Targeting Vulnerabilities
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2015

Over six-and-a-half million people are internally displaced in Syria, while Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are hosting over four million Syrian refugees. Some of the most vulnerable people among them are affected by one of the most serious of human rights violations: trafficking in persons. People who have fled within and outside of Syria should be able to set up a new life for themselves safe from the war, and safe from trafficking and exploitation. This Study assesses the impact of the Syrian war on trafficking in the region and presents timely recommendations on how to respond.
Targeting Vulnerabilities
The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Situation on Trafficking in Persons

* A Study of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq

Prepared by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna - Austria
Commissioned and funded by the United States Department of State, Office to Monitor & Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP)

International Centre for Migration Policy Development • December 2015
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ICMPD wishes to thank various people for their contribution to this Study. Special thanks are due to Dr. Claire Healy, the Research Coordinator, for coordinating the research and drafting this report, and to the Country Researchers Zaid Khaldoon Adelby, Erica Aiazzi, Dr. Vanessa Iaria, Dr. Fulya Memişoğlu, and Şenay Özden, for their dedication and commitment in conducting the research in the countries under study and for providing invaluable information and analysis.

ICMPD would also like to express its deep gratitude to Prof. Ibrahim Awad, Dr. Elżbieta M. Goździak and Albert Kraler, Peer Reviewers of the Study, for their guidance and useful critiques of the research.

A key role was played by the ICMPD project team in coordinating and managing the research activities, without which the completion of this Study would not have been possible. Thanks to Nedaa Amraish, Lukas Gehrke, Melita Gruevska Graham and Elisa Trossero for their continuous support during the implementation of this research.

Finally, ICMPD is particularly grateful to all the research informants for this Study from state institutions, non-governmental and international organisations, local authorities, journalists, academics and all the other interlocutors in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, who kindly shared their knowledge and experiences for this report. Without their generosity and willingness to participate in the research, many of the important findings of this Study would never have come to light.

ICMPD hopes that the findings of this Study will contribute to an improvement in the situation of those affected by the Syrian crisis.
Targeting Vulnerabilities

Over four years of conflict have seen increasing numbers of people flee their homes in Syria, becoming internally displaced or seeking refuge beyond Syria’s borders. The overwhelming majority of those forced to flee abroad are residing in the neighbouring countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Based on comprehensive research and analysis, Targeting Vulnerabilities examines an often overlooked aspect of the war and refugee crisis: trafficking in persons. This Study is orientated around the research question: What are the effects of the Syrian war and refugee situation on trafficking in persons in Syria and its neighbouring countries?

This Study, the first of this kind, examines the patterns and characteristics of internal and cross-border displacement since the war, as well as reception arrangements in the hosting countries. The results of the research on situations of vulnerability to trafficking and on indications of trafficking cases are presented and analysed. The Study is the result of the project Assessment of the Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Crisis on Trafficking in Persons (AIS-TIP), implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and financially supported by the United States Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP).

One of the main conclusions of the research is that much of the exploitation taking place is not carried out by organised transnational groups, but rather involves family members, acquaintances and neighbours. Families and communities displaced by the war are often left with no viable alternatives for survival other than situations that can be characterised as exploitation. The vulnerabilities they are experiencing therefore contribute to the likelihood of both exploiting and being exploited. The key factors influencing these vulnerabilities are related to the humanitarian crisis itself and to difficulties experienced in obtaining and maintaining legal residence status and authorisation to work in the hosting countries. In addition, in a context where, as a result of the Syrian war, Turkey now hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, and Lebanon has the highest proportion of refugees in its population of any country, host communities, as well as displaced people, are becoming increasingly vulnerable.

Therefore, we call on state and non-state organisations, at national and international level, to respond to the research findings and contribute to the implementation of the recommendations. These include specific anti-trafficking measures, more
general humanitarian issues, improving child protection and women’s rights, and targeting particularly vulnerable groups, as the new UN Sustainable Development Goals acknowledge.

We believe that combating trafficking is an integral component of the humanitarian response to war and displacement. In the context of the Syrian war and refugee crisis, addressing vulnerabilities to trafficking, protecting trafficked people and prosecuting traffickers is not only part of our responsibility to address the trafficking phenomenon, it will also help to alleviate the desperate situations of these people in general, contributing to ensuring their safety, recovery, rehabilitation and the prospects of living lives free from violence and free from exploitation.

Gabriela Abado
Acting Director General
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The conflict and violence in Syria since 2011 have caused massive loss of life and human suffering, as well as a complex displacement crisis. Four of Syria’s neighbouring states are the most important hosting countries worldwide for refugees from the war-torn country. As of the end of September 2015, there are almost four million Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq alone, whose registration is active with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, over six and a half million Syrians are internally displaced within their own country. Not all Syrians and stateless people who have fled abroad have registered with UNHCR or the national authorities (NRC, April 2015a), and not all those internally displaced are recorded as such, therefore the figures are likely to be even higher in all cases.

Apart from the violence itself, the conflict and attendant refugee crisis in neighbouring countries have led to increased impoverishment, informal “coping” economies and war profiteering, rendering people displaced by the crisis vulnerable to exploitation and different forms of trafficking in persons. Uncertainty prevails as to when the war in Syria will end and internally displaced people (IDPs) will be able to return to their homes, whether Syrian refugees abroad will be able to return to their country of origin, and for how long the hosting states will be able to meet the refugees’ needs in terms of providing access to basic services – accommodation, healthcare and education – and opportunities for income generation.

As of mid-2014, the situation in Syria, as well as in parts of Iraq, has been further exacerbated by the seizure of large swaths of territory by Da’ish (ISIS/ISIL/IS), resulting in violence and further displacement of Syrian and Iraqi people, as well as of other people residing in those areas.

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1 Da’ish is also variously referred to as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State (IS). “Da’ish” is an acronym formed from the name of the organisation in Arabic: “al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham,” and is used to refer to the group throughout this Study.
About the Study

This Study assesses the effects of the Syrian war and refugee crisis on trafficking in persons (TIP) in Syria and the surrounding region. The five countries under study - Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (with a focus on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq – KR-I) - were selected on the basis of the magnitude of refugee and internal displacement. While around 6.6 million people are internally displaced in Syria as of the time of writing (October 2015), to the north of Syria, Turkey hosts around 1.9 million registered Syrian refugees, mostly in the southeastern and southern Turkish provinces. At Syria’s western border, the second most important hosting country in absolute numbers, Lebanon, is currently hosting over 1.1 million registered Syrians. Syria borders Jordan to the south, which is currently hosting around 630,000 people who have fled from Syria. Finally, Syria shares its eastern border with Iraq, where the majority of Syrians in the country reside in
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), an autonomous region in the federal state, host to a total of around 250,000 Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, these numbers do not include people who have fled from Syria to the neighbouring countries, but are not registered as active with the UNHCR - nor, in the case of Turkey, with the national authorities. In addition, the situation is highly dynamic, with Syrian refugees newly arriving in host countries, moving outside the region, entering a situation of internal displacement within Syria and, in some cases, returning to Syria for various reasons. Throughout the text, the five countries under study are referred to by order of the size of the displaced Syrian population: Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq.

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2 Iraqi Kurdistan is an autonomous region comprising the four governorates of Duhok, Erbil (Hewler), Sulaymaniyah and the newly established (early 2014) governorate of Halabja.
The human trafficking phenomenon itself is the thematic focus of this research, which aims to understand the forms of trafficking in persons that are taking place and whom they affect, as well as who the perpetrators are, rather than examining anti-trafficking policies or initiatives. The forms of trafficking in the countries under study are the subject of investigation, as well as situations of vulnerability to trafficking, although reference is also made, where relevant, to trafficking from or through these countries. Relevant anti-trafficking legislation, institutions, policies and activities in the countries under study are briefly examined below, and throughout the rest of the Study are referred to only as and when relevant to understanding the trafficking phenomenon. This is driven by the conviction that the most important step in responding to the trafficking and exploitation of girls, boys, women and men is to first understand it.

The chronological scope of the Study facilitates a comparison of the situation at the beginning of 2011, referred to throughout as the baseline date, with the situation throughout 2011-2015 inclusive, in order to assess the effects of the conflict. To better understand the situation prior to the outbreak of the war, the Study covers the decade 2001-2010, which is referred to as the baseline period. As set out below in the section on Methodology, the analysis of the baseline period principally draws on secondary research and data, while primary sources were also consulted for the period since the outbreak of the war. Research commenced in late 2014, with all of the field research taking place in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq during 2015.

About the Project

This Study is the result of a research project to assess the impact of the Syrian war and refugee crisis on trafficking in persons in Syria and the surrounding region, making feasible recommendations to respond to its findings. The overall goal is to increase and enhance knowledge on the impact of the Syrian war and refugee crisis on TIP in Syria and the countries most affected by the attendant refugee movement (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq). The project: “Assessment of the Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Crisis on Trafficking in Persons (AIS-TIP)” is funded by the US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP) and is being implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), an international organisation with headquarters in Vienna, Austria.
The research was carried out by a coordination team based at ICMPD in Vienna, with five country researchers who conducted country-specific desk and field research on Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. This Study has also been subject to two rounds of external and internal (ICMPD) peer review. Through the publication and dissemination of this Study, the project aims to contribute to strengthening the response to trafficking in persons by relevant actors operating in the region, by providing the reliable knowledge and data necessary to inform emergency and short-term actions to address trafficking in persons and vulnerability to trafficking, and drawing recommendations for mid- to long-term anti-trafficking activities to meet the needs of identified and unidentified victims of trafficking, as well as other groups vulnerable to TIP in the region and beyond. The project commenced in October 2014 and the field research was carried out from January to October 2015, with the launch of the final Study at an International Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, in December 2015. During the first half of 2016, the Recommendations that comprise chapter 7 of this Study will be discussed, expanded upon and adapted, where necessary. A series of workshops will be organised for this purpose in the hosting countries under study and outside the region, in order to build upon the country-specific findings of the research.

Structure of the Study

The Study consists of the following chapters:

**Chapter One: Introduction**

This first chapter of the Study explains the terms used and the research methodology that was applied, as well as comprising the literature review and relevant legislative and institutional framework at international level and in the countries under study.

**Chapter Two: Migration and Trafficking during the Baseline Period**

The second chapter analyses the situation in terms of migration and trafficking during the decade prior to the Syrian war, in order to provide an indication of the baseline conditions.

**Chapter Three: Displacement Context, 2011-2015**

Chapter three details the current context of international and internal displacement and migration of Syrians and other affected groups.
Chapter Four: Situations of Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons

Chapter four examines situations of vulnerability to trafficking in persons.

Chapter Five: Impact on Human Trafficking in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq

The fifth chapter is the main focus of this Study – the impact of the Syrian war and refugee crisis on trafficking in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendations

The Study closes with the conclusions of the research, and recommendations for responses based on the research findings.

1.1 Terms Used in this Study

This Study uses the definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, as a person who,

“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.

Although Syrians currently outside their country of origin are not officially recognised by the national governments of the four hosting countries under study as Convention refugees, this Study refers to them as Syrian refugees throughout, as they are considered refugees by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), even if a certain number of Syrians in each of the four host countries under study are not registered with the UNHCR. An asylum applicant is someone who is outside of their country of origin, or at an international border, and applies for Convention refugee status. Forced migration generally refers to refugee situations where someone is compelled to leave a country due to persecution, violence or a particular political situation, though it may also refer to internal displacement and to international displacement as a result of a natural disaster or climate change.
In addition, persons of concern are considered by the UNHCR to be returnees, stateless people and internally displaced people (IDPs). Returnees are former refugees who return voluntarily to their countries of origin, whether spontaneously or in an organised fashion; a stateless person is someone who does not have internationally recognised national citizenship of any state; and an internally displaced person (IDP) is someone who is forced to flee their home but who remains within their country’s borders. The UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (OCHA, 2004) define the internally displaced as:

“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”

A camp refugee is someone who resides in a camp or a camp-like setting (including informal tent settlements). Camps include “temporary settlements, including planned or self-settled camps, collective centres, and transit and return centres established for hosting displaced persons. It applies to ongoing and new situations where due to conflict or natural disasters, displaced persons are compelled to find shelter in temporary places”.3

Palestine Refugees are defined, as per the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” Palestine refugees from Syria who have fled the conflict to Lebanon and Jordan remain under the mandate of the UNRWA, rather than that of UNHCR, while in Turkey, they are covered by the government’s temporary protection regime, and in Iraq, they are considered refugees under the mandate of UNHCR.

Trafficking in persons (TIP), as per Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (UN Trafficking Protocol), supplementing the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, is:

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“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”

In the case of trafficking in adults, this can be broken down into a specific act, using certain means, for the purpose of exploitation. Trafficking in children, however, is defined as committing a specific act for the purpose of exploitation, as the means are irrelevant. A child is any person younger than 18 years, according to the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, referred to as boys or girls where relevant throughout, depending on their sex. In this Study, rather than “victims”, the terms “trafficked person”, “trafficked people”, “trafficked adults” and “trafficked children” are preferred, as they are not strictly legal terms.

Trafficking in persons is also an offence that may be committed by an organised criminal group, defined in accordance with the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime as:

“a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.

Migrant smuggling, according to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, is

“the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”.

Although they are referred to by many interviewees for this Study as “smugglers”, facilitators of internal movement within one country do not facilitate the irregular crossing of an international border and therefore cannot be defined as
migrant smugglers according to international law. For this reason, and in order to distinguish them from migrant smugglers, they are referred to as facilitators of internal movement throughout this Study.

Irregular migrants do not have a permit authorising them to legally reside and/or work in their country of destination. They may have been unsuccessful in the asylum procedure, their visa or permit may have expired, or they may have entered irregularly. Irregular border crossing or irregular entry is when a person enters a country other than that of their citizenship or regular residence without the necessary legal permit or visa. Border Crossing Points (BCPs) are official locations where national authorities check documentation to determine whether a person has authorisation to enter a country, and may be either permanent or temporary. People may also cross borders at informal border crossing points. Irregular migration includes irregular entries, but also refers to a person residing in a destination country without authorisation, because their permit or visa has expired, transiting a country without authorisation, or when a person works in a destination country without being authorised to do so.

In relation to the chronological scope of the Study, the baseline date is the beginning of 2011, while the baseline period refers to the years 2001 to 2010. The impact period for this Study, with impact taken to mean the effects of the war and population displacement, is 2011 to late 2015, the date of publication.

Among the geographical and political terms used in this Study, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) is an autonomous region of Iraq. See: www.picum.org, accessed 02.10.2015.

Glossary of Arabic Terms used in the Text

Dallala: Guide.
Kafala: Sponsorship system governing the immigration and employment of migrant workers.
Maktoum: Unregistered or not appearing in records; refers to a sub-group of stateless Syrian-born Kurds.
Mishyar: Tourist marriage. Also: Zawaj al-Mishyar.
Mukhtar: Local government official.
Muta’h: Temporary marriage among some Shia Muslim communities.
Nafaqa: Maintenance allowance (in the context of marriage).
Qadi: Judge.
Shari’a: The Islamic legal system, based on the instructions of Islamic texts, particularly the Quran and the Hadith.
Shawish: Supervisors or foremen on farms. Also: Moraqeb.
Sheikh: Muslim religious leader.
Zawaj bil wakala: Proxy marriage.
within Federal Iraq, comprising the four governorates of Duhok, Erbil (Hewler), Sulaymaniyyah and the newly established (early 2014) governorate of Halabja. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The MENA countries refer to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional organisation whose participating countries are some former Soviet Republics, formed during the breakup of the Soviet Union. Its Member States are: Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Moldova; Russia; Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; and its Associate States are Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is one of the main armed opposition groups in Syria. The Democratic Union Party (PYD, in Kurdish Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) is a Syrian Kurdish opposition party.

The People’s Protection Units (YPG, in Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) are the main armed forces of the Kurdish Supreme Committee, of which the PYD is a member.

The Nusra Front (also: Jabhat al-Nusra) is an armed Islamist opposition group in Syria.

Da’ish is variously referred to as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State (IS). “Da’ish” is an acronym formed from the name of the organisation in Arabic: “al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham”, and is used to designate the group throughout this Study.

The Peshmerga is the official army of the KR-I, recognised by the 2005 Iraqi Constitution.

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, in Kurdish Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) is a Kurdish militant organisation based in Turkey and the KR-I.

1.2 Methodology

This Study applies an interdisciplinary methodology, combining primary research in the field with secondary desk research and remote consultations, as well as analysing qualitative and quantitative sources. Article 3 of the UN Trafficking Protocol defines “trafficking in persons” (TIP) and, as such, delineates
the scope of this research, covering both internal and international trafficking. Trafficked people in Syria and its neighbouring countries, as well as those vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation due to the crisis, as set out in chapter four of this Study, may include IDPs and communities affected by violence and/or the socio-economic impact of the war within Syria; refugees of Syrian and other nationalities; stateless people; regular and irregular migrants; and host communities.

Desk-based research on relevant literature, reports, official documents and statistics was carried out in the countries under study, taking into account the relative reliability of different sources according to whether they were based on empirical research, official data, or other methods. This was then complemented by field research. Due to the logistical difficulties of carrying out field research with a sufficiently representative sample among refugees, displaced people and vulnerable groups themselves, because of the diversity of groups affected and the high numbers involved, quantitative and qualitative data and information was obtained directly from international organisations, national and local state authorities, international, national and local NGOs and humanitarian organisations, journalists and other media sources, researchers and other interlocutors identified as having relevant information. A higher number of potential informants were contacted than interviewed, as some of those contacted did not have relevant information or were not willing to participate in the research.

Therefore the results of the research should be viewed with the caveat that trafficked people and Syrian refugees and IDPs were not themselves directly consulted for this Study, but rather institutions, organisations and individuals at one remove from these populations were interviewed, on the basis that these interviewees have direct context with the affected groups.

With the informed consent of participants, semi-structured interviews according to a standard set of interview guidelines were carried out in person, over the phone, on Skype and through email exchanges. A total of 168 interviews and meetings were conducted for this Study, and are cited in what follows as (XXNN), whereby XX is the code of the country under study (Syria: SY; Turkey: TR; Lebanon: LB; Jordan: JO; and Iraq: IQ) and NN is the number of the interview. Interviewees were given the option of remaining completely anonymous; of being cited only with their organisation; or of being fully cited with their name, position and organisation. In every case, the wishes of the research participants have been respected. For Syria, the majority of interviewees requested to remain anonymous for reasons of personal safety. These details, together with the interview codes as cited in this Study, are contained in Annex 1.
The analysis applied an inductive approach, not only due to the lack of quantitative data on the topic of trafficking in persons, but also because the inductive method facilitated observations beyond previously established categories. **There was no predefined set of forms of trafficking, and so existing forms were observed on the basis of the reality surveyed.**

**Primary field research continued until the point of theoretical saturation was reached,** meaning that no more relevant new information was being obtained through interviews and consultations. The saturation point is the moment at which subsequent data and information collection does not bring anything new and significant to the topic under study.

There are significant obstacles to the collection and management of relevant statistics in the region, particularly by various government bodies that face a lack of capacity, bureaucratic complications and current mass inflows, leading to difficulties in acquiring information on a topic perceived as sensitive, and one which, at a global level, is usually under-reported. Added to this is the disintegration of the Syrian state and the deterioration of the rule of law in that country. To address this limitation, available quantitative data was corroborated with primary qualitative field evidence, facilitating the generation of more complete and up-to-date knowledge on trafficking than would be possible through official statistics or set questionnaires. This did not exclude existing quantitative data, but rather treated it as a source to be complemented with primary qualitative field evidence. Indeed, as this Study found, relatively few of the cases identified through this research as having indicators of trafficking that would merit further investigation were recorded in official statistics.

**While the country researchers for Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan were based in the respective countries, a distinct methodology was applied to conducting the field research components on Syria and Iraq.** The country researchers for Syria and Iraq were based in Turkey and Jordan, and conducted the research with the same types of sources as in the other three countries, but for Syria, due to the security situation, consultations and requests for information were conducted remotely, and through organisations active within Syria that have branches in other countries, particularly Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, and/or functioning lines of communication, and organisations based outside of Syria. The approach for Iraq was similar, due to the security situation in Baghdad, though it was possible to conduct two field research trips to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I).

In order to corroborate information, **different sources were triangulated with a view to determining their accuracy and validity.** Triangulation is an approach
Introduction

that involves assessing whether the information obtained from one source, or through one research instrument, supports or confirms the information obtained from other sources or through other instruments. The information supplied in the interviews, for example, sometimes confirmed or reproduced the information obtained from the analysis of documents or statistics, and vice versa. On the other hand, the information could also be contradictory or conflicting, necessitating a dialogue between methods and consideration of the relative weight attributed to each source and research instrument.

The country research findings, based on desk and field research for the five countries, together with regional desk research, have been compiled and analysed for this Study. Policy-relevant conclusions were then drawn and action-orientated recommendations developed in relation to existing trafficking and short- to long-term vulnerabilities to trafficking in persons in the countries under study. The research was planned in such a way as to reconcile the minimum time necessary to conduct robust empirical research and satisfactorily answer the research question, with the urgency of the completion of the task in view of the rapidly evolving political and humanitarian situation in the region.

1.3 Literature Review

A myriad of human security issues arise in the context of wars and mass population movements, beyond the central focus on injuries and deaths in conflict zones. Trafficking in persons is a human rights violation that has thus far received little attention in literature on conflict situations and refugee movements. Conversely, trafficking research is rarely carried out on an ongoing conflict and refugee crisis. Within each of the five countries under study, as well as in the region as a whole, there is a dearth of literature specifically addressing trafficking in persons (TIP), particularly since the outbreak of the war in Syria. Such a lack of a knowledge base, according to an IOM Briefing Paper on Addressing Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of Crisis,

“often handicaps the response to trafficking both in normal times and even more so in crisis situations. It is hence difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the impact of a crisis on human trafficking trends” (IOM, 2015: 5).
According to Bales, the factors driving trafficking in persons include economic pressures, political instability and transition, the greed of criminals and social and cultural factors, while civil unrest and internal armed conflict, as well as population displacement, are considered to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities to exploitation and trafficking (Bales, 2007). However, little published empirical research is available to substantiate this. Specifically, internal and international displacement caused by civil wars is purported to render orphans and street-based children particularly vulnerable to trafficking (Bales, 2007; Ray, 2008). Syrian and Lebanese street-based children in Lebanon, according to recent research, are no exception (Consultation and Research Institute, 2015). On the other hand, research specifically on child trafficking in the wake of natural disasters - the Asian tsunami of 2004, the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, the Myanmar cyclone of 2008 and the Haiti earthquake of 2010 – found little empirical evidence to indicate an increase (Montgomery, 2011).

Steele (2006) suggests that wars enhance any existing peacetime conditions that favour trafficking, because people affected by wars are more willing to take risks in order to migrate, while traffickers are more likely to perpetrate the crime in the context of war. This means that ‘civil wars have the potential to increase networks’ opportunities and decrease individuals’ alternative opportunities in such a way that is likely to increase the supply side of trafficking, all else being equal’ (Steele, 2006: 78). However, much of the research on this topic remains theoretical, rather than empirical.

The economic effects of the Syrian war are dramatic, with three of every four Syrians living in poverty by the end of 2013, and more than half the population in a situation of extreme poverty, “only able to secure the most basic food and non-food items required for the survival of their households” (UNRWA, 2014). Such situations of financial desperation may leave IDPs and refugees with no alternative but to resort to risky coping strategies to try to survive and make money, rendering them more vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking. In addition, in the Syrian case, host communities, which include IDPs and refugees already resident prior to the outbreak of the conflict, have also been affected by mass population movements and concomitant effects on the labour market and inflation in the prices of essential goods (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2014).

In terms of understanding the general situation of Syrian refugees in the four neighbouring countries, an important milestone was the publication of a report by the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), an Ankara-based research centre, in April 2014, referenced throughout this study (Orhan, 2014). The economic and social vulnerability of the Syrian refugee population, particularly
of women and children, has also been the subject of a number of reports since the intensification of the refugee flow into the neighbouring countries (IRC, 2013; Save the Children, 2013; UNHCR, 2014; UNICEF, 2014; Amnesty International, 2014).

The UNHCR issued guidance in 2006 on its role in relation to trafficking in persons. The Agency clearly points to the need to protect refugees and persons of concern from the risk of trafficking, as well as seeking to ensure that trafficked people who fear persecution or re-trafficking in their countries of origin and qualify for asylum are recognised as refugees (UNHCR, 2006). However, responses to the situation of Syrian IDPs in Syria and refugees in the neighbouring countries have thus far been “emergency-oriented” (Mackreath, 2014: 20). Information on trafficking and vulnerability to trafficking in the context of the Syrian war is currently patchy and anecdotal, necessitating a more rigorous analysis in order to fulfil obligations to refugees and trafficked people. This Study therefore aims to provide the empirical information necessary to inform short-, medium- and long-term programming in order to address existing incidences of trafficking, and to target vulnerability to trafficking in order to prevent further cases.

1.4 Legislative Framework

International Protection

The legislative framework at both international and national level in the countries under study is relevant to the situation of Syrians and other vulnerable groups in those countries. Of the four hosting countries under study, only Turkey has ratified the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, but it did not ratify the provisions of the Protocol to extend its geographical scope beyond Europe.

Turkey acceded to the Protocol with the following reservation:

“The instrument of accession stipulates that the Government of Turkey maintains the provisions […] of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees […], according to which it applies the Convention only to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe.”

Therefore, **none of these countries apply the Convention definition of a refugee to those fleeing the war in Syria.**

The League of Arab States (LAS),\(^6\) of which all countries under study other than Turkey are members (though Syria is currently suspended), engaged in negotiations with the UNHCR, which led to the drafting of the *Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World*, adopted in November 1992; and the *Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries*, adopted by the LAS in 1994, though not ratified by any of the countries under study (League of Arab States, 2008; Sadek, 2013). The UNHCR then continued negotiations with the LAS, leading to the signing of an agreement between the two parties in June 2000 (League of Arab States, 2008). In addition, as we will see below, both Jordan and Lebanon have signed MoUs with the UNHCR, governing the agency’s mandate and activities in those countries.

The lack of participation in the UN refugee framework in the region means that refugee issues are in practice addressed by national legislation:

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\(^6\) *The LAS is a regional intergovernmental organization of the 22 Arab countries. It was established on 22 March 1945, with the aim to strengthen ties among the Member States, coordinate their policies and promote their common interests.* The Member States of the LAS are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen (El Fegary, July 2015: 6).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>In Syria itself, Decision No. 1350 of 1984 foresees visa-free entry for nationals of all Arab states, though an entry visa requirement was re-introduced for Iraqis in 2007 by Decision No. 30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>The status of foreigners in Turkey was regulated by various pieces of legislation, such as the Passport Law (1950), the Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners (1950), and the Regulation on Asylum (1994), until the adoption of the country’s first single-body immigration law, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, in 2013. In line with the EU’s 2001 Directive on Temporary Protection, this law makes reference to temporary protection (Article 91), but states that this should be governed by an additional regulation issued by the Council of Ministers. The law also differentiates between refugee status (‘events occurring in European countries’ – Art. 63), conditional refugee status (‘events occurring outside European countries’ – Art. 64) and subsidiary protection (‘a foreigner or a stateless person who could neither be qualified as a refugee or a conditional refugee’– Art. 65).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>The main law regulating the entry of foreigners into Lebanon is the 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country. Article 26 of this Law allows non-Lebanese people to request asylum in Lebanon if their lives or freedoms are in danger in their country of origin. Nevertheless, Article 32 provides for criminal charges for those who enter Lebanon without authorisation, even if they entered to seek asylum (Global Detention Project, June 2014).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The term foreigner is used to define a person ‘who has no citizenship bond with the State of the Republic of Turkey’. See: Memişoğlu, 2014.

8 The 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection creates a comprehensive legal framework for the management of entry rules, visa regulations, work and residence permits. It widens the scope of individual rights and freedoms for refugees, asylum seekers and victims of human trafficking, which was previously regulated by secondary legislation. Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458/2013. Available at: www.refworld.org/docid/5167fbb20.html, accessed 02.03.2015. For a detailed analysis of the law, see: Memişoğlu, 2014.

9 See: Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences of thereof.
In Jordan, Article 21 of the 1952 Constitution offers refugee status for political asylum in exceptional situations. UNHCR-recognised refugees’ entry and residence in Jordan is regulated through the Nationality Laws (1954, 1987) and the Law on the Entry and Residency of Foreigners (1973). In 1998, Jordan signed an MoU with the UNHCR to collaborate in following some of the principles contained in the UN Refugee Convention (Olwan, 2006).

In Iraq, the relevant legislative instruments are the 1971 Political Refugee Law no. 51 and the 2009 Migration and Displacement Ministry Law no. 21. The Political Refugee Law only applies to political refugees, while the 2009 Law has a broader definition of refugees, but does not clarify the rights of those protected (Sadek, 2013; Orhan, 2014).

### Specific provisions for Syrian refugees

Syrian citizens, as well as stateless people from Syria, do not generally qualify for the limited political asylum provisions in force in the hosting countries, nor, in the case of Turkey, for the provisions for Convention refugee status for European citizens. In each of the four countries, therefore, they are subject to specific ad hoc regulations issued prior to and since the outbreak of the war in Syria and the beginning of the forced migration movement.

Since the Turkish government declared ‘temporary shelter’ for Syrian refugees in March 2012,¹⁰ there has been more clarity about their legal status. This implies protection and assistance for all Syrians - both camp and non-camp refugees, with or without identification documents, Palestine refugees¹¹ from Syria and stateless people from Syria. It also guarantees unlimited stay, protection against forced return and access to reception arrangements. A special Temporary Protection Regulation was promulgated on 13 October 2014,¹² providing the legal framework for Syrians’ access to social services, including education and medical care, financial assistance, interpretation services and access to the labour market. The

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¹⁰ Regulation on Receiving and Sheltering the Syrian Arab Republic Citizens and Stateless Persons living in the Syrian Arab Republic, who Entered Turkey for the Purpose of Mass Sanctuary, no. 62, 30 March 2012.

¹¹ Palestine refugees are defined, as per UNRWA, as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.”

Regulation emphasises that additional measures will be taken for trafficked people. It also indicates that compulsory registration of domicile is necessary in order to benefit from social services and financial assistance.

Before the introduction of visa requirements for Syrians in January 2015, it was possible for Syrians to cross the **Lebanese** border without a visa. Until then, Syrians who entered Lebanon through an official border crossing point could apply for a six-month residence permit, free-of-charge, and renewable without any fee for another six months. After one year, refugees had to either exit and re-enter Lebanon, or pay an annual fee of US$200 to renew the permit (NRC, 2014).

The **Jordanian** government allowed the entry of Syrians on humanitarian grounds until 2012, and ‘everyone crossing a border from Syria was considered to be a refugee unless they were considered a potential security threat or to have crossed illegally’ (Al-Kilani, 2014: 30). Syrians residing in Jordanian refugee camps were issued with a camp resident ID, while Syrians living among host communities in urban and rural areas hold a security ID issued by the Ministry of Interior free-of-charge, which entitles them to remain in Jordan indefinitely on humanitarian grounds.

In July 2012, the **Iraqi** Council of Ministers decided to open the BCPs in the governorates of Nineveh and Anbar to receive Syrian refugees, and to establish camps and provide required services and medical care to the refugees.
Legal Framework
Refugee law in hosting countries

1951 UN Convention on Refugees and 1967 Protocol
National Law concerning refugees
Response to the Syrian Situation

Turkey
- Ratified but with reservation limiting geographic scope to Europe

Lebanon
- Not Ratified
  - 1962 Law regulating the entry and stay of foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country
  - Art. 21 - Jordanian Constitution 1952 (only applicable to political refugees)
  - Nationality Laws (1954, 1987)
  - Law on the Entry and Residency of Foreigners (1973)
  - Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR (1998)

Jordan
- Not Ratified
  - 1971 Political Refugees Law (only applicable to political refugees)
  - 2009 Migration and Displacement Ministry Law No. 21 provides a broader definition of refugee but does not clarify rights.

Iraq
- Not-Ratified
  - 1971 Political Refugees Law (only applicable to political refugees)
  - 2009 Migration and Displacement Ministry Law No. 21 provides a broader definition of refugee but does not clarify rights.

“Temporary shelter” declared for Syrian refugees (March 2012) guarantees unlimited stay, protection against forced return and access to reception arrangements. Temporary Protection Regulation (Oct 2014) provides access to social services, financial assistance, interpretation services and labour market access.

January 2015 - visa requirements for Syrians entering Lebanon. Prior to this, Syrians could apply for 6 month residence permit, free of charge. Renewable after 6 months. Further renewals after 1 year only possible with exit and re-entry of Lebanon or by paying $200.

Allowed entry of Syrians on humanitarian grounds until 2012. Syrians in refugee camps issued with camp IDs. Syrians in host communities issued with security ID, entitles them to remain in Jordan indefinitely.

July 2012 - Border Crossing Points in Nineveh and Arībara Governorates opened to receive Syrian refugees.
Anti-Trafficking

All of the countries under study have ratified the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Anti-Trafficking Protocol; while Jordan is the only country not to have ratified its Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Turkey also signed the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings in 2009, but has not yet ratified it.

Table 2: Ratification of UNTOC and its TIP and SOM Protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signatories</th>
<th>UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime</th>
<th>Anti-Trafficking Protocol</th>
<th>Migrant Smuggling Protocol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Arab Charter on Human Rights for the Arab League entered into force in 2008 and has been ratified by all the LAS member states under study (JO 2004; SY 2007; LB 2011; IQ 2012).

Article 9 sets out a general prohibition on trafficking in human organs, and Article 10 reads:

“1. All forms of slavery and trafficking in human beings are prohibited and are punishable by law. No one shall be held in slavery and servitude under any circumstances.

2. Forced labor, trafficking in human beings for the purposes of prostitution or sexual exploitation, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or any other form of exploitation or the exploitation of children in armed conflict are prohibited”.13

The 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was ratified by all of the countries under study (TK 1988, JO 1991, LB 2000, SY 2004, IQ 2011).

At the national level, while Turkey added a new article to the Penal Code in 2002, criminalising trafficking in persons, the other countries under study all passed anti-trafficking legislation within the last six years.

**Table 3: National Anti-Trafficking Legislation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Anti-trafficking legislation</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Syria   | Legislative Decree No. 3     | The Syrian Legislative Decree No. 3 of 2010 defines trafficking in persons in accordance with the Trafficking Protocol definition, and has expanded the explicit definition of trafficking to include “child pornography, as well as illegal acts and purposes in consideration for material or moral gain or privileges or a promise thereof.”
| Turkey  | Article 80 to the Penal Code  | Turkey added new articles to the Penal Code in August 2002, criminalising migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons. The new 2005 Criminal Code’s Article 80 (Human Trade) prohibits trafficking for both sexual exploitation and forced labour. A new draft anti-trafficking law has also been prepared, and is expected to be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly soon. |

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14 Translation from Arabic by the Country Researcher for Syria.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Law No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Law no. 164</td>
<td>In 2011, the Lebanese Parliament passed an Anti-Trafficking Law (Law No. 164) that amended the Lebanese Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure for crimes of human trafficking. The law is considered by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to cover all forms of exploitation indicated in the UN Protocol (UNODC, 2014a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Law no. 9</td>
<td>In 2009 the Jordanian government ratified the Trafficking Protocol and domesticated it with Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law No. 9 of 2009. The law is considered by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to cover all forms of exploitation indicated in the UN Protocol (UNODC, 2014a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Law no. 28</td>
<td>Together with the 2012 Anti-Human Trafficking Law No. 28, Iraq's 2005 Constitution also prohibits forced labour, slavery, the slave trade, trafficking of women and children, and prostitution. The situation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) is distinct, however, as the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) has not approved the central government's law.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Women’s Rights and Marriage

The 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has been ratified by all five countries under study (TR 1985, IQ 1986, JO 1992, LB 1997, SY 2003); and Turkey also ratified its Optional Protocol recognising the competency of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 2002. Turkey is also the only one of the countries under study not to have submitted reservations on ratification/accession. Most reservations were in relation to CEDAW Articles 2, 9 and 16.

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17 An interviewee for this research, a Member of the KNA, is lobbying for the approval of a recent draft anti-trafficking law for Kurdistan proposed by local NGOs. Current challenges in Iraq and the KR-I are causing delays in hers and international and national NGOs’ efforts to have it approved (IQ06).
### Reservations to the CEDAW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reservations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Reservations to article 2; article 9.2; article 15.4, concerning freedom of movement and of residence and domicile; article 16.1 (c, d, f, g); article 16.2, concerning the legal effect of the betrothal and the marriage of a child, “inasmuch as this provision is incompatible with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Reservations to Article 9.2 on equal rights for women with respect to the nationality of their children, and article 16.1 (c, d, f, g) on rights during marriage and its dissolution, as parents, in relation to guardianship and adoption of children, and personal rights, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Not bound by article 9.2, and article 16.1 on rights as parents and personal rights (d, g), and rights arising upon the dissolution of marriage with regard to maintenance and compensation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Not bound by the provisions of Article 2 (f, g) on legislative change to remove discrimination against women from the legal framework, and of Article 16 [marriage].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These reservations translate into practical issues in protecting women’s rights in the countries under study, and in preventing women’s rights violations as per international law. As we will see below, the incidence of early marriage, trafficking for forced marriage and forced marriage as a means of trafficking for sexual exploitation, is affected by the lack of protection for girls and women in a marriage context. The limitations on mothers’ rights to custody of their children also have implications in terms of the children’s vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation, not least due to problems in relation to birth registration.

In addition, in Syria (1953 Law on Personal Status, as amended by Law no. 34 in 1975), Iraq (Personal Status Code No. 188), Jordan (Personal Status Law No. 36 of 2010), and Lebanon (15 different Personal Status Laws for various recognised religious communities), separate legal systems apply for civil and criminal matters on the one hand, and personal status matters, on the other. Among other issues, personal status includes marriage, divorce, alimony, custody, adoption and other family-related issues. In Syria, the courts with jurisdiction over

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18 “2. States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: […](f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women; (g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.”
personal status are *Shari’a* courts for Sunni and Shia Muslims, *Madhabi* courts for Druze and *Ruhi* courts for Christians. The Lebanese Constitution also recognises religious sects as legal entities as far as personal status is concerned.

On the other hand, the 2002 Turkish Civil Code is widely considered to have heralded a new era for gender equality in Turkey, especially by improving women’s legal status in family matters, which is the outcome of a long-standing campaign by numerous women’s rights associations (Çelik-Levin, 2007; Ilkkaracan & Amado, 2011). In order to improve the legal framework concerning violence against women, the Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women No. 6284 was adopted in 2012.

In *Syria*, the minimum marriage age is 18 for males and 17 for females, but Article 45 of the Personal Status Law allows *Shari’a* judges to authorise marriages of boys aged 15-17 and girls aged 13-16, with the permission of a male guardian. Article 82 regulates that marriages of boys aged below 17 years and girls aged below 15 years cannot be registered.

This is similar to *Iraq*, where the legal age of marriage is 18 for both sexes, but with judicial discretion, also subject to parental approval, for children aged 15-17, according to the Personal Status Code (Art. 7). Also in Iraq, if a marriage was found to be forced, it is considered void if the marriage has not been consummated, but valid if it has (UN Women, 2014). In addition, in much of rural Iraq, mediation and decision-making by ethnic, tribal, family or religious leaders supplants formal adjudication of civil and criminal matters (Allawi, 2010; Hepburn, 2014). However, in February 2014, Iraq became the first nation in the Arab world to adopt a national action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which includes aspects addressing sexual violence.

The legal age for marriage in *Lebanon* also varies according to religious sects and all religious groups allow girls under 18 to marry (UNICEF, 2011). A recent bill against child marriage was registered at the Lebanese Parliament at the time of writing and had already received the approval of one commission. This law would forbid marriage under 18 years old unless there is the approval of both a juvenile judge and a legal guardian. Religious leaders who do not abide the law would have to pay a fine and would face jail sentences if they were repeat offenders (LB20).

According to the *Jordanian* Personal Status Law No. 36 of 2010 (Chapter 2, Articles 5-13 on ‘Conditions of Marriage’), the legal minimum age for marriage is 18 years. The
same law, however, allows Shari’a judges to authorise marriages of girls and boys aged 15-17 years in exceptional circumstances, such as in cases of pregnancy. In rare cases, a Shari’a judge may authorise a marriage involving girls and/or boys aged under 15 years and the registration of the marriage is postponed until the girl turns 15 years old (UNICEF, 2014).

The new Civil Code that came into force in Turkey in 2002 set the minimum age for marriage for both sexes as 17 years (Article 124) and marriage requires the consent of both parties (Article 142). The Code also gives women and girls who have been forced into marriage the right to file a criminal complaint or file an annulment within the first five years of marriage (Articles 149-152). Under the Civil Code, religious marriages cannot take place without demonstrating the relevant civil marriage document (Article 143). The 2005 Criminal Code criminalises polygamous and fraudulent marriages. It also foresees a prison sentence of 2-6 months for those who hold a religious ceremony without contracting civil marriage (Article 230).

Child Rights

All of the countries under study have ratified the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - CRC. Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq have also ratified its Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography; and Turkey, Syria and Iraq ratified its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Lebanon has signed the latter but not ratified it. In addition, Turkey ratified the Council of Europe European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights in 2002.

Article 16 of the CEDAW states that women should have the same right as men to “freely choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent”, and that the “betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal effect”. 19

In 2005, the Turkish Child Protection Law No. 5395 entered into force, which aims to incorporate international standards into the procedures and principles regarding children in need of protection, including special arrangements for the sensitive treatment and protection of child victims of crime, an increase in the number of children’s courts, and provision of protection for children by civil society organisations. In coordination with relevant NGOs, the General Directorate for Child Services under the Ministry of Family and Social Policies has developed Turkey’s first Strategy Document on the Rights of the Child, covering the period 2012 to 2016.

The Lebanese Civil Code, in conformity with the CRC, defines a child as every human being under the age of 18. There are, however, gaps in the protection of refugee children, including Palestinians (Manara Network, 2011). Personal status laws, as detailed above, affect child rights, as the best interests of the child are often not taken into consideration (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

The Jordanian government’s first National Plan of Action on child rights was issued in early 1994, and implemented with the support of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and other relevant UN agencies (Gharaibeh & Hoeman, 2003).

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States that have signed the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child have also committed to take “all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolish traditional practices prejudicial to the health of the children [...] which includes, among other practices [...] child marriage.”
In Iraq, key child protection laws are still at draft stage, including the draft Child Protection Act, the draft Children’s Parliament Act, the draft Child Welfare Commission Act, and the draft amended Minors’ Welfare Act No. 78 (1980).

**Labour Law**

Under Turkish Labour Law (Law No. 4857), employment of children under 15 is prohibited.\(^{20}\) In order to address irregular labour migration and labour exploitation, new legislation was introduced in 2003 to facilitate legal employment opportunities for foreigners, increasing penalties for unregistered employment and centralising the system under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Violation of freedom of employment and labour ‘by using violence or threats or performing an act contrary to the law’ is also subject to imprisonment from six months to two years under the Criminal Code (Article 117). In 2005, Turkey adopted the national Bound Policy and Programme Framework (TBPPF) to eliminate the worst forms of child labour – especially in seasonal agricultural work, work in the informal urban economy, rural child labour and street work - by 2015, with the support of ILO.

In Lebanon, the Labour Code (Arts. 22 and 23) states that no child under 8 years old is allowed to work; no child under 13 years is allowed to engage in heavy industrial or similar work; children between 13 and 16 years can engage in physically demanding work only with a medical certificate. A medical examination is also required for children between 14 and 18 years old and these children cannot work more than six hours per day, cannot work at night and should have a 13-hour rest between working days (Manara Network, 2011).

According to Article 74 of the Jordanian Labour Law No. 8 of 1996, and its subsequent amendments, no child under the age of 18 years shall be employed in occupations considered hazardous, exhausting or detrimental to health.

The minimum age for admission to employment is 15 years old according to Iraqi labour law,\(^{21}\) with restrictions on the type of work that can be carried out by children aged 15-17. The provisions of Iraqi labour law were set out in the Iraqi Labour Code, Law No. 71 of 1987, but a new Iraqi Labour Law was passed on 17 August 2015.

\(^{20}\) The law allows for the employment of children who have completed the age of 14 and primary education in light work that does not harm their physical, mental and moral development. See: Article 71, Turkish Labour Law.

The new law further limits child labour and provides improved protection against discrimination and sexual harassment at work, as well as providing for collective bargaining and the right to strike. The Social Security Law, No. 39 of 1971, also contains provisions on the relationship between employers and employees.

In 1994, Lebanon and Syria signed a Bilateral Agreement in the Field of Labour, according to which:

“workers of each of the two States shall enjoy in the other State treatment, privileges, rights and obligations, according to the laws, regulations and directives applied in both states; the two Ministers of Labour in both countries shall be entrusted with pursuing their efforts in order to find the means likely to ensure workers’ rights in both states” (CLDH, 2013).

In order to address issues identified in relation to the exploitation of foreign domestic workers in the countries under study, recently approved laws sought to improve their employment rights in Jordan and Syria.

➤ In Syria, in 2013, Legislative Decree No. 65 and Decision No. 2644 regulated private recruitment agencies for foreign domestic workers, as well as conditions and regulations for their employment.

➤ In Jordan, the national Labour Law of 1998 was extended to include domestic workers with Law No. 48 in 2008.

In Lebanon, however, migrant domestic workers are excluded from the Labour Code, and thus from any form of protection related to employment (LB20). In August 2014, a court gave an employer a fine for withholding the passport of a migrant worker (Wansa, 14 August 2014), so now it is easier to refer to this case in order to fight confiscation of identification documents (LB03).

Prostitution and Begging

The provisions of Islamic Law in all of the countries under study, with the exception of Lebanon and Turkey, prohibit the act of prostitution (Mattar, 2011).

➤ Syrian Law no. 10 of 1961 for Combatting Prostitution outlaws prostitution.

➤ In Turkey, forced prostitution has been included in the scope of human
trafficking with an amendment to the Criminal Code in 2006. Procurement for prostitution is also specified as a crime under Article 227. It should be noted that prostitution is not defined as a crime in the Criminal Code, but it is rather regulated through secondary legislation (By-law on Provisions Regarding Prostitutes and Brothels and Fight against STDs Transmitted due to Prostitution, 1961).

➤ Prostitution is highly regulated in Lebanon. In theory, a Law dating back to 1931 sets the characteristics of sex work in the country (the minimum age is 21 years old, workers have to undergo medical examinations and sex work can only be practiced inside licenced brothels). In practice, the government has not issued licences for brothels since the late 1960s, making prostitution de facto illegal in the country. The Penal Code punishes people (although male sex workers are not addressed by the law) who practice prostitution or those who facilitate it with a prison sentence that can range from one month to one year (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

➤ The Jordanian Penal Code, No. 16 of 1960, criminalises prostitution, as well as procurement, acting as an intermediary for prostitution and brothel-keeping.

➤ The act of prostitution is a criminal offense under the Iraqi Penal Code. In 1988, the Anti-Prostitution Law provided for a minimum sentence of three months and a maximum sentence of two years for those convicted of prostitution. For those convicted of pimping and prostitution, Revolutionary Command Council Order No. 234 imposed capital punishment. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) replaced all capital punishment sentences with life imprisonment in 2003 (Minwalla, 2011). A significant proportion of women who make up the female prison population are those convicted of prostitution, and coercion is not a defence under Iraqi law (Minwalla & Portman, 2007).

Begging is also criminalised by the Lebanese Penal Code, though Law No. 422 defines begging as a situation that endangers the child (Terre des hommes, 2011). In 2014, the Lebanese parliament passed a law on domestic violence that also includes crimes related to forced prostitution and forced begging (Human Rights Watch, 2014a). Paragraph 390 of the Iraqi Penal Code prohibits begging. Begging is also an infraction in Jordan according to Article 389 of the Jordanian Penal Code, while a clause of the same law also states that the person found guilty of forcing another person to beg can be sentenced to up to a year in prison. Only in Turkey does the Criminal Code set out punishment for those ‘who use children’s or adults’ lack of physical or mental ability in begging’ (Article 229), rather than for begging itself.
1.5 Institutional Framework

**Syrian refugees**

For refugee status determination of non-Europeans (non-Convention refugees) in Turkey, the Turkish authorities work in collaboration with the UNHCR to find them a third country for resettlement. The 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection has transferred the management of migration and international protection to the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of Interior, which became fully operational in 2014.\(^{22}\) Since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) under the Prime Ministry has become the main agency responsible for setting up and managing refugee camps for refugees mainly from Syria (Memişoğlu & Ilgıt, 2014). With the 2014 Regulation on Temporary Protection, AFAD's responsibilities have been extended, and it has become the main agency and umbrella organisation responsible for the coordination of the refugee influx from Syria. Accordingly, it has increasingly been working in collaboration with other national and local authorities in order to also meet the needs of non-camp refugees (TR48).

**Lebanon** signed a memorandum of understanding with the UNHCR in 2003. According to the memorandum, Lebanon recognises the refugee status determination procedures of UNHCR, but expects that refugees are resettled to a safe third country within six months, with a further extension of three months possible (UNHCR, 2010). This MoU was not, however, designed to respond to a crisis of the scale of the current situation of Syrians in Lebanon. Apart from UNHCR, the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon is mainly coordinated by the Lebanese Supreme Council for Aid.

**Jordan** signed the first formal cooperation agreement with the UNHCR in 1997, despite the agency having already opened an office in the Jordanian capital, Amman, in 1991, to provide assistance and facilitate the refugee status determination of Iraqi refugees fleeing the Gulf War (De Bel-Air, 2007). In 1998, the UNHCR and the Government of Jordan signed an MoU, to collaborate in following some of the principles contained in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (Olwan, 2006).

The **Iraqi** Ministry of Migration and Displacement was created in 2003 and it is responsible for displaced persons and migrants, including internally and

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\(^{22}\) The provincial organisation of DGMM became fully functional in May 2015 (TR41).
internationally displaced Iraqis and foreign nationals inside Iraq. On foot of the July 2012 Council of Ministers Decision, the Government of Iraq formed a Relief Committee, chaired by the Minister of Migration, with representation from the National Security Council, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Transportation. It also formed a group of support committees to facilitate procurement, camp constructions, and provision of health services. The UNHCR is also active in managing issues related to the arrival of Syrian refugees in Iraq.

In Syria, around 17% of IDPs are in camps, under the overall coordination of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In all of the four hosting countries, the majority of Syrians are living outside of official refugee camps. Lebanon has not authorised the setting up of any official refugee camps for this group, while in Iraq the proportion is 39%, in Jordan 19% and in Turkey 15% of all registered refugees. Nevertheless, due to difficulties in obtaining accommodation, many refugees in some of the hosting countries are living in informal tent settlements.

**Anti-Trafficking**

In the wake of the approval of anti-trafficking laws in the countries under study, dedicated units at the Ministries of the Interior, inter-ministerial committees and a department at the Ministry of Justice were set up to combat trafficking:

- **Syria** has established a National Committee on Trafficking. However, due to the ongoing conflict, there have been difficulties in implementing anti-trafficking campaigns and monitoring TIP, as the state has lost control of much of the national territory (Charron, 2014), and of most official and unofficial BCPs, which are now controlled by different non-state armed groups (Al-Abed, 17 July 2014). According to the Syrian Minister of Interior, the lack of cooperation with neighbouring countries and the inability of international agencies such as Interpol to operate inside Syria are other obstacles to anti-trafficking efforts (Qiblan & Hammoud, 2 October 2015).

- The major Turkish national agencies involved in anti-trafficking activities are the Ministry of Interior (General Directorate of Security, General
Command of Gendarmerie, Turkish Coast Guard Command, DGMM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Family and Social Policies (Directorate General of Child Protection Services and Directorate General for Women’s Status), Ministry of Health, and their related provincial directorates. The DGMM has undertaken the coordination role in the field of trafficking in persons and it has a new service unit called the Department of the Protection of Victims of Human Trafficking. Through this crucial institutional change, some of the major responsibilities of the security forces concerning TIP are being transferred to the central and provincial organisations of DGMM. These responsibilities mainly include victim-related services, such as identification and protection processes (TR41).

➤ In Lebanon, the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the Lebanese national police force, is in charge of detecting human trafficking cases and conducting the initial stages of investigation. The Directorate General of the General Security (DGSG) is a branch of the Ministry of Interior that intervenes in cases of human trafficking where victims are non-Lebanese citizens. The Ministry of Labour has a role in the licencing of recruitment agencies for migrant workers and receiving complaints in relation to labour exploitation and abuse, while the Ministry of Social Affairs runs around 200 Social Development Centres to protect vulnerable people and victims of crime across the country, and the Ministry’s Higher Council for Childhood is responsible for child rights issues including child trafficking (ICMPD, 2013a).

➤ The Jordanian National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee was established in 2009 as a supervisory body to develop and implement, in cooperation with other key stakeholders, the national anti-trafficking strategy (National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee, 2013). In 2009, the Ministry of Justice also set up a Department for Human Trafficking, which is responsible for investigating, prosecuting and sentencing trafficking offenses, as well as inspection. The Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior and the Public Security Directorate (PSD), also under the Ministry of Interior, conduct the first-level investigation, identification and referral of TIP cases to the judiciary. The Counter-Trafficking Unit (CTU) was established in January 2013 on foot of an MoU between the Ministry of Labour and the Criminal Investigation Department of the PSD (JO21). The Secretary General

For further information on responsibilities of national stakeholders, the identification process for trafficked people and the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), see: ICMPD (2013) and Sever et al. (2012).
of the Ministry of Labour supplies the counter-trafficking unit with trained labour inspection officers (National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee, 2013).

➤ **Iraq** established an Anti-Trafficking Department at the Interior Ministry, and the Central Committee on Counter-Trafficking (CCCT), headed by the Ministry of the Interior, is responsible for deliberating over trafficking-related matters (IQ09). The Central Committee, formed by an Administrative Order under Article 2 of the Trafficking Law, has convened a couple of times and drafted Executive Orders to facilitate implementation of this law.

Some of the countries under study have put national action plans and strategies in place to combat and prevent trafficking in persons, as well as shelters for trafficked people. Following the establishment of a National Task Force on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings under the chairmanship of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two National Action Plans were adopted in 2003 (completed in 2006) and 2008 (Turkish MFA, 2011). The national action plans comprise the basis of ‘Protection, Prevention and Prosecution’ programmes and policies to combat and prevent trafficking in persons (Sever et al., 2012).

Following the implementation of the national action plans on trafficking, three shelters for trafficked people were established in Istanbul (2004), Ankara (2005) and later in Antalya (2009). These shelters are run in cooperation with the three main national NGO partners of the Ministry of Interior, namely the Human Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) in Istanbul, the Foundation for Women’s Solidarity (FWS) in Ankara and Antalya Family Counsellors Association (AFCA) in Antalya. Law enforcement agencies are responsible for identifying victims of trafficking, and the NGOs running the shelters only deal with previously identified victims of trafficking who have been granted access to assistance and protection (ICMPD, 2013). An emergency helpline (157) was set up in 2005, initially reachable only from Turkey; it became internationally operational in 2007.

In **Lebanon**, the national anti-trafficking plan of action had not been formally adopted as of September 2015, though awareness-raising initiatives have been implemented (ICMPD, 2013a). In 2014, the Institute for Human Rights of the

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26 Due to lack of funding, shelters in Ankara and Istanbul were closed during certain periods. As of October 2015, all the three shelters are open. DGMM is supposed to take over the financing of the shelters; however, the relevant protocols with the NGOs had not yet been signed at the time of writing (TR51).
Lebanese Bar Association published trafficking indicators to facilitate protection of trafficking victims and prosecution of offenders (Institute for Human Rights of the Bar Association, 2014). Lebanon also has a network of shelters for trafficked people in place.

In 2010, the Jordanian government, supported by IOM, adopted a strategy for the prevention of trafficking for the years 2010-2012. The National Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Persons was approved by the National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee on 11 February 2010 and entered into force on 2 March 2010 (National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee, 2015). The Jordanian Committee also approved draft Shelter Regulations on 14 July 2011, which were submitted to the Bureau of Legislation and Opinion to conduct the legal procedures necessary for their approval (National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee, 2015). The CTU, established within the Department of Civil Defence at the Ministry of Social Development in 2014, works according to Decree No. 30 of 2012, which regulates the functioning of shelters for trafficking victims.

At the time of fieldwork for this study, in May 2015, the Jordanian Ministry of Social Development was working on the refurbishment of a building which is to be used as the premises of the first permanent shelter for trafficked people in Jordan, due to open in September 2015. According to the Head of the Counter-Trafficking Department at the Ministry of Social Development, the refurbishment of the shelter is funded through a grant from the United States (JO19). Until the opening of the permanent shelter, trafficked people are being temporarily accommodated in a special section of a shelter for female victims of domestic violence and gender-based violence, run by the Ministry of Social Development.

In Iraq, there was initially a low level of implementation of the 2012 Anti-Trafficking Law, though this started to change in 2014 with awareness-raising and capacity-building of law enforcement and the judiciary. Two judges have been designated by the Higher Judiciary Council for trafficking cases, while special units have been designated by the Ministry of Interior (IQ17). Iraq does not yet have a national action plan on trafficking. Although a shelter has been set up for trafficked people, it has not to date hosted anyone, due to the lack of a referral system in the country. According to the Iraqi authorities, this is something that the CCCT is working on with international organisations like IOM (IQ16).
2.1 Migration Profile

During the baseline period for this Study, the countries under study were destination countries for migrants principally working in low-skilled and low-wage jobs in domestic work and construction, as well as in agriculture, services and cleaning, and in the sex and entertainment industry. The main regions of origin of the migrants were South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka); Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and East Timor), and East Africa (Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia). There was also some intra-regional mobility, with refugees and migrants from Iraq in all of the other four countries under study, and Syrian migrants in Lebanon and Jordan. Lebanon and Jordan also experienced immigration from North African countries, particularly Egypt. As we will see in Chapter 3 below, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan also hosted significant populations of Palestine refugees. Turkey and Lebanon were also countries of destination for migrants from Eastern European countries, and Turkey also experienced immigration from Central Asia.

In terms of emigration, the countries under study had large diaspora communities abroad, particularly Lebanon and Iraq, with common regions of destination being the EU, USA and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Iraq also experienced dramatic internal mobility and displacement during the 2000s, due to uneven economic development in different governorates and the unstable security situation, particularly in the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003.

A recent article by a League of Arab States (LAS) official provides a snapshot of migration in the LAS region at the onset of the revolutions and unrest in Arab countries from the end of 2010, the baseline date for this Study, with almost eight million emigrants from Arab Mediterranean countries living abroad. The majority of these emigrants lived either in the EU or in another Arab state, particularly the GCC countries. Lebanon had a particularly high proportion of its population living abroad – 12%, while Syria had the lowest – 2% (El Fegary, July 2015). Despite this relatively low percentage, Syria, like Lebanon, was mainly a country of origin for emigrants who, since the nineteenth century, migrated to and settled in the United States, Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries, Lebanon, Egypt, and other countries in Western Europe and West Africa. Before the baseline date, an
estimated 600,000 Syrian migrants worked in the agriculture, construction and service sectors of Lebanon, Jordan and the GCC states (Kahale, 2003; Kane, 2011).

During the same period, Syria was also a country of destination for migrant domestic workers, although compared with its neighbouring countries, it had received a relatively small number of an estimated 15,000 by 2010 (Kane, 2011), mainly from South and Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) and East Africa (Ethiopia and Sudan) (Kahale, 2003). Until 2001, the employment of foreign domestic workers in Syria was illegal according to Syrian law, and migrants were smuggled and trafficked into Syria overland through Jordan and Lebanon by illegal recruitment agencies (Kahale, 2003).

In 2001, the Syrian government legalised the employment of migrant domestic workers, but the governments of the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, East Timor and Ethiopia officially banned their nationals from migrating to Syria for work due to the lack of a comprehensive set of rules to manage labour migration (Kahale, 2003; US Department of State, 2009). Migrant domestic workers from these countries therefore continued to be smuggled and trafficked into Syria by illegal Syrian agents, assisted by intermediaries in countries of origin (Kahale, 2003). Syria was also a significant hosting country for Iraqi, Palestine and Sudanese refugees, as set out in Chapter 3 below.

Turkey has a long tradition of accepting migrants and refugees, especially those of perceived Turkish ethnicity (Kirişçi, 1996). It is estimated that more than 1.6 million ethnic Turks and Muslim ethnic groups from the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia immigrated to Turkey between 1923 and 1995 (Kirişçi, 2000). By 2010, there were 1.4 million foreign-born people in Turkey, though the majority were children of Turkish emigrants born abroad, with Turkish citizenship. There were 207,076 regular immigrants with residence permits in 2007 (Steinmayer & Hamada, 2011). During the baseline period, circular migration constituted one of the major forms of irregular and regular movements towards Turkey. Migrants mainly from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Balkans either engaged in the “suitcase trade”27 or found employment in private households, the sex and entertainment industry, and the agriculture and construction sectors (İçduygu & Yükseker, 2012).

Starting from the early 2000s, the composition of irregular migrants in Turkey diversified, including migrants mainly from Ukraine or Moldova working in

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27 The “suitcase trade” refers to the purchasing of Turkish textiles to sell in the traders’ countries of origin, often in large parcels shipped by air freight.
agriculture, construction or domestic work, and migrants from the Middle East, mostly Iranians and Iraqis, and Central and South Asia, particularly Afghanistan, Iran, Bangladesh and Pakistan, who often considered Turkey as a transit zone *en route* to Europe (Steinmayer & Hamada, 2011). Some irregular migrants in Turkey were people whose asylum application was refused, and who looked for job opportunities there, rather than returning to their country of origin (IOM, 2008). Syrians did not comprise a significant proportion of the migrant community in Turkey before 2011.

In Lebanon, migrants mostly worked in agriculture, construction, menial jobs, maintenance, domestic work and the entertainment industries, and many were from Sudan and Egypt. Iraqi and Palestine refugees also made up a significant proportion of the non-Lebanese population in the country. Syrian migrants had easy access to Lebanon prior to the war, as no visa was required to cross the Lebanese-Syrian border, and often worked in agriculture and construction. Migrants from outside the Middle East either entered into an employment contract in their countries of origin and travelled to Lebanon regularly, or they entered Lebanon irregularly across the Syrian-Lebanese border (Young, 2000). In addition, some Sub-Saharan African migrants were smuggled into Lebanon by sea, via Libya (LB33).

Eastern European, North African, South and Southeast Asian and Sub-Saharan African women migrated to Lebanon for domestic work. However, similar to Syria, the Philippines, Nepal, Madagascar and Ethiopia banned their citizens from domestic work in Lebanon (Hamill, 2011). Where bans existed, migrants often had to reach Lebanon through transit countries. Migrant domestic workers used East and Southeast Asian cities such as Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Singapore or Bangkok for transit, since they are able to reach these cities without a visa, and then proceeded to Beirut via GCC states - Bahrain, Abu Dhabi or Dubai. The NGO KAFA reported the case of six women caught at Manila Airport in the Philippines where, dressed as nuns, they pretended to be travelling to Hong Kong to attend a religious seminar (Hamill, 2011).

Some Ethiopians also transited through cities in the Gulf States, or Cairo on their way from Addis Ababa to Beirut. Other transit countries included Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen, with many migrants reaching Khartoum by land. According to reports, the Ethiopian ban was not enforced by Sudanese airport and immigration authorities. India was the transit country used by Nepalese migrants, as no visa is required between Nepal and India. After reaching India by land, they flew to a Gulf State and then to Lebanon (Hamill, 2011).
According to the Jordanian census, in 2004, 342,273 people - 7.7% of the total resident population in Jordan – were non-Jordanian. Almost one-third of these people were Palestine refugees, while the others were from Iraq, Syria, Egypt and other North African countries (Di Bartolomeo, Fakhoury & Perrin, 2010). During the first decade of the century, the rapid growth of the Jordanian apparel and garment industry resulted in a significant influx of migrants, primarily from the Asian continent: South Asia (India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka); East Asia (China); and Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam). These migrants generally arrived by plane with regular entry visas. As in Syria and Lebanon, between 2008 and 2012, the Philippines government forbade Filipina women from travelling to Jordan to work because recruitment agencies both in the Philippines and in Jordan had used deception in recruitment (JO23). A significant but unknown number of migrant workers were employed in the Free Trade Zones, also referred to as Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) (Jordanian Ministry of Labour, 2009; Tamkeen, 2011; JO23).

Many migrant worker recruitment agencies were set up in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003 (Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013), with migrants from South and Southeast Asian countries like Bangladesh and the Philippines, and sometimes also from Somalia, coming to Iraq for domestic work and cleaning in the case of women, and construction in the case of men (Minwalla & Portman, 2007). After 2003, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) received migrants to work in the construction sector, domestic work and the service industry (Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013). Many of these migrants were from the Philippines, Nepal and Ethiopia (Minwalla & Portman, 2007).

Iraq also experienced significant internal mobility of citizens seeking safety from violence and employment opportunities, particularly Iraqi men. Wages in the KR-I in 2005-2006 were approximately 150% to 200% of wages elsewhere in the country, and the more stable cities in the KR-I experienced a construction boom. In April 2006, for example, the passport and residency office in Sulaymaniayah in the KR-I registered around 6,000 Iraqis from outside the Kurdistan Region (Minwalla & Portman, 2007).
2.2 Trafficking Routes

People were mainly trafficked for sexual exploitation, domestic servitude and labour exploitation to and within the countries under study during the baseline period, particularly from South and Southeast Asia. East Africans were also trafficked to Syria and Lebanon, while Eastern Europeans were trafficked to Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. North Africans were identified as trafficked to Lebanon, and to a lesser extent to Turkey, while people from CIS countries comprised a large proportion of identified trafficking victims in Turkey, with Russians also trafficked to Syria. Among the countries under study, Iraqis were also trafficked to, and through Jordan, Turkey and Syria; and Syrians were reported as trafficked to Lebanon during this period. Citizens and residents of Lebanon and Iraq were also identified as internally trafficked within those countries, particularly for sexual exploitation.

The map below shows that the principal regions of origin of people identified as internationally trafficked in the Middle East during the period 2010-2012 were East Asia and the Pacific (33%) and other Middle Eastern countries (29%), as well as South Asia (18%). Just 2% of identified trafficked people in the Middle East had been trafficked internally (UNODC, 2014). Indeed, trafficking routes within the Middle Eastern region, and between this region and Turkey, were in evidence in the countries under study during the 2000s.
A significant group of trafficked people in the countries under study during the baseline period were Iraqis. Many women and girls from the southern governorates of Iraq - Basra and Baghdad - were trafficked to Syria and Jordan, as well as the UAE and Saudi Arabia (IQ5; Goedert, 2011). The international trafficking route to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), considered the most important regional sex market, was by air, with Dubai as a particular destination (OWFI, 2010). Of 2,000-3,500 women and girls estimated as having gone missing from 2003 to 2008 in Iraq, the NGO Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq (OWFI) presumes that approximately 25% were trafficked abroad to neighbouring countries like Syria, Turkey and Jordan, and GCC states, as well as internally trafficked to the KR-I (Minwalla & Portman, 2007; Sarhan, 2007; Minwalla, 2011). Iraqi people from other parts of the country were also trafficked through the KR-I as a transit point, and then onwards to neighbouring countries, including Syria, Jordan, Turkey and the GCC countries. OWFI also mentioned that trafficking to Saudi Arabia via Mosul was in evidence, though no further information or figures were provided (Minwalla & Portman, 2007; OWFI, 2010). Iraqis were also trafficked through Jordan to the EU and other regions (Chatelard, 2003).
Iraqi women and girls were reported as dominating brothels in Syria during the baseline period (Micha et al., 2011). Vulnerable Iraqi refugee girls and women were trafficked to Syria for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation in prostitution (UNHCR, UNICEF & WPF, 2006; Women’s Commission, 2007). OWFI reports that there were five cases of trafficking in 2008 from Iraq to Syria, as well as five to the UAE, and one Iraqi woman trafficked to Jordan (OWFI, 2010).

Internal trafficking in Iraq during the baseline period was primarily from Baghdad and other parts of central and southern Iraq to Sulaymaniyah and Erbil in the KR-I, and to other cities with less demand, such as Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra (IQ5; OWFI, 2010; Minwalla & Portman, 2007; Goedert, 2011). OWFI (2010) recorded five cases of internal trafficking to the Kurdistan Region, two to Mosul and two to Basra in 2008. A research informant also mentioned kidnapping of Kurdish women by the Iraqi regime prior to 2003 (IQ17).

According to Dar al-Amal, a Lebanese NGO working with sex workers and victims of commercial sexual exploitation, women and girls were also trafficked from Syria and Jordan to Lebanon for sexual exploitation, with Lebanese and Palestinians from Lebanon also trafficked for sexual exploitation within the country (cited in: IRIN, 7 March 2006). An interviewee for this research confirmed that Syrian women and girls from Aleppo were trafficked to Lebanon for sexual exploitation before 2011 (LB23).

As is clear from the UNODC data above, South and Southeast Asia were also important source regions for trafficking to the countries under study, as well as parts of Eastern Europe, North Africa and East Africa. Before 2001, when the migration of domestic workers to Syria was prohibited by the Syrian government, migrants were smuggled or trafficked to the country through Jordan and Lebanon (Kahale, 2003). Also thereafter, as mentioned above, some country of origin governments banned their citizens from migrating to Syria for work. Migrant domestic workers from these countries were trafficked, as well as smuggled, into Syria using various means, including multiple flight tickets transiting in the GCC states, forged passports and tourist visas (Kahale, 2003). Syria was also a transit country for the trafficking of girls and young women from Iraq, Egypt, Russia, Ukraine, Somalia and Morocco, as well as Southeast Asian countries, for sexual exploitation by transnational prostitution networks in GCC states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE), Europe and Lebanon (US Department of State, 2010). Russian and Eastern European women were also trafficked to Syria for sexual exploitation (SY04).
According to the UNODC *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, between 2010 and 2012 the detected victims of trafficking in Lebanon were: 40 from Syria, 7 from Eastern Europe, 6 Lebanese, 6 from other MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries and 3 from other countries (UNODC, 2014a). Victims of trafficking to Lebanon for domestic servitude were recruited in South and Southeast Asian and East African countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Ethiopia, while women trafficked for sexual exploitation, under the “artist visa”, originated from Eastern European countries, Tunisia or Morocco. The trafficking often commenced with deception about the nature of the job in their countries of origin. As in neighbouring Syria, because of the bans imposed by several countries on their citizens migrating to Lebanon for domestic work, some migrants were trafficked to Lebanon for domestic servitude, as well as being smuggled (Hamill, 2011).

During the baseline period, people were trafficked to Jordan from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India and other Southeast Asian and South Asian countries. These women generally arrived by plane with regular entry visas and many were then deprived of their passports by traffickers - recruitment agents and employers - and subjected to exploitation (Tamkeen, 2011). In 2012, staff from the NGO Tamkeen met more than 35 Indonesian women whose age was between 13 and 17 years when they arrived in Jordan for domestic work, using forged passports (JO23).

Some foreign workers in Iraq from South and Southeast Asian countries like Bangladesh and the Philippines, and sometimes also from Somalia, were subject to labour exploitation and trafficking for domestic servitude (Minwalla, 2007). According to media reports, some recruitment agencies were accused of using Jordan as a transit country to traffic Southeast Asian migrants to Iraq (IRIN Middle East, 27 January 2009).

**Turkey** was considered a destination for trafficking in the Black Sea region, with **victims usually coming from CIS countries and Eastern Europe**. People from Ukraine, Moldova, Russia and Romania were trafficked via Istanbul to the Mediterranean and Aegean regions of Turkey, while people from Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were trafficked via Sochi Port in Georgia or Trabzon Port in Turkey to other Black Sea cities of Turkey and towns in eastern and middle Anatolia. Others were trafficked from Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Russia (Dagestan) via

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towns in northeast Turkey to large cities such as Antalya and Istanbul, and from northeast Turkey and Istanbul to the Aegean coast of Turkey (Atauz et al., 2009).

During the 2004-2008 period, the majority of trafficked people assisted by IOM in Turkey were from Moldova, Ukraine and Russia (IOM, 2013). From 2008, there was an increase in the number of trafficking victims from Central Asian countries, particularly women from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, while the proportion of trafficked Moldovans, Ukrainians and Russians declined (US Department of State, 2009). In 2007, three of the identified TIP victims in Turkey were from Morocco, Tunisia and Sri Lanka, outside the major source regions mentioned above (Dündar & Özer, 2012).

2.3 Extent of Trafficking

Determining the extent of trafficking in the five countries under study during the baseline period of 2001-2010 is rendered difficult particularly due to the fact that key anti-trafficking legislation was passed in four of the five countries under study only towards the end of that period, as we have seen in the Introduction.

This also had implications in terms of the lack of systems and infrastructure for data collection; for identification and assistance of trafficked people; and for investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases. For Turkey, on the other hand, more detailed data is available, as a provision criminalising trafficking in persons was added to the Penal Code in 2002, although recent reforms to the allocation of anti-trafficking competences at government level also render a comparison of the baseline period with the period since 2011 difficult.

Nevertheless, the available literature does provide some indications of the extent of trafficking during the period 2001 to the end of 2010. In addition, as will become clear from the following section, 2.4, sources other than official statistics provide a more complete picture of the trafficking phenomenon during this decade, even if detailed empirical research on trafficking in the baseline period is rare.
Before the baseline date of the beginning of 2010, the Syrian authorities did not release official statistics on trafficking in persons. The lack of specialised health facilities and shelters to receive and assist victims of trafficking complicated any attempts to assess the extent of the phenomenon (IRIN, 2 February 2009). In relation to trafficking for sexual exploitation in Syria in particular, many victims of organised criminal networks did not report such violations out of fear of violence and retaliatory actions by their exploiters or detention and deportation by the police and immigration authorities (Sinjab, 2007). Nevertheless, with the arrival of high numbers of Iraqi refugees in Syria after 2003, the media and some local NGOs estimated that between 4,000 and 5,000 Iraqi women and girls were involved in or sexually exploited in prostitution (Hassan, 2007; Dakkak, 2007). One report estimated that 95% percent of the sex workers and sexually exploited people in Syrian brothels at the baseline date were Iraqis, the majority of whom were suspected to be teenage girls (Micha et al, 2011).

There is a similar dearth of statistics on child trafficking for labour exploitation and worst forms of child labour in Syria for this period. The National Study on the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Syria, which comprises research carried out by the Syrian Ministry of Social Affairs, ILO and UNICEF on Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi children in the country between April 2010 and February 2011, had a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. However, based on figures from 2000, the Study estimated that around 261,000 children, 17.8% of all children aged 10-17 years, were working, with around 7.8% working outside of their families (ILO & UNICEF, 2012).

A total of 1,165 trafficked people were identified and assisted by the authorities and the NGO HRDF in Turkey between 2004 and 2010 (Dündar & Özer, 2012), while 165 trafficked people were identified through the Hotline 157 from 2005 to 2009 (IOM, 2013). The shelter run by the Turkish NGO Foundation for Women’s Solidarity (FWS), one of the three main national anti-trafficking NGO partners of the Ministry of Interior, provided assistance to 199 people between 2005 and 2009 (FWS, 2010). The HRDF, the second main NGO partner, provided assistance to 149 foreign women and girls identified as trafficked between 2008 and 2011. While the average number identified per year for the 2004-2006 period was 247, this decreased to 106 for the 2007-2010 period (Dündar & Özer, 2012). Lower numbers of people were identified as trafficked internally (TR01).

A report released by the Lebanese Ministry of Justice in 2008 defined the problem of human trafficking in Lebanon as “small”, with around 60 cases per year, and considered it solely a destination country, while also acknowledging the difficulty of identifying the actual number of trafficked people (Lebanese Ministry of Justice,
Migration and Trafficking during the Baseline Period

In 2010, UNODC cites the Lebanese “Office of Morals” (presumably the Moral Protection Department of the ISF) as investigating 3 trafficking cases and identifying 9 victims of trafficking (3 girls and 6 women). Between 2010 and 2012, a total of 62 people were officially identified as trafficked in Lebanon (UNODC, 2014a).

In Jordan during the 2000s, little trafficking data was available, due to the anti-trafficking law only being passed in 2009; the fact that the authorities did not actively identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses (Olwan, 2011); the fact that exploitation often occurred in the domestic environment (Gharaibeh & Hoeman, 2003); and trafficked people’s fear of facing socio-cultural marginalisation in a conservative society if they reported it to the authorities (WCRWC, 2007). According to data provided by the Jordanian National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee to the UNODC, 26 trafficking cases were investigated in 2010, covering a total of 54 suspects, and 81 people were identified as victims of trafficking (UNODC, 2014a).

There are no specific data on trafficking during this period in Iraq, although the NGOs Heartland Alliance and OWFI did identify cases (IQ17; Minwalla & Portman, 2007; OWFI, 2010). As in the other countries under study, there were socio-cultural disincentives for women and girls to report trafficking, exacerbated in the Iraqi case by concerns for the security of victims and NGO staff, as well as retaliatory gender-based violence and honour killings (IQ04). As set out above, however, there is evidence that Iraqi women and girls were trafficked to Syria, Jordan, Turkey and GCC states, among other countries, during this period. The extent of kidnapping operations during the sectarian violence of 2005-2008 was also significant, resulting in Baghdad being referred to as a ‘no-woman zone’ (OWFI, 2010; Minwalla & Portman, 2007). A total of eleven international trafficking cases were recorded by OWFI during 2008, involving Iraqi women and girls trafficked abroad, as well as nine cases of internal trafficking (OWFI, 2010).

29 During the 1990s, the numbers of honour killings reached the highest rates in the modern history of Iraq. In the Kurdish region, a local group documented around 9,000 honour killings in nine years. In addition, in late 2000, around 200 Iraqi women were executed by the Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam Hussein’s militia) for alleged prostitution (OWFI, 5 March 2010).
2.4 Forms of Trafficking

Prior to 2011, identified trafficking cases in the countries under study, as per the categorisation of forms of trafficking applied in this research, were mainly for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, labour exploitation of adults and children, exploitation through begging, forced marriage and exploitation in armed conflict, as well as isolated cases of trafficking for illegal adoption and for removal of organs in Lebanon, as set out in Graph 1 below.

Before the baseline date of end-2010, the most reported forms of trafficking in Syria were of Russian and Eastern European women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation in prostitution, and of Syrian and Iraqi Shia Muslim women and girls for a coerced form of temporary marriage (muta’h) (SY04). However, trafficking for labour exploitation of adults and children, and for domestic servitude, was also reported during the baseline period in Syria.

Government data for the years 2009 and 2010 in Turkey show that the majority of officially identified victims had been trafficked for sexual exploitation, though there were also a few cases of labour exploitation – of 160 victims identified during this period, 155 were victims of sexual exploitation and 5 of labour exploitation. There were no identified victims of any other form of trafficking (data from the Foreigners Department and National Police cited in: ICMPD, 2013; Dündar & Özer, 2012).

Identified cases of trafficking of adults in Lebanon during the 2000s were also mainly for the purpose of sexual exploitation, as well as domestic servitude, while Lebanese children were trafficked within the country for the purpose of sexual and labour exploitation (Huda, 2006; Ministry of Justice, 2008; US Department of State, 2009). The Lebanese Ministry of Justice also mentions the labour exploitation of foreign men and women, and victims of trafficking for organ removal (Lebanese Ministry of Justice, 2008). The Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre shelter for trafficked people assisted a majority of victims of domestic servitude during 2008-2010 (189 people), as well as 70 people trafficked for sexual exploitation and 26 people trafficked for forced labour. However, official statistics from ISF for 2009-2010 recorded only trafficking for sexual exploitation, both of adults and children (ICMPD, 2013a).

The main forms of trafficking identified in Jordan during the baseline period were sexual exploitation, particularly affecting Eastern European, North African and Iraqi women and girls, and labour exploitation of migrants from South and Southeast Asian countries and China in Jordan’s Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs). Children
were also exploited in worst forms of child labour, while migrants from Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Indonesia were trafficked for domestic servitude.

Similarly, one of the most commonly identified forms of trafficking in Iraq before 2011 was sexual exploitation in prostitution. Trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation were the main forms identified by the international NGO Heartland Alliance (Minwalla & Portman, 2007).

Graph 1: Forms of Trafficking during the Baseline Period

Sexual Exploitation

Trafficking for sexual exploitation in prostitution during the baseline period in the countries under study was largely reported as an intra-regional phenomenon within the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf, as well as to Turkey. Iraqi and Syrian women and girls were particularly affected. All of the countries under study with the exception of Turkey reported trafficking for sexual exploitation of Iraqi women and girls, in many cases rendered vulnerable to trafficking due to their refugee or internally displaced status. Women and girls were also reported as trafficked for sexual exploitation from North Africa and Eastern Europe to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Syria, and from Central Asia to Lebanon and Turkey. Internal trafficking for sexual exploitation was also identified in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.

Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, thousands of Iraqi refugee women and girls have been trafficked for sexual exploitation in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, as
well as GCC states. The women and girls are usually aged 12-38, and are either from large, impoverished families, or are unaccompanied and widowed women, who have lost adult male family members to violence in Iraq (Weiss, 2007; Micha et al, 2011; Minwalla & Portman, 2007; OWFI, 2010; Chatelard, 2003; WCRWC, 2007). While much sexual exploitation of Iraqi women and girls reportedly took place in brothels in Baghdad, trafficking also took place by means of forced or fraudulent marriage with women and girls in order to commercially sexually exploit them in prostitution abroad (OWFI, 2010; IQ05; Huda, 2006). Iraqi men and boys were also trafficked for sexual exploitation in specific areas of Beirut (LB32).

A joint Assessment on the Situation of Iraqi Refugees in Syria identified three main patterns of Iraqi refugee women’s sex work and the trafficking of Iraqi refugee women and girls for the purpose of exploitation in prostitution: prostitution by an individual; prostitution organised by family members; and sexual exploitation by organised transnational criminal networks (UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2006). In some cases, several members of the same family, usually women and girls, were under the control of their male relatives who brought sex buyers to the house. Some Iraqi girls had already been sexually abused in Iraq by male relatives before being sold by their parents to prostitution networks working across the border with Syria, under the pretext of securing better lives for them (Hassan, 2007; Sarhan, 2007; Micka et al, 2011; Minwalla & Portman, 2007; OWFI, 2010). Some other Iraqi girls were trafficked by their families to Syria, Jordan and GCC states, or internally within Iraq, by means of temporary marriages (muta’h), accepted by some Shia Muslims, but also practiced by some Sunni Muslims - a common route into commercial sexual exploitation (Lyon, 2007; OWFI, 2010; Minwalla, 2011; IQ05), both before and since the outbreak of the war in Syria.

According to some reports, Iraqi women working, and women and girls exploited, as dancers and prostitutes in nightclubs in Damascus in Syria paid a fee to the club owner in order to find clients in the nightclub (Hassan, 2007). Where criminal networks were involved, poor Iraqi families received offers of advance payments of around US$6,000 to sell their daughters. In some cases Iraqi girls and women were deceived and promised domestic work in Syria, but upon arrival they were instead forced into prostitution (IRIN, 17 March 2008). Virgin girls were sold by traffickers at higher prices to affluent clients from Iraq and the Gulf States (Sarhan, 2007).

In Jordan, Iraqi refugee women and girls transiting Jordan, as well as settling there, were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation (Chatelard, 2003; WCRWC, 2007). Within Jordan, they often lived in less affluent areas in east Amman, and their vulnerable humanitarian situation, as well as, in some cases, the intention
to use smugglers in order to seek asylum in Western countries, rendered them vulnerable to sexual exploitation by transnational trafficking networks (Chatelard, 2003; WCRWC, 2007), foreshadowing the situation of Syrian refugees in the region since 2011, as we will see in Chapter 4 below.

**Migrant smuggling and irregular migration situations were particularly mentioned as a means of recruiting and sexually exploiting Iraqi women and girls.** Smuggling of Iraqis from Syria to Lebanon could turn into trafficking, with smugglers kidnapping Iraqi women and children and asking their husbands or fathers to pay ransoms (Save the Children Sweden, 2011). Bogus travel agencies in the Down Town area of Amman in Jordan advertised travel visas or advice on emigration to the West, in order to recruit Iraqi refugee women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Iraqis who inquired about the costs of the irregular trip to Europe were offered work as prostitutes until they earned the amount of money necessary to pay for the smuggling of their families and themselves out of Jordan. Working hours were determined in advance, and the Iraqi women worked and gave the money they earned to pimps, who would release them and provide them with the travel documents only after those women found another woman to replace them (Chatelard, 2003).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), and particularly the city of Dubai, was also a destination for prostitution and sex trafficking involving Iraqi women and girls (OWFI, 2010). Reports on trafficking in Iraq itself at the baseline date focused on the sexual exploitation of Iraqi women and girls (OWFI, 2010; Goedert, 2011). OWFI conducted interviews in 2008 with a total of 25 women and 47 girls trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation, and adult sex workers. Girls and women who ran away from their families because of gender-based violence, including sexual assault by a relative, were particularly vulnerable, and five cases of child trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation by parents of their daughters were recorded (OWFI, 2010).

Identified traffickers in Iraq were often members of organised criminal groups, usually men, but in some cases also women, including gangs kidnapping girls and women and trafficking them to neighbouring countries for sexual exploitation, particularly during the sectarian violence of the period 2005-2008 (IQ06). Kidnapping operations mainly in the south of Iraq (Basra and Fallujah), as well as Baghdad, internally trafficked women and girls to the KR-I or Baghdad during that period. Vulnerable women and girls were also specifically targeted by the staff of shelters for women who had experienced domestic violence (OWFI, 2010). In some extreme cases, traffickers recruited women with mental disabilities for sexual exploitation, taking advantage of their situation of vulnerability (IQ05; IQ06).
Criminal gangs sexually exploited women and girls in Iraq under the cover of massage parlours, or they were exploited by groups of women involved in prostitution, who recruited other women and girls to join them (IQ05; IQ06). Means used by traffickers in Iraq included the threat or use of force, coercion, kidnapping, fraud, withholding of passports, deception and abuse of power or vulnerability, withholding of passports, rape and sexual assault, restriction of freedom of movement, physical assault and torture (Minwalla, 2011; IQ05). OWFI (2010) mentions that traffickers sold girls aged 11-15 years inside Iraq for around 1-4 million Iraqi Dinars (ID) (around US$800-3,600). International traffickers, according to the same report, sold girls aged 11-15 years outside Iraq for an average of 7 million ID (around US$6,000).

Syrian and Jordanian women and girls were also trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation in Lebanon, sometimes by means of forced or fraudulent marriage, as well as Palestinians from Lebanon and Lebanese women and girls (IRIN, 7 March 2006; LB23; US Department of State, 2011). Sex work by women and the commercial sexual exploitation of women and girls in prostitution was also reportedly relatively common in Syria itself. A large number of the customers were Saudi Arabian men who usually travelled to Syria during the summer (SY04).

Apart from Iraqi women and girls, people trafficked for sexual exploitation to Syria came from Eastern Europe, especially Russia and Ukraine, and North Africa, particularly Morocco, and tended to be young women in their twenties. These women had often studied oriental dancing in their countries of origin and were recruited to work as cabaret dancers and entertainers with regular employment contracts by owners of hotels, nightclubs and similar entertainment venues. They were sexually exploited in prostitution by means of deception, threats, withholding of passports, physical and sexual violence and violations of freedom of movement (Anglin, 17 September 2014; Kane 2011; Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013; US Department of State, 2009; 2010).

By 2011, there were more than 6,000 women working with an artist visa in Lebanon (ICMPD, 2013). As in neighbouring Syria, many women who entered Lebanon with “artist” visas to work as entertainers in “super nightclubs” were trafficked for sexual exploitation by nightclub owners, most of them, as in Syria, from Eastern European countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Romania and Belarus, but also from North African countries such as Morocco and Tunisia (ICMPD, 2013; Huda, 2006; US Department of State, 2009). Also in Turkey in 2007, two people identified as trafficked were from Morocco and Tunisia (Dündar & Özer, 2012).
Women with “artist” visas were trafficked by means of deception, with contracts as models, masseuses, dancers and barmaids, and deprived of their freedom of movement and ID documents. Debt bondage was also used as a form of threat, as well as non-payment of wages (LB01; US Department of State, 2009). Women were usually forced into prostitution in the hotels where they resided outside of working hours, as no sexual contact was permitted inside the super nightclubs where they worked. The nightclub-owner often also controlled their movements during their free time (ICMPD, 2013).

Lebanon was also a transit country for Eastern European women and children forced into prostitution in other Middle Eastern countries (US Department of State, 2010). According to official data from the Lebanese Ministry of Justice (2008) on trafficking for sexual exploitation, most traffickers prosecuted were male, with a ratio of 1 female to 22 males.

Women and girls trafficked for sexual exploitation in Turkey were mainly from CIS countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) (US Department of State, 2009; Dündar & Özer, 2012; IOM, 2013). A *modus operandi* that was reported during the baseline period in Turkey was deception, with women being promised jobs in entertainment or the care sector (TR50). 46 per cent of victims assisted by the NGO HRDF and interviewed for their research had come to Turkey believing that they would be working as au pairs or domestic workers (Dündar & Özer, 2012).

Some migrant women in Turkey were then sexually exploited by means of violence, withholding of passports and IDs, and being forced to sign documents (Öztürk & Ardor, 2007). Foreign women were generally not aware that, if they are identified as trafficked, they would not be deported (Dündar & Özer, 2012). Recruiters and intermediaries were usually women of the same nationality as the victims, in many cases acquaintances. There were also some Turkish men who brought foreign women to Turkey by means of the deception that they would get married. An interviewee for this research who researched the topic indicated that this profile has not changed, based on information shared by the National Police (TR50). In terms of exiting the trafficking situation, trafficked women and girls assisted by the Turkish NGO HRDF indicated that they escaped themselves; were helped by a sex buyer; were identified by law enforcement agencies in the course of raids; or were identified through calls to the 157 Hotline (Dündar & Özer, 2012).
In relation to internal trafficking for sexual exploitation, like Iraqis in Iraq, Lebanese women and girls were also victims of commercial sexual exploitation in Lebanon. One interviewee for this research specialises in legal services and witnessed cases of Lebanese women forced into prostitution by family members, usually their husbands, who either put the woman in contact with a pimp, or directly organised the contacts with sex buyers, in the form of street prostitution or ‘delivery’ prostitution (LB35; US Department of State, 2009; 2011).

Labour Exploitation and Exploitation through Begging

Most cases of labour exploitation, worst forms of child labour and poor working conditions identified during the baseline period in all five countries under study were in construction, agriculture and factory work, as well as in the service industry in Syria. The involvement of children in begging and other street-based work was identified in Lebanon and Jordan, with further details in Lebanon indicating that Palestinian and Iraqi refugee children were particularly affected, as well as Syrian and stateless children.

Prior to 2011, Syrians worked in construction and agriculture in Lebanon. Syrians were not required to obtain a visa to enter Lebanon and were not bound to any sponsor, as well as being able to freely travel back and forth between Syria and Lebanon. Nevertheless, Syrian men working in agriculture in Lebanon were often not granted proper employment rights, as agricultural jobs are not included in the Lebanese Labour Code. Stateless people from Syria and Lebanon resident in the Bekaa Valley and in the coastal region of Akkar in Lebanon were also exploited in agriculture.

The trafficking of foreign women and men for the purpose of labour exploitation in factories was identified as an issue in Jordan during the baseline period. Men and women from China, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Somalia were in conditions of labour exploitation in factories in the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), by means of withholding of passports, non-payment of wages and physical abuse (Tamkeen, 2011; Jordanian Ministry of Labour, 2009; ILO, 2008). Many migrants outside QIZs were also subject to abuses, especially Egyptians and Syrians working in construction and agriculture (ITUC 2008; Tamkeen, 2009; 2011). However, it is not possible to establish to what extent these abuses constituted labour exploitation or labour trafficking.
Very little data, information or research was available on labour trafficking in Iraq, particularly before 2003. However, with the construction boom after 2003, as described above, cases of labour exploitation started to be identified. However, the majority of cases were treated as labour disputes. Similarly, trafficking for labour exploitation was rarely identified during the baseline period in Turkey.

From the available literature, it is not possible to determine what proportion of cases of worst forms of child labour and exploitative child labour during the baseline period in the countries under study involved child trafficking. Worst forms of child labour were in evidence in Syria, mainly affecting Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi boys aged 10-17 years, exploited in factories, agriculture and family businesses in the service industry (IRIN 2006; 2008; UNICEF, 15 October 2010). The children were from large poor families, and often stopped attending school and entered the informal labour market in order to help meet the subsistence needs of the household (UNICEF, 15 October 2010). Working for long hours in unhealthy environments, many of the children developed serious health problems and faced various forms of abuse, including sexual and physical violence at the hands of their employers (IRIN, 2006). Trafficking of children for the purpose of labour exploitation and the engagement of children in worst forms of child labour was mainly perpetrated by Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi parents and relatives, heads of poor, large households, who, failing to provide for their families, sent their children to work instead of securing their access to schooling. Most employers of children were owners of factories, workshops and farms, who paid children daily wages as low as US$2 per day (IRIN, 14 December 2009; ILO & UNICEF, 2012).

In 2007, seasonal agricultural work, street-based work and work in small and medium-scale enterprises under hazardous conditions were classified as worst forms of child labour in Turkey. Four joint surveys conducted by TurkStat and ILO in 1994, 1999, 2006 and 2012 provide a comprehensive national dataset on child labour (age cohort 6-17), including the sectors they were employed in and their working conditions (TurkStat, 2013). From a declining trend in child labour during 1999-2006, recorded rates began to increase again from 2006 onwards. According to the results of the survey, the overall employment rate remained at 5.9% both in 2006 and 2012 (girls and boys), while the proportion of children engaged in economic activity rose from 2.5% to 2.6% for the age group 6-14 during the same period (TurkStat, 2013).

In the southern Turkish city of Adana, for example, children worked on the streets, in industry and as farm labourers during the baseline period (TR04). One interviewee for this research spoke of her visit to an industrial estate in Adana in 2007, where
she encountered 10-15 children aged 10-12 years working under extremely difficult conditions with heavy machinery (TR05).

One report estimated that 25% of Iraqi boys in Lebanon were working. Iraqi girls in Lebanon were less economically active (Danish Refugee Council, 2007). 61% of working Iraqi children surveyed by Save the Children worked for less than minimum wage and 98% worked more than 28 hours per week (Save the Children Sweden, 2011). In Iraq itself, child labour was estimated in 2006 at 715,737, around 11% of the child population of the country (World Bank, 2015). Also in Lebanon, children – mostly Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian and stateless – were exploited in child labour (Huda, 2006). Before 2011, most victims of worst forms of child labour were found in Palestinian refugee camps, and non-Lebanese children represented 80% of children working on the streets (US Department of Labor, 2011). ILO reported that 49% of working boys aged 10-14 years, 47% of working girls aged 10-14 years, 52% of working boys aged 15-18 years and 29% of working girls aged 15-18 years did not earn the minimum monthly salary in Lebanon (ILO, 2004).

In Jordan, reports testify to physical hazards and sexual abuse faced by disadvantaged Jordanian and Jordanian Palestinian children in conditions of exploitative labour and worst forms of child labour in agriculture (NCFA & World Bank 2004); in family businesses and in urban industrial areas (Gharaibeh & Hoeman, 2003). These children worked long hours for extremely low wages, and their unhealthy and exploitative working conditions severely harmed their physical and mental development (NCFA & World Bank, 2004; IRIN Middle East, 2 July 2006). Reports mention the collusion of families, relatives and legal guardians, as well as the owners of businesses exploiting child labour, without depicting them as human traffickers per se (Gharaibeh & Hoeman, 2003; IRIN Middle East, 2 July 2006). Child labour was often connected to a practice referred to as ‘child specialisation’, whereby impoverished parents allowed certain siblings to go to school while others worked (Gharaibeh & Hoeman, 2003).

The exploitation of Lebanese and foreign children through begging was in evidence in Lebanon (Huda, 2006), and a media report refers to children involved in street vending and begging at traffic lights and near commercial centres in Amman and other cities in Jordan. The exploitation of children through begging in Jordan increased during summer holidays, when children attending school were also sent out in the streets to sell small items or to beg for money. According to media reports, many children were sent to work in groups and the most lucrative areas were divided among them to avoid competition (IRIN Middle East, 2 July 2006).
Demographic analysis from 2005 quoted in El Asmar (2013) indicated that the majority of street-based children working and begging in Lebanon were non-Lebanese, with a prevalence of Syrians and Palestine refugees. A significant number of Palestinian children from Lebanon were working, after dropping out of school due to the lack of future employment prospects arising from job restrictions for Palestinians (Save the Children Sweden, 2011).

Earlier in the 2000s, a social worker described children working and begging on Lebanese streets as Syrian, Palestinian, Kurdish or Egyptian, exploited by a begging system that was “very well organized and hierarchical” (Chahine, 2003). The 2010 US Department of Labor Report on the Worst Forms of Child Labour also mentioned that children working on the streets in Lebanon had to give their earnings to their “employers,” indicating that most children were victims of organised gangs, while a smaller number were sent by their families to beg. The Report found that most child victims of worst forms of child labour were found in Palestine refugee camps, with non-Lebanese children representing around 80% of children working on the streets (US Department of Labor, 2010).

 Stateless children of Bedouin ethnicity, from the Wadi Khaled area, were also transported to Lebanese cities to work on the streets, selling small items and begging, though the total number of children working on the streets was much lower than since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, as we will see in Chapter 4 below. Within Lebanon, children were trafficked from the north of the country to the main cities for exploitation in street vending and begging either directly by their parents, or they were rented out by their parents to networks of traffickers (LB33). In Jordan, both before and since end-2010, the Anti-Begging Unit has dealt with cases of begging involving Jordanian Dom people, as well as Syrian, Iraqi and Yemeni Dom people (JO19; JO20). In some of the cases detected by the Jordanian Anti-Begging Unit before 2011, some Jordanian Dom (Roma) girls were forced by their fathers to beg from around 10am until about 7pm and then were sent by their families to be sexually exploited in nightclubs. In other cases, Jordanian Dom children who had lost their fathers were put in the custody of their uncles and other family members, who exploited them and forced them to beg (JO20).
Domestic Servitude

Trafficking for domestic servitude was reported in the literature during the baseline period in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, particularly affecting women from South and Southeast Asia, and East and Southeast Africa. In Syria, migrants trafficked for domestic servitude were mainly women aged 19-62 years from South and Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) and East Africa (Ethiopia and Sudan). Most Sudanese reported fleeing persecution and war, but were not granted refugee status by the UNHCR in Syria. Due to their irregular immigration status, the Sudanese could not obtain work permits; women worked as domestic workers and men as caretakers in the informal labour market (Kahale, 2003).

Migrant workers from South and Southeast Asian countries, on the other hand, migrated to Syria for better paid and better quality work opportunities. Unlike Sudanese migrants, Southeast Asian women migrating for domestic work were either single or travelled to Syria alone, leaving their families and children back home. Both before and after the 2001 Syrian law legalising the employment of migrant domestic workers, migrant women from South and Southeast Asia and East Africa were trafficked to Syria by recruitment agencies owned by Syrian citizens, assisted by intermediaries in the countries of origin of the migrants. A 2003 IOM study identified at least 15 illegal manpower agents recruiting migrant domestic workers for Syrian clients (Kahale, 2003).

Some Filipina and Indonesian women reported being deceived, as they were promised work opportunities in GCC countries, and later discovered that they had instead been taken to Syria. The women also had their passports withheld and were forced to sign a new contract lowering their previously established salary and worsening the working hours and nature of the work. Private employers and recruitment agents violated their basic rights, such as access to food, rest hours and occupational health and safety, and they were forbidden to leave the workplace or speak with other migrant domestic workers. Some of the women interviewed for an IOM study had been orally, physically and sexually abused by their employers and recruitment agents, and then had to cover their own medical expenses (Kahale, 2003).

The Lebanese NGO KAFA reports that in 2010, around 500 migrant domestic worker recruitment agencies were officially licenced by the Lebanese Ministry of Labour. Some recruitment agencies deceived intending migrants and abused their situations of socio-economic vulnerability, also involving sub-agents, intermediaries
and auxiliaries in the pre-departure and transit phases (Hamill, 2011). The US *TIP Report* of 2009 also describes Lebanon as a destination country for Asian and African women trafficked for the purpose of domestic servitude, with 15% of all migrant domestic workers meeting the indicators for domestic servitude (US Department of State, 2009). Migrant domestic workers in Lebanon mainly came from South Asia (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal), Southeast Asia (the Philippines) and East and Southeast Africa (Ethiopia and Madagascar). They were often recruited by means of deception or abuse of a position of vulnerability and suffered abuses at the hands of private employers, such as non-payment of wages; retention of identity documents; excessive working hours; confinement to the workplace and other restrictions on movement; refusal to allow the termination of the employment contract; and non-renewal of residence permits (ICMPD, 2013a; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Hamill, 2011).

The falsification of documents – work permits, passports, visas, medical reports and residence permits – was also prevalent. Only the trafficked woman herself was punished if she was apprehended with false documents, even if she was not aware that they were false (Beydoun, 2006). If migrant domestic workers left their employer, they became irregular in Lebanon, because the *kafala* (sponsorship) system bound them to their employers, making them more vulnerable to trafficking. By 2011, it was estimated that thousands of undocumented migrant domestic workers were present in Lebanon, as they had either left their employers or had otherwise become irregular in Lebanon (Hamill, 2011). The vulnerabilities inherent in the *kafala* systems still put migrant domestic workers at risk of trafficking in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, as set out in Chapter 5 below.

Also during the baseline period, the approximately 70,000 Indonesian, Sri Lankan and Filipina female migrant domestic workers who migrated to *Jordan* for economic reasons paid large amounts of money for promises of well-remunerated domestic work (Tamkeen, 2011). Many were deceived and trafficked for domestic servitude, as well as sexual exploitation in prostitution, by international and Jordan-based recruitment agencies (ITUC 2008; Tamkeen, 2009; 2011). The *modus operandi* of recruitment agencies trafficking mostly South and Southeast Asian migrants to Jordan were described as follows: migrants paid fees in advance to recruitment agencies, which also supplied forged and fraudulent travel documentation. In Jordan, as in Lebanon and Syria, they were subject to withholding of passports; restrictions on freedom of movement; lack of regular employment contracts; abusive working conditions; non-payment of wages; threats; and physical and sexual abuse (Calandruccio, 2005; ITUC, 2008; Tamkeen, 2009; 2011).
Forced Marriage

In Syria and Iraq, trafficking for forced temporary marriages was in evidence during the baseline period, a phenomenon which has now also been observed in Lebanon and Jordan since the outbreak of the Syrian war, described below in more detail in section 5.3.2. Men from Saudi Arabia travelled to Syria, particularly during the summer, for forced marriages to Syrian girls and Iraqi refugee girls, as young as 15, through “zawaj al-mishyar” (tourist marriage) or “mut’ah” (temporary marriage), an illegal form of marriage that ends when the men leave the country. Saudi men usually paid the girl’s father or a marriage broker and, according to this ‘agreement,’ the girl surrendered her right to housing and nafaqa (maintenance money). Because the Saudi embassy does not recognise “zawaj al-mishyar” as an official marriage, if the girls or young women got pregnant - abortion is illegal in Syria - , the children were registered in Syria as “ab majhul” (unknown father). As a result, these children experience lifelong discrimination in Syrian society. In many cases, to avoid this discrimination, young mothers registered babies in the name of the mother’s brother, sister or parents (SY04; IQ05; Micha et al, 2011).

After 2003, an increase in mut’ah marriages was reported in Iraq, facilitated by certain religious authorities, ostensibly due to the problem of the high number of widows in Iraq (IQ05). Some families in Iraq were reported to have sold their children for as much as US$30,000 for temporary forced marriage (Goedert, 2011). Forced marriage may also have involved a form of domestic servitude, as girls and women were often required to work long hours cooking and cleaning for an extended family (OWFI, 2010). Although the minimum age for marriage in Iraq is 18 for both men and women, with discretion for those aged 15-17, as set out in the Introduction, UNICEF reported that in 2006, 17% of Iraqi women aged 20-24 had been married before the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2011).

In Lebanon, on the other hand, forced marriage of children was not considered a common phenomenon prior to the Syrian crisis, though Lebanese and Palestinian girls were subject to early marriage in specific areas of the country (Huda, 2006). This mainly took place in specific rural areas in Akkar and the Bekaa Valley. Usually either both the girl and the boy were under eighteen, or the girl was under eighteen and the man not much older (LB17). Early marriage was witnessed in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, affecting mostly girls but also a number of boys (Al-Hroub, 2011; Save the Children Sweden, 2011).
Exploitation in Armed Conflict

Children were exploited in armed conflict during the baseline period by Palestinian groups and Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, by insurgents in Iraq and by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey. There is no specific evidence of child trafficking for exploitation in armed conflict by the national military in Syria prior to the war, although in the latter half of the 2000s, there was concern that some of the non-state armed groups present in Syria, including Hamas, Fatah, Hezbollah and the Iraqi Ba’athists, may have been recruiting children in Syria and training them to perform combat and non-combat military tasks in the region (Child Soldiers International, 2008).

In Lebanon, Palestinian and Lebanese children were exploited in armed conflict in specific areas of the country (Huda, 2006). The international Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers observed that military training was provided by some of the Palestinian factions to children as young as 10, and Palestinian militias carried out military training of children in Ayn al-Helweh, the largest Palestine refugee camp in Lebanon, in April 2007 (Save the Children Sweden, 2011). Also in specific areas in Tripoli, boys carried weapons, due to Sunni-Alawite tensions and pressure from the community and their peers. In highly politicised environments, recruitment for exploitation in armed conflict was sometimes facilitated by the children’s own communities (LB42).

During the July 2006 conflict between the Israeli military and Hezbollah in Lebanon, there was no evidence of children involved in fighting, although reports mention military training conducted by Hezbollah with children under the age of 15 through the Al-Mahdi Brigades (Save the Children Sweden, 2011). In Akkar, NGOs raised concerns in relation to schools with strong ideological affiliations, already existing before the Syrian crisis (LB37; LB39).

In Turkey, it is estimated that the PKK has exploited around 3,000 children in armed conflict since 1994, of which around 10% were girls (Sever et al., 2012; Uslu, 29 April 2012; Child Soldiers International, 2008). Also in Iraq during 2003-2008, armed militias and insurgents forced adults and children to engage in criminal or terrorist activities, though little data was recorded on this. Cases reported by the international NGO Heartland Alliance included women forced by their husbands to detonate explosive belts while wearing them, and women and girls threatened with the exposure of intimate information or a video of sexual activity if they did not carry out terrorist acts (Minwalla & Portman, 2007).
Illegal adoption

Illegal adoption was a documented phenomenon in Lebanon, especially during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). An estimated 10,000 children have been adopted illegally from Lebanon since the start of the civil war (LB06). Children of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon were also at risk of illegal adoption (Huda, 2006). In more recent years, also prior to the Syrian crisis, orphanages in Lebanon almost exclusively hosted children of migrant domestic workers (LB13).

An interviewee for this Study in Lebanon recalled hearing a story of illegal adoption from a doctor in 2010. The doctor’s friend employed a migrant domestic worker who was pregnant, but afraid to keep the child, so the private employer identified a US American adoptive family among their friends. The adoptive mother stayed at the hospital and the biological mother received US$200-300 for the baby (LB06).

Doctors in Lebanon who refused an abortion to a single woman or girl sometimes offered to organise an adoption through a convent or other Christian organisation, and register the adoptive mother as the biological mother (LB06). Also, when a biological mother could not pay hospital fees related to childbirth, some hospitals registered an adoptive mother as having given birth.

Removal of Organs

The only indications of organ trafficking and/or trafficking for organ removal during the baseline period were identified in Lebanon and Iraq. According to an article in the Lebanese newspaper The Daily Star, organ trafficking was already a concern in 2003 (Raad, 20 January 2003). The Secretary-General of the Hazmieh-based National Consultative Committee on Bioethics reported that many poor people sold their organs in exchange for money, mentioning also advertisements in local newspapers requesting organ “donations.” It is not possible to determine whether these were cases of organ trafficking or human trafficking for organ removal. Another case that was observed in Lebanon before 2011 concerned an orphanage that raised children with purpose of child trafficking for organ removal. At least eight children were involved in this. The orphanage is now closed (LB31). The media also reported illegal organ trafficking during the baseline period in Baghdad, with Iraqis in desperate financial situations selling kidneys and other organs, but it is not clear whether trafficking in persons was involved (Al Jazeera, 20 July 2009).
3.1 Syrian Internal Displacement and Mobility

Syria’s existence as an independent parliamentary republic dates back to 1946, when the French mandate for Syria and Lebanon came to an end. The Syrian Arab Republic was created in 1963 on foot of a Ba’athist military coup, and the country was under Emergency Law from then until 2011. The socialist Ba’ath Party’s ‘Corrective Revolution’ brought Hafez Al-Assad to power in November 1970. Bashar Al-Assad succeeded his father Hafez in 2000. Throughout the decade prior to the outbreak of the war in 2011, Syria regularly had prickly relations with its neighbouring countries. Syrian forces were present in Lebanon until 2005, and Iraq and Syria restored diplomatic relations in late 2006 after almost a quarter of a century’s break, only to experience a further break in 2009-2010.

The first signs of conflict ensued from protests in Damascus, the Syrian capital, and in the city of Dera’a in the south, in March 2011. In May of the same year, the Syrian Army entered the suburbs of the capital, as well as the cities of Dera’a, Banyas and Homs. At the end of 2011, a military base in Damascus was attacked by opponents of the Syrian government, leading to full-blown war. An important watershed in the conflict was the seizure by the group Da’ish of territories stretching from Aleppo in northwest Syria to Diyala in eastern Iraq in mid-2014.

The number of documented killings in Syria as a result of the conflict, during the period March 2011 to April 2014, was 191,369, according to a report by the Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG) for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, though the HRDAG considers this the minimum number, as many more killings remain undocumented (Price, Gohdes & Ball, 2014).

As of September 2015, there are an estimated 6.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Syria (OCHA, 2015). Internal migration, internal migration facilitation and internal trafficking routes inside Syria vary according to the shifting of battle lines; control of specific areas of the country by the Assad regime and different opposition groups; and the areas of origin and destination of internally displaced people.
Many IDPs and intending refugees have moved multiple times since the beginning of the war. A research informant spoke of the experience of a group of Syrians from a village in the Aleppo governorate, who had recently arrived in Kırıkhan in Hatay province, Turkey:

“They said, ‘we moved from Aleppo to Idlib, then to Homs, then to Qamishli. We fled from the PYD,30 Da’ish, the Free Syrian Army, the Assad regime. We had no strength to run any longer, no bread, nothing’” (TR16).31

Apart from internal displacement, specific internal routes are also taken by Syrians intending to flee the country and seek refuge abroad (see Graph 2 below). This requires them to travel through the war-torn country from their area of previous residence to the borders with Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq. Many Syrians request Syrian Bedouin groups to facilitate this, due to the need to avoid checkpoints. These facilitators transport people in trucks along desert roads from one Bedouin village to another (JO11). Whenever the battle lines shift and there are increased dangers for drivers and passengers, the drivers and the “dallala” (guides who provide information on the safest irregular migration routes) take advantage of the situation to charge higher prices for smuggling out of Syria.

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30 The PYD is the Democratic Union Party (“Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat” in Kurdish), a Syrian Kurdish opposition party.
31 Original interview in Turkish, translation by the Country Researcher.
Syrians come to Turkey from almost all regions in Syria and enter by the nearest border, particularly when violence in a certain area increases (TR13; TR48). The most dangerous routes to Turkey, according to interviewees, run through areas where the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) have taken control of border crossing points (BCPs): from Kobane (Ayn Al-Arab) in the Syrian governorate of Hasakah to Mürşitpınar in Şanlıurfa, Turkey; and from Ras al-Ayn in Hasakah to Ceylanpınar in Şanlıurfa (SY01; SY07). One interviewee reported that there, Turkish soldiers had opened fire at people trying to cross into Turkey, with reported fatalities (SY07). Also, however, Syrians fleeing Tell Abyad and intending to enter Turkey through the Akçakale BCP in early June 2015 were prevented from reaching the BCP by Da’ish forces 6km away, who were asking for money in return for letting them pass (TR09).
Another research informant confirmed that Da’ish assist people to cross the border in exchange for money, as do the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the areas that they control (TR13). In the early stages of the conflict, internal movement to the Turkish border was mainly facilitated by members of the FSA, who provided transport in cars and vans at no cost. More recently, people have tried to travel to Turkey either independently, or facilitated by fellow travellers who have cars and are reported to charge each passenger up to SYP 150,000-200,000 (around US$800-1,060) for the trip (SY12).

Movements back and forth between Syria and Turkey were also reported, with some Syrians going back to Syria, especially the governorates of Aleppo and Homs, to harvest their land. Other Syrians frequently cross the border irregularly at Kilis, in order to financially support elderly relatives still living in Syria (TR17; TR18; TR28). Still others are students still registered at Syrian universities, who go to Syria to sit university exams and then return to Turkey (TR28).

Until the beginning of 2015, the official BCPs between Syria and Lebanon – on the Syrian side - were open and controlled by Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, while on the Lebanese side, the General Security (DGSG) controls the BCPs. However, since May 2015, the allied Syrian army and Hezbollah militias have clashed with Da’ish and Nusra Front militants in the Syrian-Lebanese border areas from Zabadani, northwest of the city of Damascus, to Asal Alward in Qalamoun in the governorate of Rural Damascus (Rif Dimashq), southeast of Baalbek in Lebanon. There were also clashes around the BCPs in Qusayr and Talkalakh, southwest and west, respectively, of the Syrian city of Homs (Aziz, 11 May 2015). This pushed internal migration facilitation and migrant smuggling routes to the north to Turkey, through the Turkmen mountains in the Syrian governorate of Latakia and through Da’ish-controlled areas near the city of Aleppo.

A similar shift has been perceived since early 2015, when Jordan closed its official BCPs in Jaber in Mafraq governorate and Ramtha in Irbid governorate in the northwest of the country, and the unofficial BCP near Ruwashid in the east. Syrians from the areas controlled by the Nusra Front in the Syrian governorate of Dera’a then increasingly attempted to leave Syria by travelling through Da’ish-controlled areas in Tadmour (Palmyra) in Homs governorate and Aleppo in the north, where there are informal BCPs into Turkey in agricultural areas, served by migrant smugglers (SY12). People from the western regions of Syria have to pay higher prices in order to travel to the east, as the journey is longer and they need to have the necessary ID documents to pass through checkpoints in the southeast Syrian governorate of Suwayda, which is controlled by the regime forces (JO11;
JO12). This is considered highly dangerous, as people must travel along desert roads that have recently been the scene of fighting. Some people do not survive the desert journey, though it has not been possible to record the numbers of deaths en route (JO12).

People from the Syrian border villages of Tiba, just east of Ramtha in Jordan, and Tal Al-Shihab, just north of Ramtha - both about 3km from the border - guide intending refugees walking to the border. According to an informant for this study, the average sum paid by one adult for transportation as far as the Jordanian border, avoiding checkpoints, can vary between 30,000 and 50,000 SYP (around US$150-250), with the trip taking up to a month because Syrian Bedouin facilitators require people to wait in their villages until they have gathered a sufficiently large group for the trip (JO11).

It should be noted that some Syrians previously in the KR-I in Iraq have returned to Syria through the Peshkhabour BCP, with a total of 4,173 people returning voluntarily and independently during the first quarter of 2015. The reasons cited by UNHCR were “family reunification, family events, medical reasons, lack of job opportunities, and high living costs in the KR-I”.32

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Map 4: Internal displacement in Syria as of 21 October 2014

3.2 Syrian Refugee Movement

Graph 2: Official Border Crossing Points used by Refugees from Syria

- **In Şanlıurfa:**
  - Akçakale (TR) - Tell Abyad (SY);
  - Mürşitpinar (TR) – Kobane (SY);
  - Ceylanpınar (TR) – Ras Al-Ayn (SY).

- **In Hatay:**
  - Yayladağı (TR) - Kesab (SY);
  - Cilvegözü (TR) – Bab al-Hawa (SY).

- **In Kilis:**
  - Öncüpınar (TR) – A’zaz (SY);
  - Çobanbey (TR) – Ar-Ra’i (SY).

- **In Mardin:**
  - Nusaybin (TR) – Qamishli (SY);
  - Şenyurt (TR) – Ad-Darbasiyah (SY).

- **In Gaziantep:**
  - Karkamış (TR) – Jarabulus (SY).

- **Official**

  - **Turkey**
    - Jdaitet Yabous (SY) - Masnaa (LB);
    - Aarida on Mediterranean coast between Tartous (SY) and Tripoli (LB);
    - Addabousiyah (SY) - Aaboudiyeh (LB);
    - Jousiyah between Qusayr (SY) and Qaa in the Bekaa Valley (LB).

  - **Lebanon**
    - Ramtha in Irbid (JO), close to Dera’a (SY);
    - Jaber in Mafraq (JO) bordering Nassib in Syria.

  - **Jordan**
    - Peshkhabour (IQ) – Khanik (SY) is the main official BCP, across the Tigris River to Dohuk governorate in KR-I, at triple border between Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
Irregular border crossings assisted by smugglers have been reported to take place into all four of the hosting countries under study. Reyhanlı, in Turkey’s Hatay province (TR02; TR26), next to Al-Hamda in Syria, is informally known as ‘Smugglers’ Way’, since it was also used before the war to smuggle petrol, cigarettes and other products to Turkey (TR26). Other informal BCPs between Turkey and Syria had also been routes for the commercial smuggling of goods and it is assumed that the same group of smugglers of goods are now involved in migrant smuggling, availing of their existing ties with border guards and knowledge of the area and routes (TR02). Syrians who want to cross to Turkey through Reyhanlı - Al-Hamda pay about 20TL (US$6-7) (TR26), while in other areas the smuggling fees vary, ranging from 20TL to up to 200TL (US$6-70) (TR02). A research informant from an international NGO had come across refugees who had

come to Gaziantep in Turkey with the assistance of Turkish smugglers whom they had met in Syria. Some smugglers had promised to take them to Istanbul for a fee, but had left them in Kilis and disappeared (TR32). Migrant smuggling services are particularly required at times of heightened security concerns when the Turkish authorities close the borders (TR02).

In December 2014 and January 2015, the news outlets *Naharnet* (29 January 2015) and *Al Akhbar* (16 December 2014) reported a criminal gang and a security force member facilitating migrant smuggling from Syria to Lebanon in exchange for bribes. Some Syrian refugees in Lebanon reported that certain family members had been on minibuses that had ‘disappeared’ close to the border, and they did not have any information concerning their whereabouts (LB44).

As is the case in Reyhanli in Turkey, before the war, goods like sugar, meat and cigarettes were smuggled from Dera’a governorate in Syria to Ramtha governorate in Jordan by Syrian Bahara people from Dera’a, in order to evade import taxes. They used private cars to transport products through informal BCPs on the western side of the border, which, since the outbreak of the war, have served also to smuggle refugees (Townsend & Oomen, 2015).

Refugees also use the services of migrant smugglers to cross the Rabiaa (IQ) - Al-Yarubiyyah (SY) BCP from Syria into Iraq. The unofficial BCP referred to in KR-I as Al-Lakh Road is also controlled by migrant smugglers.

**Refugees in the Hosting Countries**

As of September 2015, a total of 3,930,330 Syrian refugees are registered and active with the UNHCR in the four hosting countries (in Turkey, UNHCR cites the Turkish government figures), and over 6.6 million people are internally displaced people in Syria. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq together host 86.7% of Syria’s refugees abroad. An additional 441,246 Syrians sought asylum in European countries between April 2011 and August 2015, and 159,147 Syrian refugees are in Egypt and other North African countries, giving an overall total of 4,529,572 people from Syria who have sought refuge outside their country’s borders.

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By far the largest proportion of Syrians who have sought refuge outside the borders of their country are in Turkey. Turkey hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees – and indeed of refugees in general – in the world; a full 42.8% of all registered refugees from Syria are in Turkey. As of 2 October 2015, Turkey officially hosts 2,072,290 registered Syrian refugees, of which 26.2% are girls, 28% are boys, 23% are women and 22.9% are men.\(^{36}\)

As of 2014, due to the influx of Syrians, Lebanon is the country with the highest per-capita concentration of refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2014). From a total of 2,408 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon in mid-2011, the official number had increased to 1,140,585 in 2014, with the sharpest increase from 2013 and throughout the whole of 2014.\(^{37}\) The current figures for Lebanon as of the end of September 2015 are 1,113,941 Syrian refugees.\(^{38}\) In addition, based on reports and government policy on registration, there is likely to be a significant number of people from Syria in Lebanon who are not registered. As of 6 May 2015, UNHCR suspended new registrations, on foot of instructions from the Lebanese government, and people awaiting registration have since then no longer been included in the figure for Syrian refugees.

Jordan, with the third largest Syrian refugee population in absolute numbers, hosts a total of 628,887 registered Syrian refugees as of the end of September 2015, of which 25.2% are girls; 26.6% are boys; 23.5% are women; and 21.2% are men. People from the Syrian governorate of Dera’a, the governorate bordering Jordan where the conflict began, started travelling by foot and by car to the border

with Jordan in 2011, and currently, almost half of all registered Syrian refugees in Jordan are from Dera’a (44.7%).

As of end September 2015, UNHCR Iraq had registered 248,503 Syrian refugees, beginning gradually during the first months of 2012. The official refugee count, which had reached 10,794 by end July 2012, has rapidly increased since then, and due to proximity and linguistic similarities, the majority of Syrian refugees are in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), and are Syrian Kurdish people from north and northeast Syria. Of all Syrian refugees registered in Iraq, just 6,636 are outside of the KR-I, in the neighbouring governorates of Anbar (4,512) and Kirkuk (781), and dispersed in other parts of Iraq (1,343).

Table 5: Refugee and IDP Country Profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Area (km²)</th>
<th>Syrian refugees/IDPs as of end 2014</th>
<th>As % of population</th>
<th>Syrian Refugees/IDPs as of 30.09.2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>23,000,000</td>
<td>185,180</td>
<td>7,632,500 IDPs</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>6,600,000 IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>76,667,864</td>
<td>783,562</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1,938,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5,882,562</td>
<td>10,452</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>1,113,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6,459,000</td>
<td>96,188</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>628,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>33,000,000</td>
<td>437,072</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>248,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KR-I</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
<td>207,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,930,330 refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 From: www.unocha.org, accessed 01.10.2015.
45 “As of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration as per Government of Lebanon’s instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer included.” See: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122, accessed 30.09.2015.
Around 260,000 Syrians in **Turkey** currently reside in 25 “protection centres” (hereafter camps) in ten cities and towns, comprising approximately 15% of the entire Syrian refugee population in Turkey. The vast majority therefore live outside the camps, mainly in cities and towns in southeast and southern Turkey, close to the Syrian border - Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, Adana and Mersin -, while an estimated 330,000 live in Istanbul (HUGO, 2014). More recently, refugee movement has become similar to patterns of internal migration of Turkish people, with some Syrians moving on to larger provinces in search of better employment and education opportunities (TR33; TR36; TR38). The western Turkish province of İzmir and other Aegean cities, such as Mersin, Aydın, Muğla, Balıkesir and Çanakkale, have also seen a significant increase in the numbers of refugees living in temporary shelters, parks and other open spaces, waiting to cross to the Greek islands with the help of smugglers.

For Syrian refugees in Turkey, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies has a flexible approach to granting work permits, waiving the requirement of 100,000TL (around US$33,370) cash capital and of compliance with the foreign labour quota system, which requires at least five full-time Turkish employees at the workplace (TR42). The main precondition for Syrian refugees is to possess a passport with entry stamps and a residence permit for a period of minimum 6 months in order to obtain a work permit (TR42).

As set out in the Introduction, people who have fled from Syria are not defined as “refugees” in **Lebanon**, but rather as “displaced persons” (Pizzi, 6 January 2015). Lebanon has not set up any official camps for Syrian refugees, who live in informal tent settlements, or rented rooms or properties. Most Syrian refugees fled to the Tripoli area in the North of Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley neighbouring Syria, or the Beirut and Mount Lebanon region, while a smaller number reside in the southern part of the country. It is common for people from the same village or neighbourhood in Syria to migrate together and settle in the same informal tent settlement, helping to maintain social networks.

Syrians migrating internally in Lebanon move from rural areas such as the Bekaa Valley and Akkar to cities, such as Beirut, Tripoli or Saida, while urban-to-rural migration is very rare. However, some isolated cases of internal rural-to-rural migration were reported, whereby the residents of an entire informal tent settlement

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migrated from the Bekaa Valley to the Akkar region, which a research informant assumes was based on labour agreements between landowners in the two regions (LB39).

17.5% of Syrian refugees in Jordan live in official camps, with the majority of camp refugees in Zaatari Camp in Mafraq governorate, with a current population of 79,317. Syrians residing in refugee camps are issued with a camp resident ID, while Syrians living among host communities hold a security ID, entitling them to remain in Jordan indefinitely on humanitarian grounds. However, since 2013 the Jordanian authorities have imposed restrictions on the entry of Syrians (Sweis, 8 October 2014).

At the beginning of the conflict, 90% of the Syrians who crossed into Jordan from Tiba and Tal Shihab were from Dera’a, while later, when Ruwashid became the main BCP, the refugee groups included Syrians from Homs (currently 16% of all Syrians in Jordan), Rural Damascus (12.3%), Aleppo (8.2%), the city of Damascus (7.8%) and Deir Az-Zour (0.6%), as well as Dera’a. The new arrivals mainly complained about the long wait to enter Jordan - some refugees reported waiting between 20 and 50 days - and the hardships they faced during that time in the no man’s land on the Syrian side of the eastern border (JO17).

**Abuses**

As an official from the League of Arab States (LAS) pointed out in a recent article, the migration routes involved in seeking refuge from the conflict are highly dangerous:

“One of the most dangerous consequences of the current situation in the Arab region is taking dangerous routes of migration trying to flee the conflicts. Several countries in the Arab region are important points of transit along the irregular migration routes taken by migrants, including unaccompanied minors. […] They often employ the services of human smugglers and embark on dangerous sea or land trips, which many do not survive” (El Fegary, July 2015: 5).

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This is borne out by the findings of this research, particularly in relation to the situation at the borders. An interviewee mentioned cases of abuse and violence by facilitators and smugglers in Syria, involving deception, theft of money and belongings, and abandonment before reaching the intended final destination (SY12).

One woman living in the Atme camp in Syria reported to an NGO that she became paralysed after a soldier physically assaulted her (TR38). A 2013 Amnesty International report documented problems with border crossings such as refusal of entry, push-back operations and excessive use of force at the Syrian-Turkish border (2014). One NGO also reported human rights abuses at this border, including cases where Syrian refugee women and girls were sexually harassed by soldiers in exchange for being allowed to cross the border. The NGO investigated and documented the case of a refugee man who was seriously injured by a soldier while attempting to cross the border with his two children, who were also harassed, allegations that the soldier in question denied. Syrian refugees told the NGO that assaults had become so common that they had become accustomed to them, though no charges have been filed. Women and girls are too scared to report rape, according to the same interviewee (TR38).

At the end of 2014, when the Jordanian government became a member of the coalition against Da’ish in Syria and Iraq, fewer refugees from the governorates of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zour and Hasakah in Syria were allowed entry. Jordan cited security reasons, fearing that there could be Da’ish members among the refugees from those areas (JO06; JO17). Returns at the Syrian-Jordanian border caused concern among international humanitarian staff because people from Raqqa, Deir
ez-Zour and Hasakah entered Jordan across the eastern border, but were returned across the western border with Dera’a, a Syrian governorate where they had few family ties and could be vulnerable to violence at the hands of groups facilitating internal movement and the armed groups controlling that region (JO17; JO02).

### 3.3 Iraqi International and Internal Displacement

After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent sectarian violence, many Iraqis were displaced to the neighbouring countries, with Syria receiving the highest numbers. The protracted deterioration of the security situation in Iraq led to the gradual depletion of savings and other forms of funding that refugees relied on (Weiss, 2007).

At the baseline date, the Syrian government estimated that there were approximately 471,400 Iraqi refugees living in Syria, though UNHCR was assisting only 101,900 Iraqi refugees in January 2012. By the end of 2012, UNHCR’s numbers had decreased to some 62,700.\(^{51}\) They are barred from formal employment, meaning that many do not possess the financial resources to flee the Syrian war. Of those who can, they need to choose between returning to Iraq, or attempting to cross the border into another neighbouring country. Approximately 70,000 have returned to an insecure and potentially dangerous situation in Iraq, while others face double displacement, discrimination and vulnerability in neighbouring countries.

Iraqis fleeing the war in Iraq were also smuggled to Lebanon from Syria, as few Lebanese visas were available. The main reasons why this group continued on to Lebanon rather than staying in Syria, in spite of the risk of being detained, were the lack of labour opportunities in Syria and, for Christian Iraqis, the presence of a significant Christian community in Lebanon (Save the Children Sweden, 2011). By 2015, around 6,100 Iraqi refugees were registered and active with UNHCR in Lebanon,\(^{52}\) though the actual number of Iraqi refugees in the country is estimated to be significantly higher. IDPs from Northern Iraq, mainly Iraqi Turkmens and Iraqi Yazidis, also pass through Syria in order to reach Turkey (TR12; TR13).

The nature of internal mobility in Iraq since 2011 has varied according to the region and the ethnic or religious group involved. Iraqi Sunni Muslims, Christians,

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\(^{51}\) See: [www.unhcr.org/51b1d63cb.html](http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d63cb.html), accessed 04.11.2015.

Kurds and Yazidis tend to flee north to the KR-I, while Iraqi Shia Muslims head toward southern Iraq, the traditional Shia heartlands (IQ13). As of end 2014, Da’ish had taken control of areas in the western and northwestern Iraqi governorates of Anbar and Nineveh, including the city of Mosul, from its base in north and northeast Syria. This caused a wave of internal displacement in Iraq, with people from those areas moving to other Iraqi governorates. The city of Mosul fell to Da’ish in the summer of 2014, and later other parts of Nineveh and parts of Anbar governorate were also occupied. The resulting influx of internally displaced Iraqi people to KR-I and other Iraqi governorates put financial pressure on both the Federal Government of Iraq and the KR-I, exacerbated by the security situation (IQ13).

As of September 2015, **there are 3,182,736 internally displaced Iraqis**, dispersed across 102 districts and 3,430 distinct locations in Iraq. The KR-I hosts around 27% of the total number of registered IDPs (852,660 people) (IOM Iraq, September 2015). Most originate from the neighbouring governorates of Anbar, Nineveh and Salah al-Din. Some organisations interviewed for this research stressed their concern regarding the IDP situation at the internal borders of the KR-I with the rest of Federal Iraq. Thousands of IDPs are banned from entering the Kurdistan Region, and have been staying in desert areas in Kirkuk governorate since the beginning of May 2015 (IQ13).
3.4 Other Refugee, Migrant and Stateless Populations

Graph 4: Palestine refugees in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq

Table 6: Palestine refugees in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline Date</strong></td>
<td>486,946</td>
<td>436,154</td>
<td>1,979,580</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>449,957 (+ 53,070 Palestine refugees from Syria)</td>
<td>2,097,338</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNRWA Camps</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 Significant numbers of Palestinian refugees were already present in all the countries under study, apart from Turkey, prior to the outbreak of the war in Syria. There were twelve UNRWA-recognised Palestine refugee camps in Syria, and Yarmouk Camp, on the outskirts of Damascus, was home to the largest Palestine refugee community in the country. Law No. 260 of July 1956 granted equivalence with Syrian citizens to Palestine refugees who resided in the country at that time in relation to employment, trade and military service, without granting them political rights or the right to own real estate. They are issued with “travel documents,” but do not have access to naturalisation on a par with nationals of other Arab states. UNRWA considers that in Syria: “the escalating violence makes movement and access more difficult and causes severe hardship for Palestine refugees”. A total of around 80,000 Palestine refugees from Syria are estimated to have left the country since 2011. Among these, an estimated 53,000 fled to Lebanon, and most of them are living in the twelve Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon (UNRWA, 1 July 2014).

Palestinians in Lebanon, including those born and long-term resident in the country, are considered as foreigners and discriminated against on the labour market, because Lebanese labour laws are based on the principle of reciprocity and Palestinians do not have a recognised state that can grant labour rights and benefits to Lebanese workers. Before 2005, Palestinians did not have access to over seventy professions, while as of mid-2015, they can obtain work permits only for low-skilled jobs (The Daily Star, 30 April 2015). Around 53 per cent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon live in the 12 recognised Palestine refugee camps (UNRWA, 1 July 2014).

There were about 300,000 stateless Kurds in Syria at the outbreak of the war. Decree No. 93 of August 1962 called for an exceptional census that stripped around 120,000 Kurds (20% of all Kurds in Syria at that time) of their Syrian citizenship, and issued them with “foreigner” identity cards. Stateless Kurds are forbidden from owning land, housing or businesses, from public service employment and from professions as doctors or engineers. They may not access public healthcare, may not legally marry Syrian citizens, and are not issued with any form of travel document.

A further group of stateless Syrian-born Kurds are referred to in Syrian government documents as “maktoumeen” (“unregistered” or “not appearing in records”), and have neither identity cards nor are they listed in official population registers.

According to information provided by the Syrian government to Human Rights Watch in July 1996, there were around 75,000 stateless Kurds with this classification. Children are *maktoumeen* if: they are the child of a Syrian-born Kurdish “foreigner” man and a Syrian citizen woman; one of their parents is a “foreigner” and the other *maktoum*; or both parents are *maktoumeen*. However, a presidential Decree dated April 2011 granted citizenship to over 100,000 stateless Kurds in an attempt to prevent Kurds joining the uprising.

During the early 2000s, about 4,000 Sudanese people also sought asylum and work opportunities in Syria (Kahale, 2003). In addition, around 2,400 Somalian refugees and 1,740 Afghani refugees were registered with the UNHCR in Syria at the outbreak of the war. In 2012, IOM reported that there were more than 100,000 migrant workers in crisis-hit Syria, mainly from Indonesia, the Philippines and Ethiopia, and as many as 15,000 migrants were considered to be in need of evacuation assistance, as they had been abandoned by their employers amid the violence, often without valid travel and identity documents (IRIN, 20 September 2012). By 2014, more than 2,000 Filipino workers had been evacuated from Syria into Lebanon (LB04). In addition, some affluent Syrian families moved to Lebanon with their migrant domestic workers, some of whom may have been trafficked for domestic servitude (LB04).

Similarly, the situation of Indonesian women, domestic workers taken to Jordan by their Syrian employers, is particularly precarious because they are considered irregular migrants, especially those who entered without a visa through unofficial BCPs (JO23). Six Indonesian women who were taken to Jordan by their Syrian employers are currently in Jordan, at the Indonesian embassy, and are unable to leave because they either entered irregularly or overstayed their visas, and in order to be repatriated they need to rectify their migration status with the Jordanian authorities. In 2012, hundreds of undocumented Indonesian women crossed into Jordan from Syria to escape the conflict and the Indonesian government organised a plane from Amman to repatriate them to Indonesia (IRIN, 20 September 2012).
The violence that has characterised many parts of Syria since 2011, and certain areas within Iraq since mid-2014, has affected people in those territories and those who have fled abroad in a myriad of ways. The complexity of their situations is influenced by the war and violence itself, but also by the legal and institutional systems that they must navigate within Syria and in the four hosting countries in order to maintain a legal status, seek employment and generate income, access humanitarian aid and public services, and seek legal redress if they are victims of abuse. For certain specific groups, these difficulties are compounded by gender-based discrimination and violence (in the case of women and girls) and child protection issues (in the case of children), such as being separated from parents and caregivers and lack of birth registration. Lack of child protection can, in turn, contribute to the incidence of early marriage, child labour and child begging. People who, based on these conditions, consider that the least bad option is to try to move outside the region, and have the means to do so, are faced with a situation of irregular migration and dependence on migrant smugglers that can also render them more vulnerable to being exploited.

The desperation of some of these people, who do not have the resources to provide for the sustenance, accommodation and access to essential services for themselves and their families, can lead to them exploiting members of their own families. Nevertheless, not all of the exploiters and traffickers in this context are themselves in a situation of vulnerability, as others engage in the exploitation and trafficking of vulnerable people for their own gains, and as a specific form of war profiteering, taking advantage of the situations of vulnerability arising from the war.

All of these factors, in certain cases, as set out below in chapter 5, contribute to the incidence of trafficking in persons in the five countries under study, as one of the many deleterious effects of the war and refugee crisis. These situations of vulnerability are therefore the focus of this chapter. The relationship between situations of vulnerability, vulnerability to trafficking, and trafficking itself, are visualised in Graph 5 below.
Situations of vulnerability to trafficking in persons in the countries under study since 2011 may be linked to the general humanitarian context of Syrian refugees and IDPs, leading to severe impoverishment in many cases and difficulty in meeting basic subsistence needs, as well as preventing or restricting access to essential services such as accommodation, healthcare and education. Such situations also arise from a lack of legal status, restrictions on legal status and difficulties in renewing legal status, as well as attendant challenges in employment and other income-generating opportunities in the four hosting countries under study. Child protection issues such as access to education, birth registration and the migration of separated children may also render children more vulnerable, and contribute to the incidence of early marriage, child labour and child begging. The risk of trafficking for women and girls is also influenced by sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). A lack of protection for trafficked people due
to **gaps in the anti-trafficking response** – prevention, protection and prosecution -,, together with **a lack of safe and legal onward migration opportunities,** particularly to Europe, also render people more vulnerable to trafficking in persons.

Apart from Syrians and Iraqis affected by internal displacement and forced migration, **host communities** in the four hosting countries under study and migrants who were in Syria when the war broke out were also found to be vulnerable to trafficking due to the war, as well as due to pre-existing situations of impoverishment and legal and social exclusion.

### 4.1 General Humanitarian Situation

**Situations of severe impoverishment among Syrian IDPs and refugees** in the five countries under study are a central issue that renders them more vulnerable to various forms of exploitation and trafficking. Assistance from international and national aid providers is not always sufficient, due to shortfalls in funding and restrictions on access for refugees who are not registered, as well as difficulties in fair distribution of aid within Syria. There is also a general concern that greater attention and assistance has been given to the minority of IDPs and refugees who are in official camps (see section 1.5 above). In Syria and among host communities, **IDPs and refugees face difficulties in meeting needs for the payment of rent, basic household items, water, sanitation and food, as well as access to healthcare, education and livelihoods.** Also within Syria, a crucial vulnerability factor is the lack of access to income-generating opportunities and dire economic necessity, together with, in the case of women, lack of access to culturally accepted jobs (SY02).

The interplay between severe impoverishment and depletion of financial resources among many IDPs and refugees on the one hand, and shortfalls in international and national provision of humanitarian aid, both financial and in-kind, on the other, places many people in a desperate situation, in all five countries under study. It means that they may go into debt, or engage in risky coping strategies, working informally or engaging children in employment and income-generation. It prevents many people from accessing essential services such as accommodation and healthcare.
Impoverishment

Since the start of the conflict in 2011, a growing number of Syrian people have lost their homes and livelihoods and become extremely impoverished. Syrian IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Syria also have to cope with the effects of the violence and trauma that they have suffered during the war and deal with further vulnerability and abuse arising from the experience of forced displacement and degrading living conditions in the host communities in Syria.

Many households sold property in Syria in order to survive, if it had not been destroyed (LB14). According to vulnerability assessments conducted by UNHCR in 2013 and 2014, an increasing percentage of Syrian households in Lebanon are going into debt and, year-on-year, the average amount of the debt is increasing. Money borrowed is used to buy food and pay rent (UNHCR, 2013; 2014). However, certain vulnerabilities (lack of food or lack of money to buy food) tended to decrease with the time that passed from the date of refugees’ registration with the refugee agency (UNHCR, 2013), suggesting a higher vulnerability among newly arrived refugees and among those not yet registered.

Most Syrian refugees in Jordan come from poor urban and rural backgrounds, and in order to survive in Jordan, they mainly rely on financial and in-kind assistance from humanitarian aid providers, savings from the sale of properties in Syria and on income generated through informal work in Jordan. Syrian families in refugee camps or in host communities are in very precarious economic conditions, as most have now depleted all their savings due to the protracted nature of the conflict (Ajluni & Kawar, 2014; Stave & Hillesund, 2015; NRC & IRC, 2014).

As in Jordan and Lebanon, the difficult economic situation that many Syrian refugees face in Iraq and Turkey is also related to the fact that they have spent any savings they have and their properties have been destroyed, meaning that they are entirely dependent on what is available in the host communities. The Syrian city of Kobane, for example, at the Syrian-Turkish border, has been laid to waste. Informants for this research described the precarious situation of the former residents of this city who fled to Iraq and Turkey because their homes had been destroyed (IQ06; IQ02).
Provision of humanitarian aid

Issues related to the provision of humanitarian aid to IDPs and refugees arise from shortfalls in sufficient funding to meet needs and inequalities in the distribution of aid. In some IDP camps in Syria, access to humanitarian assistance has been used as a method of control and as a recruitment strategy.

Another research participant in Syria explained that, while IDPs from Aleppo and families of soldiers receive a large proportion of aid donated by UN agencies, IDPs from the Homs countryside are discriminated against since they are considered anti-regime. As a result, IDP families perceived as opposing the regime receive less assistance, becoming destitute (SY08).

Access to humanitarian aid appeared to be uncoordinated in certain Turkish cities due to NGOs’ lack of access to the Government aid agency AFAD’s refugee registration system (TR02). However, AFAD subsequently transferred the registration process to the DGMM, and developed the ‘Electronic Aid Distribution System’ accessible for national and international NGOs, which aims to resolve these coordination problems (TR48). Indeed, in Turkish cities where there is a relatively larger Syrian refugee population, information exchange and aid distribution seem to be more coordinated, with the establishment of community centres by international NGOs, and associations run either jointly by Turks and Syrian refugees or solely by Syrians (TR09; TR11; TR13). In Şanlıurfa, for instance, there are 29 unofficial humanitarian associations founded by Syrian refugees and an umbrella association, which creates a platform for all the associations, strengthening coordination among them (TR08; TR11; TR09).

For example, one of the research participants explained that while he was still inside Douma, a rural town on the northeastern outskirts of the city of Damascus, it was under siege by the regime’s armed forces. Due to the siege, prices of consumer goods increased and at the checkpoints, regime soldiers did not allow anyone to bring goods into Douma. By October 2013, there was a complete siege around the town and no one was allowed to enter or leave; the few goods available at the market reached exorbitant prices. The residents of Douma realised that tradesmen linked with the Army of Islam (Jaish al-Islam, a member of the Islamic Front), the military power controlling Douma, were storing goods and selling them to civilians at very high prices. Men and boys started joining the Army of Islam in return for salaries and in-kind assistance for their families (SY06).
On the other hand, one interviewee from Gaziantep commented that international NGOs, in particular, invest all their efforts in a particular city, such as Gaziantep, while services provided in other cities remain insufficient (TR36). The cost of aid to the Turkish Government, which has amounted to an estimated US$7.6 billion so far, exceeds the total budget allocated for the eight ministries in Turkey.54 In 2012, Turkey appealed to the UN for assistance, leading to the country’s inclusion in the UN’s Coordinated Regional Response Plans for the main hosting countries.

In Lebanon, however, decreasing cash and food assistance have caused deterioration in humanitarian conditions (LB36; LB39). Many interviewees for this research in Jordan were also concerned that the decrease in international humanitarian assistance was increasingly causing Syrian refugee families to experience livelihood security challenges (JO06; JO17; JO05). As one of the humanitarian aid providers interviewed explained (JO12), assistance from international organisations is not sufficient to meet the needs of Syrian refugee families, based on the cost of living in Jordan.

**Access to essential services**

In Turkey, access to essential services is provided to registered Syrian refugees, yet, as an interviewee pointed out, “the general vulnerability is so high that it does not cover every need” (TR30). In addition, public services, as well as law enforcement, are designed for Turkish citizens and not tailored to the needs of the refugee population, with forms in Turkish and staff who do not speak Arabic (TR28).

Accommodation issues are critical in Lebanon. Some Syrians live in small one-bedroom apartments with large numbers of people where there is no safe, private space, and women and girls can be harassed by men from other families living in the same flat. Toilets may also be shared by a high number of people (LB08). Particularly in the Bekaa Valley and Akkar, Syrians live in informal tent settlements, in regions that were already among the poorest in the country before 2011 (UNDP in Lebanon, 2012). In 2014, UNHCR estimated that there were around 240 informal settlements in the Bekaa Valley, of different sizes, from around ten tents to more than one hundred (Loveless, 2014; LB27). As of June 2015, there were more than 600 informal tent settlements in Akkar, a number that has doubled since the previous year (LB38).

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As mass evictions of tent settlements usually start with a dispute between the landowner and the community, often because the community is not able to pay the rent, the higher number of evictions carried out by landowners may also have been influenced by the worsening economic conditions of refugees. Evictions can also be ordered by the Lebanese Armed Forces, if the tent settlement is near a military installation, or by the municipality. The number of evictions increased from 2014 to 2015 (LB43). The insecurity that refugees experience due to threats of eviction is reported to increase the number of early and forced marriages, as refugees may consider that marrying off their daughters to a member of the local community will protect them in case of an eviction (LB25). Furthermore, as land rents have steadily increased since the beginning of the crisis, it is more difficult for refugees living in informal tent settlements to negotiate with landowners, who can exploit them through forced labour (LB42).

Vulnerable conditions can also be observed within the twelve official Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and in settlements close to those camps, which have received a significant influx of Palestinians from Syria. However, several interviewees for this research stressed that Palestinians fleeing Syria have often been able to reunite with Palestinian family members in Lebanon and thus to be protected by stronger family and community networks than most of the Syrians (LB10; LB18).

Access to healthcare is also a challenge, as the Lebanese health system is highly privatised. Syrians who are not registered with UNHCR either have to go back to Syria to receive healthcare, go into debt, or go without any medical care (LB26; LB38). Furthermore, some rural areas in Lebanon, as well as some parts of urban areas, are not covered by government water networks and therefore water has to be bought from private sources, or, in informal tent settlements, supplied by the landowner. Some landowners have exploited refugees in forced labour or sexually as a condition for providing water. Although the problem of scarcity of water also affects the Lebanese population, Lebanese people can put in place less risky coping mechanisms, thanks to their social networks (LB42).

In Iraq, violence was reported among refugee and IDP communities because of a lack of privacy in inadequate accommodation. One specific issue mentioned was the risk of violence at the camps because bathrooms were located far from residences in dangerous areas (IQ12).
4.2 Legal Status

As set out in the Introduction, national legal provisions apply to the residence of people fleeing the war in Syria in the host countries. These national provisions are of a temporary nature, which means that in the short-term, refugees face difficulties in renewing their status, while in the long term, they do not guarantee permanent residence and do not allow refugees to plan for or invest in their future. The legal status of Syrian refugees governs their access to humanitarian aid, essential services — including education for children —, and to regular, legal employment opportunities and methods of income generation. Indeed, a minority of Syrian refugees in the four countries have legal authorisation to work. The fact that adults work on the informal labour market, due to the availability of jobs, the size of the informal markets and their lack of legal authorisation to work, places them at increased vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking. In some cases, the remuneration for work does not take the form of a salary, but rather of an in-kind transaction, such as working in exchange for rent, or marrying off daughters at an early age in exchange for protection from eviction from land.

Syrian refugees in Lebanon, where it is assumed a high proportion are unregistered, face issues in obtaining and renewing their legal residence. Renewal is, for some individuals and families, unaffordable. A lack of registration leads to restrictions on freedom of movement and access to healthcare, among other issues (NRC, 2014). Indeed, because of the cost of the residency documents, many families prioritise the registration of only some members of the family over others (LB43). Security checkpoints restrict the freedom of movement of adult men without legal status or with limited legal status. In Akkar, an increase in ad-hoc temporary checkpoints has caused difficulties among such Syrians (LB40). Difficulties in accessing services because of limited legal status can put refugees at risk of exploitation by other refugees who are able to cross checkpoints and thus have access to services (LB07).

Regulations on the entry of Syrians and the renewal of their status in Lebanon were altered in January 2015, and the Government instructed UNHCR to temporarily suspend new registrations of refugees entering Lebanon as of 6 May 2015 (UNHCR, 25 August 2015). Syrians are now required to comply with one of a series of categories, such as tourism, study or medical treatment, in order to enter Lebanon, with no category for those fleeing conflict, apart from a “displaced”

55 Each renewal costs US$200 per adult.
category and an exceptional category (NRC, April 2015a). A news article in early November 2015 indicated that an estimated two-thirds of Lebanon’s Syrian refugee population do not currently have active legal status (Kullab, 2 November 2015).

**Palestine refugees from Syria who fled to Lebanon have even greater difficulties in terms of legal status** (Amnesty International, 2014). According to a recent needs assessment of Palestine refugees from Syria in Lebanon, by the end of March 2015, the overwhelming majority (86%) had no valid residence permit. Periodic measures to allow renewal greatly vary in their scope, are often valid for a limited period of time, lack proper mechanisms to inform the concerned public and in general, even if renewal is possible, are unaffordable for the majority of the refugees (LB45; Tatwir, 2015).

As in Lebanon, Syrian refugees in Jordan were reported to experience challenges in maintaining a regular immigration status, in the process of renewing legal registration in 2013-2014. The **lack of registration affects refugees’ access to public services provided by local government authorities, and services and assistance provided by the UNHCR and international NGOs**, because this is limited to refugees holding valid registration documentation issued by the Jordanian Ministry of Interior, as part of the agreement between international NGOs and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (JO08; JO10). Since 14 July 2014, the UNHCR has been instructed not to provide asylum seeker protection letters to Syrians who do not have proof of registration and a valid sponsorship registered with the Jordanian authorities. It is unclear how many Syrians have been affected by this new regulation (JO10). Without registration, refugees are exposed to a series of risks, including arrest, detention, forced return to the refugee camps and deportation (JO08).

The sponsorship systems for Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are particularly open to abuse. In Lebanon, the system has raised concerns that Lebanese people could exploit Syrians in exchange for their sponsorship. Some cases were reported of Syrian women marrying Lebanese men in order to have a sponsor and thus legal status in the country without being registered with UNHCR (LB28). The Norwegian Refugee Council also reported cases of potential Lebanese sponsors who asked Syrians to pay for the service (NRC, April 2015b). An NGO in Akkar reported the sexual abuse of women in exchange for assistance in obtaining legal status in Lebanon (LB36).

In 2012, the Jordanian authorities also put in place a sponsorship procedure that regulated the exit of refugees from Zaatari Camp and their settlement in host
communities. This required a refugee to find a Jordanian sponsor to take legal responsibility for the refugee’s residence and activities on Jordanian territory. The fees for the sponsorship amounted to 15 JOD per person (around US$21) (JO05; JO12; JO17). Until July 2013, any person could bail out Syrians from the refugee camp and some Jordanians made a profit by asking the Syrians to pay large amounts of money for this. In some cases, the Jordanians bailed out Syrian refugee families in exchange for being given in marriage one or more Syrian daughters or engaging in intimate relationships with them (JO03; JO05; JO12; JO13; JO22). The sponsorship system was almost completely suspended in 2015, with sponsorships completely blocked in Azraq Camp and granted in Zaatari only in very few cases recommended by the UNHCR (JO05; JO12; JO17).

Employment

In Turkey, Syrian refugees without valid passports and entry stamps did not have the legal right to work until the adoption of the Temporary Protection Regulation in October 2014, and only a small portion of non-camp refugees were able to work officially. From 2011 to July 2015, just 5,148 Syrians had obtained work permits from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (TR42), indicating that the majority of Syrian refugees who work are doing so informally (TR32; TR50; TR51). As of October 2015, the implementing by-law that would facilitate Syrians’ legal access to the labour market is still awaiting the Turkish parliament’s approval (TR32; TR43; TR44; TR50). There is no mechanism to monitor whether Syrians are paid fairly (TR02; TR50; TR51) and employers are not sanctioned for employing Syrians who do not have authorisation to work (International Crisis Group, 2014).

As of January 2015, Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in Lebanon have to sign a pledge not to work in Lebanon, which has led refugees consider the option of deactivating their registration in order to be able to work without incurring criminal sanctions (NRC, April 2015a).

The Jordanian Ministry of Labour estimated in 2013 that around 160,000 Syrians were working irregularly in Jordan (Hazaimeh, 17 March 2013). Very few refugee workers have legal employment contracts because many of them do not have valid residence and work permits. Moreover, refugees consider work permit fees very high and they can be obtained only for work in specific economic sectors (Iaria, 2014). Some Syrian refugees have been apprehended and deported by the Jordanian authorities for working without a work permit, although more recently,
refugees caught working were sent to the Azraq Camp instead of being deported (JO02). Furthermore, according to the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis (2015), international NGOs are not allowed to implement livelihoods activities and income-generating opportunities for Syrian refugees, as their engagement in regular work is considered potentially detrimental to employment and income-generating opportunities for Jordanians (ILO, 2014; 2015; JO02; JO05; JO10).

In many cases, based on qualitative information obtained through field research for this Study, it was not possible to establish whether labour exploitation or trafficking for labour exploitation was taking place. What was reported in all countries under study as a prevalent phenomenon was poor working conditions, low wages and other employment-related abuses. In addition, all of the hosting countries under study are characterised by large informal economies as a percentage of GDP. The informal economy is estimated to be even larger in the rural sector than the urban sector in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, though not in Jordan (Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, January 2012).

Table 7: Estimates of the Size of the Informal Economy in the Countries under Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>31-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfair payments, below the legal minimum wage, were reported for Syrians working in all four hosting countries under study, including differences in wage rates paid to nationals and Syrians (Amnesty International, 2014; Çelik, 3 September 2012; Kirişçi, 2014; Orhan, 2014; Öztürkler & Göksel, 2015; Today’s Zaman, 28 October 2014; TR07; TR22; TR29; TR35; TR36; TR51; JO11; IQ06; IQ12). Syrians were also subject to excessive working hours and degrading and exploitative working conditions (Amnesty International, 2014; Çelik, 3 September 2012; Kirişçi, 2014; Orhan, 2014; TR29; JO10). Syrians in the hosting countries often work without any contractual rights because they do not have legal employment contracts (JO10; Iaria, 2014; US Department of State, 2015).

56 Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, January 2012.
57 Schneider & Savaşan, 2005; Today’s Zaman, 5 May 2015.
58 Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, January 2012.
59 UNDP, Ministry of Planning & Economic and Social Council, August 2012.
60 Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, January 2012.
The sectors where these labour rights violations take place include construction, agriculture, manufacturing, services, cleaning, retail, hotels and catering, the textile and shoe-making sectors, as well as in jobs such as electricians, plumbers and carpenters (TR29; LB07; IQ06).

Some interviewees for this Study directly linked difficulties in legal status and employment authorisation for Syrians to the incidence of trafficking and exploitation. Lacking legal authorisation to work in the host countries often means that, in order to secure means of subsistence, Syrian refugees become more vulnerable to labour exploitation, since any type of work may be accepted (TR01; TR25; TR32; TR36). For example, before the new regulations were introduced in Lebanon in January 2015, social workers reported that it was easier to reach a mutual agreement with families on the issue of child labour (LB40). Limited legal status can also have an impact on Syrians’ willingness to report cases of abuse. The NGO Mosaic notes that one of the main challenges in protecting Syrian victims of sexual exploitation is that they refuse to meet the lawyer, as they lack regular residence in Lebanon (LB17). Some reports in Jordan directly link the lack of legal documentation, as well as of access to sustainable income, shelter, food and adequate medical care, to the vulnerability of Syrian refugees and the fact that some Syrian families consider “early marriage” as a way to ensure the protection of their daughters (Greenwood, 25 July 2013; UNICEF, 2014).

In Syria, the kafala or sponsorship system adopted to regulate the employment of migrant domestic workers is a factor that also increases this group’s vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation in the context of the war, because this grants their employers full control and authority over the workers with respect to work; residence permits and renewing such permits; and control over the termination of contracts. To change employer, the migrant worker needs
the approval of the current employer, and she cannot leave the country without an exit permit from the employer. If employers refuse to grant migrant domestic workers any of the permits and approvals mentioned above, the migrant has no access to legal means of disputing the decisions of the employer (SY13).

4.3 Child Protection Issues

According to UNICEF:

"[o]ver 2 million Syrian children have crossed the borders and now live as refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq" (UNICEF, September 2015).

Syrian children are affected by various issues in the hosting countries that influence their vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation, including in relation to access to education, birth registration and migrating unaccompanied, each of which are dealt with in turn here. This may lead to risky situations for children, such as child labour and early marriage, which are dealt with in the following sections. In addition, as set out in the previous two sections, the humanitarian situation and the legal residence and employment status of their parents influences children’s vulnerability.

Access to Education

Children who are not in school are generally more vulnerable to exploitation, particularly labour exploitation and exploitation through begging, as well as being subject to a violation of child rights. Both in regime-controlled and in opposition-controlled areas in Syria, there is a lack of, or an insufficient number of, functioning schools. The majority of Syrian children are therefore left with no access to education (SY01). In a situation of protracted conflict, many Syrian families’ priority is survival rather than education and therefore they send their children to work and earn money instead of sending them to school (SY02).

Though not as severe, access to education is also a major problem for Syrians in Turkey, especially for non-camp Syrian refugee children (TR02; TR04; TR10; TR12; TR32; TR50; TR52). Only 14 per cent of Syrian children outside the camps go to school, while 60 per cent of the total school-age camp population receives education in camps (International Crisis Group, 2014). The Turkish Ministry
of Education issued a circular in September 2014 to facilitate non-camp Syrian refugee children’s enrolment in public schools and to open temporary education centres. Recent numbers of non-camp Syrian refugee children attending these schools within the age cohort 6-12 vary between 110,000 and 150,000 according to different sources, while around 400,000 out of 640,000 Syrian refugee children are out of school (Afanasieva & Bektaş, 02.10.2015; Hürriyet, 29.09.2015).

In the temporary education centres established by the Provincial Directorates of Education, a ‘second-shift’ system has been put in place, whereby Turkish pupils attend classes before noon, and refugee pupils in the afternoon. The classes are in Arabic and there are also Turkish language classes (TR52). In other cities, such as Hatay, Mersin and Şanlıurfa, there are also private schools and education centres mostly run by Syrian refugees themselves. Among these schools, some are faith-based and funded by international foundations and the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia (TR12).

Factors other than the availability of school places also lead Syrian refugee families not to send their children to school, such as: the language barrier; misunderstandings about school enrolment procedures; early marriage; child labour; other economic vulnerabilities; and reluctance to register as refugees in Turkey because they do not want Turkey to be their final destination (TR30). It was also noted that, outside of the Turkish national education system, the very limited school options providing secular education is another factor leading parents not to send their children to school (TR26).

In Lebanon in 2013, it was estimated that around 300,000 refugee children were out of school (Watkins, 2013). Difficulties in coordination between donors and the Lebanese Ministry of Education have also contributed to delays in the enrolment of Syrian children in the ‘second shift’ in Lebanon. Syrian children can also be enrolled in the first shift together with Lebanese children, but their number is limited as schools can accept them only if there are available places after all Lebanese children have enrolled. In autumn 2014 a document released by the Ministry of Education required schools to request residency documents from Syrian children enrolled in the first shift. Facilitating transportation to and from school is essential even for short distances because it is not safe for Syrian children to walk home alone after attending school during the ‘second shift’ (LB26).

As many Syrian pupils lack proper documents to register in national exams in Lebanon, an organisation in the Bekaa Valley transported children to and from Syria to take national exams. Although the intentions of this organisation may
have been positive, it is of concern that other such organisations could promise something similar with the intention of exploiting the children (LB26).

Similarly to Turkey, the main reasons for lack of enrolment in school or school dropout include: transportation costs; economic needs of the family and related child labour; fear of girls being harassed on their way to school or in schools; lack of perception of school as important or useful by parents; difficulty in enrolling Syrian children at Lebanese schools; and the different curriculum, different teaching languages (Syrian children are not used to classes in English or French) and discrimination (LB26; LB40).

In Jordan, the period of Syrian refugee children’s detachment from schooling varies between 3 and 5 years, depending on their geographic area of origin in Syria and the date of their arrival in Jordan. A large proportion of the Syrian children in Jordan come from the governorate of Dera’a in the south of Syria, and before finding refuge in Jordan, they had spent a number of months or years in conflict-affected areas in Syria where they did not have access to education. They therefore arrived in Jordan already behind in their schooling compared to Jordanian children of their age (JO06; JO15).

Also in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, there is a lack of availability of school places to provide education to refugee and IDP children (IQ12). Language may also be a barrier there, as instruction is generally in Sorani Kurdish, while Syrians speak Arabic or Kurmanji Kurdish.

**Birth registration**

Together with lack of access to education, another factor that violates child rights and leaves children more vulnerable to exploitation is lack of birth registration. This is an issue that should particularly be taken into account in relation to the resilience of children born in Syria and the hosting countries since the outbreak of the war to exploitation and trafficking in the future. In the UNHCR database in mid-2015, **around 37,000 children were recorded as born inside Syria without birth registration**. They may be registered in the family booklet, do not have personal identity documents (JO17).

As the Turkish President recently stated at a press conference, around 60,000 Syrian babies have been born in **Turkey** since the start of the population movement from Syria (Haberler, 05 October 2015). The risk of a lack of birth registration and
statelessness for some of these newborn babies makes them vulnerable, and may also create problems, especially for single mothers, in the registration process for temporary protection status in Turkey (Reynolds & Grisgraber, 2015).

The high number of babies born to Syrians in Lebanon, whose birth has not been registered, also raises concerns there. Indeed, when a baby is unregistered, it is more difficult to seek international protection on her/his behalf, to access basic services and to avoid the threat of statelessness. In 2014, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) assessed that 92% of Syrian refugees interviewed were not able to complete the necessary steps to register the birth of their children in Lebanon (NRC, 2015), while UNHCR estimated that around 75% of children born in Lebanon to Syrian parents do not have birth registration (Gatten, 23 May 2014). The NRC assessment also found that a significant obstacle in birth registration was the lack of legal residency in Lebanon, as set out in the previous section, which makes refugees fear travelling and having contacts with local authorities. One of the coping mechanisms used is to travel back to Syria to register the birth there (NRC, 2015). The fact that many Syrian children and Palestinian children from Syria in Lebanon do not have their birth registered sparks concerns that it might be easy to falsify their birth registration in order to facilitate illegal adoption (LB13), as well as a higher risk of child labour, sexual exploitation and trafficking (Gatten, 23 May 2014).

Also among Syrian children born in Jordan, around 4,700 babies do not have birth certificates and notifications, so UNHCR is trying to contact their parents to find ways to address this problem. The births of children without birth registration who were born in Syria and taken to Jordan can only be certified by the competent Syrian authorities. Being outside of Syria, refugees do not have access and direct communication channels with those authorities. As in Lebanon, there is also a concern in Jordan that the high number of unregistered births amongst Syrian refugees could become a factor leading to the trafficking of children for the purpose of illegal adoption (JO17; JO13), among other forms of child trafficking.

**Separated children**

Refugee children who are identified as unaccompanied in Turkey are referred to the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, and sent to the special section in the Sariçam camp in Adana (TR46). For those children whose status is uncertain, the family tracing and reunification process takes place while the children are in the camp (TR46; TR47). There are, however, currently no statistics available on this issue.
The Syrian crisis has created an emergency situation in **Lebanon** in relation to unaccompanied and separated children who cross from Syria into Lebanon. Another concern is related to border controls of family ties, in cases where a child is crossing the border with an adult (LB39). To cope with separated children arriving in Lebanon, international organisations and NGOs have discussed the possibility of placing them with families of the same community, something that some NGOs consider potentially dangerous. Himaya, for example, a child rights NGO, warns that it has been observed that children taken into foster care from other families may be treated in a different way to biological children, and in some cases foster families have exploited foster children (LB22). Badael also underlined in an interview for this research that being a foster child in a situation of scarce resources can be a danger for the child as far as exploitation is concerned (LB06). Although there are low numbers of identified unaccompanied Palestinian refugee children from Syria in Lebanon, there are higher numbers of separated children living with extended family members, and related concerns that these children face higher risks of child labour, school dropout and early marriage (LB45).

In 2014, there was a concern about a large number of Syrian girls arriving in **Jordan** alone or accompanied by the families of their fiancés (JO17). The Senior UNHCR Protection Officer in Jordan explained that unaccompanied children are either identified by the Jordanian authorities at the border or at the registration centre in Raba’a Al Sarhan managed jointly by UNHCR and the Jordanian authorities. They are then registered as either separated or unaccompanied children and they are placed in specialised reception areas in Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps, managed by the International Rescue Committee. The children remain in these areas until the UNHCR and its partners find family members of the children or alternative foster families. Despite the fact that in Jordan, according to **Shari’a** law, legal adoption is not allowed, in July 2014, alternative foster care procedures were formalised and endorsed by the Ministry of Social Development (JO17).
There were also reports of separated Syrian children arriving to Jordan and to the refugee camps accompanied by relatives, neighbours and family friends not related to the children. This is a coping strategy not just for the families, but for the entire community, whereby in situations of displacement refugees from the same communities tend to stay close together as a way of mutually protecting and taking care of each other (JO10; JO02). However, there may be challenges when official documents need to be provided for the child to enrol in school and to have access to other services (JO10; JO13), and in certain cases the situation may not be in the best interests of the child.

4.4 Child Labour

According to UN Women, the more the situation of displacement is prolonged, the greater the likelihood of higher rates of child labour for boys and early marriage for girls (UN Women, 2013), as we will see in the following sections. UNICEF estimates that one in ten Syrian refugee children in Syria’s neighbouring countries is engaged in child labour, some of whom may be subject to trafficking for that purpose (UNICEF, March 2014). The principal reason for Syrian children’s involvement in work in the host countries under study, cited by research informants in all of these countries, was restrictions on Syrian adults working, as well as restrictions to the movement of Syrian adults within those countries and discrimination in the employment of Syrian adults.

Syrian refugee children were reported to find it easier to get odd jobs in Turkey, whereas it is harder for the adult members of the family to find a job due to prejudices against them and difficulties obtaining official work permits (TR26; TR27; TR32). Similarly, in Lebanon, the movement restrictions that adults are subject to due to the lack of, or limitations of, their legal status in Lebanon, lead families to send their children to work in exploitative jobs that require traversing areas that would be dangerous for adults who have to pass through security checkpoints (LB21). Also in Jordan, Syrian adult refugees are not allowed to work in most professions. In order to avoid being caught and arrested, the parents, legal guardians and caregivers of children send them to work and earn money to support the family, as they know that the Jordanian labour inspectors and other authorities tend to be more lenient with Syrian refugee children and women when they are apprehended as working irregularly (JO02; JO03; JO06; JO11; JO22).
Syrian children work in many different sectors in the hosting countries, but particularly in agriculture (TR04; TR18; TR28; LB27; ILO Jordan, February 2014). However, one interviewee considered it relatively safer for a child to work in agriculture than in other jobs, as children working in agriculture usually do so in the company of family members (LB38). Syrian refugee children also work on the streets selling tissues and other small items, as car mechanics, in industry, and in restaurants and bakeries (TR04; TR07; TR13; TR18; TR28; TR32; TR33; LB07; LB09; LB11; LB19; LB21; LB36; LB37; JO15). In the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, children have also been observed collecting scrap iron or plastic items from rubbish bins (LB09). Syrian refugee children employed inside the Azraq camp to work for Jordanian construction companies build prefabricated shelters, contracted by international service providers funded by the international community (JO05), while Syrian children in Turkey also work in construction (TR13; TR32). In Lebanon and Jordan, Syrian children work in shops and car washes, and at outdoor markets (LB07; LB09; LB11; LB19; LB21; LB36; LB37; JO15). Other sectors mentioned were tailor’s shops in Turkey, and shoe-shining, cleaning and trades such as electricians, painters, plumbers or carpenters in Lebanon (TR13; TR32; LB07; LB09; LB11; LB19; LB21; LB36; LB37).

The type of work that Syrian refugee children engage in at Azraq Camp in Jordan includes helping in the family business, and working for others, performing a range of activities such as transporting by wheelbarrow, loading and carrying goods and water, preparing food and beverages to be sold at the local camp market (mainly girls) and street vending (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2015). Taking advantage of the fact that children are considered to accept lower wages, some employers in Jordan are reported to hire and exploit several working children for the same amount that they would pay to hire a single adult worker (JO15; JO06; JO12).

Boys are particularly affected by involvement in child labour. In Adana in Turkey, for example, girls constitute the larger proportion of pupils registered at temporary education centres for Syrian refugees, because school-age boys usually work as apprentices or on farms, and even those boys who are enrolled at schools do not attend regularly. When teachers ask some of the boys why their hands are covered in bruises, they state that they work after school, some as young as 12-13 years old (TR52). Other interviewees confirmed that a significant proportion of Syrian boys over 12 in Turkey work (TR12; TR18), and a crucial observation shared by several interviewees is that child labour is tolerated by the host community (TR04; TR12; Meeting TR24). Also in Jordan, more boys than girls are involved in child labour. In addition, most boys aged 9-14 years and most
Targeting Vulnerabilities

girls are accompanied by their families, while older boys aged 14-17 can be found working unaccompanied (JO07; JO15). A recent assessment of child labour in Zaatari Camp found that working children there were mainly boys aged 7-17 years (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2015).

In 2007, the ILO conducted a national child labour survey in Jordan and estimated that there were 33,190 working children at national level (JO07). Since the Syrian refugee crisis, however, the incidence of child labour in Jordan is much higher, according to an interviewee from ILO. Furthermore, while in previous years the age of working children was usually 14-17 years, currently it is possible to find working children as young as 12 years old (JO07).

Child labour is also reported to be widespread among Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, with 63% of children living in an urban context working and 30% of children in the camps involved in child labour. The explanation given by a research informant was the lack of access to Arabic-speaking schools and the fact that the families are unable to pay for their children’s needs and school expenses, leaving children outside of education and more vulnerable to child labour and worst forms of child labour, as well as child trafficking (IQ15).

Child Begging

The phenomenon of begging among both adults and children has increased in many parts of Syria and in the host countries under study, related to internal and cross-border displacement. Reports from Syria indicate that begging in the country, particularly involving children aged 6 and up, has significantly increased since the beginning of the conflict (Al Souria Net, 14 April 2015; UN News Centre, 2 July 2015). According to the limited available evidence, mainly IDP children living in regime-controlled camps are affected, as their families receive insufficient assistance from the UN through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other local NGOs operating in regime-controlled areas (SY08), as set out above in section 4.1.

In the Dera’a governorate of Syria, both local people from Dera’a and IDPs from other parts of the country beg, including children. They can be found mainly in towns and larger villages, begging on the streets, at local markets and in front of mosques, particularly on Fridays. Giving alms to people begging can be interpreted in Muslim communities as zakat or sadaqa, spending a portion of one’s wealth for the benefit of the poor or needy, which is one of the five pillars of Islam.
children are exposed to insults, harassment and abuse from both armed men and civilians. This type of begging is not organised by a criminal network, but is a negative coping mechanism in order to generate income to survive in a situation of violence, lack of work opportunities and extreme poverty (SY12).

Also in Turkey, the increasing visibility of children begging is frequently reported outside of camp contexts, particularly in Gaziantep and Istanbul, and those involved are assumed to be Syrian (TR30). However, it was also mentioned that begging among Turkish people has increased since the arrival of Syrian refugees, posing as Syrians (TR09; TR17). Where children are involved, they are usually in the company of adults and other children, or in a group of children, and rarely unaccompanied (TR07).

In Lebanon, Alabaster and Saker (2012) reported that while before the Syrian conflict, Syrian children in Lebanon begged during the summer and went back to school in Syria in the autumn, now they stay in Lebanon and beg all year round. Research published in 2015 found that almost 61% of street-based children had come to Lebanon during the Syrian crisis, the vast majority of them (96%) Syrians. Only around 18% of Syrian street-based children lived in Lebanon before 2011. According to the same research, most street-based children are boys (around 70%) (Save the Children, ILO & UNICEF, 2015). An interviewee for this Study confirmed that the majority of children working on the streets in Beirut are Syrian; few, if any, cases of Lebanese children in this situation were reported (LB11; LB38).

Begging is also reportedly on the increase in Jordan, especially among children, as well as women and people with disabilities (JO20; JO19). As in cases of child labour, because of Syrian adults’ lack of access to the regular labour market in Jordan and their fear of being arrested, detained and deported by the Jordanian authorities, some Syrian parents send their children to beg to sustain the rest of the family. There is a general awareness that the Jordanian authorities tend to be more lenient towards children detected working or begging (JO12). As well as begging, some Syrian children sell small items like chewing gum near mosques, at traffic lights and in front of shops on main streets, with chewing gum sold at a price several times higher than its actual market value (JO20; JO12).

Other reported groups involved in begging in Jordan were Syrian refugees with disabilities, both men and women, whose limbs were amputated following injuries in Syria due to mines, rockets or barrel bombs. They often travel to Jordan in order to receive medical treatment from international aid organisations, but the available
assistance is not sufficient. (JO11). This type of begging is not considered organised and they are not part of a large criminal network, usually begging individually or as family units (JO20).

4.5 Early Marriage

As set out in the Introduction, child marriage in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq is legal for certain age groups and regulated, according to the respective Personal Status Laws for different religious communities. The rates of child marriage in the countries under study, as a percentage of all children, are set out in Table 8 below.

Table 8: Rates of Child Marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children under 15</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All children</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While some research interviewees claimed that early marriage was already common in certain areas of Syria before displacement, research has shown that displacement has also had an impact on this phenomenon. The most relevant impact of displacement has been the decrease in the age of children – mostly girls - from close to eighteen years old to a younger age.

In certain communities in Syria, early marriages are culturally and religiously accepted. Early marriages are mostly observed in large, poor, conservative Syrian families from the countryside, who marry their daughters off as a way to relieve the family from the responsibility of providing for an extra family member, especially because having an unmarried daughter of what is considered marriageable age in the house is seen as socially unacceptable (SY12). As we have seen in the Introduction, despite the fact that the *Shari’a Qadi* (judge) has the power not to authorise a marriage in Syria if the girl is younger than 15 years old, most of the time due to the family’s will, the religious authorities authorise such early marriages, regardless of the will of the child bride (SY08). Girls and young women who have lost their husbands in the conflict become more vulnerable as the lack of a male
breadwinner requires them to go out of the household and find alternative income-generating opportunities (SY12).

There is no official statistical data on the extent of early marriages in Turkey, since these are mostly conducted as religious rather than civil marriages (UNICEF, 2011; UNFPA, 2014). Existing studies indicate that early marriages in Turkey are reinforced by various factors, including poverty, ‘honour,’ domestic violence, illiteracy, social, religious and cultural pressures (Öztebe & Biçer, 2013; UNICEF, 2011a). Experts from the Ministry of Family and Social Policies commented that forced and early marriages are often not reported, due to general lack of awareness and cultural acceptance (TR46; TR47). Early marriages among Syrian refugees frequently take place in Turkey, both for cultural and economic reasons (TR02; TR08; TR13; TR14; TR16; TR17; TR32; TR33; TR43; TR48). With particular reference to Şanlıurfa, early marriages not only take place among Syrian refugees, but also among Turkish people, especially living in rural areas. (TR08).

An AFAD report indicates that 14% of Syrian girls in Turkey aged 15-18 years are married (AFAD, 2014). This has prompted both the Turkish authorities and UNHCR to engage in awareness-raising campaigns concerning early marriage, including public meetings with refugees and distribution of brochures (TR28). As noted in the Girls Not Brides Platform, a UNHCR survey conducted in 2014 found that the average age of marriage for Syrian refugee girls in Turkey was between 13 and 20, and many respondents asserted that ‘if they had money, they would not have resorted to marrying off their daughters at such a young age’.62

Also, through unofficial marriages, Syrian refugee women and girls sometimes become the second or third wives of men (TR13; TR32; TR08; TR43; TR47; TR49; TR50; TR51). Other research informants also confirmed an increase in polygamous marriages since the arrival of Syrian refugees – where a Syrian refugee woman or girl becomes the second wife of a Turkish man – especially in the early years of the war, though this is now in decline (TR08; TR21).

Despite the fact that the official statistics do not register an increase in early marriage in Lebanon (Hartlaub, 22 September 2014), all interviewed informants working on this issue in the country stressed a significant increase in early marriage since the start of the Syrian crisis. They also noted an expansion in the geographical areas in which this phenomenon takes place. Indeed, before the Syrian crisis, early marriage was concentrated in rural areas including the Bekaa Valley and

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Akkar regions (LB07) and in Palestinian refugee camps (LB18), and the girls were mainly Lebanese and Palestinians from Lebanon. With the settlement of Syrians in different parts of Lebanese territory, this phenomenon has extended beyond specific areas of Akkar and the Bekaa Valley and is particularly frequent where there is a high density of Syrians.

KAFA, an NGO that works specifically on the issue of early and forced marriage in the Bekaa Valley, has noted through conversations with mothers of child brides that they would not have married off their daughters so early in Syria, but economic needs forced them to do so in Lebanon. Many of the mothers of child brides were child brides themselves in Syria, and they are critical of this practice, but they admitted to being left with no other choice for their daughters (LB25). Research conducted by Harvard University came to the same conclusion, as refugee communities indicated that while early marriage is common in rural areas of Syria, in Lebanon marriages occur even earlier than in their home communities and that the marriage rate among the Syrian population in Lebanon is higher than the marriage rate among the general population in Syria (Harvard School of Public Health, 2014). It is common for Syrian girls to be married to Syrian men within the same community (LB25). However, economic reasons can also push families to marry off their daughters to men outside of their community, as they might feel that a Lebanese man would be better able to protect the girl than a Syrian who is also experiencing the hardships of displacement (LB08).

There is also evidence indicating that the Syrian war and related refugee displacement have exacerbated existing pressures on girls in relation to early marriage in Jordan (UNICEF, 2014). According to data compiled by UNICEF Jordan (2014), early marriages involving Syrian girls, compared to early marriages involving Jordanian girls and Palestinian girls from Jordan, are on the rise. For the same period, the UNICEF data show a significant increase in the proportion of girls under 18 among all Syrian brides, from 12% in 2011, to 18% in 2012, further increasing to 25% in 2013 and to 32% in the first quarter of 2014 (UNICEF, 2014).

The UNICEF Child Protection Specialist interviewed for this research in Jordan stressed that the legal context with respect to marriage and birth registrations creates the space for possible exploitation and abuse of the rights of refugees (JO22). The UNHCR faces a dilemma when advocating for the registration of early marriages, but given that some of these marriages result in new births, in some instances documentation of early marriage is considered the best option in order to avoid the vulnerable status of the babies born to the couple, who otherwise would remain without a legal status in the Jordanian legal context (JO17).
Also in Iraq, there is a perception that early marriage will protect Syrian girls from difficult living conditions (IQ05). In February 2014, the Iraqi Parliament attempted to pass the “Ja’fari Law”, which would have allowed marriages involving girls as young as eight years old. International and national organisations considered this proposed law a violation of human rights and child rights and it was not passed (IQ05). However, it indicates a high level of tolerance of forced marriages involving very young girls.

### 4.6 Gender-Based Discrimination and Violence

Gender-based discrimination, as well as sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), is an issue of concern for Syrian refugee women and girls in all of the hosting countries under study, as well as in Syria itself. This is exacerbated by a reported reticence in seeking help from the authorities in such cases. Also, in Syria, once women or girls have been involved in prostitution particularly, it is difficult to leave because in their local communities they are unable to find alternative work and income-generating opportunities, particularly if people are aware of their involvement in prostitution (SY02).

In a survey conducted in Turkey, most respondents were not willing to openly discuss these issues (Mazlumder, 2014). Indeed, interviewees who contributed to the research for this Study raised similar concerns with reference to sexual exploitation of Syrian refugee women and girls (TR02).

The situation is similar in Lebanon, where an NGO that manages shelters for SGBV victims noted that women usually seek their help because of physical violence, and it is only after spending some months in the shelter that some of them might also report sexual abuse (LB29). This may be linked to the fact that perpetrators are often family members, and another NGO considered it very difficult for women and girls to discuss family members as potential ‘dangers’ to them (LB37).

A research informant in Iraq also considered that SGBV cases were generally underreported because of social barriers and vulnerabilities affecting women (IQ12). In addition, in Iraq, women who have suffered sexual harassment and rape do not report these crimes to the authorities or other organisations because they are afraid they would risk honour killing by their own family. It is posited that, after natural causes, honour killings are one of the leading causes of death for women in Iraqi Kurdistan (Dosky, 17 March 2013).
Despite this reticence in speaking up, widespread sexual and gender-based violence in the countries under study was indicated by many of the interviewees for this Study as a factor increasing the vulnerability of girls and women to trafficking (SY12). One specific group of seven Syrian refugee women, consisting of university graduates and university students, were held captive in Syria and sexually abused or raped by the regime soldiers. Indeed, the added vulnerability of women and girls who have been raped or sexually abused before leaving Syria should be noted. On arrival in Turkey, women and girls have reported sexual proposals from men in Turkey, which make them feel unsafe and isolated (TR23). Domestic violence is also frequently observed among both camp and non-camp refugees in Turkey (AFAD, 2014: 26).

With particular reference to female non-camp refugees in Turkey, women with no professional qualifications or experience and limited education may also be more prone to abuse when faced with financial difficulties, since migration and conflict increase risks and exacerbate the vulnerability of such women. A recent AFAD report recommends providing financial support to female non-camp refugees and encouraging the enrolment of female camp refugees on the vocational training courses available at camp premises (AFAD, 2014).

One interviewee in Lebanon related the incidence of SGBV cases to stress caused by, among other factors, severe financial problems (LB29), which is a very frequent situation among Syrian refugees in the host countries, as set out in section 4.1. Inadequate and overcrowded accommodation also exposes women and girls to sexual harassment (LB08). Another factor influencing SGBV in displacement is mental illness affecting former combatants, which can, in some cases, lead to domestic violence (LB10).

The absence of an adult male family member or relative increases the vulnerability of Syrian women in Jordan, particularly female heads of a household, as they cannot find work in host communities due to social norms regarding women working. Close to one third of all Syrian refugee households in Jordan are female–headed and tend to be large, with an average of five children per household (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2015).

68% of Syrian refugee women surveyed by UN Women in the KR-I in Iraq reported that they knew someone who had been abused, while 82% lived in a daily fear of abuse or aggression, and because of that, 35% reported not being allowed to leave home without an escort. Syrian refugees who have survived SGBV can be referred to shelters run by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). However,
they can only access the shelter after first reporting their case to the police (UN Women, 2014).

The local NGO Democratic and Human Rights Development Centre (DHRD) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) reported that since the beginning of the Syrian crisis they have dealt with a total of 22 cases of rape. In addition, they dealt with 28 cases of sexual harassment (IQ04). The Kurdistan Human Rights Commission, also interviewed for this Study, detected 28 cases of families who suffered from violence, 20 of which involved girls being sexually harassed. There were also many cases in which husbands assaulted their wives through marital rape and physical assault (IQ12). Issues were also identified in terms of the treatment of Syrian refugees by the local community, especially for Syrian women, who reported harassment and verbal abuse (UN Women, 2014).

Despite constitutional provisions on anti-discrimination, one interviewee in Turkey also commented that lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) Syrian refugees are in a vulnerable position, since there is no comprehensive anti-discrimination legislative framework guaranteeing LGBT rights in Turkey. The interviewee’s association has provided assistance to several LGBT refugees and put them in touch with local LGBT communities (TR32). Also in Lebanon, a research informant considered that people belonging to the LGBT community, and especially transgender people, are subject to social stigma and exclusion, making it difficult for them to find jobs and rent accommodation, which can lead them to become involved in prostitution (LB29). They may also be ostracised by their families and subject to homophobic and transphobic bullying (LB17).

In Lebanon and Iraq, people with mental disabilities are also considered to be vulnerable to sexual abuse, both male and female, because they are often not able to talk about the abuse. Syrian refugees with disabilities were not a focus of aid programmes until 2015, which has put them in a worse socio-economic situation than that of other Syrians (LB41; IQ05; IQ06).
4.7 Anti-Trafficking Response

As examined in the following chapter, very few cases of trafficking of Syrian IDPs and refugees have been identified by the competent authorities in the five countries under study. Particularly in the area of identification of trafficked people, the necessary referral mechanisms are still under development at national level. In addition, many Syrian refugees are reluctant to report crimes that they have suffered, such as trafficking, to the police, for social and cultural reasons. This reluctance is also related to the fact that for certain forms of trafficking, a victim who reports to the authorities may be considered criminally responsible, instead being protected as a trafficked person. They may also make themselves liable to punitive measures due to working without the proper authorisation, a common situation, as examined in section 4.2 above. As Harroff-Tavel & Nasri (2013) stressed, current legislation and practice in Syria and neighbouring countries offers trafficked people only limited redress and much more needs to be done in order to identify and convict traffickers and to ensure victims’ access to adequate protection and assistance.

In Turkey on the other hand, the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) has included a partner NGO, translators and psychologists in the identification process of trafficked people, which is regarded as a positive step towards protection (TR41; TR49). It is expected that anti-trafficking efforts will gain momentum through a more active role by the DGMM’s central and provincial organisation and the forthcoming ratification of the Council of Europe Trafficking Convention, which will be followed by the adoption of new action plans (TR47; TR49).

In Lebanon, however, there is no national protection strategy for victims, in spite of initiatives carried out by NGOs, and particular difficulties were reported in finding a shelter for victims. Once victims have been identified, the provision of a place in a shelter is not automatic, because shelters have different criteria and sometimes there is no place available. If there is no place at a shelter, victims are kept in detention until the case is settled (LB35; LB48). A local NGO in Akkar is advocating for a higher number of shelters in that region (LB36).

Similarly, the interviewee from the Jordanian Anti-Begging Unit explained that although the anti-trafficking law is in force, its enforcement is still weak and cases of begging in particular are not generally recognised as cases of trafficking. He added
that the Anti-Begging Teams have difficulties in distinguishing between simple begging cases and begging cases that present elements of human trafficking (JO20). In addition, Jordanian labour inspectors find it difficult to access large farms to monitor labour exploitation, due to the complex politics characterising Jordanian rural communities, based on community and clan relations. If the owners of the private farms belong to important clans, the Labour Inspectors are reluctant to seek access to the farms and conduct inspections of labour exploitation or child labour. The Ministry of Labour continues to encourage the inspectors to conduct inspections on all the farms, but a lack of human resources also complicates their work (JO07).

Also in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the fact that there are no systematic identification and monitoring tools for human trafficking cases in place, combined with the lack of Kurdistan Regional Government legislation on human trafficking, leaves people vulnerable. Although Iraq passed an anti-trafficking law in 2012, as set out in the Introduction, the KR-I had not yet approved it at the time of writing. In addition, Iraq in general still lacks the capacity to enforce the anti-trafficking law, and is particularly in need of training and workshops to introduce it to the different levels of the executive and judicial authorities in order to detect, monitor and combat trafficking (IQ12).

While it is not possible to determine to what degree, many trafficking cases may be prosecuted as violations of labour or immigration laws, prostitution or begging. In such cases, there is a high risk that a trafficked person is held criminally responsible for something they were coerced or deceived into doing, violating the non-punishment principles of anti-trafficking legislation.63

Because prostitution is illegal in Syria, women and girls trafficked for the purpose of exploitation in prostitution are often treated as criminal offenders and risk being arrested, detained and/or deported, in the case of foreign citizens, instead of being protected as victims of trafficking. Arrests and threats of deportation or of sending unaccompanied children to refugee camps are used by police officers in Hatay, Adana and Gaziantep in Turkey to deter Syrian people who beg (TR17; Meeting TR24; TR29).

The Director of the NGO ARRD Legal Aid in Jordan explained that refugee women and girls involved in prostitution are usually identified by the Jordanian authorities

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63 See, for example: OSCE, Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (2013). Policy and legislative recommendations towards the effective implementation of the non-punishment provision with regard to victims of trafficking. Vienna: OSCE. SEC.GAL/73/13.
as people who have committed a criminal offense, rather than being considered as potential trafficking victims. In light of this, whenever Legal Aid receives a case of a refugee exploited in prostitution, they do not try to defend the refugee by applying the category of trafficking victim, because the application of the anti-trafficking law is still minimal and there is a high chance of them losing the case. Instead they are referred to the UNHCR Legal Unit, guaranteeing a higher degree of protection for the defendants. As far as the Director was aware, none of the suspected trafficking cases referred to the UNHCR were presented to the court as human trafficking cases (JO24).

Like in Syria and Jordan, girls and women in prostitution are generally prosecuted under the prostitution paragraph of the Iraqi Penal Code, as judges and police officers are not aware that they could be dealing with trafficked people (IQ17). Another interviewee in Iraq mentioned challenges due to the lack of a referral system for trafficking cases, and that often somebody who is working irregularly and subject to labour exploitation is fined under Residency Law No. 28, rather than recognising the person as a victim of exploitation. The trafficking law foresees a temporary residence permit and other assistance for trafficked people, but this is not applied in practice (IQ16). Based on focus group discussions with Syrian refugee women in the KR-I, UN Women indicated that those who mentioned sexual exploitation taking place were not willing to provide more details, as “they knew of families who had complained about other issues being deported to Syria” (UN Women, 2014: 6-7).

4.8 Lack of Migration Alternatives

Restrictive legal entry routes to the European Union are also a factor increasing Syrian refugees’ vulnerability to trafficking, as well as increasing their vulnerability to human rights violations perpetrated by migrant smugglers, and other dangers experienced en route outside of the region. As highlighted by an interviewee, ‘Rather than granting refugee rights and providing settlement, they implement more restrictive measures to protect their borders’ (TR38). Because Syrian refugees have the right to seek recognition as Convention refugees in the European Union, but not to travel regularly to EU countries, they are dependent on migrant smugglers to facilitate the trip.
Some Syrian refugees in **Turkey**, particularly highly-skilled Syrians who cannot work in their field there, decide to travel to the EU to apply for asylum (TR38; TR50), taking life-threatening risks in order to travel. One interviewee assumes that traffickers are part of the smuggling process, since it is possible that people are trafficked to Europe for commercial sexual exploitation, or other forms of trafficking, under the guise of migrant smuggling (TR38). They pay around US$1,000-2,000 to migrant smugglers to reach Europe by sea or overland (Oruç, 5 August 2015).

Since August 2015, the Turkish authorities have adopted new measures to curb irregular crossings via the Aegean Sea. The governorate of Izmir, for instance, has established checkpoints at the city’s entrance in order to identify especially Syrian refugees who are planning to leave Turkey by irregular routes, and to send them to camps before they attempt to do so (Yıldırım, 12 August 2015). The southern port province of Mersin has recently become a hub for irregular border crossings by sea involving smugglers (Meeting TR40; TR38).

According to the Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2015, cargo vessels have been increasingly used to smuggle people from Turkey to Italy since September 2014. The analysis also confirms Mersin as a principal point of departure for Syrians being smuggled to the EU:

> “Wooden boats [...] have departed from various points along south-eastern Turkish coast such as Mersin, Adana and Hatay provinces to reach cargo vessels waiting off shore. [...] This means that the criminal networks might be financing other criminal activities by exploiting and putting at risk vulnerable groups of displaced families from Syria” (Frontex, 2015: 21).

**Lebanon** can also be a transit country in Syrians’ attempts to reach Europe (Sherlock & Malouf, 14 November 2013). Usually, the migration route from Lebanon to Europe is via Turkey for Syrian citizens and by air to Sudan, continuing overland to Libya for Palestinians from Syria, as it is difficult for them to obtain a visa for Turkey.

The vulnerability of **Iraqi IDPs**, according to one research interviewee, is also affected by their desire to emigrate outside the region, for example, to the EU, USA or Canada. This may lead to a willingness to migrate irregularly. Smuggling networks are benefiting from this situation by smuggling Iraqi people outside of the region in return for large sums of money, reportedly up to US$5-10,000. A research informant reported that many of these Iraqis are then exploited either by the smugglers or by business owners in the country of destination (IQ12).
4.9 Impact on the Host Communities

As there are few prospects of a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Syria, it is unlikely that refugees will be able to return in the near future. This also has an impact on host communities in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Lebanon is particularly affected, due to the high percentage of its current population that is composed of Syrians and Palestine refugees from Syria, though certain areas in southern and southeastern Turkey and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as well as northern Jordan, also accommodate high numbers of Syrians relative to the local population. This has implications for the local labour markets, prices of consumer goods, political and security issues, and aid, which may also have an impact on the vulnerability of Turkish, Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi populations, and other refugees and migrants, to trafficking in persons. According to an article in Forced Migration Review (2014: 19), hosting communities of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries have both the potential to benefit from the presence of the Syrian communities, and are subject to certain vulnerabilities as a result.

Given that population growth rates among Syrians since their arrival in Turkey have been higher than the growth rates of the Turkish population as a whole, the labour markets and social characteristics of the host cities and towns have been significantly affected. Kilis, for instance, had experienced a population increase of 30% by 2013, while more populous cities such as Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa had experienced an increase of more than 6% (AFAD, 2013). Moreover, extra strain on the existing healthcare facilities of the host communities in southern Turkey is estimated to have resulted in an additional patient load of 30-40 per cent (UNCHR, 2014b).

Local communities in Lebanon also reported increases in food prices, because of the increase in demand and the damage to the local economy caused by smuggled goods from Syria. The increase in demand for accommodation also increased rents (World Vision, 2013). Focus groups and interviews conducted by World Vision (2013) among local communities hosting Syrian refugees showed that while Lebanese women and girls showed sympathy for Syrians subject to abuse and early marriage because of their vulnerable situation, they also expressed concerns about a ‘moral decline’ among host communities, driven by the presence of a significant number of vulnerable refugees.
Cheap labour has become an issue of tension in places where there the Syrian population is concentrated in Turkey, such as Akçakale, Viranşehir and central Urfa, because it is perceived to lead to Turkish people being paid less, losing their jobs or being unable to find work (TR08; TR22). A report on Syrian refugees by the research institute ORSAM confirms the possibility of a significant wage rate decline, especially in informal sectors, due to the increased labour supply since the arrival of Syrian refugees (Öztürkler & Göksel, 2015).

Like the situation in Turkey, Syrian refugees are concentrated in some of the poorest areas of Lebanon. A sudden expansion of the labour market supply has pushed down wages for both Lebanese and Syrians. Education and health services that were inadequate before are now further stretched. According to Loveless, tensions between refugees and host communities are increasing because, among other things, many Lebanese perceive that all aid is allocated to the Syrians (Loveless, 2014). A report published by World Vision (2013) underlines that, according to members of the host community, Syrians do not have to pay taxes, and are given food vouchers and support for accommodation, so they can afford to work for lower wages than the Lebanese. Several interviewees stressed that the possibility for employers to exploit Syrians with impunity is making it harder for Lebanese to find jobs due to competition with Syrians, which increases unemployment among Lebanese people. However, the official unemployment rate actually only rose from 6.2% in 2012 to 6.5% in 2013.64

Accessing employment in refugee-hosting areas was already difficult before the refugee crisis, and now the availability of a cheap workforce has made the job search even more competitive (Loveless, 2014). In regions such as Akkar and Tripoli, which were already poor before the Syrian crisis (LB36) and have since welcomed high numbers of refugees, job competition with Syrians is an issue, and there is a fear that Lebanese child labour could increase as a result. Nevertheless, there is a lack of statistical evidence on employment and the labour market to support this. In spite of these effects on the host communities, however, Thibos (2014) stresses that Lebanese workers in the Bekaa still earn double the income of their Syrian counterparts, although salaries are below the minimum wage. Although no interviewee for this research had come across cases of trafficking of Lebanese people caused by their deteriorating economic situation, their vulnerability should raise concerns for future cases of trafficking.

As an interviewee from Adana in Turkey comments, Syrians there have not caused resentment because it is a province affected greatly by internal migration movements, so they were easily incorporated into society (TR07). Meanwhile, the Syrians’ arrival appears to evoke sectarian concerns among some other host communities, such as in the province of Hatay, where more than a third of the local population is of Arab Alawite descent (Memişoğlu & Ilgít, 2015). In August 2014, violent incidents and protests targeting Syrian refugees in Gaziantep were reported, following the killing of a Turkish landlord by his Syrian refugee tenant. Two research informants mentioned allegations after the murder that the tenant had killed his landlord due to the latter’s sexual proposal to the tenant’s wife or daughter (TR32; TR36).

Given the political interconnections between Syria and Lebanon, the Syrian crisis has exacerbated the sectarian divisions that were already present in Lebanon. Sunni/Alawite tensions are especially acute in the north, while clashes between Sunni and Shia groups also took place in the Bekaa Valley (Van Vliet & Hourani, 2012). From July 2013 to April 2014, Lebanon experienced around thirteen car or suicide bombings (Thibos, 2014), and the worst violence since the end of the civil war was experienced in November 2015 when bombings claimed by Da’ish killed over 40 people in Beirut. Especially in the coastal area of Akkar, where Sunni and Alawite populations coexist, there have been reports of abductions, in some cases for political reasons. Thanks to connections at border crossing points, it can be relatively easy for militants with strong links to the Assad regime to cross the border and smuggle abducted people into Syria (LB39).

Besides sectarian tensions fuelled by the Syrian crisis, tensions between the Syrian and the Lebanese communities are also growing for both political and economic reasons. Human Rights Watch reports an increase in violence by private Lebanese citizens in the wake of the clashes in the city of Arsal in the Bekaa Valley, in August 2014, after Lebanese soldiers were executed by Nusra Front militants (Human Rights Watch, 2014b). A general fear among refugees of expressing their political opinions has been observed in the south of the country, where refugees are tightly controlled by Hezbollah, the Lebanese authorities and other groups (LB19).

Nevertheless, one interviewee observed that the situation has improved since the Lebanese government drafted the first Crisis Response Plan, as the Lebanese

population felt less ‘forgotten’ by the government, and especially important was the change in aid strategy of the international community, who started to also focus on vulnerable Lebanese people in their programmes (LB42). Nevertheless, OCHA and REACH estimated that between 170,000 and 200,000 Lebanese families would fall below the poverty line by the end of 2014 as a result of the Syrian refugee influx (OCHA & REACH, 2014).
As analysed in the previous chapter, the effects of the war and refugee crisis, which have placed people affected in a situation of increased vulnerability to trafficking in persons, have indeed, in some cases, resulted in actual trafficking cases. This has not, however, as set out in section 5.2 below, manifested itself in a significant increase in the identification of trafficking related to the war and refugee crisis by the relevant authorities in the countries under study. The nature of the research methodology for this Study, and the limitations of what it was possible to examine, did not allow for the definitive categorisation of all of these potential trafficking cases as constituting trafficking in persons, which, in any case, may only be established by state authorities. Therefore, this chapter presents and analyses indications that, due to a strong possibility that trafficking took place, cases would merit further investigation in order to protect trafficked people and hold traffickers responsible, if the trafficking act and purpose are established, in the case of children, and the act, means and purpose are established, in the case of adults.

The analysis in this chapter is informed by sets of indicators of various forms of trafficking in persons developed by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2013) and the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2009), together with relevant international legal frameworks as they apply to certain forms of trafficking, such as forced marriage (section 5.3.2), child labour exploitation (section 5.3.4) and exploitation in armed conflict (section 5.3.7). As UNODC points out in its Human Trafficking Indicators leaflet:

“Not all the indicators [...] are present in all situations involving trafficking in humans. Although the presence or absence of any of the indicators neither proves nor disproves that human trafficking is taking place, their presence should lead to investigation” (UNODC, 2013).

This conceptual framework is presented in Graph 6 below. Graph 6 should be understood in conjunction with Graph 5 at the beginning of the previous chapter, in order to understand how in certain specific cases, situations of vulnerability to trafficking in persons can present indicators of actual trafficking cases, which, in turn, on further investigation by the relevant actors in each of the countries under study, may be determined to constitute the crime of trafficking in persons. Due to weak reporting and investigation of many of these situations that present indicators of trafficking, some of the information analysed in this chapter is of necessity anecdotal. Where the information is of an official, confirmed nature, this is indicated.
5.1 Trafficking Routes

People officially identified as trafficked in the countries under study since 2011 are mainly from Syria, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, though in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, as well as Syria, national citizens were also identified as trafficked internally. Refugees from Syria in the host countries are frequently internally trafficked without significant geographical movement, beginning in the host countries rather than before departure from Syria. This means that the fact of being displaced plays a major role in their vulnerability to trafficking, as examined in chapter 4. Far fewer cases were reported by interviewees for this Study where the trafficking process began in Syria, with the purpose of moving a person to a host country in order to exploit them. Also within Syria, internally displaced people and other people affected by the conflict are generally trafficked internally. On the other hand, most of the trafficking routes originating outside of the region continued largely unaffected by the Syrian war.

Note: for more information on the indicators applied, see: UNODC (2013). Human Trafficking Indicators and ILO (2009). Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Persons.
Most trafficking cases identified by the authorities in **Turkey** continued to be cross-border, for sexual exploitation, with the main countries of origin during 2009-2013 being CIS countries: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Russia, as well as Georgia (ICMPD, 2013). According to the US State Department *TIP Report*, in 2014 Turkey identified potential trafficking victims – mainly of sexual exploitation - from Central Asia and Eastern Europe, as well as Syria (US Department of State, 2015).

A larger proportion of officially identified victims in **Lebanon** are from Syria. As set out in chapter 2, between 2010 and 2012, the origins of detected victims in Lebanon were: 40 from Syria, six from Eastern Europe, six Lebanese, six from other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and three from other countries (UNODC, 2014a). During the years 2011 and 2012, a total of 54 victims of trafficking were identified by the authorities, of which by far the largest proportion – 35 victims – were Syrian. The other main nationalities of victims were Lebanese (internal trafficking), Ukrainian and Moldovan (ISF data cited in: ICMPD, 2013a). Several cases came to the attention of the authorities in Lebanon of Syrian girls who were trafficked from Syria to Lebanon, by means of forced or fraudulent marriage to Syrian men, to be sexually exploited in prostitution (LB05; LB48). Syrian women and girls from Aleppo were trafficked to Lebanon for sexual exploitation, both before and since the war (LB23), and one girl was kidnapped in Syria and sexually exploited in prostitution in Lebanon by means of temporary marriages (LB45). A case was reported, though it was not possible to verify it with more than one source, in which a girl was forced to travel back and forth between Syria and Lebanon for the purpose of exchanging messages between allied armed groups in Syria and Lebanon (LB29), a form of exploitation in armed conflict.

Trafficking victims in **Jordan** assisted by the Jordanian Women’s Union during 2009-2013 were largely from outside the region: from Bangladesh (20), East Asia (7) and other South Asian countries (6), as well as 9 people from other parts of the Middle East (9) (UNODC, 2014a). However, there was a significant increase in trafficking victims from Syria officially identified in Jordan during 2013 and 2014, as well as in those from Egypt, in the context of an increase in numbers of trafficked people identified overall, as the Counter-Trafficking Unit (CTU) began to be operational. The majority of those identified were from Egypt, Bangladesh, Syria and Jordan (internal trafficking), while the other victims were from other South Asian countries, Southeast Asia, East Africa, Yemen and Tunisia (see Graph 7 below). In terms of nationality, the victims in 2013 and 2014 were: 69 Egyptian men; 38 Bangladeshi women; 24 Syrian women and 1 Syrian man; 15 Jordanian men and 10 Jordanian
women; 14 Filipina women and 4 Filipino men; 13 Indonesian women; 12 Sri Lankan women; 10 Ethiopian women; 8 Kenyan women; 5 Indian men; 4 Yemeni men; and 1 Tunisian man – see also Graph 7 below (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015).

Graph 7: Identified Victims in Jordan, 2013-2014

Cases were also reported in which people involved in migrant smuggling from Syria to host countries engaged in trafficking. One research informant received a number of reports of abuse and exploitation by facilitators of internal movement and migrant smugglers in Syria, both the smugglers who facilitated crossings at unofficial BCPs in Tal Shihab and Tiba in the western part of the border with Jordan during the earlier years of the war, and the Syrian Bedouin groups transporting people through the eastern Syrian desert to Ruwashid later on in the conflict. Some Syrian refugees reported that when they refused payment for smuggling or transportation, they were threatened at gunpoint by Syrian Bedouin facilitators who forced them to pay all the money they had in order to be taken to Ruwashid. Rival Syrian Bedouin groups reportedly compete over the route to Ruwashid and have started kidnapping prospective refugees for ransom, in order to prevent other Bedouin groups from doing business with them (JO11).
In one case, a Syrian woman reported directly to an interviewee for this Study in Jordan that she was forced to have sex with a migrant smuggler in Tal Shihab in Syria, in exchange for being helped to cross into Jordan. The woman was smuggled into Jordan in mid-2013, she did not have enough money to pay for her smuggling journey and the smuggler exploited her need to reach Jordan to persuade her to have sex with him as a payment. The interviewee believes that there were more cases like this, but Syrian refugee women and girls are reluctant to report the abuses that they suffered to the authorities for fear of being stigmatised in their own communities (JO11).

One interviewee for this research had witnessed first-hand how a family crossed the Syria-Lebanon border on a truck with the assistance of migrant smugglers, who had seized the family’s passports in Syria. Once they reached Lebanon they were exploited by means of debt bondage, in order to repay the debt they had contracted with the smugglers. The interviewee described this as a “common phenomenon”, both for the purposes of labour and sexual exploitation (LB33). The irregular migration route to EU countries by flying to Sudan and continuing overland through Libya, typically used by Palestinians from Syria and Lebanon, is also a route for trafficking for organ removal, as there are accounts of this happening in the Western Desert between Sudan and Libya (LB18).

5.2 Extent of Trafficking

The question of the extent of trafficking in the countries under study since early 2011 is of central concern to this Study. Official statistics on trafficking cases identified by the authorities would suggest a minor or negligible impact of the Syrian war on trafficking in all five countries. However, the desk and field research conducted paints an entirely different picture. The caveat here is that all of the potential trafficking cases identified through the research, other than the official statistical data, have not been determined by law enforcement or state social services to be actual trafficking cases. Nevertheless, based on trafficking research methods, indicators and elements of adult trafficking and child trafficking crimes have been analysed in order to shed light on the significant proportion of trafficking cases that have never come to the attention of the responsible authorities.

There are many reasons why the authorities have not been involved. In Syria, and, to a lesser extent, Iraq, the exigencies of war, together with the disintegration of
the Syrian State and of rule of law in that country, render the collection of reliable data extremely problematic. While data collection and identification of trafficked people in the hosting countries under study has in some cases improved since the baseline period, particularly due to the passing of dedicated anti-trafficking laws and other legislative and institutional reform, challenges persist. Many of the reasons for the partial and patchy data and information on the extent of trafficking highlighted in section 2.3 above still apply.

Furthermore, many research informants pointed to reasons why trafficked people would not report their case to the authorities or seek help from government institutions, including:

In addition, as in other regions of the world, official statistics on crime, and particularly on trafficking in persons, do not reflect the full reality of the phenomenon as it occurs on the ground.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2014* provides data on trafficking in the MENA region for 2010-2012, giving an insight into routes and forms of trafficking, based on official identification by the authorities, as described in Section 2.2. It is notable that relatively little intra-regional trafficking and internal trafficking is identified in the MENA region. Also, the authorities identified very few trafficked children and few perpetrators who are nationals of the countries in which they are identified:

“Just 11 per cent of the persons convicted in this subregion come from the country where they were convicted; a share that is largely made up of North Africans, rather than Middle Easterners” (UNODC, 2014: 82).

This points to the authorities’ focus on identification of foreign perpetrators of the crime and of adult victims. Only 5 per cent of all victims detected were children, and a far higher proportion (37.5%) were adult males than in all the other regions that the UNODC report covers (UNODC, 2014).

While before the outbreak of the conflict, the Syrian authorities had started to implement a national anti-trafficking strategy (US Department of State, 2009; 2010), since 2011, the regime has not released official figures on trafficking in persons. Ongoing fighting and restrictions on access by humanitarian organisations also make monitoring the numbers and humanitarian needs of Syrian IDPs very difficult (Charron, 2014), and consequently also the gathering of data and information on trafficking in persons.

Research informants in Turkey indicated that despite the presence of factors that make Syrian refugees vulnerable to trafficking (see chapter 4), few trafficking cases involving Syrians have been officially recorded and the shelters have not assisted trafficked Syrian people since the beginning of the refugee crisis (TR01; TR49; TR50; TR51). According to the NGO HRDF, since no trafficking cases among Syrians had been referred to the organisation when they were consulted for this research in January 2015, it is difficult for them to assess the incidence of trafficking among this group (TR37). Experts from the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) stated that they have not observed an increase in trafficking since the arrival of Syrian refugees. The DGMM provincial officers and law enforcement agencies have been investigating suspected incidents of trafficking of Syrian refugees reported in the media or in NGO reports, but their investigations did not identify any specific trafficking cases (TR41).
Indeed, according to a number of interviewees for this research in Turkey, there has actually been a sharp decline in the number of identified victims of trafficking since 2010 (TR01; TR37; TR45; TR46; TR49; TR50). A general lack of awareness about forms of trafficking other than sexual exploitation, especially labour exploitation of adults and children, and forced marriages involving children, also contributes to the low number of identified victims (TR37; TR44; TR45; TR46; TR47; TR49; TR50; TR51). No data is available for Turkish people identified as trafficked (ICMPD, 2013). The prosecution of forms of trafficking like child and adult labour exploitation, exploitation through begging and illegal adoption is very rare, and there is a general lack of awareness of internal trafficking in Turkey (TR45; TR46; TR47). Turkish judges and prosecutors who are not familiar with the crime of TIP are reluctant to prosecute on the basis of Article 80 (trafficking) of the Criminal Code, and so if the case involves elements of forced prostitution or child exploitation, judges often sentence the perpetrator(s) on the basis of Article 227 (prostitution) and Article 103 (child molestation), rather than investigating for evidence that would also constitute a violation of Article 80 (TR45; TR46; TR47).

A lack of institutions for protection may also be a factor influencing the fact that there are few court decisions on trafficking in persons in the North District of Lebanon. This points to the importance of awareness-raising, especially for civil society. In addition, continuous training for the judiciary is particularly important, also given that the anti-trafficking law is relatively new (LB47).

Since 2010, data on trafficking in persons in Jordan has been gathered more systematically, and the National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee is in the process of developing an inter-agency referral mechanism in order to define the role of each governmental and non-governmental stakeholder in identifying, investigating, prosecuting and convicting trafficking in persons offenses (JO19; JO21). However, the Jordanian government “acknowledged that it had difficulty tracking human trafficking cases as they passed from the police and the labor inspectorate to the court system and social services” (US Department of State, 2014: 1).

In Iraq, the identification of trafficking, particularly for sexual exploitation, is considered by informants as likely to be low, due to societal norms in relation to speaking up about sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in general. According to one interviewee, people in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) often consider that reporting the case will not improve their situation, and, in the case of Syrians, that no one will help them because they are refugees (IQ15). According to UN Women:
Impact on Human Trafficking in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq

“in KRI, underreporting of violence against women and girls, inefficient data collection and management, stigmatisation of GBV survivors and inadequate service provision for survivors make it impossible to obtain precise information on the prevalence of GBV crimes” (UN Women, 2014: 3).

Some estimates are available on the extent of trafficking in Syria since the outbreak of the war. In April 2015, at a press conference during a workshop on trafficking organised by the Syrian Ministry of Interior in Damascus, the Minister of Interior, Hassan Maruf, stated that trafficking in persons has increased since the beginning of the conflict, particularly highlighting Syria as a country of origin for trafficked people. The Minister offered an estimate of around 1,000 cases identified in 2014, involving vulnerable IDPs and refugees exploited by criminal networks working in partnership with Syrians operating inside Syria (Qiblan & Hammoud, 2 October 2015). The Syrian government has therefore acknowledged an increase in trafficking, although it is unclear how the Minister arrived at the figure of 1,000 - since 2011 most Syrian anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking capacities have been focused on combating arms trafficking rather than human trafficking, and the State has lost control of large areas of national territory and of most official and unofficial BCPs (Torres, 2012; Charron, 2014; Al-Abed, 17 July 2014). In his public statement, the Minister did not mention any cases of human trafficking perpetrated by elements of the regime armed forces or pro-regime militias involved in the conflict.

Some of the trafficking taking place within and from Syria is directly related to the conflict. There is evidence that several hundred Syrian children and children of non-Syrian members of armed groups in Syria (“foreign fighters”) have been recruited and trained as child soldiers by different armed groups involved in the conflict, with or without the knowledge and/or consent of their family members (Avaneesh, 16 July 2015; Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2015). During the second half of 2014, between 3,500 and 5,500 Yazidi women and girls were kidnapped and trafficked by Da’ish militants in Syria and Iraq for the purpose of sexual slavery, as well as forced marriage and hostage-taking for ransom (The Guardian, 9 June 2015; Callimachi, 3 August 2015). Also, a research report found that around 62,000 injured Syrian civilians and military personnel were transported for treatment across the border to Turkish hospitals, where the organs of as many as 15,600 were removed and the bodies were sent back to Syria (Blough, 8 February 2014; Beri, 6 April 2015; Qiblan & Hammoud, 4 April 2015).
The total number of **292 convictions in Turkey under Article 80 (trafficking in persons)** of the Criminal Code during the period 2011-2013 is much lower than those under Articles 227 on prostitution (50,665) and 103 on child molestation (58,450), as was also the case during 2009-2010. Based on convictions under Article 80 during 2009-2013, the composition of trafficked people was 74% foreign and 26% Turkish (TR45). While it is not possible to know what proportion of these prostitution and child molestation cases involved elements of trafficking, based on information from many research informants in Turkey, it is likely that some of them did.

The number of foreign people officially identified as trafficked in Turkey fell from 82 in 2011 to 55 in 2012 and 11 in 2013 (ICMPD, 2013). While data on officially identified victims are not disaggregated by gender, data on potential victims of trafficking indicate they are overwhelmingly female. No men or boys at all were considered potential foreign victims of trafficking in 2013 (ICMPD, 2013). However, there has since been an increase in the numbers of trafficked people identified (TR49).

**During the years 2011 and 2012, a total of 54 victims of trafficking were identified by the Lebanese authorities** (ISF data cited in: ICMPD, 2013a), while according to UNODC, between 2010 and 2012, 61 victims of trafficking were identified in Lebanon. UNODC gives the number of trafficking investigations as 6 in 2011 and 10 in 2012, and the numbers of victims of trafficking identified were 23 women and 5 girls in 2011, and 23 women and 5 girls in 2012, all trafficked for sexual exploitation (UNODC, 2014a).

**In 2014, there was a dramatic increase in the number of trafficking investigations, prosecutions and convictions in Jordan**, as show in Table 9 below. Prior to that year, UNODC cites the Jordanian Anti-Human Trafficking National Committee’s figures, giving the number of trafficking investigations in Jordan during 2011-2013 as 58, and the number of people investigated during that period as 76 males and 19 females. The number of victims of trafficking identified was 76 females and 78 males (UNODC, 2014a). This latter figure is unusual, indicating that more males than females were identified as trafficked in Jordan in 2011-2013, bucking the international trend where females dominate as trafficking victims. For 2012 in Jordan, the US State Department cites the Public Security Directorate (PSD) as recording 21 trafficking investigations: 19 for forced labour – including 3 for domestic servitude - and 2 for sexual exploitation. The Jordanian Ministry of Justice recorded 8 trafficking prosecutions in 2012 and no convictions (US Department of State, 2014).
The Jordanian Counter-Trafficking Unit (CTU) compiled detailed statistics of TIP cases that it identified and investigated during the period 1 January 2013 - 30 June 2015, which it kindly shared for this Study. It is of note that no victims or suspects from Syria were identified during the first half of 2015, as compared to 21 Syrian victims and 11 Syrian suspects identified in 2014, and four Syrian victims and four Syrian suspects in 2013. However, these cases do not provide enough evidence to determine the nature of the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on TIP in Jordan (JO21), also given the absence of statistics and active identification by the authorities prior to 2013.

The Head of the Research and Statistics Department at the CTU explained that prosecutions by the specialised court take on average two years, meaning that a significant number of cases referred to the court since January 2013, which is the date when the CTU started operating, are still under prosecution. From January 2013 to June 2015, the Jordanian Public Prosecutor prosecuted 94 cases as trafficking, involving 272 victims (174 female and 98 male) and 191 suspects (149 male and 42 female). Throughout 2013 - June 2015, no trafficked children were identified (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015). The former Head of the Counter-Trafficking Unit explained that since 2013, the Unit has been very active in identifying, investigating and referring TIP cases to the Public Prosecutor, and as a result, the number of identified cases has progressively increased in line with the capacity of the Unit to expand its operations at a national level, as well as growing societal awareness about trafficking (JO21; JO18).

From 2014, due to more intensive campaigns and awareness-raising, the Iraqi Federal Ministry of Interior start to receive and refer human trafficking cases to the courts, which include cases of sex trafficking, and trafficking for labour exploitation of Indians and Bangladeshis. However, as in Turkey, no officially recorded trafficking cases involve Syrian refugees (IQ17). However, during 2014, the international NGO Heartland Alliance recorded a total of 29 cases

### Table 9: Trafficking Statistics: Jordan, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigations</th>
<th>Prosecutions</th>
<th>Suspects</th>
<th>Convictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>311</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>115 (91 male, 24 female)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
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*Source: US Department of State, 2015.*
of trafficking among refugees and IDPs in Iraq. Of those 29 cases, 24 were child trafficking for labour exploitation, mainly through begging, while the other cases were sex trafficking (IQ13).

Based on fieldwork conducted during the second half of 2013 on Syrian refugees in the KR-I, UN Women concluded that teenage girls were experiencing fears of forced marriage, women outside of camps were experiencing high levels of sexual harassment by employers and by taxi drivers en route to and from work, and there was an awareness of women and girls involved in prostitution and sexual exploitation both inside and outside camps (UN Women, 2014). This is confirmed by UNHCR in Iraq:

“Field visits and discussions with stakeholders confirm that SGBV is a main protection concern among Syrian refugees. Specifically highlighted are the risk of domestic violence, sexual violence, forced/child marriage, honor killing, prostitution and survival sex, and trafficking” (UNHCR, 2014a).

In addition, one international organisation, which requested to remain anonymous, has identified around 1,000 SGBV cases, including sexual exploitation, sexual harassment, domestic violence and early marriage (IQ15), though it is not clear what proportion involved trafficking. Through interviews with research informants working on SGBV and protection programmes in Iraqi Kurdistan, it was clear that they anticipate the continuing of the trafficking phenomenon, as the number of vulnerable people in the KR-I increases (IQ07; IQ13).

5.3 Forms of Trafficking

In the countries under study, the majority of people officially identified as trafficked during the period 2011-2015 were trafficked for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude – particularly sexual exploitation in Turkey and Iraq; and domestic servitude in Lebanon and Jordan. As mentioned above, those identified as trafficked were mainly from Syria, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, though in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, national citizens were also identified as trafficked internally. Women were particularly identified as trafficked for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude, while men were more commonly identified as trafficked for labour exploitation. Very few children were officially identified as trafficked during the impact period in the countries under study.
Of the estimated 1,000 trafficking cases in Syria in 2014 mentioned by the Minister of the Interior, around 400 were for sexual exploitation. The other forms of trafficking mentioned by the Minister included: forced marriage of Syrian IDP and refugee women and girls, who were also subjected to sexual exploitation; exploitation of children in armed conflict by non-state armed groups; sex slavery in the areas controlled by Da’ish inside Syria; and trafficking for the removal of organs transiting through Turkey, with Israel as the final destination (Qiblan & Hammoud, 2 October 2015). However, as mentioned above, it is clear that this is a selective and politically-motivated interpretation of trafficking in Syria, as compared to the forms of trafficking identified through research for this Study.

Government data for the years 2011-2013 in Turkey show that the vast majority of officially identified victims had been trafficked for sexual exploitation, though there were also a few cases of labour exploitation. Of 148 victims of trafficking identified during 2011-2013, 145 were trafficked for sexual exploitation, and 3 for labour exploitation. There were no identified victims of any other form of trafficking (data from the Foreigners Department and the National Police cited in: ICMPD, 2013).

The Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre’s shelter for trafficked people assisted a majority of victims of sexual exploitation during the period 2011-2012 (60 people), as well as 40 people trafficked for domestic servitude and 37 people trafficked for forced labour. However, official statistics from ISF for 2011-2012 recorded only trafficking for sexual exploitation, both of adults and children (ICMPD, 2013a). For the first time in 2013, the US TIP Report mentions the trafficking for sexual exploitation of Syrians who have fled to Lebanon (US Department of State, 2013). In 2014, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Justice, trafficking for sexual exploitation in prostitution was the second most common form of human trafficking in terms of the number of victims identified, after child trafficking for labour exploitation (LB47).

The Jordanian Counter-Trafficking Unit provided detailed, disaggregated trafficking statistics for this research, providing an insight into forms of trafficking and profiles of victims. All nine cases considered as trafficking by the Jordanian Public Prosecutor during the first half of 2015 were for domestic servitude. 53 trafficking cases were referred for prosecution in 2014, comprising 34 cases of domestic servitude, 10 of sexual exploitation and 9 of forced labour. During 2013, there were 17 cases of trafficking for domestic servitude; 4 for labour exploitation; 3 for sexual exploitation and 3 for removal of organs (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015). The former Head of the CTU explained that the forms of trafficking that the Unit has dealt with most since its establishment in January 2013 are domestic servitude
and labour exploitation, either involving migrant domestic workers or other migrant workers employed in factories (JO21).

In the CTU statistical data, it appears that all the victims and perpetrators of TIP identified by the CTU and referred to the Public Prosecutor during 2013 and 2014 were adults. The gender breakdown of identified victims in Jordan during 2013 and 2014 was as follows: of domestic servitude 104 women and 32 men; of labour exploitation 58 men and 7 women; the victims of sexual exploitation were 48 women and one man; and of removal of organs 7 men (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015).

An overview of trafficking cases referred to the Iraqi Central Committee on Counter-Trafficking (CCCT) during the period April – September 2015 and shared for this Study shows a preponderance of cases of trafficking for the sale of a child, as well as cases of organ trafficking, some of which may involve trafficking for organ removal – see section 5.3.10 below. In some cases of organ trafficking, it was not clear whether trafficking in persons was involved (IQ17).

Characteristics and profiles of traffickers, such as nationality, gender, occupation and educational level, differ according to the type of trafficking, which in some cases correlate with a specific occupation, gender or nationality. It was more difficult to identify this type of information for this Study than to identify the profiles of victims of different forms of trafficking.

While no specific information on perpetrators was available for Turkey, research informants noted that the changing profiles of traffickers and their methods of operation make both the trafficker and the victim identification process more difficult (TR01; TR37; TR49; TR51). While the means and _modus operandi_ used in different forms of trafficking are analysed below, in general, these elements are considered to have altered since the beginning of 2011, with less physical and more psychological violence, such as paying higher wages initially or paying the victims to prevent them from complaining; having different traffickers accompany victims at all times; transferring victims frequently from one city to another; as well as threatening to kill or kidnap members of their families. Traffickers reportedly resort less to withholding of passports or deprivation of liberty (TR01; TR37; TR49; TR50; TR51).

Nevertheless, according to a social worker from Antalya Family Counsellors Association (AFCA), traffickers have become more powerful and wealthy through establishing complex organised networks, which in almost all cases involve
traffickers from Turkey, traffickers from the country of origin of the trafficked person, and numerous facilitators who transfer the victims, and act as intermediaries between the traffickers and the victims. Some traffickers are the owners of a hotel where exploitation takes place, rendering it difficult to identify trafficked people as their details are not registered with the hotel. According to the same interviewee, traffickers have also familiarised themselves with the legal framework on trafficking in order to ensure that they can avoid prosecution (TR51).

In relation to perpetrators in Lebanon, UNODC gives the number of people investigated for TIP as 11 males and 8 unknown gender in 2011, and 7 males, 9 unknown gender and 1 female in 2012 (UNODC, 2014a).

Of a total of 168 trafficking suspects recorded by the Jordanian CTU in 2013 and 2014, 106 were Jordanian men, 12 Jordanian women, 11 Syrian men, 8 Bangladeshi women, 7 Bangladeshi men, 6 Egyptian men, 4 Syrian women, 4 Sudanese men, 3 Sri Lankan women, 2 Indian men, 1 Saudi Arabian man, 1 Palestinian woman, 1 Kenyan woman, 1 Indonesian woman and 1 Filipina woman. 64 were aged over 41 years, 58 were aged 31-40 years, and 46 were aged 18-30 (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015).

However, beyond the statistics on trafficked people and suspected traffickers identified by the authorities is the information and data obtained and analysed for this Study on the exploitation and trafficking of children and adults, which has not come to the attention of governmental anti-trafficking authorities. Based on the research findings, the following forms of trafficking were identified in the countries under study, and each is dealt with here in turn.

- Sexual exploitation in prostitution
- Forced marriage
- Labour exploitation
- Child labour exploitation
- Domestic servitude
- Exploitation through begging
- Exploitation in armed conflict
- Sexual slavery and forced marriage by Da’ish
- Illegal adoption
- Organ removal
- Exploitation in criminal activities
The order in which they are examined here does not necessarily reflect their relative prevalence. However, it does reflect the extent to which data and information was available through this research on each form of trafficking identified.

Graph 8: Forms of Trafficking in the Countries under Study, 2011-2015

5.3.1 Sexual Exploitation in Prostitution

Syrian women and girls were trafficked for sexual exploitation in the countries under study. As in the other countries under study, prostitution in Syria is illegal and women and girls exploited in prostitution face the risk of being detained and/or deported by the Syrian authorities (Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013). Syrian women originally from rural parts of the Suweyda governorate, Qamishli district in Hasakah governorate, and Rural Damascus (Rif Dimashq) were reported as engaged in prostitution, though interviewees were not able to provide any further information about the profiles of the women, nor on whether they engaged in sex work voluntarily.
or were being forced by traffickers and exploiters (SY05; SY08; SY09). One research informant for Syria, however, described the sexual exploitation of young Syrian women aged 18-25 from impoverished local families or IDP communities in Dera’a governorate, who were trafficked by a married couple who befriended them and then convinced them to engage in prostitution at the couple’s house. The young women and their families were accommodated with other Syrian IDPs at local schools in Dera’a (SY12).

Trafficking for sexual exploitation of Syrian women and girls was also reported in neighbouring Turkey, in the southern provinces of Hatay and Şanlıurfa, where Syrian refugee communities are concentrated. Alleged incidents of trafficking for sexual exploitation of camp and non-camp Syrian refugees frequently appear in the Turkish media (Acarer, 18.01.2015; 04.05.2015; Alp, 10.04.2014; Evin, 27.01.2014; 28.01.2014), though these were not verified by the Turkish authorities.

The sex industry in Hatay has grown since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, and newly opened coffee and shisha shops run by Syrians in secluded districts of Hatay, such as Yenişehir district, are the locations for price bargaining for sex with Syrian women (and possibly also girls) between traffickers and pimps – who are mostly Syrian – and sex buyers. Rent can be expensive in Hatay, and, according to one research informant, some local landlords offer their houses for free if a woman agrees to prostitution, with the landlord receiving financial gains from this (TR21). An NGO field worker, in an interview for this research, also spoke of a Syrian refugee man forcing his wife into prostitution (TR26), and similar claims were made with reference to ‘men selling their wives’, who were supposedly also selling sex with their wives back in Syria (TR11; TR13).

In the city of Şanlıurfa, according to an NGO field officer, based on observations at the only nightclub in that city, whereas a few years ago sex workers and women exploited in prostitution were mainly Russian and Ukrainian, they are now almost exclusively Syrian women in their early 20s. Although no first-hand information on trafficking for sexual exploitation of camp refugees in Turkey was obtained through interviews conducted for this Study, one informant commented that as a result of rumours of trafficking and sexual exploitation, Syrian people are reluctant to go to certain refugee camps, especially to Akçakale in Şanlıurfa province, one of the oldest and currently the largest tent refugee camp in Turkey (TR12).
Polygamous marriages between Turkish men and Syrian women and girls have also been observed (TR21) and may be forced marriages and/or are used as a means to exploit women and girls. One interviewee noted the existence of

“networks of ill-intentioned people telling the Syrians that they will arrange marriages for them – of course, not for good purposes – and in the end it would turn into a form of exploitation” (TR08).

This interviewee shared the case of a Syrian refugee father, who gave his consent to a man who wanted to marry his daughter, thinking that he could thereby ensure her future prospects. A few days after the marriage, the daughter left and returned to her father’s house, since her husband had made proposals to her involving some form of commercial sexual exploitation (TR08).

Syrian girls came to the attention of the Lebanese authorities, who, having gotten married to Syrian men in Syria, were then brought to Lebanon to be sexually exploited in prostitution. The men threatened to reveal their activities to their families in Syria if they tried to seek help (LB05; LB48). While either regular or forced marriage may have been present in these cases, the main purpose of exploitation was sexual exploitation in prostitution (see section on Forced Marriage below). Syrian girls from Aleppo were trafficked to Lebanon for the purpose of sexual exploitation both before and since 2011 (LB23), and one case of a girl kidnapped in Syria and forced into prostitution in Lebanon by means of temporary marriages was reported (LB45). Syrian women and girls who are already in Lebanon when they start to be exploited are, in some cases, moved away from their area of residence when forced into prostitution (LB23).

Other cases of trafficking of Syrians for sexual exploitation in Lebanon included a Syrian man who trafficked girls for 5,000 LBP (around US$3) per encounter, reported by the Lebanese NGO Himaya (LB22), and Saleh, who reports that in 2014, two criminal networks exploiting Syrian women and girls at seaside resorts in Wadi al-Zaina in Mount Lebanon and Kfar Abida in the north of the country were dismantled by the ISF. In Mount Lebanon, a Syrian man and his Lebanese wife had been sexually exploiting four women, while in the Kfar Abida case, there were six victims, some of whom were girls (Saleh, 13 March 2014). Unconfirmed reports indicated that unaccompanied Syrian women and Palestinian women from Syria were provided with accommodation in exchange for their sexual exploitation both
in Akkar and in Ayn al-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp (LB34; LB37). However, it was not possible to verify this with other sources.

As in Şanlıurfa in Turkey, Syrian women exploited in prostitution are now seen in nightclubs and tourist areas in Lebanon, where before the war Eastern European and North African women engaged in sex work and were sexually exploited. However, there is a distinction in that Syrian women sexually exploited in prostitution at nightclubs do not hold an “artist” visa, and therefore are not under the supervision of the General Security. Sexual services from these women also reportedly cost less than from Eastern European women (LB32). Commercial sexual exploitation often occurs in nightclubs situated in Jounieh, north of Beirut. Interviewees also mentioned rumours concerning brothels in Tripoli (LB17), but it was not possible to confirm this information. Tourist resorts situated in the coastal region attract more commercial sex during the summer, when many tourists from GCC States spend their holidays in Lebanon (LB23). Indeed, the prostitution industry in Lebanon is so easily accessible that many people mistakenly believe prostitution to be legal, even though, as set out in the Introduction, prostitution is de facto illegal in Lebanon due to the non-issuance of brothel licences (Jabbour, 2014).

Some Syrian men and boys are also sexually exploited in prostitution in Lebanon. The Lebanese NGO Mosaic, which works with the LGBT community, reported that since 2011, around 80% of the cases of sexual exploitation that they have come across involve Syrians, and 90% of these, in turn, involve Kurdish Syrians. Syrian men and boys involved in prostitution are often not themselves homosexual, according to the same NGO (LB17).

The numbers of boys and men sexually exploited in prostitution in Lebanon has increased; NGOs working with men and boys engaged or exploited in prostitution estimate that “thousands of men” are now involved (Du Verdie, 14 February 2014). In addition, those currently working in or exploited in prostitution are from poorer economic backgrounds than before 2011. There were far fewer Syrian LGBT people in Lebanon before the war and they had less difficulty finding jobs, so they were less likely to end up in prostitution (LB32). As male tourists from GCC states represent a significant number of those going to Lebanon to buy homosexual sex, the increase or decrease in this kind of sexual exploitation may be affected by political unrest in Lebanon and thus its relative attractiveness for this group of sex tourists (Du Verdie, 14 February 2014).

Indeed, the 2011, 2012 and 2013 US TIP Reports mentioned Syrian women and girls trafficked to Lebanon for the purpose of sexual exploitation, including by means
of forced or early marriages, as well as sex trafficking of Syrians within Lebanon (US Department of State, 2011; 2012; 2013). The most recent 2015 TIP Report mentions the trafficking of Syrian, as well as Lebanese, children for commercial sexual exploitation; of Syrian women for commercial sexual exploitation; and of LGBT refugees for sexual exploitation (US Department of State, 2015). It should be noted, however, that the TIP Reports classify all forms of prostitution as sexual exploitation.

In June 2015, at the time of the fieldwork for this Study, the Jordanian CTU had limited data on the extent and dynamics of the trafficking of children for sexual exploitation, although some cases of trafficking of Syrian girls for sexual exploitation had been identified and referred to the Public Prosecutor (JO21; JO18). Informants interviewed for this Study also reported that they had dealt with a number of cases of Syrian girls and young women in Jordan who were sexually exploited in prostitution either by means of temporary muta‘h marriages (JO26; JO17; JO21; JO18, see also section on Forced Marriage below) or through prostitution in nightclubs and brothels (JO12; JO17). In the reported cases of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, the victims were Syrian girls aged 16-17 and young women aged 18-35, residing inside and outside of refugee camps. Some girls live with their families, especially their mothers and siblings, in areas in and around Amman, Irbid and Mafraq. Trafficked women are generally alone or are female heads of households, as their husbands have either died, are in Syria and are unable to enter Jordan, or have divorced them (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2015).

Some girls are sexually exploited by a pimp, who subjects them to forced temporary marriage to adult male clients, in a form of trafficking for multiple exploitation. One case was reported in detail by an interviewee, and is dealt with in the section on Forced Marriage below (JO26). Other identified victims were forced to perform commercial sex on a more transactional basis in private houses rented by the pimps. Some of the women had already been commercial sex workers, and some of the women and girls were already being sexually exploited, in Syria before displacement. Other women and girls were involved in commercial sex work or commercial sexual exploitation for the first time in Jordan (JO13; JO17).

Prostitution in general is considered to have increased in Iraq since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, though most cases are prosecuted under the prostitution paragraph of the Penal Code, as judges and police officers are not aware that they could be dealing with trafficked people in some of these cases (IQ17). Sexual exploitation and prostitution among Syrians specifically is reported to have increased in the KR-I. As in the other countries under study, interviewees for this
research in Iraq also mentioned that many of those networks that already exploited people in prostitution in Syria transferred their work to neighbouring countries (IQ04; IQ12).

Based on fieldwork conducted during the second half of 2013 on Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), UN Women concluded that there was an awareness of women and girls involved in prostitution and sexual exploitation both inside and outside camps (UN Women, 2014). This is confirmed by UNHCR through field visits and discussions with stakeholders, which highlighted the risk of sexual violence, prostitution, “survival sex” and trafficking, among other forms of SGBV, for Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2014a). In seven of the focus group discussions conducted for UN Women’s research, Syrian women:

> “stated that they knew of women and girls engaged in transactional and survival sex in camp and non-camp settings. […] Unconfirmed rumours of suspected trafficking of Syrian women for sex work were also mentioned” (UN Women, 2014: 6-7).

The 2015 *TIP Report* refers to Syrian women and girls, as well as Iraqi IDPs, trafficked for sexual exploitation in Iraq by government officials and criminal gangs as well as members of their own families. The *TIP Report* specifically mentions a trafficking network for the sexual exploitation of Syrian refugee women and Iraqi IDP women in hotels and brothels in Baghdad, Basra and other southern Iraqi cities, after they were resettled from the KR-I. According to the *Report*: “Some Iraqi law enforcement officials allegedly ignored signs of or accepted bribes to allow sex trafficking in locations openly facilitating prostitution” (US Department of State, 2015). However, according to an interview for this Study with an Iraqi Federal government official, a designated group was set up to investigate this, working also with tourism police responsible for monitoring hotels and tourists in the country. This investigation did not identify any Syrian refugees sexually exploited or engaged in sex work in Basra (IQ16).

**Iraqi girls and women were also reported as trafficked for sexual exploitation** in both Iraq itself and in Syria, while, on the other hand, the sexual exploitation of Iraqi boys and men in same-sex prostitution is no longer considered significant in Lebanon. Sexual exploitation of Iraqi men and boys no longer seems to be a relevant issue because most Iraqi LGBT people have been resettled by UNHCR to safe third countries (LB17). Both before and since the outbreak of the war in Syria, Iraqi refugee girls and women who fled to Syria following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq have been trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
According to a research participant, some of these women and girls are from Sunni Muslim families who escaped the generalised conflict in Iraq or persecution by Shia Muslim militias in Baghdad, while others fled Iraq because they were personally wanted by the regime of Nuri Al-Maliki (Iraqi Prime Minister, 2006-2014). Other such women and girls were members of minorities such as Iraqi Christians, Sabians (a branch of Mandaeans who follow the teachings of John the Baptist), Chaldeans (Assyrian adherents of the Chaldean Catholic Church) and Yazidis, whose lives were threatened by different Islamist paramilitary and terrorist groups in Iraq (SY09). According to the 2015 US TIP Report, an intelligence directorate official from Basra was accused in 2014 of involvement in the kidnapping and attempted trafficking of an Iraqi girl outside of Iraq for sexual exploitation (US Department of State, 2015).

With depleted savings and without authorisation to work in Syria, Iraqi refugee families mainly depend on financial and in-kind assistance from humanitarian aid organisations. This vulnerability has led to exploitation of Iraqi girls, some as young as 12 years old, and young women aged between 18 and 35 years, by members of their families and owners of Syrian nightclubs. One interviewee reported the growing involvement of Iraqi women and girls in the Syrian sex industry (SY09).

As well as internal trafficking of Iraqis, interviewees for this research also observed Lebanese women being sexually exploited in prostitution by a family member within Lebanon, as well as becoming involved in prostitution because of poverty or domestic violence, since the baseline date (LB30). One Lebanese girl was exploited for child sexual abuse imagery (pornography videos) and a boy was sexually abused by two men in exchange for the rent for the family's

One international trafficking case detailed by an interviewee for this Study from the Iraqi Federal Government involved the trafficking for sexual exploitation to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates of an Iraqi woman and her two daughters. The woman and her daughters managed to leave the brothel where the sexual exploitation was taking place and go to the local police, who placed them in a shelter. The authorities there then contacted the research informant, who arranged for their repatriation and sought to host them at a shelter in Iraq. However, they were refused admission to the Iraqi shelter, as the shelter manager indicated that the facility was not secured by the Ministry of Interior, due to funding problems (IQ17).
accommodation (LB31). In addition, in Sabra, a neighbourhood in the south of Beirut close to the Palestinian refugee camp of Shatila, two cases of attempted kidnappings of children were reported (LB11).

Apart from Syrians and Iraqis, victims of other nationalities have also been trafficked for sexual exploitation in the countries under study since 2011, with this phenomenon largely continuing unchanged since the outbreak of the war. In Syria, as in Lebanon and Turkey, young women, usually in their 20s, and mostly from Eastern Europe, particularly Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, were attracted, through deception, by working opportunities in the entertainment industry, and trafficked for sexual exploitation in prostitution. Some continue to be sexually exploited in Syria (Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013). As stated above, the majority of victims of trafficking identified in Turkey during the period 2009-2013 were trafficked for sexual exploitation and were women from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia. In addition, during 2010-2014, a number of children were identified as trafficked for sexual exploitation in prostitution, though their ages, gender and nationalities were not stated (ICMPD, 2013; TR01; TR41; TR51).

Since 2011, the number of Lebanese “artist” visas issued to foreign (non-Syrian) women has decreased, which may be evidence of a replacement effect by Syrian women of foreign women working under the “artist” visa. However, this decrease could also be related to causal factors other than increased exploitation of Syrian women for commercial sexual purposes, such as increased awareness of the risks of exploitation among women considering migrating to Lebanon under the artist visa, increasing insecurity in some areas of Lebanon and opportunities for entertainment industry work for migrant women in other countries, such as GCC states. The Syrian crisis has not impacted the sexual exploitation of migrant domestic workers who run away from their employers, leaving the kafala system (see section on Domestic Servitude below) and becoming irregularly resident in Lebanon. Cases reported since 2011 include an Ethiopian woman who became the pimp of Ethiopian and Filipina women at a tourist resort (LB23) and Bangladeshi women who were exploited by a trafficking network of Bangladeshi pimps (LB33).

In two cases reported by an interviewee in Iraq, non-Syrian foreign women were exploited in prostitution in the KR-I (IQ12). According to the 2015 US TIP Report, women from Iran, China and the Philippines were trafficked for sexual exploitation in Iraq (US Department of State, 2015).

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66 Data provided directly to the Country Researcher for Lebanon by the Directorate General of the General Security.
Profiles of Perpetrators

A research informant in Syria considered that Syrian girls and women rarely engage in prostitution of their own free will, commenting that they are usually exploited by either their fathers or their husbands (SY09). Also, as in the other countries under study, in Turkey it is common for the exploiter to be a family member. An NGO field worker in Turkey spoke of the case of a Syrian refugee man forcing his wife into prostitution, and they were forced to move out of their apartment once the neighbours heard about it (TR26). However, a research informant in Turkey indicated that pimps involved in sexual exploitation can have various profiles, for example, he mentioned that a shoe shiner in central Hatay once approached him, "showing me pictures of Syrian girls and women. He said: 'these are all Syrians, do you want any of them?'" (TR25).67

Some Lebanese pimps work with Syrian intermediaries to traffic Syrian women and girls for sexual exploitation, using the fact that the intermediary knows the Syrian community well and facilitates connections (LB31; LB32). Some interviewees also suggested that some shawish (supervisors on a farm) might have a role in the sexual exploitation of Syrian women and girls, both in organising contacts with sex buyers and in keeping part of the financial compensation (LB22; LB18). In cases of sexual exploitation, Syrian traffickers often find it useful to work with Lebanese traffickers, as being Lebanese allows the trafficker to ask for a higher price (LB48). In other cases, such as those of migrant women with “artist” visas and “run-away” migrant domestic workers, they are forced into prostitution by pimps of their own nationality.

It was noted in Lebanon that some Syrian and Lebanese men who had worked in same-sex prostitution before the crisis have now become pimps of Syrian men and boys (LB17; LB32). Lebanese exploiters of men and boys are usually themselves sex buyers in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and therefore able to easily source business from other sex buyers. It is common for homosexual men and transgender women in prostitution to work from a shared room or flat, making it easier for pimps to get in touch with many men and transgender women at once, in order to potentially exploit them (LB32).

67 Translated from Turkish by the Country Researcher.
In **Jordan**, more detailed statistics on traffickers’ profiles were provided. Of a total of 33 suspects in 10 cases of trafficking for sexual exploitation recorded by the Jordanian CTU during 2014, 26 were men, while 7 were women (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015). In a reported case of trafficking of Syrian girls and young women for the purpose of commercial sex exploitation in Irbid, the trafficker was a Syrian woman in her forties, who sexually exploits vulnerable Syrian girls and young women in prostitution (JO12).

Informants for the research in **Iraq** mentioned that since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the husband or other family member of a woman exploited in prostitution was often involved either directly in this transaction, or indirectly through intermediaries (IQ15).

**Modus Operandi**

The trafficking of Syrian, Iraqi and other foreign women and girls and their exploitation in prostitution in **Syria** is carried out by organised prostitution networks comprising taxi drivers, bodyguards, brothel-owners and sometimes one or more Syrian *mukhabarat* (state intelligence) officers. The brothels are generally private houses in the suburbs of Damascus, in areas such as Harasta or Jaramana, where around 3-5 girls or women are sexually exploited or working. Taxi drivers look for sex buyers in the city centre, usually around Marjah Square in Damascus, and when they find a client, they negotiate the price and the taxi driver takes the sex buyer to the house and delivers him to the bodyguard. The bodyguard then takes the money from the client and allows him to enter the house (SY09). The role of taxi drivers as intermediaries between the sex buyer and the pimp was also in evidence in Lebanon, where foreign tourists often ask taxi drivers where they can find prostitutes (Nashed, 17 May 2014). It is common that Syrian brothel-owners are under the protection of the Syrian security apparatus, paying *mukhabarat* officers a commission in order to facilitate the release of the girls and women in case they are arrested and detained. If a girl or woman gets pregnant, the traffickers take her to a doctor who performs illegal abortions - most of his customers are Iraqi girls and women (SY09).

Another research participant described the possible abuse of vulnerability involved in the pimping of young Syrian IDP women in the town of Da’a’el, just north of the city of Dera’a. Three IDP women aged 18-25 years met a married couple in Da’a’el, who invited them to their home and then began to call potential sex buyers
from Da’el by phone to invite them to the house. The men paid to have sex with the women, and the profits were shared between the women and the couple. Though there was no evidence of the use of violence or threat, the interviewee considered this one of the many cases of commercial sexual exploitation of impoverished IDP women and girls by members of local Syrian host communities by means of the abuse of their situation of vulnerability (SY12).

A sex buyer interviewed in Lebanon by KAFA explained how he gets in contact with women and girls in prostitution:

“I contact [the pimp] on the phone saying that I want a pretty girl and he says to me: ‘I have five girls, I will bring them to you and you can choose the one you want.’ [...] he comes in his car, he turns the light on and I pick the girl I want. If for example, I want her for an hour, he will ask for 150 USD, I pay him and I take her [...] she gets paid from him.” (Jabbour, 2014: 27).

Syrian women and girls trafficked to Lebanon for sexual exploitation are also often subjected to a forced or fraudulent marriage with their future exploiters prior to departure, sometimes involving the withholding of the women and girls’ ID documents (LB48; LB05). Though men are always involved in such cases as the “husbands”, they may also have women as accomplices. An interviewee reported that Syrian women described the relationship with their pimps as “not positive” (LB30). This was confirmed by an NGO working with victims of sexual exploitation, which reported that the women are usually very afraid of pimps, who take a high percentage of their earnings (LB46). Another means of control mentioned by a research informant in Lebanon who works with victims of sexual exploitation was the pimps familiarising themselves with the lives of their victims, in order to be able to better exploit their vulnerabilities (LB32).

One specific network investigated by the authorities functioned in the following way: a Syrian man marries a Syrian girl or woman in Syria, takes her to Lebanon and then leaves her at the house of his acquaintances, telling her that he has to go away for work reasons. The people in the house then force the girl or woman into prostitution, promising not to tell the husband. When the husband comes back, he threatens to tell her family in Syria everything and divorces her. Often the pimp also withholds the ID documents of the girls or women (LB05; LB48).

Another way in which women and girls forced into prostitution are instructed to make contacts with sex buyers is by pretending to beg on the streets (LB31),
although this can pose the risk of legal punitive measures as begging is illegal in Lebanon (see section on Exploitation through Begging below). In this case, besides being victims of sexual exploitation, women and girls might also be forced into the crime of begging (LB46). The Lebanese NGO KAFA’s report on sex buyers provides detailed information on means of control by traffickers, from the buyers’ perspective. One man describes how pimps threaten to report women or girls to the police, and they bribe the police to support them, as well as threatening violence (Jabbour, 2014).

The Lebanese NGO Mosaic reports that sexually exploited boys and men are subject to threats if they try to leave the “job”, such as the threat to report Syrians without documents to the General Security. In one case, a pimp told Syrian men forced into same-sex prostitution that he would organise for them to travel to Europe irregularly, and he took their passports ostensibly for this purpose. However, he then threatened the Syrians that he would not give back their passports if they did not comply with his requests (LB17). Social networks, such as WhatsApp and Facebook, were mentioned by several interviewees as important tools for the organisation of sexual exploitation, as sexual services are often advertised on social networks and first contacts with buyers can also happen online. Websites where Lebanese and non-Lebanese offer sexual services are also used to make contacts with buyers (LB23; LB25). One interviewee working with male sex workers and sexually exploited men and boys reported that they access social networks seven to eight times per week on average to find buyers (LB30).

In the case of trafficking of Syrian girls and young women for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation in Irbid in Jordan, one trafficker, a Syrian woman, stands in University Street, in front of the ATM of a bank, and offers women and girls to potential sex buyers from Jordan, Syria and the GCC States. The price negotiation takes place at a nearby café, and the sexual services are usually at a furnished flat (JO12).

In Iraq, many SGBV cases identified by an international organisation were resolved internally within the family because the woman and the family were afraid that if they informed the authorities they would be expelled and forced to return to Syria (IQ15).

In the case of the Syrian IDP women in prostitution in the town of Da’el in the Syrian governorate of Dera’a, sex buyers reportedly paid 2,000-3,000 SYP (around US$10-15) per encounter (SY12). In Turkey, on the other hand, the media reported prices of 200-250 TL (around US$75-95), depending on age and
beauty’ (Evin, 27.01.2014). However, one research informant in Hatay province commented that a sexual encounter with a Syrian woman can be sold for as little as around 50 TL (around US$19-20) (TR25).

In Lebanon, the Syrian crisis has reportedly also resulted in a decrease in prices within the sex industry, with payment sometimes as low as a few US dollars, or exchanged for lunch or mobile phone credit (LB32). KAFA reports prices as open to negotiation, and dependent on the location, time of day, type of sexual act and presence of an intermediary between the sex worker/victim and sex buyer. Buyers reported having paid between 40,000 and 675,000 LBP (about US$26-450), with a median price of around 150,000 LBP (US$100) for the last encounter that they had had before the interview with KAFA, though the prices also included pre-negotiated fees for extra services. KAFA also interviewed women in street prostitution, and they stated a similar range of prices from 20,000 LBP to more than 150,000 LBP (about US$13-100) (Jabbour, 2014).

Sex work and ‘Survival Sex’

Apart from the cases set out above where it was possible to discern elements and indicators of trafficking for sexual exploitation, information was also available from the countries under study about Syrian refugee women involved in prostitution where it remained unclear whether elements of exploitation were present, though vulnerability was clearly in evidence. One research informant reported that Syrian women were involved in prostitution in Hatay in Turkey, especially widows, and some apartments rented by Syrians in central Hatay were allegedly used for prostitution, with a facilitator taking sex buyers there (TR25). In the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, several ‘sex rings’, and the existence of phone numbers to call in order to arrange a meeting with a Syrian woman, were reported (Harvard School of Public Health, 2014).

In a specific case followed by the Jordanian NGO ARRD Legal Aid, a Syrian woman, the female head of a large household, was arrested at a nightclub in Amman, and accused of prostitution. The woman’s case was complicated by the fact that her landlord found out about the woman’s arrest for prostitution and evicted the entire family. ARRD Legal Aid was appointed to negotiate with the landlord, and to ensure that the woman’s children were not evicted from the rented flat while she was in detention (JO24). It was not clear from the details of the case that were provided whether the woman had been trafficked and/or sexually exploited in prostitution, or whether she was engaging in consensual sex work.
In addition, informants for this research working with communities displaced from Syria in Lebanon frequently observed what they termed ‘survival sex’, prompted by severe economic hardship, or of sexual abuse of Syrians (LB28). Cases were also reported in Lebanon of female-headed households and unaccompanied women being offered separated accommodation, raising concerns about sexual services being exchanged for accommodation. In Akkar, an NGO observed men coming and going from one of the buildings where unaccompanied women are hosted (LB37). In a Palestinian refugee camp it was observed that women were offered better accommodation than elderly and sick people, who were accommodated in tents (LB34).

Indicators of sexual exploitation and/or ‘survival sex’ might also be evident in complaints from a refugee community that certain women are favoured during the humanitarian food or cash distribution process (LB37) or when women are invited to travel alone to another city (e.g. from Akkar to Tripoli) in order to obtain any form of aid (LB39). Women and girls have also been reported to have fallen victim to sexual abuse in Lebanon because they cannot repay their debts at a shop, or a landowner sexually abuses women or girls because they are not able to work in his agricultural field (LB28). Sexual abuse is considered more frequent than sexual exploitation in the case of women and girls with disabilities, with women and girls with mental disabilities being especially at risk (LB41). Traffickers working in the field of sexual exploitation may reportedly also receive other benefits from their victims, besides financial ones, as they may themselves sexually abuse them (LB17).

5.3.2 Forced Marriage

From the findings of this research, it is possible to identify three distinct categories of forced marriage:

| 1. | Trafficking for the purpose of forced marriage (i.e. the main purpose is making a profit from the marriage itself) |
| 2. | Trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, where a marriage is used to facilitate the sexual exploitation |
| 3. | Early marriage |
The second category has been dealt with above in the section on trafficking for sexual exploitation, as sexual exploitation in prostitution is its principal purpose, with forced marriage used as a means to traffic women and as an aggravating circumstance in the case of girls. For the third category, the cases of early marriage encountered in the research do not necessarily all constitute child trafficking, and would need to be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine the full facts from a criminal justice perspective.

The first category, trafficking for forced marriage, is very much in evidence in the countries under study and commonly involves the practice of irregular unofficial forms of marriage known as temporary marriage (muta’h) or tourist marriage (mishyar). A recent IOM publication on “tourist marriage” in Yemen, which has similar characteristics to the phenomenon in the countries under study, defined it as:

“a legal union between a Yemeni woman and a man from an Arabian Gulf country which was intended by the groom to be of a limited duration - a fact not clearly communicated to the parents, bride or Yemeni officials. Such marriages often occur during the summer months when there are significant tourists from Gulf Cooperative [sic] Council (GCC) countries visiting Yemen” (IOM, 2014: V).

Such “tourist” or “temporary” marriages in the countries under study involve girls and young women, and are never intended to be long-term, but rather are a means of sex tourism. Many of the “grooms” in these cases, as in Yemen, are from GCC countries, though they may also be citizens of the country in question. The IOM study refers to temporary marriage as a practice dating back to the pre-Islamic era, and one that has since “generated heated religious and social disputes on its legality within Islamic law and its cultural impact” (IOM, 2014: VIII).

This present Study found men from the countries under study and the Gulf States using the services of “matchmakers” to arrange temporary marriages (muta’h or zawaj al-niqah) and tourist marriages (mishyar) with Syrian refugee women and girls (Abu Shama, 5 September 2013; Kamal, 15 December 2015), for the purpose of having sexual relations with them. In relation to the issue of whether, in general, tourist marriage as present in Yemen can be considered prima facie as trafficking in persons, the IOM study points to deception by the groom and the marriage broker – and sometimes also the father, other male guardian and other members of the family of the “bride” – with the purpose of sexual abuse, due to the temporary
nature of the “marriage”. The study concludes, however, that:

“each case would need to be examined to determine collaborators to the deception and if sexual exploitation occurred. The finding of this research that Tourist Marriage should be considered human trafficking has received de facto recognition in Yemen at multiple levels of society” (IOM, 2014: IX).

As set out in the Introduction, according to Syrian law, the Shari’a Qadi (judge) has the authority to refuse to sanction a marriage if the girl is under 15, however, often due to the family’s will, a Qadi will approve early marriages. In Syria, “zawaj bil wakala” (proxy marriage) is legal, and also used to take place before 2011, especially where the groom was a Syrian man who worked abroad and wanted to marry a Syrian woman or girl still in Syria. At present, through Syrian embassies, men from GCC countries appoint legal representatives in Syria who take care of the court process and the legal side of the marriage. Once the legal process is completed, the woman or girl is flown to the country where her new husband lives (SY08).

In some early marriages, there is little age difference between the bride and the groom: they may either be both under eighteen years old, or the bride may be under eighteen with a groom close to the age of eighteen years old. In others, there is a significant age difference between the bride and the groom, with the bride being under eighteen years old and the groom much older. It is important to underline this difference because the reasons leading to families marrying off their girls at a young age differ according to the ‘type’ of marriage (LB17; LB25; Harvard School of Public Health, 2014). Where there is a significant age difference between the child bride and the groom, it is more common that a significant financial transaction takes place between the groom and the family of the child bride (LB25).

Inside Syria, girls involved in early marriage and trafficking for forced marriage, some as young as 13 and 14 years, generally come from large impoverished families from rural areas. Their parents marry off their daughters in order to receive a dowry and to have one less person to take care of (SY07). Some research participants interviewed for this study also commented that in some rural communities in Syria, early arranged marriages are culturally and religiously accepted, and are negotiated between the groom and the male members of the family of the Syrian girl, rather than organised by criminal networks (SY03; SY08).
Girls aged 13 and over, from different areas in Syria, are married off to older men from GCC states. Some of the women and girls may face multiple forms of exploitation, as they may be first exploited for forced marriage by their families, and then also sexually exploited in prostitution by their husbands, in a situation of vulnerability in a foreign country (SY08).

Similarly, a research study was conducted in 2011 by the Batman Bar Association in southern Turkey, following complaints of forced marriage involving ‘Syrian brides’ who were 12-13 years old, brought to southern Turkey from Syria in exchange for a 'bride price'. According to an interviewee from the Association, since this was already taking place before the war, it must be continuing in increasing numbers and should be investigated (TR49).

Also in Lebanon, Syrian communities are reported to worry about men from GCC states coming to Lebanon to marry Syrian girls. This phenomenon reportedly decreased in 2014 because the worsening security situation in Akkar discouraged trips there by men from the Gulf (LB36).

Similar forms of “tourist” marriage with Syrian women and girls since the outbreak of the Syrian war were also in evidence in the Jordanian governorates of Amman, Irbid and Mafraq, both inside and outside refugee camps, organised by organised groups of Jordanian and Syrian traffickers. These brokers take advantage of the sense of economic and physical insecurity of Syrian refugee families to convince some parents to sell their daughters off to be married, often without legal contracts, to older men from Jordan, GCC states or other countries. Some of these arranged, illegal marriages may be subsequently legalised and endure (Abu Shama, 5 September).

In Lebanon, local NGOs have witnessed men from GCC states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar) travelling to the Akkar region and marrying a Syrian girl through an irregular marriage, as the sheikh (Lebanese or Syrian Muslim religious leader) signing the contract is not officially recognised by the Lebanese State as having the authority to authorise marriage contracts. In none of these cases are the girls taken to the Gulf countries, as the marriage is not legalised and therefore it would be impossible for the girl to obtain a visa. A divorce takes place some weeks or months after the marriage, and obtaining the divorce is easy for the man, again as the marriage is not legalised (LB36).

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68 The findings of this study have not been published.
In one case described in detail by a research informant in Jordan, the victim was a 17 year-old Syrian girl trafficked for forced marriage and subjected to severe forms of sexual abuse. She arrived in Jordan in 2013 with her mother and siblings from the Syrian governorate of Dera’a. Her father was missing, and her mother moved on from Jordan to Lebanon with her other siblings, leaving the girl in the care of another Syrian woman, an acquaintance of her mother living in a wealthy area of Amman. This woman, apparently with the consent of the girl’s mother, subjected the girl to a forced marriage with a man aged over 50 from Saudi Arabia, in exchange for money.

Three days after the “wedding”, the Saudi man disappeared from the flat that the newly married couple had moved into and the Syrian woman told the girl that her husband had divorced her. A few days later she was forcibly married to another man, and then subjected to forced marriages to about thirteen other men from Jordan and GCC countries over a period of almost two years. Each “marriage” lasted on average between one and three days, with the longest “marriage” being with a Jordanian man, who spent about a month with the girl and then “divorced” her (JO26). The marriages were not legal: the marriage contract was written on a piece of paper by a sheikh in front of witnesses, the broker and the groom, and as soon as the husband wanted to divorce the girl, the piece of paper was destroyed by the broker in front of the girl (JO26; JO19; JO21).

Every time one of the clients requested a virgin bride, the traffickers forced the girl to undergo hymen reconstruction surgery at a private clinic in Amman. The marriages and the divorces were illegal: in the presence of a witness, an invalid wedding contract was written on a piece of paper, and when the men wanted to divorce the girl, the paper was simply ripped up by the traffickers. The victim was identified in December 2014 and taken to a shelter for trafficked people in Amman, where she remained for about two months and received gynaecological and psychiatric healthcare. Both the Syrian woman and the Jordanian doctor have been arrested and prosecuted by the Jordanian authorities and the girl’s mother was also accused of trafficking, as she was responsible for arranging the first forced marriage (JO26).
One research informant in Iraq indicated that when men arrive at places where Syrian refugees reside looking for a young bride, a group of around 14 girls are gathered into one room and the man chooses among them. The family of the girl then receives money. Many of these men come from GCC states. Some girls were reported to have committed suicide through overdoses, in order to avoid the marriages. This interviewee had first-hand experience of a 14-year-old girl who was a victim of such a forced marriage (IQ05).

Cases involving forced marriage of Syrian girls to nationals of the host countries under study, which do not involve temporary or tourist marriage, were also found through this research. Indeed, among many other issues, the arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey has stirred a public debate about early and forced marriages (TR33; TR35; TR46; TR47; TR49; TR50; TR51). While marriage brokers are particularly common in Antep, Kilis, Hatay, Urfa and Batman provinces in the southeast and south of Turkey, they establish networks and find ‘clients’ across the country. The most requested age cohort of Syrian girls and women for forced marriage is 15-20 years. At a petrol station in the Nusaybin district of Mardin, according to a research report, a catalogue of single women and girls is available for customers. In most cases, as reported by Syrian refugee women and girls, marriages do not last long and even if they last, the marriage may also facilitate a situation of domestic servitude (Mazlumder, 2014), though this was not verified by the Turkish authorities.

Two such cases were dealt with directly by local authorities, according to the same report. In one case, a ‘woman’ (age not stated) was sold at this petrol station, but later escaped and sought help from the authorities who placed her in a shelter. The other case involved a 16-year-old girl who was sold to a 60-year-old man; the incident was reported by the neighbours and the police intervened and took the girl to a shelter (Mazlumder, 2014). An interviewee from an international humanitarian organisation also spoke of the case of a 16-year-old Syrian refugee girl who was married to a Turkish man, and after only a few months, the man sent her back to the refugee camp where her family lives. The girl was then re-married within a few months (TR28).

The Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policies recently placed a Syrian refugee girl under the protection of its Directorate General of Child Protection Services. The mother and the uncle of the girl had forced her to marry and sent her to Mardin in the south from the northern province of Sinop (TR46; TR47). A case of a 13-year-old Syrian girl was also reported to an international NGO in Gaziantep, in which a landlord asked the girl’s mother if he could marry her daughter in exchange
for the rent, which the mother was unable to pay. According to this interviewee, such cases are immediately referred to the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policies, though many families are reluctant to report these issues due to social and cultural pressures (TR32).

One research informant in Turkey drew attention to a phenomenon that he termed “the exploitation of local men by Syrian women”. He had experienced at least four cases of Syrian women getting married to Turkish men, and after a week, the women left, taking with them all the valuables they had been given at the wedding. The Syrian husbands of the women reportedly introduced them as their ‘sisters’, found a Turkish man and arranged the marriages (TR09). While these incidents were narrated as the ‘exploitation of local men’, they could also indicate women’s exploitation by men who identify themselves as the women’s brothers, though it was not possible to find any evidence of this.

Several research informants in Lebanon with expertise on early and forced marriage agreed that this is the form of trafficking that affects Syrian girls the most (LB27; LB07; LB10), while Syrian boys are most subject to trafficking for forced labour (LB27; LB31), see section on Child Labour Exploitation below. The gains from forced marriage in Lebanon for the family can be either in the form of money, or, as in the case in Gaziantep in Turkey, for non-monetary gains such as accommodation. For example, the media has covered cases where a landlord or landowner obliged a Syrian family to marry off their daughter to him in order to keep their accommodation (Tomlinson, 15 January 2014).

This type of for-profit marriage has also been influenced by the displacement to which Syrians are subject, as most early marriages that took place in Syria before the war were considered not for-profit (Luca, 15 November 2013). Forced marriage is also more common since the outbreak of the Syrian war among Palestinians from Syria than it used to be among Palestinians from Lebanon (LB18). The 2014 TIP Report mentions an increase in Syrian children in Lebanon involved in early marriages that might lead to forced labour and sexual exploitation, while the 2015 TIP Report mentions the trafficking of Syrian children in Lebanon for forced marriage (US Department of State, 2014; 2015).

At the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, the UNHCR in Jordan was also concerned about the potential risk of trafficking of refugees from the camps, particularly to the Gulf countries, through the “bail-out” system (JO17). Before July 2013, cases were reported of Jordanians bailing out Syrian refugee families in exchange for being given one or more Syrian daughters in marriage (JO03; JO05;
Humanitarian assistance providers interviewed for this Study in Jordan reported that there is enough evidence to identify certain cases of early marriage of Syrian refugee girls as forms of child trafficking for forced marriage. These may include when Syrian families marry off their underage daughters in exchange for money or for being bailed out of a refugee camp by Jordanian sponsors (JO07; JO05; JO12; JO22). An international organisation working in the Syrian refugee camps was approached by a number of Syrian girls and young women who had been forced to marry and who afterwards sought the assistance of the organisation in order to divorce (JO05).

One of the reported cases involved a Syrian girl aged 15, who had already been married twice when she approached an international organisation to seek protection. The girl lived in Zaatari Camp with her parents and several siblings. One of her older sisters was also married, while two younger sisters were not allowed to leave the caravan by their father, who considered this a necessary precaution in order to preserve the honour of the family and prevent the girls, “of marriageable age,” - 12 and 13 years old -, from being harassed by other men. For the two girls confined in the caravan, the father was actively looking for offers of marriage. Another two younger daughters of eight and nine years were instead allowed to go to school because they were not yet considered of marriageable age.

Her father was responsible for marrying the 15-year-old girl off to both of the husbands, a Syrian man and a Jordanian man in his late forties who bailed her out of the camp. The second husband forced the girl to have sex with other Jordanian men, therefore also subjecting her to commercial sexual exploitation. She was repeatedly raped by various men, including her “husband.” She managed to escape to the camp and approached the organisation interviewed for this Study for help. She was supported by her mother, but her father was violent and tried to prevent her from seeking assistance, and the mother and children have now been separated from the father and moved to another location. It is unclear what, if any, action was taken against the father (JO05).

Similarly, UN Women reports that among Syrian refugees in the KR-I:

“early marriage and marriage of women to men that would not normally be considered “suitable” has been increasing since arriving in KRI” (UN Women, 2014: 7-8).

There have been reports of cases of forced marriage, with Syrian refugees as victims, in the Kirkuk governorate of Iraq, outside the KR-I, organized by a broker, who is
responsible for bringing the men. These marriages are not registered in the courts, but are informally witnessed by a religious leader (“sheikh”) (IQ08). The 2015 TIP Report refers to Syrian girls living in refugee camps in the KR-I as being subject to early and/or temporary forced marriages with Iraqi and Syrian men (US Department of State, 2015). A research informant in Iraq, on visiting Syrian refugee camps in 2013, was informed that girls living at the camps were being subjected to forced marriage, with an estimate of a few hundred cases (IQ17).

Some Syrian girls and women have also been forced to marry members of Islamist groups involved in the Syria conflict, such as Da’ish and the Nusra Front, in return for some form of protection or payment for their impoverished families (SY01; Qiblan & Hammoud, 2 October 2015). The victims are mainly IDP and refugee women and girls as young as 12 years, living alone or with their families in IDP camps inside Syria or as refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. One research informant from Dera’a in Syria explained that in that governorate there are several cases of local girls aged 15-17 years being forced to marry Nusra Front fighters. The girls come from different rural areas in the governorate, and have usually not completed their schooling as their families do not give priority to the education of the girls in the household. The groom is commonly a Nusra Front fighter and also from the local Dera’a community. In Dera’a, many families have a conservative approach to marriage, and many girls are not allowed to oppose decisions made by their male family members. The groom and the father of the girl or young woman negotiate the marriage contract in her absence and sign the marriage agreement in the presence of a religious authority (SY12).
Similar cases of temporary, irregular marriages to members of armed groups - in these cases for as little as a few hours – have been observed in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, where Lebanese or Syrian militants engage in a forced marriage for the purpose of sexual abuse of a girl. The family of the girl and the shawish of the tent settlement received money for this (LB22).

**Perpetrators**

The perpetrators of trafficking for forced marriage in the countries under study are commonly family members – including husbands, fathers and brothers. Some Syrian refugees who were interviewed by UN Women reported that the perpetrators may in some cases include staff members of humanitarian agencies (UN Women, 2014). In some situations, forced marriages were facilitated by mostly older women in the camps who act as marriage brokers between men looking for brides and the brides’ fathers.

As mentioned above, according to research informants, in many Syrian rural communities, most marriages are negotiated between the groom and the father and brothers of the girl or woman and not organised by criminal networks (SY03; SY08; SY12). Male family members in Syria agree to marry off their daughters to strangers in return for money, and, in some cases, the grooms then also traffic the girls and young women for sexual exploitation in prostitution.

IOM also found through its research in Yemen that:

“For young, uneducated and rural women from poor families, Tourist Marriage […] is often seen as addressing a number of economic and social issues. The shorter-term benefits include protecting the honour of the young woman and her family and addressing poverty. The longer-term logic of such a marriage includes having kin with legal residence (and hopefully citizenship) outside of Yemen, as well as producing legitimate heirs” (IOM, 2014: VIII).

Similarly, in Jordan, Syrian families had arrived in the country with savings, but over time they were depleted and they became impoverished. Marrying their daughters off was perceived as a way of ensuring their daughters’ safety and offering them better living conditions, while relieving the burden of having to sustain a family member. In a number of identified cases of trafficking of Syrian refugee girls for
the purpose of forced marriage in Jordan, the traffickers were legal guardians and care givers, extended families, and parents who married off their daughters (JO03).

A social worker from Izmir in Turkey spoke of how a 13-year-old Syrian refugee girl showed her a document in Arabic, which indicated that she was ‘legally married’. According to the interviewee, this document may have been produced by facilitators/traffickers as a method of escaping prosecution (TR51).

In forced marriage cases in Lebanon, Syrian men married Syrian girls in Syria and took them to Lebanon, where they have local accomplices, in order to also subject them to commercial sexual exploitation (LB48). However, in the case of men from GCC states who sexually abuse Syrian girls in Lebanon in forced temporary marriages, the local accomplice in Lebanon may be a Lebanese or a Syrian working at a religious organisation funded by a GCC state to provide aid to Syrians (LB36).

Dowries paid by non-Syrian men represent a significant financial incentive for the girls’ families, with sums of up to US$10,000 changing hands (UN Women, 2014). Based on research conducted in Syrian refugee camps in late 2013, UN Women described the following scenario:

“Rumours of non-Syrian men coming to the camps and “shopping” for brides was reported as taking place in two of the four camps visited. Such arrangements were reported to be facilitated by mostly older women in the camps who act as a type of introduction agency between the man and fathers. In one camp, a women [sic] reported to having been visited by a women [sic] and man (whom she believed to be non-
Within **Syria**, it is reported that at least 300,000 SYP (around US$1,589) is paid in dowries, in addition to the clothes and gold jewellery usually given as a gift, representing a significant financial incentive. On the other hand, some families do not ask for a dowry, as they simply want their daughters to get married and leave the family home, because of financial difficulties in providing for them or cultural norms in relation to girls of a marriageable age living in their family home (SY07; SY12).

According to a research report, at a petrol station in the Nusaybin district of Mardin in **Turkey**, single women and girls are sold for forced marriage for 2,000TL (around US$750). A fee of around 2,000-10,000TL (US$750-3,750) is charged by marriage brokers for arranging marriages with Syrian refugee women and girls, usually depending on their age (Mazlumder, 2014).

An NGO based in Akkar in **Lebanon** reported that men from Gulf States marrying Syrian girls in “temporary marriages” pay up to US$5,000 for the marriage (LB36). In cases of trafficking for forced marriage of Syrian refugees reported in **Iraq**, the families of Syrian girls receive around US$2,000-3,000 (IQ08).

### 5.3.3 Labour Exploitation (Adults)

The ongoing conflict in Syria and the refugee crisis have caused an increase in cases of trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation, as well as exploitative labour conditions, involving Syrian IDP and refugee men, women and children in the five countries under study. In some cases, children are exploited or subjected to exploitative conditions together with adults, usually adult family members. Cases only involving child trafficking for labour exploitation and worst forms of child labour are dealt with in the following section (5.3.4), while issues related to legal employment status and labour conditions were addressed above in section 4.2.
Sectors of Exploitation

Agriculture

In Antalya, some Turkish locals accommodate more than 30 Syrian refugees in their houses in exchange for making them work in their citrus fields (TR51), though this was not verified by the authorities. Labour exploitation in agriculture is also considered widespread in Lebanon, and is one of the main sectors where labour exploitation occurs, involving both adults and children. Exploitation in agriculture in Lebanon has the same characteristics as before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, when Syrian workers were employed in agriculture and excluded from the protection of labour laws. Nevertheless, where before the Syrian crisis Syrian workers generally migrated voluntarily to Lebanon, without coercion or deception as to the nature of the work, currently Syrians are displaced on Lebanese territory because of the war, with no immediate possibility of returning to Syria. Another difference is that before 2011, Syrian migrants were usually adult men, while since the crisis there has been an increase in women and children, who are also exploited in agricultural work (LB23).

An interviewee from Dera’a in Syria described how local farm-owners in the governorate exploit the cheap, available workforce. The day labourers are mainly young men, women and children from poor local families, who also conducted such work before the war, and IDP men, women and children, aged 8-40 years, from Damascus, Homs and other areas of the country. IDP communities live in schools and government housing complexes or in cheap private accommodation in different districts of the Dera’a governorate. Although most of them are literate, many children and young adults have not completed secondary education and have had limited access to education in recent years, as there are not enough school places for all the school-age children currently in Dera’a governorate. The farming work is exhausting and wages are low, but many IDPs do not have alternative ways of generating income. They farm tomatoes, aubergines, broccoli and other vegetables, working about 8 hours per day in poor conditions for as little as 500 SYP (around US$2.65) per day. Sometimes the labourers are alone, while sometimes entire families work on the same farm (SY12).

Some Syrian refugee families and unaccompanied and separated children have also been subjected to labour exploitation on Jordanian farms in Mafraq.
governorate and in the Jordan Valley (Agwar area) (JO07; JO23). Once the season or the work on a farm finishes, entire families relocate with their tents to a new farm in need of labourers. Syrian families working as seasonal agricultural workers come mainly from Dera’a and Rural Damascus, and most are registered with the UNHCR and hold security IDs issued by the Jordanian Ministry of Interior, which allows them to reside in the local host communities (JO07). Some of the Syrian families employed in agriculture were already farmers in Syria and started working as seasonal agricultural workers on Jordanian farms before the baseline date of end-2010. Others had worked in other professions and sectors in Syria and only started working in the farming industry after their displacement to Jordan.

**Factories and Services**

**Labour exploitation in factory work of Syrian IDP men** from the governorates of Aleppo and Homs, residing at IDP camps in Latakia governorate, was reported. Many factory-owners from Aleppo have moved their factories and machinery to Latakia since the outbreak of the war. These IDP men earn extremely low wages for their labour, in a region controlled by Syrian regime forces. They are paid around 200 SYP (around US$1) per day in a context where, due to inflation, daily food costs for one adult are around 1,000 SYP (around US$5) (SY05).

Some Syrian refugees, both adults and children, were subjected to exploitation and human rights abuses by **Jordanian** employers in the service and catering industries in urban centres such as the cities of Amman and Irbid. Syrian men aged 18-50 years, from different regions in Syria, work in these sectors as chefs and waiters in restaurants, in bakeries, as shop assistants in supermarkets and shops, and at car washes. Since they work without work permits, they often face exploitation from employers, who make them work excessive hours and pay them a third of the wage that is usual for Jordanian workers. In some cases the employers dismiss Syrian workers before the end of the month and refuse to pay their wages. If the workers complain, the employers threaten to report them to the police for working without work permits. In order to avoid being exploited, some Syrian men have begun asking their employers to pay them on a daily basis, in order to make sure that they are not deceived and exploited (JO12).

**Unspecified Sector**

An interviewee in **Turkey** spoke of around 55 Syrian women and girls who reported to an NGO that they had suffered labour exploitation, with sexual abuse, by their
employers in Gaziantep in southeast Turkey, who forced the women and girls to have sexual intercourse with them in order to keep their jobs. Some of these women and girls – some as young as 13-14 years old - experienced unwanted pregnancies as a result and terminated their pregnancies at private clinics. Instead of going to public hospitals, they preferred to go to a female Syrian gynaecologist who works in Gaziantep without a proper work permit (TR38).

Interviewees in Turkey reported that some adult Syrian refugees have approached NGOs to report labour exploitation, since they did not receive any payment from their employers (TR02; TR32). However, neither the NGOs nor the refugees reported this to the authorities since they work informally (TR02). This may explain why just three foreign victims of trafficking for labour exploitation were officially identified in Turkey during the years 2011 and 2012, and none in 2013 (ICMPD, 2013).

Syrian refugee men and boys are trafficked for labour exploitation particularly in manufacturing, agriculture and services in the KR-I in Iraq (IQ05). Another interviewee had directly dealt with seven cases of labour exploitation involving withholding of ID documents, low or no wages, mistreatment and threats of reporting to the authorities (IQ06).

Aside from labour exploitation of Syrian refugees, migrants from outside the region continue to be exploited with much the same characteristics as during the baseline period. An Afghani male victim of labour exploitation (age not stated) was referred to the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policies to be assisted at their men’s shelter (TR47).

Reported cases of trafficking for labour exploitation on Jordanian farms also involve Egyptian and Pakistani migrants. Some Egyptian agricultural workers were trafficked and exploited, subjected to excessive working hours, and their passports were withheld by their employers. Sometimes they did not receive their wages or they received their wages only three or four months after they had started working (Tamkeen, 2014; JO23). There have also been some identified cases of men and women from South and Southeast Asia (the Philippines, India and Bangladesh) trafficked for the purpose of labour exploitation in factories in Jordan’s Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) (JO18; JO23). The majority of cases included violations of the workers’ freedom of movement, withholding of passports, non-payment of wages and working excessive hours in unsafe or inappropriate work environments. In some cases, the workers were also victims of physical and/or sexual violence committed by employers (JO21; JO23).
Similarly, one case was reported in Iraq of migrants from Bangladesh, who were trafficked for labour exploitation at a petrol station, involving non-payment of wages and poor living conditions. They were subsequently assisted and repatriated (IQ17). Another case involved Indian migrants trafficked for labour exploitation on a construction site, who were subsequently assisted and repatriated. The cases involved non-payment of wages and poor living conditions (IQ17). One group reported by an Iraqi government interviewee for this research were irregular migrant men from South and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) working in Basra Governorate in southern Iraq, who were physically abused, did not receive their salaries and had their passports withheld (IQ16).

Among those whom IOM identified and assisted in Iraq were a group of 80 Indian and Bangladeshi men trafficked to Iraq for labour exploitation by their Turkish contractor, who came to IOM’s attention in late 2011. They had been subjected to limitations to their freedom of movement, lack of access to medical care, and withholding of full payment of salaries. Around the same time, 17 people who had been trafficked to Iraq from Bosnia and Herzegovina for labour exploitation were referred by their embassy to IOM, leading to the recovery of their passports and the provision of bus tickets for their return to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Smith, March 2012). One Filipino man reported that he was promised a job in Turkey, but was instead taken to the KR-I to work there (IQ12).

**Perpetrators**

Syrian IDP families and individuals working on farms in Dera’a governorate in Syria are **exploited by farm-owners and some shawish who supervise workers on farms**, as well as in workshops. The intermediaries are usually men or women from the same communities as the victims, who know where to find and recruit labourers. Representatives of farm-owners also go to the schools and housing complexes where IDPs live in farming areas in Dera’a governorate to recruit day labourers. When entire families are employed on the same farm, the farm owner often only pays the wage of the adults. Children under the age of 15 years work on the farm with their families without being paid, as the farm-owner claims that the children are too young to be able to complete their work as required (SY12).

In Lebanon, trafficking for exploitation in agriculture also involves farm-owners, and in many cases takes place according to an agreement between the Lebanese landowner and the Syrian shawish of an informal tent settlement (LB21). In many
cases, the *shawish* is responsible for exploitative labour agreements to which people from his or her community are subject, and it is usually the *shawish* who decides whether aid organisations can have access to the tent settlement. Working terms and conditions are usually the result of an agreement between the landowner of the field where a Syrian tent settlement is located and the *shawish*. However, the role of the *shawish* in the exploitation of Syrians cannot be generalised, as they are very different from settlement to settlement and not all of them have exploitative attitudes towards the community. They can be either Syrian or Lebanese, and sometimes they are Syrians who used to work in Lebanon before 2011, and were already known by the owner of the agricultural land (LB21). Cases have also been reported in which educated Syrian women act as *shawish* of the community (LB23).

**Farm-owners who also rent land for accommodation to Syrian communities can engage in labour exploitation using the threat of evictions to force a community to work under exploitative conditions.** Owners of agricultural land may also force the Syrian community living and working on their field to internally migrate to another area of Lebanon and work in another field owned by the same landowner, according to agricultural labour requirements and seasons (LB39). The *shawish* often takes a percentage of the salaries that are paid to the community for their work on the agricultural land (LB21; LB27; LB39), which can lead to the *shawish* holding the community in debt bondage, as he/she pays rent on their behalf in advance (LB27). While it is not always possible to know what percentage of the salary of agricultural workers goes to the *shawish*, an interviewee reported that Syrian labourers were paid around 8,000 LBP (US$5.30) for five hours of work, of which only 5-6,000 went to the worker, while the rest went to the *shawish* (LB21).

Of a total of 16 suspects in 9 cases of trafficking for labour exploitation recorded by the *Jordanian* CTU during 2014, 15 were men, while one was a woman (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015). As in Syria and Lebanon, traffickers of Syrians for labour exploitation in agriculture in Jordan are large farm-owners and intermediaries (“*shawish*” or “*moraqeb*”), who are both Jordanian and Syrian men and women.
The Syrian Refugee Crisis Response Coordinator at the ILO Office in Amman described a female Syrian shawish in her thirties who lived in a village in Mafraq, in the same community as the refugees whom she recruited to work on Jordanian farms. She was well known in the farming community as she approached the farmers on a regular basis to ask whether they needed labourers and established contacts with a few Syrian families in the village to offer them work on farms. The Syrians employed on the farms spread the word that the Syrian intermediary was looking for people to work on the farms and more Syrians would contact her to seek job opportunities. The Syrian agent earned a commission for each Syrian labourer whom she recruited. The shawish used a system also found in Dera’a in Syria: she made a deal to recruit a Syrian refugee family to work on a farm, in exchange for which she demanded to be paid the entire wage of the children working in each family. When the ILO researchers asked Jordanian farm owners why they employed children to work on their farms, the farm owners replied that this Syrian female agent had imposed upon them the condition of the hiring of the children. On average for each Syrian family, there were two or three children working on the farms without being paid. The wage of a child working on farms ranges between 3 and 7JOD per day (US$4.25–10.00) (JO07).

5.3.4 Child Labour Exploitation

Child trafficking, as defined by the 2000 UN Trafficking Protocol and other relevant international and national legislative instruments, consists of two elements: an act (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons) and the purpose of exploitation.

Worst Forms of Child Labour (WFCL) are defined by the 1999 ILO WFCL Convention as:

“(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and servitude and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict;
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances;

(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties;

(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children” (Article 3).

There is, therefore, a significant overlap between the legal definitions of the two phenomena. As per Art. 3(a) of the WFCL Convention, child trafficking is, itself, a worst form of child labour, while 3(d) also defines situations that could involve child trafficking for labour exploitation. The methodology of this multi-country study did not comprise detailed case-by-case analysis of the situations involving children’s labour that were encountered through literature review, data collection and qualitative interviews, in order to distinguish between worst forms of child labour and child trafficking. Therefore, this section focuses on situations presenting indicators of worst forms of child labour and trafficking, while child labour has been addressed above in section 4.4. Nevertheless, it is clear that on further investigation, some of the situations of child labour could also be determined to be worst forms of child labour and/or child trafficking. Situations of child trafficking for other worst forms of child labour, including use in armed conflict, commercial sexual exploitation of children and child sexual abuse imagery (pornography), and exploitation of children in illicit activities, are dealt with in the other relevant sections of this chapter.

Worst Forms of Child Labour and Child Trafficking for Labour Exploitation

A recent study on worst forms of child labour in Syria found that the conflict has drastically affected household livelihood strategies, leading to an increased number of children engaging in hazardous work in order to secure their own survival and that of their families. Inside Syria, mainly boys, but also some girls, are exploited in hazardous manual work for long hours, working in factories and mechanical workshops, carrying heavy loads, exposed to pesticides and toxic chemicals on farms, causing serious damage to their health, wellbeing and development (UNICEF, 2014). One interviewee from Syria pointed out that child labour was not considered by many people as a negative phenomenon in Syria before the
war, with many families sending their children to work during school summer holidays. However, since the outbreak of the war and with the worsening economic crisis, worst forms of child labour, child labour exploitation and the exploitation of children through begging have become a visible problem in Damascus and in other areas of the country (SY04).

Syrian IDP boys aged 13-17 years from Aleppo, who are internally displaced alone or with their families in regime-controlled areas in the governorate of Tartous on the Mediterranean coast of Syria, are subject to labour exploitation. Many local workers from Tartous have joined the Shabiha (Alawite militia force), so a new workforce was required to replace them in factories and workshops, recruited from among Syrian IDPs. While most 13-14-year-old children from Tartous attend school, boys from Aleppo work in factories and workshops (SY08). The involvement of children as young as 9 in hazardous manual labour is also a particular concern in Deir ez-Zour governorate in eastern Syria, where most out-of-school children were reported to work filtering crude oil and operating generators (Save the Children & UNICEF, July 2015).

In Turkey, specific indicators of child labour exploitation were found through fieldwork by the Turkey-Syria Migrant-Host Community Brotherhood Association in Şanlıurfa. The Association identified at least 200 Syrian refugee children (gender not indicated; age group 10-15 years old) working on the streets, mostly collecting waste paper, plastic and other refuse, who were later observed giving these collected items to a Turkish man, who pays each child 50TL (US$19-20) per day for this work. Despite the Association’s offer of support to them, the parents of these children continue to send them to work, because this amount of money is considered higher than what an adult Syrian refugee would make per day on average. The Association also identified children under 15 years old working under hazardous conditions in bakeries making ‘Syrian bread’ and earning 10TL (around US$4) per day in Şanlıurfa (TR11).

In 2014 in Lebanon, in terms of prosecutions, trafficking for child labour and child begging was the form of trafficking with the highest number of victims (LB47). The 2013 Report on the Worst Forms of Child Labour on Lebanon underlines evidence that children working on the streets may become victims of trafficking and stresses the impact of the Syrian refugee influx on the involvement of children in worst forms of child labour, due to the poor economic conditions of their families (US Department of Labor, 2013). However, an NGO assisting children working on the streets in Beirut warned in an interview for this research that it is difficult to generalise elements of child labour, child labour exploitation and/or child
trafficking by parents or caregivers, because individual situations are very varied (LB11), requiring a case-by-case approach. The 2015 TIP Report also mentions the trafficking of Lebanese and Syrian children for forced labour in Lebanon (US Department of State, 2015).

In Lebanon, children have been observed conducting hazardous work in agriculture, such as spraying harmful chemicals on vegetables and fruit (LB09), constituting a worst form of child labour. Observations show that children working in agriculture can earn as little as US$1 per day or US$15 per week (LB22; LB21) in the Bekaa Valley and 500-1,000 LBP (around US$0.50) per day in Akkar (LB38). In certain cases, their work in agriculture exempts them from paying rent for the land on which they set up tents. Children aged as young as six years old have been observed working in agricultural fields (LB24). An NGO worker witnessed the case of a boy being locked inside the workplace for 24 hours a day, and the wages were paid directly to the family of the child. The child was in charge of spraying furniture with varnish (LB27), possibly also constituting hazardous work due to the fumes.

Also in Jordan, taking advantage of the fact that children are considered to accept lower wages, employers hire and exploit several child labourers for the same amount that they would pay to hire a single adult worker. Some children work for an average of ten hours per day, for about 50 JOD (US$70) per month (Gharaibeh & Hoeman, 2003; UNICEF & Save the Children, 2014). As in Turkey and Lebanon, Syrian children’s work on farms in Jordan can involve very poor working conditions, excessive working hours, and exposure to pesticides and other chemicals without the necessary health and safety measures. 30% of the children surveyed in an ILO assessment worked for more than eight hours per day. They received very low wages and carried out heavy work constituting worst forms of child labour (ILO Jordan, 2014). Some of them were also subjected to abuse, mainly verbal abuse, but sometimes girls were also sexually harassed in a mixed environment of male and female workers (JO07; JO15).

Working Syrian children are involved in a number of hazardous work activities and worst forms of child labour in Zaatari Camp, the largest refugee camp in Jordan, including internal transportation of goods, loading and moving around gravel for construction purposes, street vending and similar jobs for very low wages and in extremely poor conditions (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2015). In the first months after the establishment of the camp, when camp security was still unstructured, there were reports that children were used to smuggle goods and people in and out of the camp (JO06; JO12). Given that children could move more unnoticed and therefore more freely, a number of adult Syrians and Jordanians
were using the children to smuggle goods and materials across the camp boundaries.

Other reported cases concern the exploitation of the labour of Syrian girls aged 15-17 years, as well as young women aged 18-30 years, at cafés in Irbid in Jordan. The owners of the cafés prefer to employ Syrian girls and women because they are attractive to the male customers who visit the cafés regularly in order to interact with the women and girls. The Syrian girls and women working at cafés are exposed to labour exploitation, with low wages and unsafe working conditions, as well as being exposed to verbal and sexual harassment by male customers (JO15; JO11).

In addition, cases of child labour exploitation identified by UN Women since the outbreak of the Syrian war involved Jordanian, Jordanian Palestinian and Syrian children aged 6-16 years, who commonly have dropped out of school and come from poor, large, fragmented families and female-headed households. Unaccompanied and separated refugee children are particularly at risk of exploitation and abuse (UN Women, 2013). The majority of working Syrian children in Jordan are boys, and while some have completed primary education and can read and write, others have never attended school and are illiterate. Some Syrian children’s work is harmful for the children both physically and psychologically, because as well as being exhausting, while they work, the children are often exposed to beatings, insults and in some cases also to sexual harassment by employers or fellow workers. In some work environments, the children also pick up habits that are damaging to their health, such as smoking cigarettes and using illegal drugs and alcohol (JO15; JO06; JO12).

The UNICEF Humanitarian Affairs Advisor in Jordan explained in an interview for this research that between March 2013 and August 2014, the extent of Syrian refugee children’s engagement in smuggling of goods and people in Zaatari Camp was significant, and at the main entrance to the camp, dozens of children could be seen selling items at the side of the main road; often items given to them and their families as part of Non Food Items packages from aid organisations. The Jordanian authorities, in collaboration with UNICEF, the UNHCR and other organisations working in the camp, addressed these problems by identifying children involved in child labour and smuggling goods, and their families, and implementing activities to mobilise the community to prevent the exploitation of refugee children (JO06).
The Head of the Labour Inspections Department at the CTU highlighted in an interview for this research that both before and since 2011 there have been very few reported cases of child trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation in Jordan (JO18). Other interviewees commented that these forms of child exploitation are not considered, and therefore not reported, as forms of trafficking, but rather as worst forms of child labour (JO13; JO23). According to an NGO report, despite the fact that Jordanian Labour Law prohibits the recruitment of children and their exploitation in hazardous occupations, neither the Labour Law nor the relevant articles of the Jordanian Penal Code stipulate adequate deterrent penalties commensurate with the gravity of recruiting children into hazardous occupations and their exploitation for low wages in inappropriate working conditions (Tamkeen, 2015).

5.3.5 Domestic Servitude

Both prior to and since the Syrian conflict, criticisms have been levelled at the kafala sponsorship system that governs the employment and immigration of foreign domestic workers in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, as well as in the GCC states. For example, a 2013 ILO Study that covered Lebanon and Jordan, as well as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, stated that:

“reliance on the kafala (sponsorship) system is inherently problematic, as it creates an unequal power dynamic between the employer and the worker” (Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013).
A recent article in the *Anti-Trafficking Review* comes to a similar conclusion, considering the *kafala* system to be “extremely detrimental for migrant domestic workers. [...] *Kafala can be conducive to the exaction of forced labour*” (Demetriou, 2015). Similar issues were identified with the Iraqi system governing migrant domestic workers, which renders those whose immigration status becomes irregular liable to fines and imprisonment, rather than protecting them from possible exploitation. The Iraqi Minister of Interior recently issued instructions to contribute to resolving this (IQ17).

The impact of the Syrian war and refugee crisis on this form of trafficking has been minimal, as it continues, with similar characteristics and profiles of trafficked people. People trafficked for this purpose continue to be from countries outside the region, rather than Syrians or nationals of the host countries under study. In Turkey, on the other hand, trafficking for domestic servitude was not found to be a relevant issue.

Nevertheless, while the trafficking of migrant domestic workers within Syria has continued since the outbreak of the war (Lutz, 18 May 2013), due to the security situation in the war-torn country, it is now more difficult to monitor their situation. People trafficked for domestic servitude in Syria are mainly young women aged 18-45 years from Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia) and East Africa (Ethiopia and Sudan) (Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013). Those among this group who are trafficked within Syria are often undocumented, as many used irregular routes due to bans by some of their countries of origin on migrating to Syria for domestic work, as set out in chapter 2 (Kane, 2011).

The requirement of an exit permit from the Syrian government is one of the elements of the *kafala* system in Syria that grants employers full control over the migrant workers, depriving them of the right to terminate their contract and rendering them extremely vulnerable to conditions of labour exploitation and abuse (SY13). The ILO recently requested information about the presence and conditions of Asian migrant domestic workers from the Syrian Ministry of Labour. The Ministry informed the ILO representatives that all the migrant domestic workers who had been in Syria when the conflict started had been repatriated to their countries of origin. However, given the access restrictions that most international organisations face in Syria there was no way for the ILO to verify this claim (SY13).
The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) reported on a wealthy Syrian family in Latakia governorate in Syria who hired a Filipina woman as a domestic worker. Her employers confiscated her mobile phone and passport, she was not allowed to take days off, and she was paid a wage of US$200 per month, which corresponded to half of what she had been promised by the recruiter in Manila. When the conflict began, her employers fled with their children and abandoned the Filipina woman locked in a five-storey villa with two other Filipina migrants. They were unable to contact the Philippines embassy in Damascus and seek evacuation assistance, and so in order to escape, the three women had to climb down the wall of the villa, causing one of the women to break her hip. Once on the street, the three women tried to get a taxi to their embassy, but the taxi driver took them to a police station where they were arrested and detained as undocumented migrants (Torres, 5 August 2012).

Indeed, many migrant women from Southeast Asia and East Africa who were not evacuated and repatriated by their embassies were stuck inside Syria, and many were arrested and detained by the Syrian authorities as undocumented migrants and remained in detention for several months. Some could not contact their embassies, or could not be evacuated without their passports, which had been withheld by their employers or recruitment agencies (SY03).

In an interview with the ITUC, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario explained that it is difficult to locate and repatriate Filipinos from Syria amidst the escalating violence, and added that the repatriation of Filipinos stranded in Syria is complicated by Syrian employers’ demands to be reimbursed for the costs of hiring the migrant workers, in exchange for their signature on the exit permits that the migrants need to leave Syria (Torres, 5 August 2012).

In Lebanon, the Syrian crisis is not generally considered to have had a significant impact on trafficking for domestic servitude, as the kafala system remains in place and Syrians have not replaced other foreign workers in this category (LB03). Syrian women usually move to Lebanon in the company of their families, and are therefore not suited as domestic workers, who are generally required to live full-time at the household where they work. The notable exceptions are non-Syrian domestic workers taken to Lebanon by affluent Syrian families, and former migrant domestic workers – “runaways”- who are in Lebanon irregularly and work independently, especially in the cleaning sector. As many Lebanese families prefer to employ Syrians for cleaning, due to language affinity, this has affected the
possibility of income generation for this group (LB04). A case of domestic servitude involving Palestinian girls from Syria was also reported by a Lebanese NGO working with Palestinians. The girls were exploited in domestic servitude by a Lebanese family and were not allowed to leave the house (LB18).

A Syrian activist interviewed for this Study had been detained in 2012 in a Syrian prison and directly witnessed Syrian prison guards sexually exploiting migrant women who were former domestic workers, in exchange for the money that they needed to survive in detention. In the interview, she recalled the sexual exploitation of hundreds of migrant women who were detained with her:

“When I was arrested and put in the [...] prison, there were three rooms full of foreign domestic workers. They were mostly from Ethiopia, Sudan, Malaysia and Thailand. They were all trafficked: They thought they were going to the Gulf countries, but were trafficked to Syria and they didn’t have their passports. When the violence started in Syria, the regime notified their embassies and asked the embassies to evacuate them back to their countries. However, the embassies didn’t want to pay the cost of flying them outside of Syria and they didn’t pay to place them in hotels, so they were being kept at police stations. Their embassies knew that they were at police stations and prison and sometimes the embassies would send food to them at the prison. [...] Some of them had been living at the police station for a year. In prison, they became prostitutes to be able to buy food and clothes. Only water was free; you had to pay for everything else in prison. The high-ranking police officers were the pimps bringing the customers. The woman and the customer would be taken to a separate room...” (SY03).

In Jordan during 2009-2013, by far the most common form of trafficking officially identified by the Anti-Human Trafficking National Committee was domestic servitude, comprising 38 of all identified cases, as compared to 29 unspecified, 18 forced labour, 5 sexual exploitation and 2 child trafficking (cited in: UNODC, 2014a). In addition, all nine cases recognised by the Jordanian Public Prosecutor as trafficking cases during the first half of 2015 were for the purpose of domestic servitude, involving fifteen women – nine from Bangladesh, three from the Philippines, one Sri Lankan, one Ethiopian and one Jordanian. (JO21).

69 Translated from Arabic by the Country Researcher, S. Özden.
trafficked people continue to be mainly women – and sometimes girls - from Southeast Asia (the Philippines and Indonesia), South Asia (Sri Lanka and Bangladesh), and East Africa (Kenya and Ethiopia), (JO18; JO19; JO23). Therefore, as in Lebanon, this is a form of exploitation that has not been significantly affected by the Syrian war and refugee influx to Jordan.

However, the NGO Tamkeen Fields for Aid has assisted six Indonesian women who had come to Jordan from Qatar, Iraq and Syria between 2005 and 2014 (JO23).

Also in Iraq, NGOs and state interviewees did not perceive an impact on this sector since the baseline date, with victims continuing to come from South and Southeast Asia, subject to detention for irregular migration status (IQ17). A specific case mentioned involved the trafficking of twenty Ghanaian women who had been promised work at hotels in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. They ended up working in private households as domestic workers, subject to exploitative working conditions and sexual harassment. In some cases, they were denied food, and the companies that contracted them withheld their passports (IQ13).

Since the outbreak of the war in Syria, as before the baseline date, migrant women are often deceived by recruitment agents and their intermediaries in their country of origin about the destination, the nature of the job and their working and living conditions in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Hamill, 2011; Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013; JO23; IQ13). A further trafficker in these cases is the private household or labour agency that employs migrant women. Private households in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq were reported to withhold passports and other

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The women who had been in Syria came to Jordan with their Syrian employers, who sought refugee status and took the domestic workers with them, similar to what happened in Lebanon. Once they arrived in Jordan through unofficial BCPs, the Syrian employers abandoned the Indonesian women without their passports, or handed them over to other employers, either brokers or private homeowners. One Indonesian woman had come to Jordan with her Syrian employer and when her employer left Jordan, he made her work in his brother’s house without paying her and without giving her back her passport. Tamkeen’s Director believes that there are more cases similar to those of the Indonesian women trafficked for domestic servitude in countries affected by conflict and crisis, but they have not yet been identified (JO23).
travel documents, as well as a range of employment rights violations including: excessive working hours and lack of rest periods; degrading living conditions; lack of access to suitable clothing, sufficient food, water and healthcare; limited freedom of movement and communication outside of the workplace; threats of psychological, physical and sexual abuse and actual abuse; threats of being reported to the authorities; withholding of wages; and, in Syria, abandoning migrant women amidst the conflict (Harroff-Tavel & Nasri, 2013; JO23; IQ13).

5.3.6 Exploitation through Begging

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons* classifies exploitation through begging as a form of trafficking under the broader category of “forms of exploitation other than forced labour, sexual exploitation or organ removal” (UNODC, 2014). Exploitation through begging is, however, generally considered as a sub-category of forced labour when it affects adults.70 In the case of a child however, it is sufficient to consider a begging case as trafficking if one of the acts has been committed (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons) with the purpose of exploitation through begging (Healy & Piotrowicz, 2013).

In general in the countries under study, there was little awareness of exploitation through begging as a possible form of trafficking. As set out in the Introduction, the act of begging itself is an infraction in most of the countries under study, and the focus of law enforcement and other state authorities is to apprehend people begging, rather than investigate for evidence of exploitation. Newspaper articles in Turkey report on how many begging people are caught by the police, such as: ‘23 Syrian child beggars aged between 8 and 13 were caught by the police’ (Milliyet, 22.02.2013) and ‘5 Syrian child beggars escaped from the police’ (AktifAdana, 22.12. 2014). In Şanlıurfa, the Turkey-Syria Migrant-Host Community Brotherhood Association cooperates with the municipal police to ‘deter children from begging’. When the police identify Syrian refugee children begging in the streets, they bring them to the Association and the children are asked to sign a piece of paper, also with their fingerprint, stating, in Turkish: ‘I promise that I will not beg again. If I do, I will be expelled from Turkey’ [shown to the Country Researcher]. According to

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70 The 1930 ILO Forced Labour Convention no. 29 defines forced labour as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”
interviewees from the Association, this has contributed to “solving” the problem (TR10; TR11).

Similarly in Jordan, husbands and parents go to the courts to bail out their wives and children arrested for begging, as their legal sponsors, and pledge that their family members will not continue begging. The mandate of the Anti-Begging Unit is to identify and stop begging children and adults, though Jordanian law also punishes forcing another person to beg. However, for this clause to be enforced, there must be sufficient evidence and in most cases, children do not state that they have been forced by their parents or other adults to beg (JO20). Also in Iraq, begging situations are not generally considered potential forms of trafficking, and are usually dealt with according to the Penal Code. Children apprehended while begging are usually placed at children’s shelters, from which they commonly run away (IQ17).

Given the very limited evidence and information about begging inside Syria, it is difficult to determine whether the reportedly growing number of women, children and people with disabilities observed begging in regime and opposition-controlled areas inside Syria are trafficked and exploited or engage in begging as a negative coping mechanism on an individual or family basis. Save the Children and UNICEF recently published a report indicating that hundreds of thousands of Syrian IDP children and refugee children in neighbouring countries have no access to schooling and are engaged in worst forms of child labour and begging (July 2015), many of whom may be trafficked for that purpose.

According to the pro-opposition Al-Souria Net website, the regime provided statistics showing that identified begging cases involving mainly women and children in Syria had increased from about 2,000 in 2010 to about 5,000 in 2015. However, it is unclear how these figures were arrived at and whether the types of begging identified were organised by criminal groups, involved low-level exploitation, or were individual or family-based activities. According to the article, the Syrian Ministry of Social Affairs acknowledged a dramatic increase in begging in the country since the beginning of the conflict. In order to respond, a special unit of the police force was set up, called the ‘civil police’, in order to identify, arrest and punish individuals and groups who exploit children, women and disabled people through begging. However, this article does not provide any further information about such cases (Al Souria Net, 14 April 2014).
No victims of trafficking for exploitation through begging were identified in Turkey during the period 2009-2013 (ICMPD, 2013). Although exploitation through begging is not explicitly defined as a form of trafficking under Article 80 of the Turkish Criminal Code, an interviewee from the Ministry of Justice considered that many cases of begging in Turkey might constitute trafficking if investigated properly (TR45). It was also not possible to obtain any detailed information about exploitation through begging in Turkey. What was encountered through research for this Study in Turkey was more general references to exploitative begging. Interviewees referred to the presence of a mafia in Istanbul forcing people to beg (TR12), and the existence of similar network structures in the south and southeast of Turkey (TR08).

In addition, an incident in April 2015 was covered in the media, where video footage showed begging children being held in an outdoor jail-like facility under the Şanlıurfa municipality building (Altun, 21.04.2015). In response to a question on this incident during an interview for this research, the Şanlıurfa municipality police mentioned situations of exploitative begging:

“You need radical measures to deal with these problems. Because it has become such an organised issue, a network of people, bringing some Syrians from Nizip [Gaziantep] to central Urfa [Şanlıurfa], making them beg here all day long” (TR09).

One case reported in Lebanon involved a Syrian man residing in Syria, who sent nine of his children to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to beg, forcing them to bring back at least 10,000 LBP (around US$7) each, under threat of beatings by adult family members. The eldest child reported that the money was used to construct a building in Syria (LB09). Children with disabilities were also mentioned as being rented out for begging purposes, both in Beirut and Tripoli, but this could not be verified (LB11; LB41). A report released in 2015 found that begging intensifies outside the major urban centres of Lebanon, especially in the Bekaa Valley and Akkar (Save the Children, UNICEF & ILO, 2015). This was confirmed by interviewees for this research (LB09; LB36). The 2014 and 2015 TIP Reports mention Syrian children forced to beg on the streets in Lebanon, while the 2015 Report also mentions Lebanese children in this situation (US Department of State, 2014; 2015).

Child begging, like child labour, is listed as and prosecuted under worst forms of child labour rather than as child trafficking in Jordan, despite many cases of child begging presenting elements of trafficking, as children are recruited and
exploited in begging for the benefit of other people. Begging children may spend long hours out of the house and sometimes children are not allowed to go home for days until they have earned the requested amount (JO19; JO20). Although UN Women and other sources suggest that trafficking of children for the purpose of labour exploitation and exploitation in begging in Jordan is high and growing as a result of the Syrian refugee influx (UN Women, 2013), the data provided by the Jordanian Counter-Trafficking Unit (CTU) do not include information on identified victims of child trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation and exploitation in begging.

The Director of the Jordanian Anti-Begging Unit and his staff commented that some cases of begging present exploitative elements and can be considered trafficking in persons, though the cases described, as during the baseline period, all involved Dom children and women of Jordanian and other nationalities, rather than Syrians. The exploiters are Jordanian, but also Syrian, Egyptian, Iraqi and Yemeni Dom/Ghajar people. In other cases, adults and children with amputated limbs are exploited for begging by their own family members, or organised networks transport Jordanians and Palestine refugees from Jordan by car to begging locations (JO19; JO20). The head of one of the begging networks in the Husun Camp in Irbid governorate is a Palestine refugee from Jordan, a man in his late forties who manages a group of about 15 children begging for him. This man takes the children by car in the morning to their designated workplaces and picks them up at night (JO11; JO12; JO15). The trafficker pays each begging child about 2JOD (US$2.80 USD) per day (JO11). The average profit made by a begging child or adult varies between 50 and 200 JOD (US$70-282) per day (JO20; JO19).

In the case of Syrians begging in Jordan, it is generally assumed that this is not exploitative but is rather driven by Syrians’ dire economic need. However, some interviewees still considered trafficking and exploitation of Syrian women, children and disabled people to be taking place in some cases, by husbands, fathers and other male relatives. While begging on the streets, adults and children are exposed to a series of dangers, including being knocked down by cars and being harassed (JO15; JO20; JO19).

No specific information on trafficking for exploitation through begging in Iraq was encountered through this research, though the 2015 TIP Report mentioned criminal gangs subjecting children from Iraqi IDP families to forced begging and other types of forced labour (US Department of State, 2015). An increase in begging was observed by international and national organisations in the KR-I since the Syrian crisis and the more recent arrival of IDPs since mid-2014. However, there
is no research available that examines begging situations in more detail and whether or not there are exploitative elements (IQ12).

5.3.7 Exploitation in Armed Conflict

This section covers exploitation in armed conflict, particularly involving boys. Most of these cases are likely to constitute child trafficking due to evidence of recruitment of children for the purpose of exploitation in armed conflict. The section is organised according to the armed groups involved, with a final note on forms of exploitation in armed conflict that do not involve combat.

A number of official documents and reports from human rights organisations provide evidence of the trafficking of children for exploitation in armed conflict by the different armed factions involved in the Syrian conflict in the governorates of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Raqqa and Dera’a, including the Nusra Front, Da’ish (ISIS/ISIL/IS) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) (Human Rights Council, 16 June 2014; Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2015; Avaneesh, 16 July 2015; UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015). From a review of the available documents, and interviews for this Study, it seems that the regime armed forces and its allied militias; the Nusra Front; and Da’ish almost exclusively exploit boys in armed conflict, while the YPG exploits both boys and girls (SY07; SY08; SY12; UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015; Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2015; Pandey, 16 July 2015). Children are exploited as soldiers, informants, executioners, human shields, suicide bombers and for other support roles in the current conflicts in both Syria and Iraq (UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015; Human Rights Council, 16 June 2014).

Government forces

The Syrian regime’s armed forces have recruited children, and the regime-run Revolutionary Youth and Vanguard Camps were directly responsible for the conscription and training of children and their posting into different pro-regime battalions (National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, 5 August 2015). The UN General Assembly reported that as the armed conflict escalated, government forces used children in military operations as informants to locate opposition fighters, or to act as guards at checkpoints, exposing them to forms of

Targeting Vulnerabilities
retaliation and punishment (UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015). Pro-regime Shia militias used sectarian affiliation and kinship ties, as well as cash incentives and force, in order to recruit adults; it is possible that similar methods have also been used in the recruitment of child soldiers (US Department of State, 2014).

Iraqi government authorities, interviewed for this Study, pointed to the Iraqi law banning military recruitment of children by Iraqi government forces, and considered that any cases mentioned in media reports involve children supporting their families in their fight against Da’ish, and in some cases defending their lives and homes from Da’ish invasions (IQ16).

Islamist groups

Boys were recruited in Syria by Da’ish’s “Cubs of the Caliphate” programme, mostly aged 14-17 years, with some cases of boys as young as 10 years old, from Syria, Iraq and other Muslim-majority countries. These boys are radicalised at Da’ish’s Islamic madrassa schools in northern Syria and Iraq, and promised high returns in cash and kind, in return for being trained to fight, execute prisoners and carry out suicide bombings (Human Rights Council, 16 June 2014; UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015; Avaneesh, 16 July 2015).

In Raqqa, Da’ish mainly recruited the sons of foreign members of the group from Central Asian countries for exploitation in armed conflict, although local Syrian children from Raqqa are also being indoctrinated at Da’ish-run schools. Foreign fighters who arrive in Raqqa with their families are given houses and salaries as mercenaries or new settlers. Da’ish armed men displaced previous residents of Raqqa who have become IDPs in other regions of Syria or have fled abroad. Their houses were then given to foreign fighters and their families along with monetary remuneration for their service as Da’ish militants (SY04). In some cases, especially when Central Asian boys are exploited in armed conflict by Da’ish, they are paid salaries of up to US$400 per month, constituting an incentive for the boys and their parents (Avaneesh, 16 July 2015).

In Da’ish-controlled areas in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zour and Kobane, the use of schools is a key recruitment strategy, as hundreds of Syrian Kurdish and foreign boys as young as 13 years old have been deprived of the right to access education. School facilities have been turned into military recruitment and training centres, where boys are kept in hostage-like conditions and indoctrinated in Da’ish’s extremist religious views and rules, and prepared to take up active combat roles. High-ranking Da’ish
commanders and the fighters training the children are responsible for the abduction and recruitment of children, often without the consent of children’s families, and for their exploitation as child soldiers (UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015).

Also in Iraq, Da’ish and other extremist groups active in both countries have perpetrated trafficking for exploitation of boys and young men in armed conflict, radicalising young men and boys in order to use them in terrorist acts, such as suicide bombings. The groups use deception, radicalisation and offers of money to recruit boys and young men and then transfer them to a new location for training. Authorities in the KR-I apprehended a group affiliated with Da’ish who had recruited people in the KR-I to commit the attack on the US Consulate in Erbil on 18 April 2015 (IQ12). Iraqi Yazidi boys and young men abducted during Da’ish’s attack on the Sinjar area in northwest Iraq were taken to military camps to be trained and indoctrinated in Da’ish’s ideology in order to be exploited in armed conflict, under threat of death (IQ14; IQ17).

One interviewee estimated that in the governorate of Dera’a alone, the Nusra Front recruits around 2,000 boys for exploitation in armed conflict each year. The boys are aged 10-17 years and are attracted by the promise of large amounts of money if they fight for one of the Nusra Front platoons. These boys are mainly local Syrian children from Dera’a and IDP children from Damascus, Homs and other cities who are displaced in the Dera’a governorate and whose families are destitute after four-and-a-half years of conflict, especially in areas under siege and in IDP camps. Many of the boys from Dera’a exploited in armed conflict are in Syria alone, as most of their family members have fled to neighbouring countries, while the boys remained in Dera’a to protect the family home from looting and destruction. Other child victims of this form of trafficking are still with their family members who live in IDP settlements (SY12).

Nusra Front commanders order junior officers and military trainers who are in contact with some civilian recruiters in rural areas, such as Shajara in Dera’a, to recruit Syrian boys for exploitation in armed conflict. The recruiters approach boys in front of their homes, schools or government housing complexes hosting IDPs, and convince the boys to join the armed faction in exchange for money. Word of mouth between boys and young men from the same neighbourhood is also used to convince them to join the armed group, with boys being told that if they join the fight against the regime forces, they will be paid good wages. The boys then go to the military bases that train children, such as the Yarmouk Martyrs Camp, the biggest child soldier military training camp of the Nusra Front-controlled area in the governorate of Dera’a. Boys as young as 12 years old are trained for two months
to handle weapons and then they are sent to fight along with adult men at the frontline, as well as working as cooks and transporting injured people or supplies such as water (SY12).

Many boys were killed or permanently injured while fighting. Once they are recruited and trained, they cannot return to their families, because they know secret military information that cannot be leaked outside of the armed faction. Therefore, boys who desert their platoons risk being detained and executed by Nusra Front commanders. The wages of a child soldier fighting in one of the Nusra Front platoons in Dera’a varies between 25,000 and 75,000 SYP (around US$132-397) (SY12).

**Kurdish groups**

Cases of recruitment of children and their exploitation as child soldiers were also documented in the Syrian areas controlled by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its affiliated political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), who are present in Hasakah governorate, parts of Aleppo governorate and other Kurdish-run areas in northern Syria (Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2015). Testimonies were given to the UN General Assembly (5 February 2015) about Syrian Kurdish children aged 14-17 years, both boys and girls, who were recruited by the YPG in its mass mobilisation to defend Kobane (Ayn Al-Arab) from Da’ish in 2014 and 2015.

The male and female recruitment sections of the YPG recruited and exploited these children, sometimes without the knowledge and consent of their families, and a large but unknown number of child soldiers were injured or killed (UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015). Despite a stated commitment to demobilise child soldiers, YPG commanders continued to recruit and exploit children in military functions through a policy of recruiting older children aged 16-17 years and training them for ‘non-combat roles’ as scouts, couriers and armed guards at checkpoints. These children are at risk of being caught and executed by rival armed factions, as they are considered spies (Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2015).

In Turkey, there have also been reports of the use of boys in armed conflict by armed groups related to the Kurdistan Workers Party’ (PKK) (Sever et al., 2012). According to sources from the Turkish security forces recently cited in the Turkish media, the PKK abducted and recruited around 2,000 children aged 12-17 from August 2013 to August 2015. Between 2013 and 2015, at least 410 children
are reported to have fled and surrendered to Turkish security forces. It is estimated that there are around 10,000 child soldiers altogether fighting for the PKK (Çakmak & Bulur, 20 February 2015). Nevertheless, no research informants for this study in Turkey reported cases of trafficking for exploitation in armed conflict or terrorist activities.

Other groups

In Lebanon, while the Syrian crisis does not appear to have created new networks for the involvement of children in armed conflict, the number of victims of this form of trafficking has risen due to the crisis. Similarly to before the Syrian war, recruitment of children into armed groups is driven by the engagement of family members or peers already in these armed groups, especially in areas affected by sectarian tensions in Tripoli (LB42) and Arsal in the Bekaa Valley (LB24).

The Palestinian refugee camp of Ayn al-Helweh in Lebanon, where tensions have escalated based on pro- and anti-Hezbollah positions, has not seen the emergence of new groups, as the groups already there have prevented any possible competition. Palestinians from Syria and Syrians who have sought refuge in the camp have been at risk of recruitment, both because of their vulnerability and because they were not affiliated with any group upon their arrival in Lebanon, as it is relatively common for boys to be recruited into armed groups in Ayn al-Helweh. One leader of an armed group is in his early twenties, and all of his fighters are younger than him. Memorial pictures of ‘martyrs’ in Ayn al-Helweh show that many of them were below 18 years old. Families usually receive money in return for the participation of their sons in armed groups, although the precise amounts are unknown. Groups may disguise their recruitment as ‘educational programmes’, even though boys are seen to carry weapons (LB34).

An increase in the exploitation of boys in armed conflict has also been reported in Palestinian refugee camps around the southern city of Tyre (Sour), due to growing tensions between groups within the camp. In the south of Lebanon, an increase in recruitment into other groups outside camps, like Hezbollah, has not been observed, although the party-cum-militia and other armed groups have a recruitment system in place that may target older children (LB19).

According to a recent UNICEF and Save the Children report, one in three children in the Kurdistan region of Iraq has been approached for recruitment into
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armed conflict (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2015). Children were reportedly also subject to kidnapping as well as exploitation in armed conflict, “including as human shields, informants, bomb makers, and suicide bombers”, with some of the children as young as 8 years old and some suffering from mental disabilities (US Department of State, 2015).

Non-combat forms of exploitation in armed conflict

Other forms of exploitation related to the armed conflict involve kidnapping and hostage-taking, and forced military labour. A number of cases of kidnapping for ransom have been reported in Syria, both in the areas under the control of the regime in the outskirts of the cities of Latakia and Tartous, in areas controlled by armed opposition groups, and on the main road from Homs to Damascus. The victims are often young Syrian adult male combatants in the regime’s army, but there are also reports of entire families of civilian hostages, including women, children and elderly people, being kidnapped in order to ask for ransom or for the release of opposition fighters (SY08; SY06; UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015). It is difficult to establish whether the perpetrators are parties to the conflict raising funds through kidnapping operations or organised criminal groups taking advantage of the lack of security and rule of law in the war-torn country to engage in profiteering (UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015).

In 2013, there were reports of a number of cases of Syrian women and children related to opposition fighters being kidnapped in the Homs, Idlib and Dera’a governorates by regime armed forces in order to pressure their adult male relatives to surrender or force them to release prisoners during exchanges. In Homs, fake real estate offices were reported by a Syrian human rights activist as used by both pro and anti-government armed groups as a venue for the exchange of kidnapped women or ransom payments. She is cited in Nasar (2013: 21) describing these offices as serving exclusively:

“to secure the exchange of money and people. Each kidnapped woman has an exchange value of 5 male prisoners, and each prisoner has an exchange value of 70,000 Syrian pounds. Before these offices existed, the majority of abduction cases would end with the victim being killed during the exchange”.

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Regime armed forces and members of the armed opposition groups Nusra Front and Da’ish have been implicated in such kidnappings, both in areas under the control of the regime and in areas controlled by non-state armed groups (Nasar 2013; UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015).

A ransom demand of 5 million SYP (around US$26,500) was reported in a kidnapping case from mid-2014 in Damascus, though the ransom actually paid for the release of the kidnapping victim, an adult male taxi-driver, was 1.5 million SYP (around US$8,000) (UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015). The ransom demand apparently depends on the perceived wealth of the victim’s family, and in some cases can be as high as 15 million SYP (around US$79,455) (SY08). According to data gathered by the US Treasury, during 2014 alone, Da’ish raised at least US$20 million in ransom payments extorted from the families of kidnapping victims passing through or living in areas under its full or partial control (BBC, 8 October 2015).

The *modus operandi* of some of these kidnappers was described as follows:

“In late June, two soldiers returning from home leave were kidnapped at the Tel Brak checkpoint (Al Hasakah). Shortly afterwards, a group claiming to be the Islamic Front contacted the family, provided proof of life, and demanded a high ransom. As the family was unable to raise the necessary funds to meet the group’s demands, in July 2014, the group informed the family that they were selling the soldiers to ISIS [Da’ish] in Ar Raqqah. ISIS later released a video purporting to show the execution of the two soldiers” (UN General Assembly, 5 February 2015).
One specific case was reported in Lebanon, in which a girl was forced to move between Syria and Lebanon for the purpose of exchanging messages between allied armed groups in Syria and Lebanon, though it was not possible to verify it with more than one source (LB29). Although the US TIP Report refers to “anecdotal information” from international organisations on the recruitment of children for exploitation in armed conflict “in support roles” in Iraq, the US State Department was not able to verify this (US Department of State, 2015).

5.3.8 Sexual Slavery and Forced Marriage (by Da’ish)

“Slavery or practices similar to slavery” are among the forms of exploitation explicitly included in Article 3 of the UN Trafficking Protocol, which defines trafficking in persons, as set out in chapter one of this Study. Sexual slavery can be understood as holding a person captive in order to force them to commit sexual acts. During 2014 and 2015, Da’ish perpetrated severe forms of trafficking, including for slavery, forced marriage and exploitation in armed conflict, particularly targeting Iraqi Yazidi people. This followed the group’s military expansion into parts of northeast Syria, and northwest Iraq. The cases of exploitation in armed conflict have been dealt with in the previous section, while this section focuses on trafficking for forced marriage and sexual slavery by Da’ish. One of the interviewees for this research in Iraq, himself a member of the Iraqi Yazidi community, provided detailed information about Da’ish’s trafficking of Iraqi Yazidis, as he has carefully documented the events (IQ14). The Yazidi people practice a syncretic religion derived from the Persian Zoroastrian philosophy (Jalabi, 11 August 2014).

Da’ish, also known as ISIS, ISIL or IS, is an extremist Salafist Sunni militant group formed in April 2013 as a breakaway faction of the Islamist jihadist group Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Its members follow a version of the Wahhabi doctrine, and it is mainly funded through the smuggling of crude oil stolen from Iraqi oil wells to Turkey and Syria, and the selling of stolen artefacts, as well as ransom from kidnappings (IQ17; BBC, 8 October 2015). The actual size of the armed group is unknown, but it is reported that there are around 20,000-32,000 members from the Middle East and further afield. During 2014 and 2015, Da’ish seized control of swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria, from the Iraqi capital Baghdad to Tadmour (Palmyra) in central Syria (BBC, 8 October 2015).
In early August 2014, around 2,500-3,000 Iraqi Yazidi people fled to Mount Sinjar to seek safety from an attack by Da’ish. Mount Sinjar is located close to Iraq’s border with Syria, in the governorate of Nineveh in northwest Iraq (IQ14; SY01; Callimachi, 13 August 2015; US Department of State, 2015). Da’ish militants besieged the mountain, leaving the people there isolated with no food and no medicine. The siege was followed by the murder of many of the men and the trafficking for forced marriage and sexual slavery, by means of abduction, of mainly unmarried women and girls aged 11-35 years, from the Yazidi religious minority. Based on the interviewee’s detailed records, a total of 1,629 people were rescued from Da’ish, comprising 267 girls, 262 boys, 760 women and 340 men. A total of 1,137 people were murdered, and a total of 3,314 people were abducted (IQ14). An Iraqi Federal government interviewee referred to statistics from the KR-I as recording 773 Iraqi Yazidi survivors of the Da’ish attacks, among whom a significant proportion had been trafficked (IQ17).

A group of 99 Iraqi Yazidi and 31 Iraqi Shabak people who escaped from Da’ish reported being subjected to torture, and, in the case of some women and girls, extreme psychological and sexual violence, including rape (IQ14; Callimachi, 13 August 2015; The Guardian, 9 June 2015). In addition, the surviving men and boys were exploited in armed conflict, as set out in the previous section, and many of the women and girls were subjected to forced marriage to members of Da’ish.

The militants transported the women and children in groups of around 100 in the back of trucks, taking some of them to Tall Afer in Nineveh, while the others were taken to Badoush Prison in Mosul. Some of the women and girls were subjected...
to sexual slavery by Da’ish leaders in Mosul, while others were transported to other Da’ish-controlled areas in Iraq and Syria for the purposes of sexual slavery (IQ14). The women and girls were considered spoils of war, referred to as ‘*sabaya*’ (slaves) and sold at slave markets in Da’ish-controlled areas. Some women and girls reported being sold from one fighter to another for values varying from a few thousand dollars to a packet of cigarettes (*The Guardian*, 9 June 2015).

Eventually, Kurdish groups, including the Syrian YPG, opened a corridor between Mount Sinjar and the Syrian border, allowing some Iraqi Yazidi people to escape to Syrian territory and then return to the KR-I through the Peshkhabour (IQ) – Khanik (SY) border crossing point (IQ14). A number of women and girls who escaped from captivity under Da’ish died through suicide, while others are banned from returning to their families. Many experienced health issues such as heavy bleeding, sexually transmissible diseases and unwanted pregnancies. The majority of these women and girls are suffering from severe trauma, though they have not received psychological treatment or other assistance from the government (IQ14; IQ17; Callimachi, 13 August 2015; *The Guardian*, 9 June 2015). One research informant also pointed to the need to investigate the cases of victims internationally trafficked from Iraq to other countries by Da’ish (IQ17).

### 5.3.9 Illegal Adoption

The *Travaux Préparatoires* for the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime and its supplementary protocols establish that illegal adoption is one of the forms of exploitation covered by the Trafficking Protocol, if it constitutes a
practice similar to slavery, as defined in article 1(d) of the 1956 UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery:

“Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.”

It should be clarified that it was not possible to obtain sufficient information on the cases set out in this section in order to determine whether the exploitation of the child’s labour was the purpose of the illegal adoption. Nevertheless, they are included here due to the possibility of this taking place, together with the fact that a for-profit illegal adoption falls under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, which defines the sale of a child as:

“any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration”.

As the UN Trafficking Protocol provides a non-exhaustive list of forms of exploitation, sale of a child in the form of illegal adoption is considered relevant here.

Most informants interviewed in the countries under study had not come across cases of children trafficked for the purpose of illegal adoption. However, the significant number of unaccompanied refugee children and unregistered new births amongst Syrians are considered as indicators of vulnerability of these children to trafficking for the purpose of illegal adoption. The situation of these vulnerable groups has been discussed in more detail in section 4.3 above.

Evidence of trafficking for illegal adoptions, particularly inter-country adoptions, was found only in Lebanon through research for this Study. Almost all of the interviewees in Turkey stated that they had neither heard of nor directly witnessed any cases of illegal adoption. According to an interviewee from the Ministry of Justice, this form of trafficking is one of the most under-researched topics in Turkey (TR45). It should also be noted that adoption in general outside of the extended family is not common in the countries under study and outside of the Christian communities in Lebanon. Nevertheless, legal regulations preventing adoption result in many adoptions in some Muslim communities being irregular or informal adoptions (Stoughton, 2013).
Lebanon, on the other hand, has a history of trafficking for illegal adoption from the times of the civil war, as set out in chapter 2 above. Adoption is allowed in Christian communities in Lebanon. While there have been few reported cases of illegal adoption in Lebanon since early 2011, informants for this research raised concerns that the phenomenon may be on the rise due to the Syrian crisis. Some of the elements of the illegal adoption system that existed during the civil war are believed to be still in place today, which sparks concerns about the current situation.

In early 2015, the media reported on a criminal network selling babies in the Bekaa Valley. Women and girls were given up to US$10,000 to get pregnant and sell the babies after delivery (LB22). In 2013 and 2014 in Akkar, it was reported that groups of people were approaching refugees to convince them to sell their children (LB38).

Evidence of a certain demand for illegal adoption was also found in Lebanon through this research. Badael, an NGO that works in the field of illegal adoption, reported that between 2012 and 2015, seven non-Lebanese couples contacted the NGO in the hopes that it could facilitate an inter-country adoption from Lebanon (LB06). In 2015, a local NGO working in the Bekaa Valley reported four cases in which divorced or widower men with children were asked to sell their newborn babies or young children for high sums of money (LB09). Another NGO, working with victims of sexual exploitation, reported several cases of Lebanese and foreign couples who requested that the NGO facilitate an adoption through an unofficial process (LB46). Similarly, one interviewee from a local humanitarian relief organisation in Adana in Turkey mentioned that some Turkish families had approached the association seeking to adopt Syrian children, but the association did not get involved (TR02).

The media also reported in early 2015 on an illegal adoption agency in Lebanon that convinced migrant domestic workers to give up their babies for illegal adoptions in exchange for facilitating their return to their home country or financial compensation. Two Lebanese doctors were also involved in the case (Osseiran, 28 January 2015). In addition, a Lebanese NGO reported cases of women forced into prostitution who did not want to keep their babies and sold them (LB46).

Interviewees working on this issue agree that the system currently used the most for illegal adoption in Lebanon involves the participation of a hospital, or a midwife if it is a home birth (LB13; LB31). The hospital registers the biological mother under the name of the adoptive mother, who stays in the hospital as if she was going to
give birth. The individuals and institutions involved in this process include: doctors, nurses, midwives and *mukhtars* (as they sign the birth registration). If the adoptive couple is non-Lebanese and the child needs a passport to travel abroad with them, this is issued by the General Security (LB06). Another *modus operandi* concerning illegal adoption involves criminal gangs who buy and sell children. Some cases of this second type have been reported to NGOs by Syrians, although it is not known whether traffickers were interested in buying the children for the purpose of illegal adoption or for other purposes, such as organ trafficking.

Little information is available on the specific profits made by traffickers from the sale of babies and illegal adoptions. A media report suggests that the price of a Lebanese child in inter-country adoption is around US$75,000 (Stoughton, 9 September 2013). According to a relevant NGO, however, rumours among the Syrian community in Lebanon suggest that the price for a Syrian child is around **US$1,500**. Syrian children are considered to be among the cheapest, together with children of migrant domestic workers. Prices for boys are reported to be higher than prices for girls (LB06).

Though it is not clear whether illegal adoption was involved, in 2015, the Iraqi Central Committee on Counter-Trafficking (CCCT) recorded cases of the sale of children. Five Iraqi adults, both men and women and all aged around 30, were suspected of trafficking for the sale of a child. In another case, two Iraqi women, aged 58 and 40, were suspected of attempting to sell a 3-year-old child. One Iraqi woman was accused of attempting to sell her own child, who was reportedly born of an extramarital relationship (IQ17).

### 5.3.10 Organ Removal

**There is little evidence of trafficking for organ removal in the countries under study.**

Concerns related to organ trafficking in **Lebanon** were mainly based on rumours and media reports. One interviewee reported rumours of Syrian people willing to sell their kidneys in order to cope with medical bills for members of their families who were not registered with UNHCR and were unable to go to Syria to undergo surgery (LB07). Another interviewee reported cases where single women with children or families in financial difficulties were offered sums of money in exchange for a child’s kidney (LB09).
On the other hand, trafficking for organ removal is a specific concern for people, mainly Palestinians from Syria, who use migrant smugglers to migrate to Europe through Sudan and Libya, as they may get kidnapped in the Western Desert in Sudan and Libya. If ransoms are not paid, they may become victims of trafficking for organ removal. One case was reported of a Palestinian woman from Syria travelling with her child, who was not able to pay the US$3,500 ransom requested and disappeared (LB18), though further details about this case were not available.

In Jordan, although trafficking for the removal of organs appears in the CTU’s statistics, no information was available from other sources or research informants. Statistics shared by the Jordanian CTU for this Study showed no cases of trafficking for removal of organs during the first half of 2015, but during 2014, the CTU recorded five such cases, involving four male victims and eight male offenders, and during 2013, the Unit recorded three cases involving three male victims and six male offenders. All of the victims covered in the statistics were adults (Counter-Trafficking Unit, Department of Studies and Statistics, Government of Jordan, June 2015).

An overview of trafficking cases referred to the Iraqi Central Committee on Counter-Trafficking (CCCT) during the period April – September 2015 and shared for this Study shows a preponderance of cases of organ trafficking, some of which involve trafficking for organ removal. During 2014 and 2015, according to the Kurdistan Independent Commission for Human Rights, two cases of internal trafficking for organ removal were reported in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The first involved an Iraqi boy who was taken by his
elder brother from Kirkuk to Erbil, and there his brother and a gang member whom his brother worked with removed his kidney. The other case involved an adult Iraqi man who travelled from Baghdad to the KR-I to sell his kidney because of his difficult financial situation. A gang then removed his kidney, and deceived him by giving him significantly less money than what had been agreed upon (IQ12).

In some cases of organ trafficking, it was not clear whether trafficking in persons was involved. Two Iraqi men, aged 24 and 20 years old, claimed that their uncle is a trafficker for organ removal and trafficked one of them to Iran for that purpose, on the pretext of a holiday. Another four Iraqi men, including a medical doctor, a laboratory analyst and a dealer, were suspected of involvement in a criminal group trafficking in organs and operating in Al Karama Teaching Hospital in Baghdad for at least the past two years. Similarly, a 27-year-old Iraqi man was suspected of being an intermediary for organ trafficking to Al Khayal, a private hospital in Baghdad, including kidneys. The other cases reported involved people who were suspected of selling their own organs; two Iraqi men, aged 36 and 26 years, who sold their kidneys, in one case for 7 million ID (around US$6,300); and a 22-year-old Iraqi man and a Palestinian man suspected of selling kidneys (IQ17).

5.3.11 Exploitation in Criminal Activities

Similarly, little evidence was found on trafficking for exploitation in criminal activities, other than exploitation in armed conflict, in the countries under study. Nevertheless, it should be noted that prostitution is illegal in all five countries (de facto in Lebanon), and in all countries except Turkey, begging is an offence. The evidence that was found involved groups other than Syrian refugees or IDPs. Although there were some cases in which Syrians were involved in criminal activities, it was not possible to determine whether exploitation was involved.

One exception was an incident of children trafficked for the sale of illicit drugs covered in the Lebanese media, involving different nationalities including Syrian children (LB07). However, data from the Lebanese Ministry of Justice show that theft is the most frequent cause for prison sentences among Syrian prisoners (LB50). An interviewee for this Study in Lebanon, who runs a shelter for at-risk children, had identified a number of cases in which children were exploited to sell illicit drugs, by drug traffickers from Lebanon, either Lebanese or Palestinian (LB31).
The Jordanian Government’s Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD) investigated drug trafficking in Zaatari Refugee Camp (JO06), and some research informants mentioned a number of Syrian refugees who had been detained in Jordanian security facilities because they were caught engaging in organised drug and weapons smuggling into Jordan and/or into Syria (JO17; JO13). There is, however, no information about the profiles of these refugees and it is unclear whether they were members of armed groups involved in the conflict in Syria, small-scale criminals, or trafficked people recruited by transnational criminal groups in order to smuggle weapons and drugs across Syria and Jordan.
The conflict in Syria began more than four years ago, and Syria and Iraq have also experienced further violence due to the battle by various different groups against Da’ish. The research findings of this Study were drawn upon to reach conclusions about the effects of the Syrian war and refugee situation on trafficking in persons in the five countries under study: Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. This Study has shown that the five countries most affected by the conflict and refugee movement have made significant efforts to respond to the displacement of IDPs and refugees. However, the incidence of trafficking in persons, and the nature and magnitude of vulnerabilities to trafficking, have been affected in a number of ways. These effects are partly related to the sheer magnitude of the displacement – 6.6 million people displaced within Syria and around 4 million registered Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries – and partly to the legal, policy, infrastructural, security and socio-economic contexts in the countries under study.

Some of the vulnerabilities and trafficking cases analysed in this Study are specific to the context of the Syrian war and refugee movement since 2011, while others are also relevant to many other war and refugee situations, or, indeed, are in evidence in countries and regions not affected by wars or mass displacement. While taking into account ongoing debates, research and policy development on refugees, trafficking, migration in the context of crises and other related topics, the Conclusions presented here are drawn exclusively from the research findings of this Study.

The implications of the research findings for responses to trafficking and vulnerabilities to trafficking, including concrete recommendations, will be further discussed and analysed during the dissemination phase of this project (the first half of 2016), in order to avail of specific expertise on these issues in the countries under study, and at an international level.

The Conclusions of the research refer to the nature of trafficking and exploitation that is taking place in the countries under study; and to the factors that influence vulnerabilities to trafficking in persons. These Conclusions, in turn, form the basis for the Recommendations in the following chapter. The presentation of the Conclusions follows the structure of the Study.
Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons

➤ One of the principal conclusions is that the classic organised crime paradigm commonly used for understanding trafficking does not fit neatly onto the actual situation of people trafficked or vulnerable to trafficking in the context of the Syrian conflict. Very severe forms of exploitation and trafficking are indeed taking place, committed by highly organised criminal networks, but the most common type of exploitation is at a lower level, involving fathers, mothers, husbands, extended family, acquaintances and neighbours. This is particularly in evidence in cases of:

- forced marriage;
- sexual exploitation by means of forced marriage;
- child labour exploitation in agriculture; and
- exploitation of children through begging.

Though family members are frequently involved in these forms of exploitation and trafficking, much caution needs to be taken before defining families as traffickers. Indeed, there are often factors that leave families with no viable alternative for survival other than situations that could be defined as exploitation and trafficking according to national and international law.

➤ Many of the forms of trafficking that are prevalent in the context of the war and refugee situation were also in evidence prior to 2011, as is clear from chapter 2 of this Study. The practice of temporary (muta’h) or tourist (mishyar) marriages was a feature of trafficking for forced marriage, forced marriage, and trafficking for sexual exploitation by means of forced marriage before the war, but its incidence has substantially increased.

➤ Worst forms of child labour, child trafficking for labour exploitation, exploitation through begging and trafficking for sexual exploitation were forms of trafficking that affected people in the countries under study before the war, but they have now increased among Syrians, often simply because of the far larger Syrian populations in host countries since 2011. Particularly in the case of sexual exploitation, a certain replacement effect is in evidence, with Syrian women and girls being exploited in prostitution, where before people trafficked for this purpose were of other nationalities from outside the region.
Conclusions

Child labour and child begging have been affected in the sense that conditions have become more severe, with more serious abuses of child rights, particularly as work and begging are no longer confined to school holidays and reconciled for children with regular school attendance. The incidence of these phenomena has also increased overall.

Some forms of trafficking have emerged that are directly related to the war. This is the case for trafficking by Da’ish for sexual slavery, forced marriage and exploitation in armed conflict, particularly of Yazidi people, but also of other groups; and is also the case for forced marriage and exploitation in armed conflict by other parties in the Syrian war. The other forms that are specifically related to the conflict are kidnapping for ransom and military forced labour.

Furthermore, war widows and other women and children who, due to the war, are no longer in the company of a male adult family member, are particularly vulnerable. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the high rates of sexual and gender-based violence because of the war, and discrimination against women, particularly in the labour market.

In most of the cases revealed through this research, trafficking is not a cross-border phenomenon related to the migratory movement itself, though cross-border trafficking is present in some cases. In general however, the forms of trafficking in evidence target the vulnerabilities caused by this displacement post facto, with the trafficking process beginning when IDPs and refugees are already among host communities. This constitutes internal trafficking inside the borders of one country - within the area in which displaced people are based, or between regions within the same country. Traffickers, in turn, are not always from abroad; they may be from the country where the trafficked person is exploited, though they may also be from Syria in the case of host countries, from GCC countries, or from other countries of origin of trafficked people, even if the trafficking process begins in the country of destination.

Nevertheless, not all forms of human trafficking have been influenced by the Syrian crisis. Indeed, the trafficking of migrants - most of them women - for exploitation in domestic servitude continues, and was only marginally affected by
the refugee crisis in the host countries, with the arrival of migrant domestic workers to some of the host countries in the company of more affluent Syrian refugees.

However, within Syria, since the start of the conflict in 2011, some migrant domestic workers continue to be exploited in domestic servitude, instead of being evacuated by the embassies of their home countries, and some women were exposed to further violence and exploitation in a Syrian detention facility.

The benefits received by traffickers or exploiters are not always in the form of money. Indeed in a number of cases observed, a child or adult was exploited in return for an in-kind transaction, such as:

- sponsorship;
- authorisation to move out of a refugee camp;
- physical protection;
- in-kind assistance;
- cross-border migrant smuggling;
- facilitation of internal movement;
- passage through a security checkpoint; or
- accommodation.

This situation of humanitarian emergency has also led to women and girls being involved in ‘survival sex’, whereby a person, usually a man, who controls access to something that the woman or girl needs, compels the woman or girl to have sex with him in order to gain this access. In addition, the discriminatory and politicised distribution of humanitarian assistance in some areas within Syria has exacerbated the vulnerability of certain IDP groups and communities to abuse and exploitation, forcing them to give their daughters in marriage to fighters or to join armed factions in order to obtain protection and access to the financial and material assistance necessary to sustain themselves and their families.

Despite the empirical findings of this Study that there is a significant incidence of various forms of trafficking taking place as a result of the war, Syrians are not being identified by the authorities as victims of trafficking in the five countries under study, other than to a minimal extent. Indeed, if one were to base an analysis on official trafficking statistics alone, the conclusion would be that the effects of the war and refugee crisis on trafficking in persons have been negligible. This is also
related to the generally low identification of particular forms of trafficking, such as forced marriage, exploitation in armed conflict and exploitation through begging, and of trafficking in general. Among some anti-trafficking actors and other relevant organisations, knowledge and capacity on trafficking in persons present gaps that prevent the effective identification of trafficked people, particularly those fleeing the Syrian war.

However, there are other reasons for this under-reporting. Syrians in many cases are afraid to report a crime to the authorities because of their legal status, and, as a general challenge particularly for girls, women and LGBT people, societal norms discourage them from speaking up about sexual exploitation and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. Syrians are often not aware of their rights and duties in host countries. In addition, prosecutors in the countries under study may take a case against a trafficked person for prostitution, begging or militancy, rather than prosecuting their trafficker for TIP.

Situations of Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons

None of the host countries grants Convention refugee status to Syrians, as they have either not ratified the UN Refugee Convention, or apply geographical limitations that exclude Syrians. As a consequence, the forms of status that Syrian refugees have been granted since 2011 in the hosting countries under study do not yet generally allow adults to work regularly, which is a major challenge in terms of theirs and their children’s resilience to exploitation and trafficking. A prevalent underlying situation that contributes to trafficking situations, as well as to vulnerability to trafficking, is therefore complications in relation to legal status in the host countries under study, and in relation to legal authorisation to work. This is often compounded by a lack of availability of jobs and other possibilities for income generation in order to survive in the host countries, and in Syria this concern is paramount.

Legal status also affects access to essential services in some of the countries under study, and, in some cases, affects movement within a host country, due to the presence of security checkpoints and checkpoints at entrances to refugee camps. Sponsorship programmes governing residence permits for Syrian refugees also affect legal status in certain host countries, and may cause vulnerability to abuse. Moreover, refugees who are in a situation where their residence or the fact
that they work in a host country is not authorised will fear reporting any abuse to the authorities, as they may risk detention, deportation and other penalties.

The vast majority of Syrians are not living in official IDP or refugee camps in the countries under study, which affects their access to essential humanitarian aid and other services like education, accommodation, vocational training and healthcare. The research findings show that non-camp Syrian populations are subject to additional vulnerabilities to trafficking due to this lack of access to humanitarian aid and basic services, and lesser attention overall in terms of international aid.

Host communities have also been affected by the war and displacement in the countries under study, particularly the areas within each of the countries that have received higher proportions of internally displaced people and refugees: northern Syria; south and southeast Turkey; Akkar, the Bekaa Valley and Beirut and Mount Lebanon in Lebanon; northern Jordan and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), as shown in Map 5 below. Though a resulting increase in the incidence of trafficking is not yet in evidence, this may also render people in those areas more vulnerable to trafficking.

The effects on local populations may also contribute to tensions between host communities and Syrian refugee or IDP communities, exacerbating the latter’s vulnerability due to potential discrimination in the labour market and access to essential services. In the hosting countries, this situation has been acknowledged, and efforts are underway to include host communities in programmes to alleviate the humanitarian situation in those areas.
A multitude of child protection issues arise in the context of the conflict and the refugee crisis, particularly children remaining out of school and not having birth registration, placing them more at risk of being trafficked, as well as in themselves constituting violations of basic child rights.

Some schools in areas with a high population density of Syrians operate with two shifts per day in order to provide the additional school places needed, but education capacities in many areas in all five countries are overwhelmed, with children’s school attendance suffering. Lack of legal status for adults also has an impact on their children’s access to education. Furthermore, in Syria, some schools have been occupied by armed groups and transformed into child soldier recruitment and training spaces, facilitating child trafficking for exploitation in armed conflict by the groups fighting in the war.

The administrative procedure necessary for the registration of new births among Syrian families in Syria and in host countries is prohibitive for many of those families, in terms of logistics and/or cost. Children out of school and children without birth registration are more vulnerable to trafficking, exploitation and additional child rights violations.
In the context of people’s flight from Syria, children may become separated from their parents and other caregivers. Some children are therefore arriving in the host countries from Syria as separated or unaccompanied children. Measures have been put in place to deal with this situation, including family tracing, family reunification and foster care, but until a sustainable solution in the best interests of each child is found for each case, these children are more at risk of exploitation and other child rights abuses, including – though not limited to – child labour, particularly for boys, and early marriage, particularly for girls.

Due to the current situation of Syrian IDPs and refugees in the countries under study, as well as the lack of prospects for improvement in these conditions in the near future, some refugees and displaced people have started to move on to countries outside the region, particularly European Union (EU) Member States. While they are still within the five countries, the need to pay substantial sums of money - and possibly become indebted - to facilitators of internal movement and migrant smugglers in order to move further afield is causing people to resort to risky methods of obtaining that money, rendering them vulnerable to trafficking. For those who leave the countries under study in order to seek asylum in an EU country, there is no safe and regular method of travelling.

The internal migration routes, irregular and regular migration routes within and between the countries under study, and irregular migration routes to the EU, all present risks to the safety and security of Syrian and Iraqi refugees, and children, women and men of other nationalities, or stateless, who are intending to seek refuge in the EU. One major risk is that a situation of internal movement facilitation or migrant smuggling can develop into one of trafficking in persons.

The war and displacement has caused added vulnerability for migrant and refugee groups whose situation was already precarious prior to 2011 and who were in Syria when the war broke out, including:

- Palestinian refugees from Syria;
- Iraqi refugees;
- Stateless people;
- Refugees of other origins, particularly from Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia;
- Migrant domestic workers from South and Southeast Asia and East Africa.
Because humanitarian measures and legal provisions for protection of refugees and IDPs often aim to protect Syrian citizens, these other groups have been overlooked. This is despite the fact that they have also been displaced by the war and are affected by similar vulnerabilities to those of Syrian IDPs and refugees.

The overriding conclusion of this Study is that **the effects of the war and refugee situation on trafficking in persons are driven by the affected people’s lack of means to meet their basic needs**, as a key element of a lack of durable solutions for Syrian refugees. They have left their homes, jobs and schools in their area of origin in Syria. They desperately need to find new homes, new sources of income and education for their children. They are likely to have been subject to the trauma of violence and the loss of family members and friends, and are in urgent need of physical and mental healthcare. In many cases, even if they have a legal right, there are simply no jobs, accommodation or school places available, and public services such as healthcare are overwhelmed. Many are living in regions under the control of armed groups in Syria and Iraq, and states and regions at war face serious challenges in providing for basic needs, let alone protecting people from trafficking.

Basic needs also include the right to live in safety, and to be able to plan for the future. Neither of these things is possible in Syria as long as the war continues, and both are challenging in the host countries. All of these aspects contribute to people’s situations of vulnerability to trafficking in persons - a severe violation of their human rights -, as well as in themselves constituting violations of other rights.

Putting in place robust and decisive initiatives aimed at ending the war remains the most urgent and decisive recommendation, but also the most complex to implement. However, policy-makers, practitioners, and, not least, the Syrian people themselves, have to accept that the war may not end any time soon. In the meantime, the factors that will contribute to the incidence of trafficking among those affected are already clearly in evidence. In addition, there is a cumulative effect in that the longer the war continues, the more people’s savings or income from sale of properties are depleted, while ‘donor fatigue’ results in insufficient funding for humanitarian aid, and so they become increasingly vulnerable to trafficking and other rights violations. It is only by using this knowledge to invest in addressing these problems that we can reduce the likelihood of trafficking cases in the future.
There is a need for a paradigm shift in how trafficking, refugee, migration and child protection policy are perceived in relation to access to protection. While policy-makers and practitioners might see themselves as working in distinct fields, on specific topics, the human beings affected by these policies do not always fall under one single, clear-cut category. They are falling between the gaps created by these distinctions, affecting their access to protection. Efforts must be combined and concentrated to provide access to basic needs and safety for people displaced from and within Syria. And in the medium term, temporary solutions are not appropriate and people who have fled from Syria should be entitled to means of generating an income and access to essential services, so that they can set up a new life for themselves safe from the war, and safe from trafficking and exploitation.

As set out in the Recommendations below, just as traffickers and exploiters are targeting these vulnerabilities in order to profit or benefit from abusing people’s rights, so policy-makers and practitioners can target these vulnerabilities in a positive way, alleviating them in order to prevent trafficking, exploitation and other abuses. This can contribute to increasing the resilience of the people affected, giving them alternatives that are not merely the ‘least bad option’, and providing them with what they need in order to better cope with the ravages of violence and displacement.
Based on the findings of this research, the following are recommendations to respond to trafficking and vulnerability to trafficking in the countries under study. Some are also relevant for Syrian refugees in other hosting countries, and for human trafficking in situations of conflict in general. Wherever feasible, Syrians and other affected communities should be directly involved in implementing the recommendations. Where relevant, host communities in the countries under study should also be the focus of initiatives and policies, as they are also affected by some of the vulnerabilities highlighted.

Because anti-trafficking capacities are significantly affected by the ongoing war and related conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and because the hosting countries are overwhelmed with the arrival of large groups of people fleeing Syria, these Recommendations primarily address vulnerabilities to trafficking and propose short-term and medium- to long-term actions to meet the needs of identified and unidentified victims of trafficking, as well as other people vulnerable to trafficking in the countries under study and beyond.

The primary focus of these Recommendations is therefore prevention of trafficking and addressing vulnerabilities to trafficking. This necessitates an emphasis on building the affected people’s resilience to exploitation and trafficking, and to other rights violations. However, the protection of trafficked people and the prosecution of perpetrators is also a central concern, and Recommendations in this sense are also included.

The Recommendations presented below are not intended to be exhaustive in terms of responding to the research findings. Subsequent to the publication of this Study, the research findings and recommendations will be disseminated and discussed with research participants and other relevant stakeholders in the countries under study and beyond. Experts on specific topics will be consulted and the Recommendations will be adapted and added to, in accordance with the expertise and feedback provided during a series of dissemination workshops. The Recommendations should therefore be seen as a work-in-progress, to be finalised in mid-2016.
1. Address low-level trafficking

**Short Term:** Families should be first supported in order to exit situations of extreme vulnerability and desperation, before considering family members as perpetrators of the serious crime of trafficking in persons. People affected by the war should be provided with viable alternatives to exploiting or being exploited, including for subsistence, income generation, accommodation, access to healthcare and education. Non-family members involved in exploitation, such as landowners and landlords, and other service providers, should be investigated and sanctioned, as also set out in Recommendation 11 below.

**Medium to Long Term:** There should be a focus on vulnerability when designing anti-trafficking strategies and policies, with targeted initiatives to build the resilience of vulnerable populations. This also requires an evidence-based assessment of vulnerability factors in each context, in order to establish the knowledge base to assist and protect vulnerable populations from violence, abuse and exploitation.

2. Identify trafficking of refugees

**Short Term:** Identification of potential trafficking cases should be incorporated into refugee registration procedures through proactive screening in the countries under study and other hosting countries outside the region. All authorities, including frontline officials, agencies and organisations dealing directly with refugees and IDPs, should be trained to identify and refer potential trafficking cases. State and non-state organisations dealing with refugee issues should be trained to identify potential trafficking cases. Capacities for prosecution of trafficking cases identified should be reinforced among relevant prosecutors and the judiciary.
### Medium to Long Term: Specific indicators of trafficking in persons, and indicators of vulnerability to trafficking, including long-term vulnerabilities beyond initial displacement, should be developed for use in humanitarian emergencies, including in the context of war. International and national humanitarian staff should be trained in the use of these indicators and mechanisms for referral of potential trafficking cases in a crisis should be established. Capacity-building on the prosecution of such cases should be incorporated into criminal justice responses to trafficking.

| National authorities | International organisations; International NGOs; Donors |

### 3. Provide protection to refugees who are trafficked

**Short-Term:** Anti-trafficking actors should be trained to understand refugee issues and identify potential trafficking victims among refugees and other vulnerable groups. National anti-trafficking strategies, referral mechanisms and initiatives should, if existing and operational, be revised to take into account that trafficked people may also be refugees, IDPs or undocumented migrants.

**Medium to Long Term:** Existing legal and operational understandings of trafficking, refugee, migration and child protection as separate policy areas should be altered. The protection needs of a vulnerable person should be prioritised in determining their legal status.

| National authorities | International organisations; International and national NGOs; Governments outside the region |

### 4. Provide access to regular employment and regularisation of legal status

**Short Term:** Syrians and other affected populations should have legal authorisation to work, be the focus of livelihoods schemes and vocational training, and be facilitated in moving around within a country without fear of detention or deportation. Policies and practices should address the vulnerable girl, boy, woman or man first, and their urgent protection needs, and only subsequently examine minor infractions related to residence status. Victims of abuse, exploitation and trafficking should be facilitated in reporting their situation and seeking legal redress.

| National authorities |
**Medium to Long Term**: The prospect of a more medium- or long-term refugee status in host countries would allow refugees to plan for their future, to develop an understanding of their rights and duties and to be gradually included into mainstream social services and the labour market. However, as set out in Recommendation 18 below, this can only be realised if: there is international investment in the hosting countries and hosting communities; and resettlement of some refugees outside the region is significantly increased, as the capacities of the four hosting countries under study are overstretched.

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<th>National authorities;</th>
<th>International organisations; Governments outside the region.</th>
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5. **Guarantee sufficient funding and fair distribution of aid**

**Short Term**: Authorities, organisations and agencies should endeavour to guarantee the equitable distribution of food and non-food aid to populations in need in Syria and the neighbouring countries, inside and outside camps, and ensure that this distribution is not abused in order to take advantage of vulnerable people.

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<tr>
<th>International organisations; International and national NGOs; National authorities</th>
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**Medium to Long Term**: International organisations and governments outside the region should ensure the sustainability of aid donations as long as the war continues and carry out fund-raising campaigns to counteract ‘donor fatigue’, as well as exploring possibilities for large-scale investment in the hosting countries through the financial markets, to improve essential infrastructure and promote employment for refugees and hosting communities.

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<tr>
<th>International organisations; Donors</th>
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6. **Ensure birth registration for children**

**Short Term**: Children born in Syria since the outbreak of the war; children born to Syrian refugees in the hosting countries; and any other children who do not have birth registration, should be the target of tailored programmes to provide them with birth registration from Syria if possible, but if this is not possible, births should be registered in the hosting countries.

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<th>National authorities; International organisations</th>
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**Medium to Long Term**: In the event of the violence ending in Syria and the eventuality of Syrian refugees returning to the country, the birth registration of any children who are still not registered should be prioritised.

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<th>National authorities; International organisations</th>
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7. **Ensure children are in school**

**Short Term:** Children’s access to regular schooling should be urgently facilitated, in order to grant them their basic right to education and render them less likely to become involved in child labour or begging. Children’s parents should also be supported in order to have methods of income generation that do not involve their children, and in order to provide for children’s safe transportation to and from school.

| International organisations; International and national NGOs; National authorities |

**Medium to Long Term:** Children who have had their schooling interrupted, and who have become involved in child labour, early marriage or begging, are likely to suffer disadvantages if and when they do return to school, which should be taken into account within education systems. Special school-based programmes should be designed and implemented to allow them to rehabilitate and catch up.

| National authorities; International organisations; Donors |

8. **Address forms of trafficking directly related to the war**

**Short Term:** As well as taking war-related forms of trafficking into account in planning humanitarian responses, the heightened risk of exploitation in armed conflict should also be alleviated through the active enforcement of bans on the recruitment of child soldiers by all combatants. Those wounded during the war should be provided with proper healthcare to promote their physical and mental recovery, without exposing them to the risk of trafficking. The specific grave violations of Iraqi Yazidi people’s rights should be recognised, and those affected should be urgently provided with the protection and rehabilitation services necessary for them to recover from severe trauma. Such trafficking cases should be prosecuted by criminal justice authorities.

| International organisations; National authorities; Parties in the war |

**Medium to Long Term:** Reintegration programmes should be implemented for Syrian and other children exploited in armed conflict by the various armed groups in the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

| International organisations; Donors |
9. **Improve aid and other services for non-camp refugees and IDPs**

**Short Term:** The majority of Syrians are not living in official IDP or refugee camps in the countries under study, which affects their access to essential humanitarian aid and other services like education, accommodation, vocational training and healthcare. Therefore food aid, non-food items, cash assistance, healthcare, accommodation and income-generating opportunities should be improved in non-camp environments, as well as in refugee and IDP camps.

| International organisations; National authorities |

**Medium to Long Term:** The needs of displaced populations who are not living in official IDP or refugee camps should be incorporated *a priori* into planning for humanitarian crises and the provision of aid and other services.

| International organisations; International NGOs; Donors |

10. **Incorporate internal trafficking into anti-trafficking policy and initiatives**

**Short Term:** Anti-trafficking initiatives in the countries under study should be designed and implemented in such a way as to prevent, identify and respond to internal trafficking as well as cross-border trafficking. Sets of procedures for identification, access to information, regularisation of migration status, rehabilitation and reintegration should be tailored to the needs of victims of internal trafficking, as well as of cross-border trafficking. Criminal justice procedures should also incorporate prosecution and witness protection for internal trafficking cases.

| National authorities; National and international NGOs. |

**Medium to Long Term:** Anti-trafficking policy measures, such as national referral mechanisms, awareness-raising campaigns, strategies and plans of action, and prosecution, should ensure that internal trafficking is not overlooked.

| National authorities |
11. **Enforce sanctions to combat abusive practices**

**Short-Term:** Effective sanctions and binding codes of conduct should be put in place in order to combat corruption and abusive practices among law enforcement and border officials, humanitarian staff, landowners and landlords, military personnel, service providers and others, in order to reduce the incidence of ‘survival sex’ and other forms of abuse and exploitation in exchange for essential goods or services.

| National authorities; International and national NGOs; International organisations |

**Medium to Long Term:** Lack of enforcement of the law and certain corrupt practices should be rectified in order to avoid situations in which people in positions of power are able to exploit vulnerable people. Prosecution of cases of trafficking among these abusive practices should be carried out.

| National authorities; International and national NGOs; International organisations |

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12. **Identify and respond to labour exploitation**

**Short Term:** Violations of workers’ rights should be actively identified and perpetrators held responsible by law enforcement agencies, requiring the development and use of indicators, and training programmes for labour inspectors and law enforcement agencies on trafficking for labour exploitation. Labour inspectors should have sufficient resources to carry out inspections of workplaces, particularly in sectors where there are indications of labour exploitation and trafficking.

| National authorities; International organisations |

**Medium to Long Term:** Capacity-building programmes and training curricula for labour inspectors, prosecutors, the judiciary and other anti-trafficking stakeholders should incorporate components on the identification and prosecution of labour rights abuses, labour exploitation and trafficking for labour exploitation, and the protection of victims.

<p>| National authorities; International organisations |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13.</th>
<th><strong>Combat gender-based discrimination and reduce the risk of sexual and gender-based violence</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Short Term:</strong></td>
<td>Training and other programmes should be put in place to facilitate and promote women’s access to the labour market, particularly in a situation where women are heads of household. It should be ensured that accommodation for refugees provides sufficient safety and privacy for children and women. Discrimination and sexual harassment at the workplace should be sanctioned. SGBV programmes should acknowledge that boys, men and LGBT people may be victims of discrimination and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as women and girls.</td>
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<td>National authorities; International organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Medium to Long Term:</strong></td>
<td>Training and awareness-raising programmes should be put in place for men, women and children on gender-based discrimination and sexual and gender-based violence, and incorporated into school and vocational training curricula. Girls’ education and women’s vocational training should be promoted. Traditional and religious leaders should be involved in information sessions on gender-based discrimination and SGBV, due to their influence on public opinion in many communities.</td>
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<td>National authorities; International organisations; Donors</td>
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<th>14.</th>
<th><strong>Address the vulnerabilities of host communities</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Short Term:</strong></td>
<td>Host communities have also been affected by the war and displacement in the countries under study. Humanitarian assistance and other services and initiatives for refugees and IDPs should also include vulnerable members of host communities, particularly in areas with a high concentration of displaced people. This will also contribute to improving relations between displaced people and the local residents of these areas.</td>
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<td>International organisations; International and national NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Medium to Long Term:</strong></td>
<td>Host communities should be included in crisis planning from the outset and information should be provided to the host communities about the influx of displaced people and what they are entitled to, in order to prevent tensions and hostilities arising from perceptions that displaced people are in a privileged position vis-à-vis host communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>International organisations; International and national NGOs</td>
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### 15. Implement prevention programmes at community level

**Short Term:** Prevention programmes and awareness-raising campaigns among vulnerable groups on different forms of trafficking and related abuses should be carried out together with local host communities and refugee communities. Where there is a language barrier, cultural mediators should be employed from both communities.

**Medium to Long Term:** Awareness-raising programmes should be designed to target both host communities and refugees, also after initial arrival, promoting a sense of shared concerns and aspirations, taking into account the linguistic, cultural and religious diversity of the populations in question.

| National authorities; Local authorities; International organisations |

### 16. Reform *kafala* systems for the immigration and employment of migrant domestic workers

**Short Term:** The situation of migrant domestic workers who are still inside Syria should be urgently investigated and addressed. Procedures should be carried out in order to repatriate them to their country of origin or resettle them to a safe third country, depending on their best interests. Migrant domestic workers who have been trafficked should have access to information on legal rights and remedies, and perpetrators should be prosecuted.

**Medium to Long Term:** The *kafala* systems in place in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan should be amended in order to reduce the inherent risk of exploitation and trafficking in a sponsorship system that makes migrants dependent for various issues on their employer.

| International organisations; International NGOs; Governments of countries of origin | National authorities |
### 17. Put specific measures in place for particularly vulnerable groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short-Term:</th>
<th>International organisations; National governments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine refugees from Syria and Iraqi refugees, as well as other refugee groups, should be urgently included in any measures and policies for refugees who are Syrian citizens, to ensure equality of treatment. In particular, the different mandate at international level for Palestine refugees in Lebanon and Jordan should not be detrimental to their access to basic rights.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Medium to Long Term:</th>
<th>International organisations; International NGOs; National authorities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian planning and refugee policies must take into account that not all people fleeing a war situation will have the national citizenship of the country that they are fleeing. Special legal and humanitarian measures should address this.</td>
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### 18. Significantly expand legal channels for settlement outside the region

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<th>Short Term:</th>
<th>Governments outside the region; International organisations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States and other safe countries outside the region should significantly increase the numbers of Syrian and other affected people who are offered refugee resettlement. Other legal channels for moving outside the region should be offered for people in need of international protection who are not registered with UNHCR. Resettlement and other legal channels for refugees would also be beneficial to the overburdened infrastructures and labour markets of the hosting countries, and would take into account that, as a result of the Syrian war, Turkey has the highest absolute number of refugees in the world, and Lebanon has the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Medium to Long Term:</th>
<th>Governments outside the region; International organisations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The dynamics of the Syrian war and refugee situations in neighbouring countries should be monitored in order to continue to increase resettlement quotas and expand legal channels for settlement outside the region as necessary, in accordance with the hosting capacities of neighbouring countries and countries outside the region.</td>
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19. **Disseminate, discuss and respond to the research findings and recommendations**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Term: Workshops and other events should be held in the countries under study, and in other transit and destination countries along the migration route of those Syrian refugees who move on to the EU and other regions, to disseminate the findings of this Study, discuss the Recommendations, adapt them and develop additional recommendations. These events should involve all relevant actors, including anti-trafficking, refugee and migration professionals, as well as experts and activists on child protection and women’s rights. International organisations, international NGOs and donors should be lobbied to respond to the findings and implement the recommendations.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International organisations; National governments; Research community; International and national NGOs; Other experts</td>
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<tr>
<th>Medium to Long Term: In recognition of the vulnerabilities to trafficking identified through this research, the four hosting countries under study and other transit and destination countries for Syrian refugees should work in partnership to prevent and combat trafficking among this group, by, among other programmes and initiatives, establishing and/or reinforcing transnational referral mechanisms for trafficked people, and prosecuting internal and cross-border trafficking cases.</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>International organisations; International NGOs; National authorities</td>
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Annex 1: Field Research

List of interviews for Syria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Code</th>
<th>Name and Organisation</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SY01</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13/03/2015</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY02</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11/03/2015</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>SY03</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>-</td>
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### List of interviews for Turkey

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## List of Interviews for Lebanon

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### List of Interviews for Jordan

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<td>Maha Kattaa, International Labour Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>Response Coordinator, Syrian Refugee Crisis</td>
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<td>Hassan Frajat, Counter-Trafficking Unit, Ministry of Labour</td>
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<td>Firas Abu Loha, Directorate of Social Defence, Ministry of Social Development</td>
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<td>Maen Ahmad Al-Qada, Ministry of Social Development</td>
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List of Interviews for Iraq

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<td>Mohammed Bassam Al Nasseri &amp; Alvina Samjawon, IOM Iraq</td>
<td>Project Officer &amp; Programme Manager for Hijra Amina Project</td>
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<td>Anne Hagood, UNDP Programme Analyst</td>
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<td>08/03/2015</td>
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Annex 2: Bibliography


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Targeting Vulnerabilities


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Targeting Vulnerabilities

Over six-and-a-half million people are internally displaced in Syria, while Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are hosting over four million Syrian refugees. Some of the most vulnerable people among them are affected by one of the most serious of human rights violations: trafficking in persons. People who have fled within and outside of Syria should be able to set up a new life for themselves safe from the war, and safe from trafficking and exploitation. This Study assesses the impact of the Syrian war on trafficking in the region and presents timely recommendations on how to respond.