Ten years since the refugee crisis 2015 – what has changed, and which challenges remain?

Mr Director General, please tell us - how did the 2015 “migration crisis” start a new era in international migration and European migration policy? 

The crisis of 2015 was not an entirely new or singular event, but rather a “two-years peak” in long-term developments that suddenly entered the public and political debate due to their high momentum and large numbers.

Already in the 1990s, there was the notion of an asylum crisis in the EU, which already displayed the same basic patterns as the one in 2015, albeit with smaller numbers, and for which there were no truly viable solutions at the time either. This discussion was then overshadowed by other issues: questions of EU expansion and institutional reform, the emerging climate crisis, the global financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent Euro crisis, or the looming Brexit. Public and political attention is limited; it focuses on a few dominant developments and often overlooks others that are just as important. And once they catch public intention, we speak about a “sudden crisis” or a “turning point”. In reality the “crisis” of 2015 had started already long time before and was not that “sudden” at all.

The term “crisis” is, of course, a label assigned by the public debate, by politics, and by the media. Whether migration is truly as significant as most would assume today is not really the question. What we perceive as a crisis is one, at least from a political perspective. 

At a global level, the number of forcibly displaced people has reached a record 122.6 million. But specifically in the EU, asylum applications have more than tripled since the 2000s — from 261,000 in 2010, peaking at 1.283 million in 2015, to 998,000 in 2024. 

In that sense, 2015 certainly marked a turning point and has started a new era, an era that we are still living in today. Simply put, we live in an “age of migration” since many years, since 2015, we also live in an “age of migration crisis”.

A full decade now, how has the EU migration policy responded to the challenges that the region continues to face? What has changed since 2015?

An important conclusion from what happened in 2015 is that the current state of European migration policy is significantly more advanced now than is often perceived through media coverage or public discourse on social platforms. Over the past three decades, the collective understanding of migration dynamics, the policy instruments, and the quality of international partnerships have all evolved. All this happened to a level that would have been considered highly ambitious in the past.

For example: In 2015, the EU had hardly anything in place when it comes to the “external” dimension, the cooperation with non-EU countries. Since then, it developed a myriad of instruments, enhanced funding, tested initiatives and turned them into regular policies. Meanwhile, cooperation and migration partnerships with non-EU countries have become firmly embedded in the EU’s migration diplomacy, reflected in agreements with countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, and the Western Balkans.

Amongst others, these partnerships are credited with contributing to a reduction in irregular arrivals and facilitating voluntary returns in 2024, particularly from North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa, which doubled in comparison to 2023.

And yet there is still a growing dissent – particularly among hard-line conservative political parties and their constituents, and even within the media and among the broader public – that this is not working; or that migration is the problem. Why is that?

Conversely from what has been explained above, there also is a critical perception gap: Despite this substantial progress in migration policies across the EU and among its Member States, this [progress] is not always readily visible; largely because the scale and complexity of migration challenges have grown, and developments occur at an increasingly rapid pace. In short, we have become much better on migration policy – but the challenges have become much bigger as well, so we do not see the progress we have made. Nevertheless, it is essential to recognise and build upon the achievements made, as they provide a solid foundation and the confidence necessary to address present and future challenges effectively. 

Equally concerning, is that strategic communication on migration remains underdeveloped. Governments continue to face difficulties in clearly conveying their actions, objectives, and rationales to the public, media, and political constituencies. This communication gap fosters susceptibility to polarised narratives and constrains the political space needed for the implementation of coherent, long-term migration policies.

If both the events of 2015 and today’s situation manifest long-term structural drivers and trends in international migration – why does finding the solutions to the challenges seem to remain elusive? Are we not able to address these challenges better?

International migration is shaped by a complex set of drivers, including war, conflict, economic disparities, globalisation, and climate change. Conflict and instability remain primary causes, particularly in regions near Europe, as seen in past migrations from the Balkans, Middle East, Africa, and more recently, Ukraine. The number of armed conflicts has nearly doubled over the last decade. Two billion people are believed to live in conflict-affected areas. Globally, these areas have expanded by 65 percent since 2021. 

In 2024, the number of forcibly displaced people rose for the thirteenth consecutive year, reaching an estimated 122.6 million by mid-2024 and marking an 11.5 percent increase compared to the previous year. As a beacon of freedom and stability in an increasingly volatile global environment, Europe has become a primary destination for refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular migrants. In the 2000s, the average annual number of asylum applications submitted in an EU Member State was around 302,000. In the 2020s, this number more than tripled to an average of almost 950,000 cases per year.

Largely, moreover, the EU responded decisively: Since 2014, the number of positive asylum decisions has reached 4.1 million – a testament to the region’s commitment to international protection.

Given the current context – particularly including the ongoing geopolitics and conflicts in Europe’s neighbouring regions – can we expect even more migration flows into the EU?

As crises become more widespread and interconnected, the likelihood and scale of migration events are expected to grow in future. Thus, migration is no longer merely a humanitarian issue; it is deeply connected to global political and economic transformations. It is also characterised by an increasing instrumentalization of migration, as was made evident by Belarus's hostile actions toward the EU following the attack on Ukraine. These shifts challenge traditional policy approaches and call for more robust, adaptive, and cooperative responses at national, regional, and global levels.

As complex as migration as geopolitics is, the EU seems to have made some strides – although not without their own internal hurdles. What have been the debates on European migration policy at the moment? The key reforms and challenges they seek to address, and where this is headed?

Since 2015, the EU has initiated sweeping reforms in its migration and asylum policies, most recently and most notably through the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, slated for implementation by 2026. These efforts reflect the need to reconcile legal obligations and economic needs with political realities and public sentiment. Europe has strengthened border infrastructure, expanded partnerships with neighbouring and transit countries, and incorporated migration issues into broader development and labour cooperation strategies. 

However, despite these advances, irregular migration and asylum applications remain high, and public trust in migration management remains low. This has prompted calls for more “innovative solutions”, including the externalisation of asylum procedures, return hubs in third countries, and broader use of the "safe country" concept. 

And what about the growing discourse on returns, dominating Brussels at the moment?

Recently, the EU has worked on a list of safe third countries (Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco and Tunisia) and the abolishment of the “connection criterion” in EU migration law, which makes it legally possible to establish “return hubs” in third countries.

Experiences of externalisation models, such as the Italy-Albania memorandum, however, have highlighted a number of legal, operational and political challenges. Return hubs are a viable yet challenging concept. Given the great challenges their development and implementation will face, it remains to be seen whether such centres can be established and made operational by 2025. If at all, such centres would be based on bilateral rather than on whole-of-EU agreements.

However, all of these proposals raise significant legal, ethical and political questions, as they may challenge fundamental EU principles like access to asylum and Schengen freedom of movement.

As the EU works on these channels and mechanisms, inter alia, to manage the return of migrants or processing asylum-seekers in third-countries, today’s migration is also embedded in the growing discourse of Europe’s changing demographics and growing labour shortages. Is it fair to say that this is now an opportunity to be even more open [to migrants]?

Migration is increasingly influenced by global demographic shifts. While population growth is concentrated in the Global South, many countries in the Global North, especially in Europe, experience population decline and ageing.

By 2050, almost 90 countries in the Global North may face shrinking populations and labour market shortages across key sectors such as healthcare, STEM, construction, and transportation. Despite advancements in automation, these demographic pressures cannot be offset without labour migration. The growing demographic-economic mismatch compels European governments to consider more open immigration policies. 

However, promoting labour migration remains a politically sensitive task. It involves balancing economic needs with public concerns about irregular migration, integration, and national identity.

Despite the critical stance of populations in destination countries, the number of international migrants nearly doubled since 1990, reaching 281 million, of whom 169 million are migrant workers. They not only support host economies with critical skills but also send over $900 billion annually in remittances, aiding development in origin countries.

How then, can the EU drive a less contested, and more constructive (and welcoming) policy field – so that not only is it beneficial for both the EU and for migrants; but also overall to improve migration governance?  

To bring about real and lasting change, the EU and its non-EU partners must work together on continuous dialogue, shared goals, and joint initiatives - such as job creation and investment in origin countries – also to address the root causes of forced and irregular migration. The eight priorities are:

1. The private sector must be more actively engaged in migration cooperation to ensure a long-term impact of economic cooperation.
2. Investing in the transfer of vocational education and training standards to countries of origin is another priority. This not only equips potential migrants with the skills needed in European labour markets; it also supports local economic development, encouraging origin countries to cooperate on return and border control policies.
3. The control of the external borders must be improved even further. There will be no functioning and publicly accepted migration regime without functioning border management. To balance control with humanitarian obligations and economic needs is challenging but possible. And it is essential for any functioning migration governance system.
4. Better balance between migration control and legal migration pathways is essential. The latter must be harmonized across Europe and clearly communicated to potential migrants and their home countries. Expanding legal avenues while strengthening enforcement mechanisms will help reduce irregular flows.
5. Return policies must become smarter and linked with development aid and job creation, making them more acceptable and effective.
6. The EU must reassess its visa policy, as over 30% of asylum seekers enter visa-free but come from countries with very low recognition rates.
7. Fast, legally sound asylum procedures are absolutely critical to discourage misuse of the system.
8. Efforts to combat migrant smuggling must intensify, as these networks play a central role in irregular migration. Despite their proven impact, countermeasures remain under-resourced and underestimated in policy priorities.

In the end, however, three major questions remain. How should a functioning, fair and global refugee regime look like? How can the international community help to reduce the number of violent conflicts that are still the main driver of flight and irregular migration? How can a fair global economic order provide opportunities for as many people as possible and limit the need to migrate in disorderly and irregular ways? These three questions wait for satisfying answers. Only when they are given, a final breakthrough on migration issues is in sight as well.