration.\(^9\) Why is that? The identity between population, territory and sovereignty might be seen as problematic, as a fiction, as not suited to the situation of many parts of the world; it is still a precondition of the nation state and it is ensured by borders which have an integrating function within a state and a distinguishing function between the inside of a state and its outside. Borders are both physical and non-physical boundaries between one state unit and the other. They are ‘determinants of national identity’.\(^10\) Nation states depend on their existence; as long as nation states exist, they will have borders. Whether they are ‘barriers’, ‘bridges’ or ‘gateways’ is of course a different question.

The question that must be asked is how the undeniable trend of globalisation and increasing international interdependency can coexist with, and event complement, continued state formation and fragmentation. Two parallel trends can be observed in this regard: the number of nation states is increasing as is their regional integration. They form ‘clubs’ of neighbouring and like-minded states (such as the EU, ECOWAS, the Eurasian Union or NAFTA), which outsource part of their governance to joint supra-national institutions while retaining a large degree of national autonomy and sovereignty. In some cases, these ‘clubs’ might shift the control of national borders to joint or communitarised arrangements, but these arrangements have to successfully assume the same functions as national borders do or did before regional integration. Such ‘super borders’ have an even bigger task to fulfil than national ones, as they have to fulfill the requirements of all participating states, reduce the overall number of ‘filters’ that had existed in a region with national border control, and are often located where areas of significant economic, political and social differences border each other.

In view of the above, three main conclusions can be drawn. Borders will stay with us; they will form part of the overall context development is embedded in; and the global agenda must reflect their positive potential as enablers instead of allowing them to become barriers for development.

1.2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the post-2015 development agenda

Throughout the 1990s, the world community engaged in an intense dialogue on the overall direction and the concrete goals of a global development agenda. The results of a broad number of related initiatives,


\(^9\) James Anderson, Theorizing State Borders, p. 30

\(^10\) Anna Moraczewska, The Changing Interpretation of Border Functions in International relations, Revista Romano de Geografie Politica, Year XII, no. 2, November 2010, p. 330
agreements and resolutions provided the basis for the Millennium Summit and the Millennium Declaration of 2000. The Millennium Declaration was adopted by 189 member states of the United Nations and emphasised a global commitment to eradicate poverty, improve health and welfare, promote development and protect the environment.\textsuperscript{11} This commitment was expressed in 8 goals and 18 quantified targets, the so-called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to be implemented by 2015.\textsuperscript{12}

In late 2014, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reported on the achievements made as well as on the way ahead for the period after 2015. He concluded that the ‘global mobilisation behind the MDGs’ had generated ‘unprecedented improvements in the lives of many around the world’ and had proven that multilateral action ‘can make a tangible difference.’\textsuperscript{13} But he also stressed that the work of the MDGs is unfinished and that the next phase will be an equally challenging one. New threats and problems increase the risk of reversing positive trends and make realising the development agenda more difficult. Thus, a new transformative agenda is needed that is both universal and adaptable to the situation of each country; that places ‘people and planet’ at its centre; and that is based on ‘democracy, rule of law, civic space and more effective governance and capable institutions’.\textsuperscript{14} Consequently, the discussion on the post-2015 development agenda called for five transformative shifts, namely the ending of extreme poverty; a focus on sustainable development; economies that provide decent jobs and inclusive growth; the building of peaceful societies based on open, transparent and accountable governance; and a reinforced global partnership for sustainable development. Within these parameters, the intergovernmental dialogue developed more than 100 concrete options for policymakers to choose from. In structural terms, the General Assembly tasked the 30-member Open Working Group to prepare a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to follow the MDGs of the previous period.\textsuperscript{15} The Open Working Group proposed 17 specific goals with 169 associated targets.\textsuperscript{16} The proposed SDGs are currently being negotiated and set to be adopted by the end of 2015.\textsuperscript{17}

In the context of the present paper, three of the proposed SDGs and their respective operational targets are of particular relevance. For Goal 8, the ‘promotion of sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic

\textsuperscript{12} The eight MDGs are: Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education; Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; Goal 4: Reduce child mortality; Goal 5: Improve maternal health; Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability; Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development.
\textsuperscript{13} United Nations, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet, Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General On the Post-2015 Agenda, New York, December 2014, p. 4
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 7
\textsuperscript{15} Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/owg.html
\textsuperscript{16} The SDGs are: Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere; Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation at all; Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; Goal 8: Promote sustainable, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation; Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries; Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development; Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss; Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development; see: United Nations, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet, Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General On the Post-2015 Agenda, New York, December 2014, p. 18
\textsuperscript{17} Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable Development Goals, p. 7
growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all’, the impact of border management is an indirect one, assuming that its effectiveness or ineffectiveness would be one of a broad number of factors influencing the achievement of this goal. Goals 9 and 16 have a more direct reference to border management. Goal 9 calls for the building of ‘resilient infrastructure’, the promotion of ‘inclusive and sustainable industrialisation’ and the ‘fostering of innovation’. The associated target 9.1 refers to the development of ‘quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including transborder infrastructure’, which should support ‘economic development and human well-being’. Thus, a special focus should be on ‘African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small-island developing States’. Goal 9 emphasises industrialisation, but links it to the question of infrastructure, also from a transborder perspective.\(^{18}\) The well-managed movement of people, services and goods over borders is an important factor to support this goal. Goal 16 is even more straightforward when it comes to the link to border management. It calls for the promotion of ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’, the ‘provision of access to justice for all’ and the ‘building of effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. Many of its associated targets link up directly with border management, such as ‘ending the abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against the torture of children’ (target 16.2); the reduction of ‘illicit financial and arms flows’, the strengthening of ‘recovery and return of stolen assets’; the combatting of ‘all forms of organised crime’ (target 16.4); the ‘substantial reduction of corruption and bribery in all their forms’ (target 16.5); and the development of ‘effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels’ (target 16.6). These targets should be achieved by strengthening ‘relevant national institutions’, by facilitating ‘international cooperation’, and by ‘capacity building at all levels’, with a focus on ‘developing countries’ and on ‘preventing violence’ and ‘combatting terrorism and crime’.\(^{19}\)

Doubtlessly, the three SDGs described provide some strong arguments for placing border management on the global development agenda for the next fifteen years. But in order to understand more clearly what the concrete role of border management for development could be, it is important to distinguish between three dimensions: border management as an institution; border management and its link to other policy areas and goals; and border management as a concept and policy in its own right.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 15  
\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 22
2. Border management as a concept

In the context of the SDGs, it is worthwhile to look at the aspects that the various thematic task teams considered in their input to the development of the SDGs. The task team on ‘governance and development’, whose work influenced the formulation of Goal 16 described above, perceived the institutional and human capacities for governance as a key determinant for the effectiveness and delivery of public policies and strategies. Ineffective institutions imply ineffective implementation of policies, and this affects the poor and vulnerable the most.\(^\text{20}\) In this regard, the task team concluded that the post-2015 agenda must be based on an understanding of the importance of and a commitment to strengthening institutions.

Institutions have a value in themselves; their capacities can decide whether a policy can be implemented or not, regardless of the substance and quality of the policy in question. At the same time, it would be an overstatement to attribute development solely to the existence or building of functioning institutions.\(^\text{21}\) Institutions have to be embedded in a general policy and legal framework which promotes development. However, such a framework will not fulfil its potential if it is not supported by functioning institutions. Policy, legislation and institutions are complementary elements that reinforce each other. If one of them is missing, the others lose their impact as well. With regard to border management, one can think of a multitude of institutional weaknesses that would create bottlenecks harming the ‘good governance’ of borders and related policies. Badly trained, underpaid and unguided staff - an example of insufficient institutional resources at the border - are less motivated to implement border management standards effectively and more prone to corruption and bribery. This single weakness can completely undermine the objectives of a well-designed and well-meaning border management policy. There are many other potential bottlenecks which can have the same effect: overburdened staff, insufficient equipment, ill-designed communication lines, dysfunctional cooperation between the competent entities and units at the border and at centralised levels, uncoordinated work flows, etc. Any attempt to make border management an enabler for development has to acknowledge a basic fact: institutions do matter and making them ‘resilient, legitimate and inclusive’, as is called for by the post-2015 agenda, is a precondition for their positive impact on development.

2.1 Border management and its link to other policy areas and goals

As previously stated, in a world of territorially defined nation states, borders are key mechanisms for state control. They impact a broad range of state policies, especially those which entail interaction with other states and those which deal with the physical crossing of people, goods or persons across state borders. Borders are by no means the only boundaries between jurisdictions or the only points of transition from one jurisdiction to another. Many related processes are conducted within the state territory and are independent from border control, though they might have to revert to border management for their implementation. Both the recognition of skills and qualifications of immigrants and the link between migration, development and border control are good examples that demonstrate border management’s connection to state policies not directly dealing with state borders. National legal systems

\(^{20}\) UNDESA, UNDP, UNESCO, UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda, Governance and development, Thematic Think Piece, May 2012, p. 3

\(^{21}\) Sebastian Dellepiane Avellanda, Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 2006, p. 26
normally have defined formal requirements for the professional qualification of individuals who seek work in certain sectors. Immigrants who have obtained such qualifications in another country have to go through a process of qualification recognition. For sensitive areas of work, such requirements can be highly sophisticated and the process of checking and recognising formal qualifications can be very cumbersome for the individual concerned. Regardless of the outcome, the validation of qualifications, i.e. the transition from one jurisdiction to another, is not conducted at the border but by other institutions prior to or after entry to the country in question. What is checked at the border, however, is the individual’s permit to enter the country’s territory, which in many cases is based on the recognition of their qualifications.

There is much evidence of the mutual dependency between border management and other policy areas in terms of institutions and procedures. The post-2015 agenda task team on ‘trade and development' validated this connection in preparation of the SDGs. The task team’s paper on the SDGs also provides a number of important insights on the SDGs’ relation to institutions and possible links to border management. The paper states that trade remains the most reliable and productive way to integrate into the global economy, but that it is not the volume of trade that matters, but rather the goods and services that are traded. It emphasises that benefits from trade do not emerge from a simple ‘opening up’ and that a number of flanking policies and measures at the domestic and international level have to ensure that trade is ‘harnessed to inclusive and sustainable development’. The observed increase in global trade since the 1970s is largely a result of the increasing integration of developing countries, notably through ‘new South-South trade linkages’. But the increase in trade and inclusion of developing countries has also resulted in an increasingly complex global trading system. The expansion of trade has led to a significant increase in bilateral, regional and inter-regional trade agreements, which have become more and more comprehensive; however, they have not yet generated multilateral or global solutions. Tariffs have fallen, but non-tariff measures, such as sanitary/phyto-sanitary measures and technical standards, have become increasingly important due to fully justified public concerns, although not always to the benefit of trade flows. For some countries, however, it is estimated that in recent years the share of all imports that are affected by non-tariff measures has exceeded 50 per cent. This value alone illustrates the logical increase of requirements in regard to border management, which has to enforce the compliance of imports with the corresponding rules in an effective and efficient manner. The paper on trade and development concludes that a more equitable global trading system will require ‘massive investments (…) in new infrastructure, new technologies and new institutions’. Such investments are especially needed for African states to become further integrated into global trade and for intra-African trade as such. Reviews of the effects of regional trade agreements and regional economic groupings regularly conclude that they have not yet lived up to their full potential. This assessment refers to both global and intra-regional trade. In 2009, Africa’s contribution to global trade stood at 3 per cent (compared to 6 per cent for Latin America and 28 per cent for Asia). For the same year, intra-African trade only represented 10 per cent of Africa’s total trade (compared to 22 per cent for Latin America and 50 per cent for Asia). The comparatively weak trading position stems from a number of factors: the small size of its markets, a fragmented economic space, demand-side constraints, inadequate cross-border infrastructure and a lack of adequate regional transport infrastructure. On the supply side,

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22 UNCTAD, UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda, Trade and development and the global partnership beyond 2015, Thematic Think Piece, May 2012, p. 5
23 Florian A. Alburo, Policy Coherence and Coordination for Trade Facilitation: Integrated Border Management, Single Windows and other Options for Developing Countries, August 2008, p. 5
24 UNCTAD, UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda, Trade and development and the global partnership beyond 2015, Thematic Think Piece, May 2012, p. 7
25 Habiba Ben Barka, Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions, January 2012, p. 2
underdeveloped infrastructure – together with weak production, low investment, gaps in human and institutional capacities, and ineffective policies – constitutes a main impediment to trade. In the context of infrastructure and trade, border control plays a vital role, and a number of negative effects on development caused by inadequate institutions and human resources and ineffective policies have been identified. In general, the crossing of goods and services over African borders is hampered by ‘cumbersome and costly procedures’, the need ‘to complete two sets of controls on each side of the border’, the need to make ‘illegal payments’ and to ‘bribe officials’, regular ‘congestion due to increased traffic’, and delays due to outdated procedures and insufficient manpower and infrastructure. Such ‘border experiences’ also impact the mobility of people, tourists, business travellers and migrants, both in terms of their actual crossings and the likelihood of future visits to the country in question. The first impression of a country is often the lasting one. Exposure to lengthy and cumbersome administrative procedures, poor service delivery and facilities, a lack of information on immigration and customs procedures, and unfriendly and poorly qualified staff rank among the most frequent negative experiences of tourists and other travellers at border control points. Related studies reveal that tourists and travellers who have had such experiences often decide not to visit the country again. In times of global communication, negative ratings of a country’s image spread quickly and are clearly felt in trade and tourism, areas closely related to development.

The above implications for the link between border management and development are evident. First of all, they confirm a basic observation: more international integration and interaction between states does not imply less border control but better border management. Globalisation, enhanced contacts and increasing interaction lead to an increase rather than a reduction in complexity. This lies in the nature of the nation state, which has to align any type of inter-state activity with its domestic legal system, institutions and procedures. Dealing with this complexity entails two things: additional and more sophisticated rules, and increasing requirements to ensure the high quality of institutions, staff and work flows. In their paper, the task team on trade and development already provided some cornerstones of such requirements for modern border management that promotes trade and development: opening domestic markets to trade while protecting national interests, keeping abreast of a variety of rules and regulations emanating from an ever-increasing number of trade agreements, implementing non-tariff measures while not creating obstacles to trade, keeping up with intensified cross-border traffic without generating bottlenecks or time delays and without jeopardising state security, etc. All these examples, however, also show that development cannot be supported by just any type of border management. Rather, it needs a policy that integrates a number of different elements and meets a wide range of requirements in one holistic and comprehensive approach.

2.2 ‘Holistic border management concepts’ as enablers for development

It was argued in the previous sections that borders are likely to stay with us, that functioning border management is an inevitable tool for states to transcend beyond their own borders, that such management has a direct or indirect impact on development, and that this impact unfolds in a complex environment of various state functions and policies at the domestic, regional and global level. Nevertheless, the term ‘border management’ as such is not specific enough to substantiate the claim of having a potentially positive impact on development. There are border management systems that are

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26 Ibid., pp. 4
effective and efficient when it comes to protecting state security but fail in promoting trade and human mobility. Such outcomes can be intended under the respective state’s foreign policy, as seen with the Iron Curtain, which allowed states to efficiently maintain security while completely preventing cross-border exchange and mobility. They can also be the unintended consequences of ill-designed border management policies. In order to become enablers for development, borders have to truly ‘integrate’ a number of different pillars, actors, functions and procedures. The understanding that borders have to be managed in a ‘holistic’ or ‘integrated’ way started to prevail in the 1990s. The corresponding concepts, which were often labelled as ‘integrated border management’, aimed at combining the traditional modes of border control and protection of state security with those processes at the border that would facilitate the exchange of goods and services and the transfer of people with the neighbouring states.

Since then, different labels have been used for a broad number of related reform projects in an equally broad number of countries. These projects have followed heterogeneous approaches according to the countries and regions involved, but all have had in common the aim to promote ‘lean’, ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’ management of borders, that moved away from slow and inefficient bureaucratic structures to modern governance based on economically oriented management. Based on countries' differing situations and the requirements for border management between countries and regions, the concept of ‘Integrated Border Management’ (IBM) has been continually adapted. Thus, there is no unanimous global definition of IBM; however, there is international consensus that IBM refers to a comprehensive approach on ‘border problems across administrative and national dividing lines under the management of dedicated professional skills’. The European Union has become a key actor in applying integrated border management in terms of its own enlargement process and joint external borders, and in promoting it in its neighbourhood and across the globe. Consequently, IBM is also based on different understandings in the EU context. The present paper uses the concept of IBM as formulated in the Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans in 2004 and adapted as Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation for cooperation with non-EU countries in 2010. In 2007, the European Council adopted a more security-focused IBM concept for the management of the EU's external borders.

According to the 2004 Guidelines on IBM (updated in 2010), the concept ‘covers coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in order to reach the common goal of open, but controlled and secured borders’. In order to achieve these goals and to involve all the necessary stakeholders, integrated border management must be embedded in a sophisticated setting and must apply a broad number of well-balanced processes and procedures. According to the Guidelines, IBM is based on three main pillars, namely intra-service, inter-agency and international cooperation, and on four functions each corresponding to a specific agency at the border: 1) border surveillance/checks conducted by border guards, 2) goods control conducted by customs, 3) 

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29 Different concepts exist since the mid-1990s. There has been a growing demand to coordinate the work of different agencies at the border in order to facilitate trade. Various institutions started developing a concept that is currently known as ‘coordinated border management’ (CBM) (the World Customs Organization [WCO] uses the term). Other organisations have devised their own terminology, including but not limited to ‘integrated border management’ (EU), ‘collaborative border management’ (the World Bank), and ‘comprehensive border management’ (OSCE [Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe]). The intent is largely the same: there is a need for border agencies to coordinate their actions in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of border procedures.
30 The European Union has become a key actor in applying integrated border management in terms of its own enlargement process and joint external borders, and in promoting it in its neighbourhood and across the globe. Consequently, IBM is also based on different understandings in the EU context. The present paper uses the concept of IBM as formulated in the Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans in 2004 and adapted as Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation for cooperation with non-EU countries in 2010. In 2007, the European Council adopted a more security-focused IBM concept for the management of the EU’s external borders.
31 Peter Hobbing, Integrated Border Management at the EU Level, p. 3.
animal inspection conducted by the veterinary service and 4) plant inspection conducted by the phyto-sanitary service. Finally, each of the four functions is supported by regulatory, institutional and procedural frameworks; human resources and training; communication and information exchange; and infrastructure and equipment.32

The challenges related to implementing IBM according to the above-mentioned features can be seen when looking at only one of these features, namely successfully linking the three pillars of intra-service, inter-agency and international cooperation. It starts with intra-service cooperation. One and the same ministry or agency responsible for a specific task at the border has to align the work of different units at the same level (horizontal cooperation) and between units at local, regional and central levels (vertical cooperation). As tasks at the border are not limited to one ministry or agency, the various entities with border management responsibilities must also coordinate their work, again at the local, regional and central levels. And as border management is not limited to the domestic context but inevitably touches upon cooperation with other states, it must also ensure effective cooperation at the local level between both sides of the border, between neighbouring states at the central political level, and between states at the international level to better approach ‘common fields of work such as transborder crime, irregular migration, trafficking in human beings, terrorism and smuggling of goods’.33

The inter-agency and international dimensions of IBM add to this complexity, as they involve a large number of actors in border management. The Guidelines for IBM in EC External Cooperation, for instance, list more than twenty agencies that are typically involved in border management: for border surveillance and border checks: border guard/police, coast guard, immigration service, customs, border protection service, armed forces (army, air force and navy) and other specialised law enforcement/intelligence agencies; for customs control: customs, border protection service, customs police, fiscal police/financial guard and specialised law enforcement agencies; for the inspection of plants and plant products: plant health inspection service, plant and other quarantine services, phyto-sanitary inspection and again customs; for the inspection of live animals and foodstuff: veterinary inspection, health and food safety agency, animal inspection service and quarantine service; finally for human health inspection: sanitary inspection, public health agency, health and food safety agency and again quarantine service.34 In reality, the number might be even higher when the links between border management and other policy areas are taken into account. In the United States, for instance, there are more than sixty departments and agencies with jurisdiction over international trade.35

It is worthwhile, however, to address these complexities with a holistic approach for the benefit of development, even when this is a demanding task. A comprehensive evaluation of EU support for non-EU countries in the area of border management provides an impressive list of the specific intermediate and global impacts development assistance in the areas of IBM (and organised crime) can have. Efficient borders improve the recognition of rights of the persons crossing a border, the regulation and inspection of passengers and the management of migration. They improve the flow of goods and the collection of revenues, reduce the threat of crime and terrorism and improve law enforcement. All of this leads to improved respect for human rights, enhanced mobility of people, trade facilitation, more competitive private sectors, increased revenues for the state, and improved public safety and national security. The global impacts, which follow this intervention logic, are very much in line with the

32 Thematic global evaluation of the EU’s support to IBM and fight against OC, April 2013, p. 2.
33 Guidelines for IBM in the Western Balkans, p. 20.

As stated above, it is difficult to ensure effective coordination and cooperation among a large number of stakeholders. This is one reason why national reform of and international cooperation on border management sometimes have emphasised security and control-related aspects. The other main reason for this focus is that it often reflects the priorities of states. For many states, security continues to be the main interest when it comes to border management, especially in a situation of regional conflict and uncertainties regarding territorial integrity. The above-mentioned evaluation of EU support in the area of border management also revealed that related initiatives were ‘particularly effective in security areas of IBM’. These aspects were often backed by the strong political will of beneficiaries, especially when they had only recently become independent and saw secure borders as a national and governmental priority.  

There are strong arguments to perceive the strengthening of border security in itself as an enabler for development. Secure borders are a precondition for countering a number of phenomena detrimental to development, such as transborder and international crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, trafficking of arms, illicit and informal cross-border trade, human smuggling and the illegal entry of unauthorised individuals into the territory of a state. This becomes even more important when security aspects of border management are not seen from a purely national perspective but as a joint objective of states bordering each other and as an area for cooperation and coordination between them.  

But security is only one side of the coin; trade and mobility should always be the other. The outlined understanding of IBM is particularly suited to serve as an enabler for development because it explicitly rules out any trade-off between security and the facilitation of trade and human mobility. It has emphasised the close connection between ‘security and facilitation of trade and mobility’ and ‘open but controlled borders’ from the very beginning. It emerged gradually, firmly embedded in a political environment that always emphasised economic integration, transborder cooperation and mobility but also acknowledged that it could not neglect security and control aspects at its borders either. Consequently, it encompasses both elements and balances these ‘twin goals of modern border management’ in an efficient and effective manner. Its approach and methodology might appear complex; however, they have been tested in practice numerous times by states and constantly adapted to lessons learned. Based on this long-standing experience, the use of IBM in the form of the two guidelines discussed results in a unified organisation of border agencies that can ensure coordination between them, including the provision of services in a synchronised manner, the harmonisation of procedures, the single application of risk management systems and standardised responses to security threats. Lastly, it provides a single entry point for border clients and promotes coordination and cooperation with neighbouring countries.

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36 PARTICIP, Thematic global evaluation of the EU’s support to IBM and fight against OC, April 2013, p. 21.
37 Ibid. p. V.
38 Guidelines for IBM in the Western Balkans, January 2007, p. 13.
Conclusions

The close connection between border management and development might not be initially obvious. At second glance, however, the linkages are clear. The first section of the paper stressed that there is no unambiguously accepted definition of development, and that any concept of development will always depend on individual perspectives, values and standpoints. But it also argues that regardless of the approach, any concept of development will always have to materialise in a world of nation states, and consequently involve borders and border management. The nation state will not disappear in the foreseeable future: our world is one of continued state dissolution and formation. Borders are a key mechanism of state control, and even more importantly, they are a precondition for its existence. The nation state is based on the idea of an identity between population, territory and sovereignty that needs to be defined by borders. As long as nation states exist, they will always have borders.

But when borders remain, how can they become enablers for development? This paper used the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations and the so-called post-2015 development agenda as a basis. The broadest political consensus among the world’s nations on development priorities seemed to be the best possible starting point for such an analysis. This paper concluded that 3 of the 17 so-called ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ of the United Nations that will form the global development agenda after 2015 directly relate to border management, namely the ones aiming at the ‘promotion of sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth’, the ‘development of quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure (including transborder infrastructure)’, and the ‘building of effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.

Though these goals provide some strong arguments for including border management in the global development agenda, they do not answer the question of how border management in general and which type of border management in particular can contribute to development. First of all, institutions matter. No matter how good a policy is, it will be the institutional capacities that decide whether it can be implemented or not. But functioning institutions do not automatically mean progress; they have to be embedded in a general policy and legal framework which promotes development. There is a multitude of other policy areas that are linked to border management, both in general terms and in terms of development. Any exchange with other states that encompasses the physical movement of goods, services and people across borders will be affected by it.

Development, however, will be best supported by border management concepts that address security and the facilitation of trade and mobility on equal terms. In view of the pivotal role of borders for inter-state cooperation and international trading, financial and migration systems, modern border management must integrate a number of different elements and meet a wide range of requirements through one holistic and comprehensive approach. This paper identified the European Union’s 2004 Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans and 2010 Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation as containing such concepts. Both sets of guidelines encompass the ‘twin goals of modern border management’: security and facilitation of trade and mobility, and explicitly rule out any trade-off between them. They have been extensively applied to integrate and balance these elements in an efficient and effective manner. Their approach and methodology are complex and demanding, but they are also well-tested in practice, have been constantly adapted and improved and, above all, reflect an environment which is complex and demanding. Most importantly, this particular approach to IBM represents a methodology which ensures a
unified organisation of border agencies, the harmonisation of procedures, effective responses to security threats and coordination and cooperation with neighbouring countries at the same time.

In summary, border management concepts that neglect trade- and mobility-related aspects and do not pursue security and facilitation of trade and mobility consistently can indeed become a hindrance to development. This makes it all the more important to recall the equal emphasis of IBM on security, trade and human mobility and to remind the international community, beneficiaries and donors of the importance in applying the concept consistently and to its full extent.