MIGRANTS IN COUNTRIES IN CRISIS

EMERGING FINDINGS

A Comparative Study of Six Crisis Situations

Maegan Hendow, Robtel Neajai Pailey, Alessandra Bravi
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This report presents emerging findings from ongoing research on migrants caught in crisis-affected countries. This research broadens the evidence base on the situations of migrants in crisis-affected countries, particularly focusing on socio-economic and long-term implications at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. Conducted by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the University of Oxford’s International Migration Institute (IMI), and local research partners, ongoing research presented in this report is being carried out in 11 countries on six specific crisis situations. This report presents the emerging findings and common themes identified from this research thus far. Following the completion of the data collection and fieldwork phase, more comprehensive analysis will be undertaken over the course of 2016 and early 2017 in the form of reports on each case study, as well as an extensive comparative report. A separate and parallel comparative research paper will also be developed covering European responses to crises.

We proceed by first outlining the conceptual background to this research, in particular highlighting key terminology and the scope of the research, and offering an overview of the six case studies covered. We then present the general methodology, data collection and approach to analysis across all case studies and for this report. We continue by discussing the key contextual and structural factors that affect migrants in host countries, transit countries, and upon their return to countries of origin – focusing in particular on factors related to migration history and legal status. Next, we cover how migrants and their families have responded to crises in the immediate and long-term, including their perceptions of crises and coping strategies, as well as issues related to mobility (relocation, return, circular movements, and so forth). We then examine the responses of other stakeholders to crises – governmental authorities from host and origin countries, intergovernmental and civil society organisations, and private sector actors – as well as their impact. We then look at policy lessons from the crises, clarifying which lessons have been learned by each stakeholder group in their responses to migrants caught in crises in host countries, in order to improve responses to future crises. In the concluding section, we present the main results and policy implications evident to-date, highlighting the role different types of actors can play when responding to crisis situations. At the end of the report, we have also included six factsheets, one for each of the case studies. The factsheets provide information

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1 Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Lebanon, Liberia, Niger, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia.
2 Crises in the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, Libya, South Africa, Thailand.
on the focus of the case study, the number of interviews completed as of August 2016, and the emerging findings on migrant responses, institutional responses, and policy learning.
In the context of the MICIC initiative, “migrants are defined broadly to include all non-nationals/non-citizens3 who are present in the country affected by a crisis and who do not benefit from international protection as refugees4.”5 This definition is in line with previous research on the topic, which also focuses broadly on ‘non-citizens’ impacted by a country in crisis, which can include long- or short-term labour migrants, seasonal migrants, non-citizen ethnic minorities, and tourists, as well as to a certain extent asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons. In line with the MICIC initiative definition, asylum seekers and refugees are not the focus of the research; we cover these groups only to the extent that they may be secondarily displaced by a crisis in their host country and may thus experience protection issues similar to those of other migrants, but we do not cover those asylum seekers and refugees displaced due to a crisis in their country of origin. For example this would include refugees who were in Libya at the time of the outbreak of violence in 2011 and were displaced to Tunisia, as well as Liberian refugees caught in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis, but would not include Libyan citizens and Ivorian citizens who sought refuge abroad as a result of the respective crises.

While the research recognises that legal categories are crucial (particularly for states) in terms of distribution of services and crisis responses, we emphasise that migrants can shift categories (from refugee to internally displaced person, or to irregular migrant), or they may simultaneously fit two or more legal categories (e.g. migrant workers internally displaced due to crisis). Legal categories are important, as they imply different legal obligations of different actors as well as different institutional arrangements and, as a result, different levels of protection that may be accessible to different types of migrants. Nonetheless, migrants have demonstrated agency in navigating these categories, in order to ensure the greatest protection for themselves and their families in the

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3 It should be noted that there may also be relevant issues with regard to naturalised migrants (i.e. host country citizens who were previously migrants to the country but subsequently obtained citizenship) caught in crisis situations, for example with regard to language and communication issues. They are not included in this research, however.

4 Specifically, the protection accorded under the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

5 MICIC Initiative 2015.
aftermath of a crisis.

Migrants also demonstrate this agency in creative uses of mobility, based on opportunities and constraints in the home or host countries or region. In the case of Egyptian migrants to Libya, for example, although many were displaced by the 2011 Libya conflict, many chose to re-migrate to Libya due to lack of economic opportunities in their home regions. They were then displaced for a second time in 2015 when violence flared again. Similar circular or non-linear movements have been noted in other cases for migrants who returned during the crisis and then moved back to the host country (e.g. Thailand, Chad-CAR), as well as those who travelled via or became trapped in a third country (e.g. migrants from various sub-Saharan African countries fleeing Libya to Tunisia and stranded there or Nigerien migrants who were repatriated via Mali).

In terms of ‘crises’, the research focuses primarily on situations which can be identified as humanitarian crises or disasters that threaten the life, health and safety of people (i.e. both citizens and non-citizens) present in the country/ies or directly affected areas, that are the target of external assistance (e.g. by international organisations or other states) and that entail significant movement of populations during the crisis (both citizen and non-citizen). However, in some cases there are examples of ‘continuous low-level crises’ – particularly expressed in the cases of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon and migrants (especially Zimbabweans) in South Africa. Here migrants themselves experience a chronically negative (often xenophobic) situation as part of a longer process of a crisis, or multiple crises, for themselves and their migrant communities. In such cases, a humanitarian crisis may reveal and exacerbate these pre-existing fragilities and socio-economic circumstances that were in place throughout both the acute crisis and crisis response cycle.

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6 Koser 2014; Weerasinghe and Taylor 2015.
7 Koser 2012.
Within the Research Component of the MICIC project, six specific case studies were selected, in which migrants have been particularly impacted by a crisis situation, with fieldwork conducted in eleven countries. This breadth of research serves to demonstrate the wide range of impacts and responses to crises on the part of multiple stakeholders. Moreover, in each case study, we placed particular emphasis on the longer-term impacts of crises, heretofore minimally covered by the literature. The six selected country case studies cover violent conflict, xenophobic violence and a natural disaster. Overall, the case studies include fieldwork on the situation of migrants who during a crisis remained in the host country, on those who became stranded in a third country of transit, and on those who returned to their countries of origin (by birth or ancestry).

8 For more information, please see also the six case study fact sheets annexed to this report.

9 When referencing fieldwork in a specific case study, this report will refer to the fieldwork country first, and the case study second – as responses from the same fieldwork country may differ between two different crisis situations. For example, Niger—Libya refers to fieldwork conducted in Niger on the Libya crisis.

10 Or in rare cases, returned to the host country after a very brief stay in their home country (e.g. Thailand).
## Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fieldwork Conducted In</th>
<th>Research Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>2006-today</td>
<td>Migrant domestic workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Political unrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>2008-2015</td>
<td>Xenophobic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thailand</strong></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Natural disaster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
METHODOLOGY

For this qualitative research study, all case studies employ the same methodological approach – including desk research, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. We prepared general tools for data collection and analysis for the fieldwork, tailored to each country to ensure comparability. At the launch of the research, we prepared working papers based on desk research for each case study: five written by the research teams at IMI and ICMPD, and the sixth by a team led by Jonathan Crush of the Southern African Migration Programme in South Africa. These covered the background of each case study, including specific information on each fieldwork country, its relevance to the case study selected, the focus of the research and the approach to and timeline for the fieldwork. In all cases, local researchers engaged in the fieldwork country verified the findings from the working papers before the launch of the fieldwork. In light of these findings, we prepared general interview guidelines on the basis of which we produced tailored interview guidelines for each stakeholder group per country, to ensure comparability across all case studies.

The research teams (IMI, ICMPD and local research partners) then planned and conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with six stakeholder groups: migrants, family members of migrants, government authorities (from host, transit and origin countries), experts and private sector actors (including employers, community leaders and academics), civil society organisations (both international and local), and intergovernmental organisations (such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR and EU delegations). In launching the fieldwork, we adopted an approach of purposive sampling for migrant and family member interviews, using either snowball sampling or site selection strategy (or a combination of both), in order to identify appropriate interviewees. For other stakeholder groups, researchers submitted official letters, email or phone requests to organisations to obtain authorisations for interviews, identify the most appropriate interviewees within an organisation, and organise interviews. In each fieldwork country, researchers conducted interviews in the capital city and in a small number of other sites in the country, depending on the locations of target groups of interviewees across the country. See Table 1 for more details on the number of interviews and participants in focus groups conducted across the six case studies as of July 2016. Researchers are still conducting additional interviews in several fieldwork countries as of August 2016.
For one case study (Lebanon), we also used participant observation, joining events where migrants were taking part in high numbers, often hosted either by migrant associations or country of origin authorities, such as the ‘2016 Philippine Independence Day Festival’ at a local church in Beirut organised by the Philippines Embassy of Beirut and Filipino associations in Beirut, as well as the fashion show ‘Celebrating Colors’ organised by Lebanese NGOs supporting migrant domestic workers (and where migrant domestic workers modelled some of the designs) at a restaurant in Beirut. This allowed researchers to observe the organisation of the migrant community and also helped us to gain the trust of the community and identify further potential interviewees.

Researchers for each fieldwork country (IMI, ICMPD and local research partners) compiled preliminary research findings and fieldwork reports, which served as the basis for this report. This information was supplemented by the data already collected in the working papers. Fieldwork was not yet been completed for all case studies at the time of the drafting of this report; final analysis is conducted over the course of 2016 and 2017 in case study and comparative reports, including a particular research strand on European responses to crisis.

### Note

There was overlap between some of the interviews in providing information for two different case studies. For example, an interview with a ministry in Ghana provided information on Ghana’s response to its nationals caught in both the Côte d’Ivoire and the Libya crises. Therefore, several interviews are counted twice (relevant for fieldwork conducted in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Ghana, for the CAR, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya case studies).
The growing number of migrants affected by natural disasters in recent years has brought attention to the topic and to the need to better integrate migrants into Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policies and practices.\textsuperscript{11} At the international level, the new Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 had for the first time explicitly included migrants as relevant stakeholders and recognises that “their participation and engagement are crucial for effectively building the resilience of communities and societies of origin and destination”.\textsuperscript{12} From the interviews conducted with stakeholders working on DRR policies in Thailand it emerged that – although migrants received some support during the 2011 Thai floods and the level of awareness about migrants’ vulnerability during a natural disaster increased after the crisis – the existing DRR policies and practices still do not specifically include migrants or have particular provisions for the most vulnerable ones, including irregular migrants.

While natural disasters have impacts on all those dwelling in affected areas, migrants, both regular and irregular, seem to be particularly vulnerable to them.\textsuperscript{13} The study highlighted two related causes for this. First, there is limited data about migrants’ numbers and locations which may make them invisible to those responsible for emergency planning and response. As a result their particular needs are overlooked in disaster preparedness and when a natural disaster hits, those providing assistance do not know where they are to help them.\textsuperscript{14} Second, the precarious economic, social and legal situation with which many migrants live before crisis leaves them particularly exposed when disaster strikes. For example, migrants may struggle to get access to humanitarian assistance and support, get compensation for their material losses and even reclaim the bodies of dead relatives.\textsuperscript{15}

The research conducted for the Thai case study confirms that migrants’ vulnerability to natural disasters is exacerbated by pre-existing factors, in particular their legal status. The possession of identity documents, including valid passports and formal work permits, determine migrants’ ability to gain access to services such as healthcare, social security and labour protection; migrants’ freedom of movement can also be contingent on access to identity documents. From the interviews conducted in Thailand, evidence demonstrates that migrants’ legal status affected their choice of coping strategies. In particular for irregular migrants the fear of arrest and consequent deportation, together with the fear of losing their job and unpaid salaries, strongly influenced their decision whether or not to leave their place of residence, register in a shelter, and ask for support and compensation for unpaid salaries and other material losses they might have suffered due to the crisis.

\textsuperscript{11} Guadagno 2015.
\textsuperscript{12} For more information on the Sendai Framework for DRR, please see: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrrren.pdf (accessed on 08.09.2016)
\textsuperscript{13} IOM 2007.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
The positioning of migrants within host country societies prior to crises – their legal status, socio-economic position, and migration history, including the conditions of both their arrival in the countries and departure from origin countries – are key factors that can determine migrants’ options during and after crises. Migrants’ positioning can strongly influence opportunities for mobility (or immobility), who migrants turn to for help, and what resources they have at their disposal.

MIGRATION HISTORY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

As might be expected across such a diverse set of origin and host countries, there is a wide array of demographic and social characteristics among the different groups included in this study. In this brief report, there is no attempt to give a comprehensive account of this variation – more detail will be found in the forthcoming case studies and comparative analysis. Instead, this section provides a synthesis, drawing together common themes identified through interviews and literature reviews conducted thus far. Basic data about the variety of populations and contexts included within the study are summarised in Table 2.

As can be observed in Table 2, the vast majority of migrants interviewed for this study thus far, who were caught in crisis situations, tended to have low levels of education and work in low-skilled sectors in host countries (even in cases when they had higher levels of education). In addition, they often also come from rural or poor communities within their countries of origin. Although migrants interviewed in this study have been predominantly men, in several countries of research migrants interviewed were predominantly women (Ghana—Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia—Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon), or they make up a strong proportion of the group (Chad—CAR/Libya, Thailand, South Africa). Often they engaged in sectors dominated by women, such as domestic work and sex work, but not exclusively.

All the case study countries covered by this research became important migration host countries by the late 20th century – either within their own region due to a strengthened economy in comparison to neighbours’, as a host for refugee flows from neighbouring countries, or attracting migrants from further afield to
work in a particular sector. For Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, migration-friendly policies aimed at boosting economic production (within the agricultural and oil sectors, respectively) led to a boom in the migration of low-skilled workers from elsewhere in the region.\textsuperscript{16} In Libya, a policy of attracting sub-Saharan African migrants was implemented in the late 1980s and 1990s by removing residence permits and entry visa requirements.\textsuperscript{17} For Lebanon, too, one could argue that migration of domestic workers from outside the Arab world has been supported – if not by explicit policy – by the fact that Arab domestic workers were considered increasingly unsuitable during the Lebanese civil war due to growing interreligious and cultural tensions, combined with efforts of private recruiters to arrange the legal migration of Asian and African domestic workers.\textsuperscript{18} Despite this encouragement of immigration, state authorities in both Libya (under Gaddafi) and Lebanon have implemented strict detention and deportation rules for irregular migrants, to discourage irregular migration or stay.\textsuperscript{19} Thailand also increasingly became a net importer of migrants in the 1980s and 1990s, due to the difficulties of Thai employers in filling vacancies, the increasing demographic deficit and widening economic disparities between Thailand and its neighbours.\textsuperscript{20} However, despite several memoranda of understanding (MoUs) signed between Thailand and migrant source countries in the region (which were not very successful as they entail expensive and complicated procedures for migrants), Thailand’s policies have focused more on regularising irregular migrants post-arrival through amnesty programmes, rather than improving and speeding up the procedures of the MoUs and supporting more proactive migration-friendly policies.\textsuperscript{21}

Aside from economic reasons, historical flows of people fleeing violence and political conflict are also significant in the cases of Côte d’Ivoire (Liberians in 1989, 2003 and 2004), Lebanon (Palestinians in 1948, Iraqis as of 2003, Syrians as of 2011), South Africa (Zimbabweans as of the early 2000s) and Thailand (Burmese as of the 1980s). Whether they have formal status as refugees or not, such groups in these examples often have minimal access to the labour market and services (e.g. health and education) and may be in a very weak economic position, reliant on the support of international aid. This makes return or relocation during a crisis in the host country doubly difficult due to the compound effects of multiple displacements and poverty.

Although host countries have offered considerable opportunities, migrants interviewed thus far in all fieldwork countries claimed that they would not have gone to work abroad had they felt there were economic opportunities in their home countries.\textsuperscript{22} Unemployment – particularly among youth – has been an especially

\textsuperscript{16} IOM 2009; Lewis 2011.
\textsuperscript{17} Migration Policy Centre 2013.
\textsuperscript{18} Jureidini 2009.
\textsuperscript{19} Global Detention Project 2015; Global Detention Project 2014.
\textsuperscript{20} IOM Thailand 2011.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} The only caveat to this is the situation observed of Syrian refugee domestic workers in Lebanon. They have arrived in Lebanon due to the conflict situation in Syria as of 2011, but a small number have entered the domestic work sector only recently, due to the lack of formal work opportunities available to them in Lebanon.
While economic opportunity and conflict were the principal factors reported as driving people's decisions to migrate, their decisions about where it might be feasible or desirable to go were also shaped by other factors including geographical proximity (and thus often cheaper migration costs), common languages, family, and social networks and cultural affinities. Particularly for cross-border communities, or ethnic groups with affinities to others in the region, these ties are a strong source of social capital facilitating movement across borders – for both economic and asylum reasons. For example, for Liberians who fled to Côte d’Ivoire during the wars in Liberia, as well as for Ivorians fleeing the political unrest in Côte d’Ivoire to Liberia, ethnic ties, particularly in the border counties (Nimba, Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland), were important sources of protection and shelter during and immediately after crises, and have helped in integration.

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23 Although it should be noted that migration and development research suggests that poverty reduction and increased development levels in a country do not decrease migration levels but rather can increase them, in part as a result of increased resources of (potential) migrants to cover the costs of migration. This is often referred to as the ‘migration hump’. See Martin and Taylor 1996; Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002.
### Table 2: General demographic and social capital factors of migrant respondents in the study, by fieldwork and case study country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fieldwork Country</th>
<th>Group/Nationality</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Skill Level</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>Cross-border ethnic groups (Gbaya from East region) and also Fulani and Arabs from Adamawa, North and Far-North, Muslim majority</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Majority married, ca. half in monogamous relationships and ca. 30% in polygamous relationships</td>
<td>35-45 and 60-64</td>
<td>Grazers, traders and buyers, gold and diamond resellers</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Non-formal education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAD</td>
<td>Mostly traders and herders from Salamat and Ouaddai; others of cross-border ethnic Ngama and Kaba origin; Majority CAR born, all Muslim</td>
<td>Men and women</td>
<td>Majority married</td>
<td>Evenly split across age groups</td>
<td>Mostly trade and business (transport, clothes, gold and diamond); few pastoralists and herders</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Low to no education; few university graduates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKINA FASO</td>
<td>Majority poor Mossi and Lobi from rural north and southwest Burkina Faso, respectively; large proportion Muslim</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>35-70</td>
<td>Agriculture, livestock, fishing, forestry (smaller proportion in small businesses or trade)</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Mostly illiterate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Poor, rural agrarian communities</td>
<td>Majority women</td>
<td>Majority either married or divorced</td>
<td>30-55</td>
<td>Fishing and farm labour (men); trading and prostitution (women)</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Very low to no education; junior high school certificate highest level of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEBANON</td>
<td>Refugees, some political elites fleeing Liberia’s crises, cross-border ethnic groups. Often rural agrarian</td>
<td>Majority women</td>
<td>Majority either married or are in a relationship</td>
<td>23-65</td>
<td>Menial work (brushing cocoa farms, hewing woods) and petty trading (men); selling woods, weeding farms (women)</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Low or no education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES, SRI LANKA, ETHIOPIA, KENYA, SYRIA</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Single and married</td>
<td>Majority 30-50</td>
<td>Domestic work</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Varies by nationality - low to mid-level. For Kenyans and Filipinas, education can be high-level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP/NATIONALITY</td>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>MARITAL STATUS</td>
<td>AVERAGE AGE</td>
<td>SECTORS</td>
<td>SKILL LEVEL</td>
<td>EDUCATION LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>All poor rural dwellers from central and east central Burkina Faso; majority Bissa, with small numbers of Mossi; Muslim majority</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Majority married</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Low-skilled or unskilled</td>
<td>Low levels (primary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>All traders and salaried workers from Bar el Gazel in northern Chad (Toubou); all Muslim</td>
<td>Men and women</td>
<td>Majority married with family in Chad</td>
<td>Majority 40-49</td>
<td>Low-skilled or unskilled</td>
<td>Low levels (primary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Rural communities from Cairo, Fayoum, Minya and Sohag (central and upper Egypt)</td>
<td>Men (family back home)</td>
<td>Single and married</td>
<td>Below 35, few older migrants, Construction, agriculture, fishing, trade</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Majority literate with basic education (unfinished)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Poor, rural agrarian communities</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Majority married</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>Masonry, farming, construction</td>
<td>Unskilled/skilled (some skilled)</td>
<td>Very low/no education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Mostly rural from poor families</td>
<td>Men (some women accompanying husbands)</td>
<td>Majority married</td>
<td>Majority youth between 15-40 years, Agriculture, manual labour, masonry, security</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Low to no education on average, with some college educated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Poor, rural and urban: Ivory Coast and Senegal</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Single and married</td>
<td>Majority between 20-35</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Majority lack of formal education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Predominantly Zimbabwean</td>
<td>Mixed, with slight majority of men</td>
<td>Single and married</td>
<td>Majority between 25-39 (also large proportion of 15-24), Informal migrant entrepreneurs, hawkers, artisans</td>
<td>All levels</td>
<td>All levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Myanmar, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam</td>
<td>Mixed, with majority of women</td>
<td>Majority married/in partnership</td>
<td>Majority youth between 19-34 years, Factory work, construction, domestic work, street vendors</td>
<td>Low-skilled</td>
<td>Cambodia and Lao: low levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
processes in the mid-term (for example due to linguistic similarities in local languages). Similar cultural affinities have also been noted for cross-border communities in Niger and Libya (e.g. Tuareg, Arab, Toubou and Hausa communities), as well as the linguistic affinities, existing networks, low cost of travel and relatively porous borders between Egypt and Libya and between Thailand and both Laos and Myanmar, as well as to some extent Vietnam.\(^{24}\)

In the case of the CAR, Cameroonian and Chadian migrants were fairly well integrated into the host country at the time of the crisis. Cameroonian migrants were able to be fairly successful as farmers, traders and buyers, and gold and diamond resellers, although they still retained connections with their home communities in Cameroon. Chadian migrants were also fairly successful in establishing businesses in the CAR, but in contrast to Cameroonian, they often migrated as families, established their families or were born in the CAR, with very few keeping ties with family in Chad. This made ‘return’ to and ‘reintegration’ in Chad, a country to which many Chadian migrants in the CAR felt little affinity, much more difficult in the mid- to long-term.

In contrast, cultural differences and lack of knowledge of the host community (particularly of the host country language) has sometimes led to increased divisions between host and migrant communities – or at an individual level between an employer and employee. Such divisions and low level of knowledge of the host community and its language have regularly been a source of difficulty in times of crisis – where migrants are unable to access and understand emergency information. As research in Thailand and Lebanon has shown, even before a crisis, lack of cultural and linguistic knowledge hampers migrants’ access to jobs, ability to negotiate salaries, and integrate into society in general; where migrants have learned or speak a similar language, they have been better able to claim their rights and benefits.

In each of the host countries under study, discrimination, xenophobia or xeno-phobic violence has been experienced by migrant groups in the host country before, during and/or after the crisis – including racial and religious discrimination, lack of access to services, inability to access the banking system, differentiation of salary by nationality, violence, scapegoating, arbitrary arrests and detentions. This can be exacerbated in times of crisis in extreme ways. For example, during the 2006 Lebanon crisis, some (yet not a majority of) Lebanese employers fled the bombing of Beirut, and chose to lock their domestic workers within their own apartments – in full knowledge that they were risking their domestic worker’s life, but apparently without qualms of leaving them behind. Due to this there were several cases of domestic workers leaping from balconies to try to escape.\(^{25}\) Things may be even more extreme if migrants are believed to be taking part in the conflict. The affinity (actual or perceived) of some members of the migrant group to one side of the conflict in years prior to the conflict, and reports of

\(^{24}\) The Tai Kadai language family includes the national language of Thailand (Thai), the national language in Laos (Lao), as well as the minority languages in Myanmar (Shan) and Vietnam (Zhuang-Tai). However, Vietnamese respondents in the Thailand research did not speak the Zhuang-Tai language but rather Vietnamese, thus not sharing a similar language to Thai.

Precariousness of legal status or exclusion from certain legal protections has been reported as the most significant negative factor for migrants at all phases of a crisis, and across all research countries. Literature demonstrates the wide range of negative impacts (discrimination, exclusion from services, exploitation, abuse) that irregularity can have on migrants at all stages of the migration process, and crisis situations can exacerbate such pre-existing vulnerabilities, as the research conducted thus far confirms. In all fieldwork countries of origin for the Libya case study (Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Niger), most migrants in the country at the time of the crisis had entered irregularly or overstayed visas (e.g. tourist visas). As a result of this, states, civil society and intergovernmental organisations reportedly had incomplete information on the number of migrants (for host countries) or own nationals (for countries of origin) in the country at the time of the crisis, complicating crisis response planning and implementation. Moreover, under Gaddafi, migrants experienced increased pressure, due to intensified detention and deportation operations targeting irregular migrants (Niger–Libya, Ghana–Libya). In South Africa and post-crisis Tunisia, the very limited recognition of Zimbabweans as refugees and the lack of a domestic asylum law, respectively, limited legal opportunities for asylum seekers in the country.

Although there was a large proportion of irregular migrants in Thailand at the time of the flood, another key issue related to status was that recent regularisations of irregular migrants (national verification processes) tied migrants’ now-legal status to the conflict, bolstered larger-scale attacks. For example, there were reprisals and specific violent targeting of Liberians during the Côte d’Ivoire crises, and Nigeriens and Burkinabé during the 2011 Libya crisis, who were depicted as mercenaries involved on one side of the conflict. In the case of Nigeriens in Libya, many claimed to be Malian when fleeing the conflict, in order to avoid retributory attacks. As a result, they had to be repatriated to Niger after arriving in Mali and making their true nationality known, once they felt they were in a safe environment to do so. Harassment and beatings were primarily used against men, although rape was also reported as a particular measure used to target women during a crisis, as the research among Liberians in Côte d’Ivoire has shown. It should be noted that while xenophobic violence is exacerbated during a crisis, the research conducted thus far also suggests that escalation of violence pre-crisis can be an important indicator of an arriving political crisis, for example in the cases of xenophobic violence against migrant groups in South Africa in the mid-1990s and 2000s and large-scale deportations of Zimbabweans from 2000 onwards, as well as violence and mass deportations of Burkinabé from Côte d’Ivoire in 1999, 2001 and 2002.

LEGAL SITUATION AND STATUS

26 Kirkpatrick 2011.
27 Steinberg 2012; Schwartz 2000.
The Lebanese Labour Code includes standard labour protection stipulations on minimum wage, working hours and contracts. The *kafala*, or sponsorship, system is a customary practice applied in Lebanon, as well as in other Gulf Cooperation Countries, by which the migrant worker is required to have an in-country sponsor responsible for their residence permit and legal status, usually the migrant's employer. The system has been strongly criticised by civil society organisations as a practice that can create opportunities to exploit the migrant worker, as the migrant would be less likely to complain about abuses and exploitation by the employer when her legal status is dependent on the sponsor. In the case of domestic workers this can be compounded by the fact that the domestic worker is required to live in the same home as the employer or sponsor.

Precariousness of legal status or exclusion from certain legal protections has been the most significant negative factor for migrants at all stages of a crisis, and across all research countries. Moreover, if they did not have formal residence status or a work permit, irregular migrants were reluctant to use government-provided shelters for fear of registration or follow-up by authorities.

For the limited number of migrants who came from Myanmar to Thailand under the MoU, their standard employment contract (in Thai and English) includes the phrasing “in a case of a natural disaster causing a situation no longer conductive to work, the employer must repatriate the worker and pay all of the expenses of doing so” (Item 12 of employment contract). However, only a limited number of migrants arrive in Thailand under this MoU and there is no similar clause in MoUs concluded with Laos and Cambodia, nor did any migrants interviewed in our research refer to it.

Across all examples from the research, most irregular migrants engage in informal working arrangements. The informal work sector can be the driving force and catalyst of an economy, and provides employment opportunities and financial support to those without (or with limited) access to the formal labour market. Nevertheless, it can also at times be dangerous, poorly paid and exploitative. At the same time, formal employment arrangements can also have similar risks for migrants. In the case of Lebanon, migrant domestic workers are excluded from the protections contained in the Lebanese Labour Code, and moreover their legal status is tied to a specific employer (sponsor) in a system known as *kafala*. In many cases, this has been problematic in and of itself due to abuse of this power by the sponsor and lack of safeguards against such exploitative situations. While the majority of migrant domestic workers have a regular migration status, those who do not face innumerable additional obstacles and difficulties. Furthermore, each year a certain number of those with regular status move into irregularity because they run away from abusive employers, to whom their residency is tied.

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In contrast, when host states have extended citizenship, voting and/or land rights to immigrant populations – as demonstrated by Burkinabé and other migrant populations in Côte d’Ivoire and Chadians in CAR – migrants were able to prosper. However, in some contexts their citizenship status remained subject to contestation, often linked to broader struggles over citizenship, as experienced by Burkinabé and Ghanaians in Côte d’Ivoire.

Following a crisis, when migrants have been displaced to their country of ‘origin’ – even if they have been born and raised or have a long history in the host country – they are able to apply their status flexibly in order to receive appropriate support for their situation. In the case of many Chadian migrants living in the CAR, they had lived in the host country for many years, or generations, and no longer had much of a connection to Chad as a country of origin. Nonetheless, when they were displaced to Chad, they were able to apply for citizenship due to their Chadian heritage. However, as support for Chadian returnees from the CAR dwindled, and as they have not had the support of (extended) family from which other returnees might benefit, many have resorted to applying for refugee status in the country. This allows them to receive support they critically need, but cannot receive as returnees. Such flexible application of status has allowed returnees to assure their livelihood in a difficult situation, where there are not many options available and when their citizenship is of problematic value. Moreover, this demonstrates that the country of origin is not always the country of citizenship and vice versa – rather, the concepts can at times be more loosely applied. ‘Return’ for migrants caught in a crisis situation might in fact mean moving to a wholly new location for some, as was the case for Chadian migrants leaving the CAR.

Finally, freedom of movement has also been an interesting factor related to irregularity and legal protections. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) have both been noted by the research as facilitating mobility to and from the host country (Niger–Libya, Burkina Faso–Libya, Cameroon–CAR). For Libya, this has also facilitated irregular migration routes towards the country via ECOWAS countries (primarily Niger) by other ECOWAS nationals (Niger–Libya, Burkina Faso–Libya). This has reportedly further compounded states’ lack of data on the number of their own nationals in a country when a crisis begins. Although these agreements enable migrants’ mobility, the limitations are clear: such agreements on freedom of movement and protection of rights of certain nationals within a common regional area do not de facto ensure that the rights of non-nationals are protected in another ECOWAS country, as was noted in the case of Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire.
Consequences of crises

Although the consequences of crises on migrant populations have only been marginally studied and documented, it is evident from the existing literature that migrants’ experiences during crisis situations have a bearing on the probable long-term implications for countries of origin as well as for host countries during and after crisis. Similarly, migrants’ resource accumulation strategies during peace and their lack of preparedness in the face of crisis also greatly affect their reintegration options in countries of origin, as well as their ability to remain resilient in host countries.

The existing literature also highlights that the impact of crisis on migrants will vary depending on a wide range of factors such as the economic stability and geo-political positioning of the origin or host country, the high-profile (or low-profile) nature of the crisis and resulting external responses, the socio-economic status of migrants, their relationships with non-migrant populations and with the origin state or host state, as well as migrants’ ‘preparedness’ and ‘resource mobilisation’ regardless of whether or not they choose to remain in the country affected by crisis or return to the country of origin. Furthermore, the long-term consequences of crisis on host or origin countries and on migrants themselves differ according to migrants’ social qualifiers such as age, gender and legal status.

Migrants’ access to different forms of capital and their resource profiles may create different ‘types’ of return or non-return. For instance, migrants who have established positions in the host country and are relatively economically and socially secure and privileged may differ from those dependent on precarious wage labour who are excluded from or on the margins of the host society. The return or non-return of migrants from these latter groups is likely to have different long-term impacts on the origin or host country than the return or non-return of those relatively more privileged depending on the opportunity structures available to them.

There may also be broader impacts that are associated with the (temporary or permanent) loss of a migration destination, in the case of return. These may include new opportunities for people to invest in their country of origin while abandoning ideas of further emigration, or it could stimulate the rise of new destinations for potential migrants. Scale and area of settlement are also important factors when considering the broader implications of migrant returns on countries of origin. For instance, an exodus of 1,000 formerly Libya-based migrants from Ghana returning to the bustling urban hub of Accra may or may not have as much of an impact as that of a similar number of Burkinabé migrants returning to a village of a smaller size in Burkina Faso.

32 Ibid.
Thus, we may assume the long-term impacts of return migration to be proportional to the population size and the size of the economy of the country of origin. Long-term consequences of crisis-induced return may also vary considerably depending on migrants’ preparedness, particularly their willingness and/or readiness to return (repatriating savings and assets, securing identity documents, etc.). As Cassarino posits, “the higher the level of preparedness, the greater the ability of returnees to mobilise resources autonomously and the stronger their contribution to development”. Although this assertion also applies to non-return, our emerging findings show that the level of preparedness for return during times of crises may likely be very limited.

Given that “economic, social, cultural and political conditions at ‘home’ may be radically different from those that existed before” return will likely pose a number of challenges to and opportunities for returnees, their social networks at home and abroad as well as their countries of origin. For instance, returnees who resettle in locales different from their places of origin will likely not benefit from family or community support. Moreover, returnees may pose a threat or a boon to non-returnee populations in the allocation of presumed finite resources such as “land, water, pasture, forest produce, jobs, housing, healthcare, school places, veterinary services, extension services, credit facilities and employment opportunities”. Aligned with the discussion earlier about the precarious legal status of some migrants in host countries, one of the other major potential impacts of return migration is that it could create an unprecedented number of stateless persons who do not have a nationality based on the restrictive citizenship regimes of their countries of birth or ancestry.

In response to return migration, origin governments may adopt targeted ‘development’ schemes of reintegration that frame migrants as ‘needy’ victims, thereby soliciting donor assistance and quite possibly the ire of local residents. These schemes, though understandable as a response to large-scale return, may likely place a strain on already limited national resources and funding. Depending on how fragile/insecure a particular country of origin is, migrants returning from countries affected by crises may face challenges being reinserted into local and national politics, especially if they are perceived by authorities as a threat to peace and security. In cases of non-return, the absence of measures to address the unique vulnerabilities of migrant populations may leave some migrants at particular risk in host countries.

34 Ibid, p. 275.
36 Ibid.
37 Riester 2011, p. 192.
Beyond a theoretical discussion about the long-term potential consequences of crises on migrants, our emerging findings demonstrate concrete ways in which migrants have responded to actual crisis situations. Across most of the case studies involving armed conflict—particularly Côte d’Ivoire and Libya—our emerging findings show that migrants were often systematically targeted during crises not because of their ethnicity, race or religion but rather because of their relatively elevated socio-economic positioning in host countries. In some cases, migrants were materially better off than poor citizens of a host country thus fuelling tensions during crises, as evidenced by Chadians who prospered at gold and diamond trading in CAR, Egyptian day labourers and wage earners in Libya, and Ghanaian female traders in Côte d’Ivoire. In other cases, migrants occupied very low socio-economic positions relative to the host population partly due to their irregular migration status, differences in cultural and linguistic characteristics and low levels of education, such as Ghanaian migrants in Libya and Liberian migrants in Côte d’Ivoire. In specific instances, tensions between domestic citizens and migrants were traumatic for migrants long before crisis. As a case in point, in pre-crisis Libya Ghanaian migrants complained of racism, discrimination, name-calling, robberies and casual attacks by Libyan youths, arbitrary arrests and detentions, lack of access to rental accommodation, inability to access the formal banking system and lack of protection by Libyan security services.

While some migrants were scapegoated because of their socio-economic status, others faced harassment, intimidation and physical assault because they and their countries of origin were perceived as fuelling crises, whether or not these claims proved legitimate. For instance, reprisals against Cameroonians in CAR ensued after deposed CAR President Bozizé sought refuge in Cameroon. Similarly, while the departure from Libya of labour migrants from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa created specific opportunities for Egyptian migrants and many thus remained in the country, they were specifically targeted because of their foreign status during the crisis because of the perception that Egypt was encouraging a revolution. Moreover, because Nigerien and Liberian mercenaries and fighters were forcefully and voluntarily recruited during both Ivorian crises, Nigerien and Liberian migrants were often blamed for the generalised violence and therefore targeted in retaliatory attacks – whether they actively participated in the conflicts or not. In particular, Liberian migrants in Côte d’Ivoire complained that their small farms were seized during the time of harvest, they were stopped from using the forests for livelihoods purposes, and women were raped with impunity.

38 In the CAR case study, however, Cameroonians and Chadians resident in CAR admitted that religion was politicised during the crisis, in which foreign Muslims were particularly vulnerable to reprisals and attacks.
39 Al Jazeera 2013.
The desire for safety and security compelled most migrants to pursue cross-border movement as the most appropriate response to crisis. Nonetheless, the mobility of certain migrants was restricted because of their inability to show appropriate identity documents to authorities, and this was particularly salient for Liberian migrants in Côte d’Ivoire who did not have proper identity cards, thus compromising their legal status in the country and making them vulnerable to reprisals during crises. In extreme cases, relatives of migrants had to contract drivers to transport their identity documents from Cameroon to CAR under very volatile circumstances, and only then were the migrants able to take advantage of their government’s air evacuation services. In instances of non-return, some migrants in Thailand could not escape the floods or reach safety because their legal status was restricted to the districts in which their work permits were issued, thereby making them vulnerable to arrests and deportation. Migrants stayed in Thailand during the crisis for reasons related to their legal and socio-economic status, such as the high cost of return to regions of origin and the lack of evacuation assistance from authorities at home and in Thailand. For example, as many as 600,000 migrant labourers – many from Myanmar and unregistered – were effectively stranded in their flooded accommodation without food, water or electricity. Additionally, due to the flooding of local migration offices in some areas in Thailand, the processes of renewing and extending migration permits were temporarily suspended and migrants were left with expired documents. This calls into question whether or not stringent rules of document verification employed by host and origin countries should be officially suspended during times of crisis.

In cases involving cross-border movement, migrants’ decisions to flee crises in host countries were measured against potential loss of livelihoods and accumulated assets, with safety and security often prioritised over money and material possessions. Understandably, improvised savings arrangements were jeopardised as a result of crisis. Due to their inability to access formal banking systems migrants lost substantial amounts that were buried in safe locations. For instance, the impromptu departure from Libya of a 33-year-old Ghanaian man resulted in his leaving behind US$8,000 (€7,000):

*I couldn’t bring my stuff. I was in a rush because of the war. I left some of my money there – about US$8,000 and some of my luggage. I remember the amount because we used to wrap every US$1,000 we get and I had wrapped about 8 of them by then…The fight was becoming intensive and scary. We were even lucky because we were under a ‘kobri’ [overhead bridge]. Even the overhead bridge was destroyed by bombs. So when the overhead was destroyed we all ran for our dear lives. I was able to run away with the little money on me at that time – about US$500. It’s this amount that I’ve used part to build this makeshift shop I’m using as my place of work. So I failed to bring all my money and luggage for the fear of losing my life.*

40 Gois and Campbell 2013.
According to our emerging findings, large-scale monetary losses were apparent in instances of both return and non-return. For example, the massive floods in Thailand in 2011 implicated labour migrants and thousands of Burmese, Laotians, and Cambodians, who incurred estimated income losses of between 7 and 16 million Thai Bahts (€1.7–4.1 million).  

In crisis situations where migrants did not flee the host country – such as Thailand and Lebanon – they developed coping strategies. Labour migrants in Thailand who spoke Thai received news from various media, their employers, and other people with whom they spoke. Thus, they tried to protect their homes, blocking them from the flood, securing their valuables and buying stocks of food and drinking water. For many migrants, moving to the upper-level of a house was the most obvious coping strategy. Moving within a house was only possible for those migrants who had friends (mainly co-ethnics or fellow nationals) or relatives in the same building. Migrants also found shelter at other houses or flats of friends, employers or co-ethnics or temporarily stayed at public higher elevated areas such as bridges. However, only a small fraction of migrants moved to available shelters operated by the Thai government or private institutions.

In other cases where return migration was the most evident response to crises, interviews with migrants recorded thus far show that they adopted a range of strategies to secure their departure in the midst of chaos. For instance, some Cameroonian nationals resident outside the CAR capital, Bangui, took refuge in Christian churches before embarking on the long journey back to their country of origin. Others took refuge in their friends’ homes or in the Cameroonian embassy in CAR. Similarly, Egyptians in Libya confined their movement to buying food in short spurts in the day and staying at home during most of the upheaval. Most Egyptian migrants interviewed thus far took the route to Tunis to escape severe violence in the Tripoli airport area while en route back to Egypt. While some paid for each other and shared costs, others turned to a wealthy Egyptian shop owner to finance their return to Egypt. Emergency responses by Ghanaian migrants in Libya included seeking help from some Libyan nationals and landlords to escape to airports where international and intergovernmental organisations had arranged evacuation flights to countries of origin. Others sought help from their embassy in Tripoli but were mostly disappointed by what they regarded as the ‘uncaring attitude’ of staff at the diplomatic mission. A number of Ghanaian migrants resorted to activism, including the use of social and mass media to compel their government to arrange evacuation flights out of Libya. Local radio stations, such as Dormaa FM in rural Ghana, hosted live interviews with stranded migrants in Libya who shared their harrowing experiences.

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41 Building and Wood Worker’s International 2011.
42 This group of Egyptians left Libya in 2015 when violence erupted for a second time.
experiences with the Ghanaian public. Similarly, Egyptian migrants fleeing Libya staged hunger strikes while in transit in Tunis to hasten a response to their plight.

Migrants were particularly scarred by the uncertainty and trauma of crises, thereby shaping their decision to return to countries of origin in cases where return was feasible. For instance, a 38-year-old female Ghanaian migrant in Côte d'Ivoire highlights the imminent risks to her safety:

_The conflict was very severe in my neighbourhood. It was so intense that we wake up every morning to hear rumours circulating that hundreds of people have been massacred on the streets. It was very scary, the cry of gunshots intensified each passing day. Sometimes you could hear people shout ‘they are coming’, referring to the rebels. Then you have to run and look for a good place to hide. That was the main reason why I returned back home._

Our emerging findings show that crisis has long-lasting implications for the mental health of migrants. For example, the previous respondent recounts the trauma inflicted on her daughter by the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire as well as the return journey to Ghana:

_When the war happened, my child really suffered. She was just eight years at that time. The kid walked for miles in trying to come to us. She was made to jump over dead bodies that were lying on the streets. She was made to handle a gun as young as she was to protect herself. It was even broadcast in the print media. She walked all the way from Bouaké to Abidjan. Most of the kids she came with became paralysed they couldn’t walk again...Because of the war, my children became traumatised and terrified by any sound. Anytime they heard any sound or loud noise they would quickly run to hide. It really affected them psychologically._

Despite having experienced significant psychological stress and economic losses resulting from crisis, migrants interviewed thus far for this study showcased their resilience time and time again. While some migrants fled crises with the support of country of origin governments and intergovernmental organisations, others left of their own volition with personal resources and were in some instances financed by relatives resident in the countries of origin – as in the case of some Chadian returnees from Libya whose relatives and local community groups financed the journey to their regions of origin, such as Moussoro. While some travelled by air, such as 4,000 Cameroonian nationals who were airlifted in December 2013 from Bangui, CAR, to the commercial capital Douala by their government on the national airline Cameroon Airlines Corporation (Camair-Co), others travelled by road networks and through field and forests, borrowing trucks filled with goods and hiding in containers, such as 7,000 Cameroonian returnees who entered Cameroon via border crossings at Garoua Boulai, Kentzou, Kette, Gari Gombo and Ngaou.

Though some returnees settled in areas where they were formerly resident, others relocated to areas with which they were unfamiliar. Similarly, while some
returnees resettled in rural areas – like Chadians returning to Maro, Sido, Dja-kko, Goré – others entered metropolises, like Chadians returning to their capital, N'Djamena. Some of those who chose to settle in rural provinces different from their provinces of origin, as in the case of Burkinabé returnees from Côte d'Ivoire, benefited from the support of local communities including previously returned relatives\(^{43}\), returnees who had anticipated their return, traditional authorities and civic associations. They also received from state and non-state actors food assistance and the provision of farmland, seeds and infrastructure such as schools and dispensaries. Others who opted for urban centres engaged in trade and other entrepreneurial ventures. Yet still, settling in urban centres proved difficult for large numbers of returnees who lacked access to formal skills training and/or capital.

Whether return was to origin areas or new terrain in the countries of origin, migrants faced many difficulties, including, but not limited to: food insecurity, lack of access to health care, housing and education, and resentment from some local communities. These challenges often enticed some returnees to re-migrate to countries affected by crisis or to new destinations, including Burkinabé migrants who re-migrated to Côte d'Ivoire, Egyptians who re-migrated to Libya, or Burkinabé returning from Libya who migrated to Gabon or Guinea Bissau.

While situations of crisis expose migrants’ vulnerabilities, they also reveal their agency. In an example showcasing migrant autonomy, Cambodian, Laotian and Burmese migrants contributed to crisis mitigation before, during and after the 2011 flood in Thailand. They built walls to protect houses and factories from the elements, and launched clean-up and reconstruction exercises after the flood. This enabled them to feel a sense of belonging and connectedness to their Thai counterparts, thereby facilitating cohesion within communities otherwise fractured by differences in culture, language\(^{44}\), class and ethnicity. Similarly, during the 2006 crisis in Lebanon, some migrants became active in helping other ‘trapped’ or ‘locked away’ domestic workers from their own as well as from other countries, which also pushed them into activism. They collaborated and worked together with their embassies as well as with Caritas, the only relevant NGO on the ground at the time, to help locate and evacuate other migrant domestic workers who wished to leave or those abandoned by their employers.

Moreover, migrant domestic workers gleaned the importance of organising into formal structures to protect themselves in times of crisis. For instance, the past

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\(^{43}\) In some cases, returnees did not maintain close ties with relatives in the countries of origin – such as Chadians of multiple generations who fully integrated into CAR society – and were thus unable to rely on extended family networks for support and assistance.

\(^{44}\) However, language has not been an important difference between Thai society and Laotian migrants, as the languages are mutually intelligible.
10 years has seen the formation of a large number of migrant associations, such as the Migrant Community Centre (MCC), which have taken the plight of migrant domestic workers to Lebanese society through media and awareness-raising campaigns and events. As migrant domestic workers started to form communities – in some cases working in their individual capacities – they met whenever and in whichever way possible, most notably in churches, to discuss their daily problems, raise awareness of their common plight and educate each other on their rights.

In cases of non-return, where migrants remained in countries impacted by crisis such as Lebanon and Thailand, our emerging findings indicate that migrants are likely to develop a deeper awareness of their vulnerabilities, thereby actively working to mitigate those vulnerabilities in the future. For instance, migrants implicated in the 2011 flood in Thailand reported feeling more inclined to learn the Thai language so that they could be better prepared in the event of another natural disaster. Similarly, they vowed to undertake the following activities in order to lessen future vulnerabilities: securing legal status in Thailand, strengthening relations with employers, entering into formal, written agreements with landlords, and insuring their assets. It is worth repeating here that migrants’ abilities to mitigate vulnerabilities in host countries depend both on their resilience and resourcefulness as well as on the opportunity structures available to them.

**Migrant responses to crisis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAY</th>
<th>RELOCATE AND RETURN</th>
<th>RE-MIGRATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Find shelter, e.g. at churches, embassies, sheltering structures such as bridges</td>
<td>Share costs of relocation or return with other migrants</td>
<td>Experience challenges in country of origin: unemployment, food insecurity, lack of access to health care, housing and education, resentment from local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay at home/inside as much as possible</td>
<td>Access organised evacuations</td>
<td>Learn more about opportunities in a new host country or the same previous host country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find support by employers, landlords, friends or family</td>
<td>Find support from employers, landlords, friends or family</td>
<td>Use social networks to find out about employment opportunities abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay informed</td>
<td>Organise support through social and mass media</td>
<td>Prepare resources required for remigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure valuables</td>
<td>Manage relocation within country or to third country, or return to country of origin: finding employment, seeking support</td>
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During crisis situations, a range of official and unofficial service providers take action to get migrants to safety as quickly as possible, trying to ensure that both their basic as well as longer-term needs are addressed. States in particular are the stakeholders with the mandate to act on behalf of those within their country, or their nationals elsewhere. Nonetheless, states are supported in their actions by other stakeholders, and thus coordination and cooperation with – as well as funding of actions by – civil society organisations, private sector actors and intergovernmental organisations have been essential in assisting and protecting migrants in crisis situations, and thus shaping their experiences during and after crisis. This section outlines how actors (other than migrants) and institutions have responded to the needs of migrants during an acute humanitarian crisis, as demonstrated in the fieldwork and research conducted thus far.

It should be noted from the outset that in some cases migrant interviewees could not always distinguish between different actors providing services (including state actors, unless in military uniform), especially the different stakeholder ‘types’ noted here (Thailand, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire). However, the information presented here has been triangulated among the various stakeholder groups interviewed thus far, providing insight into the common themes identified across all interviews as regards actions taken by various stakeholders.

**STATES**

Research on state responses to migrants caught in crisis situations has highlighted, perhaps unsurprisingly, that evacuation services – conducted or facilitated by states – are the most essential response, conducted across all the research countries. As the MICIC initiative has highlighted, saving lives should be the top priority in times of crisis, and ensuring that migrants are moved outside of harm’s way is the first means to achieve this goal. Once migrants are out of danger, however, a second and essential step that some states under research have taken on a large scale has been supporting migrants to return to their local communities or final destination within the country of origin (Cameroon-CAR, Chad-CAR, Burkina Faso-Libya/Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana-Libya). Such actions have ensured that migrants have not needed to expend personal resources or savings in order to arrive at their final destination after a crisis situation.
Aside from relocation and evacuation operations, states (countries of origin, transit and host) have also administratively supported mobility (through the issuance of *laissez-passer*, passports or other travel documentation, registration of arrivals) and provided immediate humanitarian assistance in the form of food and water, financial assistance, and health services, either directly or by engaging civil society organisations and inter-governmental organisations. Such humanitarian assistance has been distributed at Embassies, airports and other spaces of evacuation in the country during the crisis, as well as reception centres in transit and origin countries upon arrival. In some cases, states can politically engage in resolving the crisis, particularly when their nationals have become targets of reprisals during the crisis; the Government of Burkina Faso was particularly involved in the political efforts to resolve the Ivorian crisis, participating in relevant international summits and political agreements with the aim to facilitate the end of the conflict.

The establishment of national policies, coordinating committees and focal points pre-crisis (or *ad hoc* committees during the crisis) have facilitated requests for assistance, coordination of and discussion among relevant state and civil society stakeholders. However, in only a few cases did such committees cater specifically to the needs of migrants caught in crises – and only in countries of origin (Niger–Libya, Ghana–Libya). This has often involved commitment of new funds to government agencies particularly involved (Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire) or creatively applying funds that were previously earmarked for other (e.g. administrative) expenses (Ghana–Libya). However, while national authorities have been the primary actors – principally through ministries of foreign affairs, social affairs, cooperation, finance and development, and of the interior – local governments have also played an important role in facilitating movement in border regions and maintaining cross-border stability (Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire), as well as in reintegration activities (Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire, Chad–CAR, Niger–Libya).

In cases of large-scale displacement due to a crisis in a neighbouring country, states have also needed to operate responses to target several different groups simultaneously: refugees, return migrants or internally displaced persons, and transit or stranded migrants from third countries. In such cases, transit states have established reception centres with...
registration services, and liaised with international organisations on the further relocation of third country nationals to their country of origin (Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire, Chad–CAR, Niger–Libya, Tunisia–Libya). As a case in point, Egyptian migrants displaced by the 2011 Libya crisis lauded the Tunisian state authorities’ efforts in providing shelter, food, medical supplies and even phone lines to contact their families.

Yet, in terms of other services provided to migrants in the longer-term, to facilitate (re)integration and recovery after the crisis, state responses have been less robust for a number of reasons, primary among which is resource constraints. Nonetheless, for those countries who have, the programmes have focused on supporting migrants’ socio-economic reintegration, either by training migrants in relevant industries (e.g. agriculture, fishing, forestry) (Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire), providing scholarships or educational opportunities for vocational schools and in academia (Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire), facilitating employment in specific sectors (Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire), or providing land to return migrants for settling and farming (Chad–CAR, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire). Such programmes serve a dual purpose in supporting returnees’ reintegration, while also promoting local development in communities with high numbers of returnees. However, (re-)integration of (return) migrants into the labour market can be hampered when there is an oversupply of labour and thus greater competition for jobs and decreased wages.

While states have been engaged in various ways in responding to the situations of migrants caught in crises, interviews conducted up to now with migrants reveal that there has been some mistrust or outright criticism of the (lack of) services or protection offered by their states of origin or citizenship. Such criticism is particularly glaring when migrants view the support they received in contrast with support received in the same crisis situation by migrants from other countries, and when migrants who receive ‘better’ help are perceived to do so because they are socio-economically more advantaged. This has been both in terms of the lack of support for mid- to long-term (re)integration services (Chad–CAR/Libya, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire) – even if immediate emergency services were provided – as well as migrants’ feeling of abandonment by their country during the crisis situation. Such mistrust, particularly during an emergency, can block states’ abilities to respond to their nationals, and is exacerbated when migrants perceive an overall lack of response

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from their own state, particularly if they observe higher levels of engagement by other states (Niger–Libya, Egypt–Libya, Ghana–Libya), or receive misinformation about services or financial support being withheld (Egypt–Libya, Ghana–Libya). For example, the perception of a lack of adequate financial support and misinformation about financial support from Gaddafi during the Libya crisis led to high tensions between migrants and some Ghanaian staff at the embassy, in some cases exposing staff to risks of physical attacks from frustrated migrants. Mistrust of country of origin embassies can seriously challenge emergency responses in myriad ways, including also due to a lack of data on nationals in the country, as migrants (and refugees) may not feel comfortable registering their presence in the host country with their country of origin (Ghana–Libya, Thailand, Lebanon). In some cases in the research, authorities of countries of origin have noted that they do not have a mandate for their nationals in the host country in crisis, where they are unregistered or departed irregularly (Lebanon, Egypt–Libya). This mistrust and frustration can extend also into state responses post-crisis: in Egypt, return migrants reported in interviews and focus groups that they had registered and paid for services (including compensation of lost items due to the crisis) from government ministries, but received no response.

**INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

The role of intergovernmental actors throughout periods of crisis has been strongly highlighted across the research, in terms of financial and technical support, as well as acting as facilitator or mediating actor between local NGO service providers and state responses to the crisis. UNHCR and IOM have clearly been the principal actors managing refugee and migrant arrivals and evacuations during crisis situations – registering refugees and displaced persons (including migrants) arriving from the crisis, providing or arranging food and other essential services, and organising evacuations – as well as to a certain extent in the longer term, particularly when displacement is protracted, or in launching development projects targeting vulnerable persons (which often include returnees from crisis situations). These two organisations have been particularly noted by migrants, policy makers and other stakeholders in four of the case studies, namely Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Thailand, and the CAR.

The Libya crisis has been a prime example of intergovernmental support to migrants caught in a conflict situation. Assistance was carried out in close coordination with state authorities of countries of origin (both in terms of embassies in Libya to arrange laissez-passers and authorities in the country of origin after arrival) and transit, as well as with local and international NGOs (particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross) in Libya, transit countries and countries of origin. During the crisis, UNHCR organised assistance for refugees and asylum seekers fleeing Libya, processed claims, and organised resettlement procedures. IOM organised the evacuation and relocation of migrants fleeing the violence from within Libya, from the neighbouring countries of Egypt and Tunisia,
and in some cases onwards to communities of origin within the country of origin. In the case of Niger, Nige-
riens were accommodated in transit centres in Niamey, Agadez, Arlit and Dirkou, where they received health, 
food and accommodation services and were subsequently transport-
ed by bus to their local community. Similarly, Chadians were transported 
by IOM from Libya via Egypt to Chad 
(N’Djamena or Faya), from where it 
was primarily returnees’ families who paid for their transportation to their local 
communities. Comparable evacuation services (although not always within the 
country of origin) were provided by IOM during the crisis for Burkinabé, Chadian, 
Egyptian and Ghanaian migrants in Libya, for migrants from Cameroon and Chad 
during the crisis in the CAR, and migrants from Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia 
during the Côte d’Ivoire crisis. The efforts of intergovernmental organisations in 
responding to this crisis have been lauded for being instrumental in mediating 
the negative effects of the crisis. Nevertheless, recent research has interrogated 
these organisations’ role in the process vis-à-vis the priorities of Western states, 
notably in the prioritisation of border management and return policies and pro-
cedures over other policy priorities.45

UN agencies in particular have also been 
involved in service provision, either di-
rectly or through subcontracting interna-
tional or local NGOs: the United Nations 
Children’s Fund in providing school kits 
for students, fuel, vaccines and/or hy-
giene and sanitation services (Burkina 
Faso–Côte d’Ivoire, Niger—Libya); the 
World Health Organisation and United 
Nations Population Fund supplying kits, 
consumables and medicines (Burkina 
Faso–Côte d’Ivoire, Niger—Libya); the United Nations Development Programme in 
crisis response in general as well as in providing financial support through emer-
gency funding (Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire and Libya); the World Food Programme in 
providing food for displaced persons (Niger—Libya); and the International Labour 
Organisation in providing financial and technical support (Thailand).

Support for the reintegration of return migrants has also been addressed by proj-
ects managed or funded by intergovernmental organisations. Intergovernmental 
organisations have provided technical assistance in developing training and 
employment programmes (including vocational and micro-business training and 
counselling), as well as material support for mechanical, trade and agricultural 
business start-ups, and provision of basic start-up kits (Burkina Faso—Libya, Niger–

45 Crépeau 2013; Brachet 2015.
An important aspect of these projects is the inclusion of particularly vulnerable host community members, as a way to avoid possible friction between host communities and returnees or stranded migrants. This was a particular tactic in IOM projects in Ghana for returnees from Libya. In contrast, in the Tunisian case, following a period of strong solidarity shown by the Tunisian population and local NGOs, tension with local communities began to mount over time, particularly with regard to those hosted in the transit camps due to the various services (accommodation, food, health) provided to them and not to the local community.

An important critique of these measures, however, is their ad hoc nature – migrants and NGOs have noted that while these are important programmes, only a very limited number of migrant returnees have had access to such training programmes, which limits the impact on the community at large. (Ghana–Libya, Burkina Faso–Libya). In Ghana, for one project, only 50 out of 900 registered returnees from Libya were provided with support for training and start-up kits. Moreover, such projects focusing on socio-economic integration into the home community have not been implemented across the board, and rather can be considered more an exception than a rule in terms of engagement with returnee communities to support their longer-term re-integration. Indeed, in most countries, longer-term projects geared toward returnees due to crisis have tapered off following the immediate aftermath of the crisis and humanitarian responses to it (Chad–Libya), or simply never been implemented (Chad–CAR).

Regional organisations have also been involved to a certain extent, primarily in financial contributions either as emergency funding, or in projects focusing on reintegration or sustainable development. For example, following an appeal for international aid from the Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the context of returns from the Libya crisis, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) provided an emergency financial contribution. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was involved in conducting rapid crisis assessment and support, following the Thailand floods. European Union funding for emergencies, particularly through ECHO, as well as UN Emergency Funds, have also been mobilised in crisis situations. European responses to crisis will be particularly highlighted in the forthcoming comparative analysis.
Civil society

For migrants, civil society actors – particularly NGOs – are often the trusted groups to whom they turn in times of crisis, and those they first encounter in the immediate responses. Across the research thus far, this group has included migrant associations, volunteer networks, (local and international) NGOs, universities, faith-based associations, community leaders and even the general public. Across all research countries, local and international NGOs and migrant associations have been the most common type of civil society organisation engaged with migrants who have been caught in a crisis situation – in origin, transit and host countries. Overall, they also commonly operate in partnership with, or are funded to provide services by government authorities, intergovernmental organisations or international NGOs. These funding sources can be problematic, particularly when tied to individual projects or emergency funding which can be limited in scale and may not cover all services needed in order to respond appropriately to the number of migrants and others displaced by the crisis situation (Thailand, Egypt–Libya).

Civil society has been particularly involved in crisis response to migrants by providing food and water, clothes, financial support, and/or health services (Thailand, Egypt–Libya, Lebanon, Niger–Libya, Tunisia–Libya, Ghana–Libya, Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire, Chad–Libya, Cameroon–CAR). Other critical emergency services commonly provided have included: dissemination of updated information on the crisis and options to the migrant community (Thailand, Ghana–Libya); managing or providing support for the management of shelters and reception and registration of migrants, as well as evacuation or relocation services (Thailand, Tunisia–Libya, Lebanon, Niger–Libya, Cameroon–CAR, Chad–CAR); and tailored support for vulnerable groups, especially migrant children (Niger–Libya, Ghana–Libya). In some cases they play an important role in liaising with local community leaders or members and in supporting professional training activities, to ensure smoother (re)integration of migrants into communities (Ghana–Libya, Niger–Libya, Burkina Faso–Libya). For example, in Burkina Faso local associations negotiated with traditional authorities and community leaders to facilitate returnees’ access to land, as well as administrative and technical services.

Public opinion in the host, transit and home country has also played a valuable role in shaping migrants’ options during a crisis and in facilitating the provision of ad hoc response and makeshift action. We underestimated the skill and preparation needed to respond to a disaster of this size.

(Sompong Srakaew, Executive Director, Labour Rights Promotion Network, Thailand CSO)
Humanitarian assistance
Dissemination of updated information on the crisis
Management or support of shelters
Management or support of evacuation or relocation services
Tailored support for vulnerable groups
Media support
Advocacy
Legal services

Challenges
CSOs uncommon in some countries or sub-regions
Lack of funding for long-term support

In the mid- to longer-term following a crisis, as well as in ordinary times, advocacy is one of the most important services provided by local and international NGOs. This is both in terms of drawing the attention of the (origin, transit, or host) government to the plight of migrant returnees, stranded migrants, or migrants who stayed in the host country, as well as in providing legal services to defend their rights (Tunisia–Libya, Ghana–Libya, Niger–Libya, Lebanon). In Tunisia, three different NGOs (Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, EuroMed Rights, House of Law and Migration) work on supporting rejected asylum seekers and stranded migrants with legal advice and services. Such legal services have been essential for migrants who would not otherwise be able to receive these services: those who may not have the financial resources, or the support of embassy representation in the country, or for those whose embassies also may not have the resources.
However, in some of the countries or sub-regions under study, civil society organisations (particularly those working on migration issues) were uncommon at the time of the crises, and thus were not a strong presence in immediate crisis response as compared to intergovernmental organisations or government authorities (Lebanon, Chad–Libya/CAR, Niger–Libya, Egypt–Libya, Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire). Yet in some of these cases, crises served to galvanise communities and led to the formation of a number of local NGOs and migrant associations focusing on serving migrant and returnee populations that were particularly impacted by crises (Lebanon, Niger–Libya, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire). For example, the Liberia Returnee Network was established in 2012 by Liberian returnees from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana particularly to fill the gap in support to these returnees, and to capitalise on returnees’ skills for development. In Lebanon, following 2006, when the plight of a number of trapped migrant domestic workers captured international and local media attention, a number of local NGOs were established, focusing on women’s rights and migrants’ rights, all with specific sections devoted to migrant domestic workers and focusing on service provision to them and advocacy on their behalf. In this sense, crises can have an important role in stimulating civil society to respond to the needs of migrants affected by crisis – either while they remain in the host country or in their country of origin upon return.

**PRIVATE SECTOR**

In responding to migrants caught in crises, private sector actors have been primarily engaged on an individual or one-to-one basis, and in an *ad hoc* manner, often based on personal relationships established before crisis, especially as migrants’ employers and landlords.

For migrants, safe shelter during times of crisis can be the difference between life and death, and findings from the research so far suggest that the private sector has been important in either facilitating or blocking access to safe shelter. In this regard, landlords have been noted in several cases. For example, in Thailand some landlords did not charge room fees for flooded apartments, while others continued to charge, or even charged extra if tenants moved together with others to an upper floor, placing an additional burden on migrants during the crisis. For some Ghanaians during the Libya crisis, landlords...
assisted them in escaping to safe locations such as airports, where they could get in contact with international and intergovernmental organisations for assistance and evacuation.

In terms of employers, their decision whether or not to continue paying salaries or to provide safe shelter to employees can frame migrants’ options in terms of responses (Thailand, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, Egypt–Libya). In the case of Thailand, while some migrants were left stranded with their salaries disrupted, limiting their possibilities of shelter or subsistence, other employers allowed migrants to stay in company buildings during the flood, or continued paying salaries, which gave migrants more flexibility and support in their responses to the crisis. Some Egyptian migrants in Libya and migrant domestic workers in Lebanon have reported that their salaries were withheld for work already done – exploitation they felt they were powerless to oppose considering the lack of functioning complaint mechanisms and their increased vulnerability during the crisis. In Côte d’Ivoire some Liberian migrants experienced a mixture of the two – employers who provided some services for migrants, such as meals, but (or perhaps because of this) refused to pay them for their work – a clear example of labour exploitation, in an even more pressing and extreme situation.

In the longer-term, private sector actors can be important in the reintegration of migrant returnees – by providing employability services and opportunities (Egypt–Libya), accepting cash vouchers issued by humanitarian agencies for services (Chad–CAR), or contributing financially to humanitarian assistance activities (Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire). When there is limited access to jobs, this can particularly hinder migrant returnees (and stranded migrants’) (re)integration or recovery following crisis – this has been found across the board in fieldwork countries.

It should be noted that there were fewer positive or negative examples of responses from the private sector as compared to all other stakeholder groups. This could be a result of the research focus on the longer-term consequences of the crisis, for which ad hoc involvement of private sector actors – while at times instrumental
in the immediate emergency phase – has not, according to stakeholders inter-
viewed to date, had a large-scale impact when compared to other civil society or
intergovernmental actions. Moreover, in certain cases, migrant returnees acted
more independently, without support of private or civil society actors. This has
been the case for Ghanaian migrants returning from Côte d’Ivoire, and has been
attributed to the proximity between the two countries, relaxed immigration con-
trols at the borders (due to ECOWAS free movement between the two countries),
common kinship, cultural and linguistic ties, and support networks from house-
hold members.
As demonstrated in this section, our emerging findings indicate that the six crisis situations under study have impacted migrants, their households, origin, host and transit countries in myriad ways, leading to some changes in policy and practice as well as a number of lessons for institutions and actors involved in responding to crises. Regardless of policy shifts, however, more needs to be done to ensure effective crisis response and long-term protections for migrants post-crisis. In order to position migrants and the communities which they inhabit at the centre of relief efforts, the broad spectrum of actors involved at pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases must coordinate their data collection, standard operating procedures, contingency planning, management bodies, and resource mobilisation.

It is evident from the data collected thus far that regardless of whether or not migrants return to their countries of origin, remain in (or return to) the country affected by crisis, or re-migrate to a third country, a number of legal, political and economic measures must be adopted to mitigate the potentially negative effects of any future crises, including: regularising the status of migrants; issuing migrants’ identity documents in host as well as in origin countries; legislating and implementing domestic and international instruments to protect migrant labour rights; advocating for the human rights of migrants; insuring migrant assets; and providing opportunities for language acquisition and labour market training for migrants. Furthermore, state institutions, international organisations, private sector actors and civil society must work to reduce the root causes of crisis as well as the post-crisis tensions and challenges that may arise.

**Migrants and Communities of Origin or Settlement**

Many migrants were not able to protect their assets during crisis situations. Savings were more often kept in homes rather than in banks or other safe places. Consequently, even some of the wealthiest migrants became destitute on return. Other returnees who learned trades in countries like Libya have set up workshops in their countries.

"The management of these returnees in the long-term will pose [a] problem...It’s obvious that many of the returnees will go back to CAR as soon as the borders will be [re-]opened."

*(Anonymous stakeholder respondent in Chad)*
of origin that bring them revenue; some migrants have even recruited young people in their workshops. Return migration has also prompted the creation of associations and cooperatives of migrants which have initiated reintegration projects benefiting their members.

Across the case studies involving conflict and return migration – Cote d’Ivoire, CAR, Libya – family members of migrants were adversely affected by crises resulting in loss of housing and remittance income, dependence of return migrants on meagre household resources, the burden of catering for depressed and seriously ill return migrants and accusations of mismanagement of remittances. In addition, there have not been adequate psychosocial interventions to deal with migrants’ traumatic experiences upon return. These pressures have sometimes triggered acrimony, some separation between spouses, and lower social mobility among some migrant households. In some cases, however, returnees did not maintain close ties with relatives in the countries of origin, such as Chadians of multiple generations who fully integrated into CAR society, and were thus unable to rely on extended family networks for support and assistance. Some migrants chose to return to areas with which they were unfamiliar, which enabled opportunities to develop new social networks.

Lack of employment opportunities for return migrants has been an important recurring challenge for returnees in all the case studies involving return, often enticing migrants to re-migrate. In some instances, migrants have re-migrated in the midst of on-going crises in countries of set-

The situation improved after the 2006 war due to open channels and communications. People started to think of connecting with each other and communicating, the war alarmed them – they could have died and no one would ever know it.

(Cameroonian migrant domestic worker in Lebanon, Female, 46)
Across all fieldwork countries, interviewees have demonstrated and asserted that there is a lack of sufficient learning on the part of state institutions about the impact of crisis situations on migrants. This is even the case when gaps and obstacles have been made clear as a result of crisis situations. Whether it is from apparent lack of political will or resources, institutional paralysis, or reprioritisation of attention and resources due to a new emergency situation, state responses are often considered insufficient by migrants, non-governmental stakeholders and even government institutional bodies themselves. Further, with few exceptions, there is a definite dearth of activity and resources allocated to long-term responses in relation to those migrants profiled in each of our case studies, even when interviewees have recognised positive responses of states in the immediate humanitarian emergency response.

Where policy changes have been implemented based on lessons learned from crisis situations, it has primarily been through the development or establishment of policies on crisis response, for example contingency plans (at the national and institutional level), or a designated department, committee or ministry to respond to crisis situations (Lebanon, Niger–Libya, Ghana–Libya, Chad–Libya, Chad–CAR, Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire, Tunisia–Libya, Thailand). It is also clear that such contingency plans must be regularly updated. In the case of the 2006 crisis in Lebanon, evacuations regularly used the land route to Syria, particularly for migrant domestic workers, and Lebanese and country of origin authorities in the country acknowledged that evacuation plans would need to provide alternative routes, considering its impracticality now.

The level at which migrant needs are taken up in contingency plans, however, varies. For instance, Thailand’s contingency plan refers to the broad category of

**STATE OR NATIONAL LEVEL**

Lack of employment opportunities for return migrants has been a recurring challenge for returnees.
While contingency plans have been established based on lessons learned, the level at which migrant needs are taken up in these plans often varies.

Together with the establishment of contingency plans and management bodies to respond to migrants in situations of crisis, both means and sufficient resources need to be dedicated to the tasks – a notable obstacle in a number of examples. In Niger, the committee set up to coordinate actions of Nigerien return migrants lacked the means to implement its own activities – in response, the state tasked the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, a Nigerien government department that reports directly to the president, to be the responsible stakeholder for developing responses. Indeed, lack of resources has been a major hindrance to state responses, often halting the establishment of crisis response bodies and mechanisms, as well as (re)integration assistance (Chad–CAR/Libya, Ghana–Libya, Lebanon, Niger–Libya). In Chad, the recent fall in oil prices – combined with prioritisation of crisis responses to new emergencies in the region – has drastically reduced the state’s resources for funding such bodies, freezing the implementation of its National Plan for Global Reintegration for Returnees. In Ghana, the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) has presented a bill to Parliament to boost its funding base through the establishment of a Disaster Management Fund, in order to better respond to similar crises in the future.

Lack of accurate data, particularly concerning irregular populations, during a crisis situation can also hinder state responses to nationals caught in a crisis abroad (Niger–Libya, Ghana–Libya/ Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire) – yet few policy responses have made concrete efforts to obtain better data. Burkina Faso has developed a new migration strategy that gives the right to vote (during referenda and presidential elections) to Burkinabé living abroad, which will involve the creation of an electoral list of these citizens and can aid the state in better assessing the scale of its nationals abroad (and thus potential return in case of a crisis). In Thailand, government ministries hope to have an integrated database for all governmental organisations in the future, which one government interviewee argued could improve crisis response, particularly to migrants, by clarifying scale and locations of affected populations: “The operation in the local level is still a manual system.
The report is still in [Microsoft] Excel format and is not up to date – it’s problematic. There is a need for improvement, which will take time.”

Moreover, the need for early warning systems that can anticipate potential crisis situations and the scale of impact (particularly those related to political unrest) have been specifically noted in the research (Niger–Libya, Tunisia–Libya, Ghana–Libya, Cameroon–CAR). The CAR research particularly evidenced the need to better heed warning signs of incipient instability in the months prior to the crisis, in order for states to implement more effective contingency plans for migrants living in crisis-impacted areas.

In many of the countries under study, new crises have emerged that have diverted attention – and funding – away from migrants who were caught in a previous crisis. In Lebanon, attention is focused on the Syrian refugee crisis; in Chad, the problems related to climate change around Lake Chad and the increased number of displaced persons in the same area; in Liberia, the Ebola epidemic. All these examples have reprioritised and refocused state efforts, often at the expense of other vulnerable groups. As one Lebanese government official lamented: “We don’t forget [about the other issues], but donors forget.”

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

For intergovernmental and regional actors, stock-taking after a crisis has helped identify key changes that have been (or need to be) adopted, as well as gaps in response. In particular, there has been recognition of the need to adapt policies and procedures, and show flexibility (particularly in resource allocation) to better respond. Following the 2011 floods in Thailand, the UN Emergency Relief Commissioner noted with regard to the international community’s response to the crisis, “the governments in the region were keen to manage their own disasters and felt that the humanitarian community needed to intensify its work to realign support to these governments, with a commensurate realignment of tools and services in line with national needs.”

Adapting policies, programmes and funding assistance to the needs of national governments, and

46 IASC Humanitarian Network for Asia-Pacific 2012.
The international community has to play a responsible role in dealing with crises in Africa. They have to understand our history, our culture, our traditions; otherwise we will be the source of perpetual research on crisis... International actors have to be responsible and even-handed in their approach to managing or intervening in crisis situations in Africa and elsewhere.

(Peter Forkpayea Zogolee Zaizay, Deputy Commissioner General of Immigration for Administration, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation (BIN), Liberia)

As with state responses, the need for reliable data – on both the number of migrants impacted by a crisis and on the development of a crisis – has been a critical challenge to the responses of intergovernmental organisations and international actors. More accurate data on the scale of migrants in the country is essential in preparing sufficiently to receive and respond to their needs, while early warning systems can support organisations in planning and shifting their crisis responses.

Finally, the research has also shown that in the longer-term following a crisis, lack of funding – as well as the type of funding – are key obstacles in sustaining operations. Lack of funding can be damaging to trust relationships with migrants that were fostered during the immediate humanitarian response (Ghana–Libya). At times funding constraints may be a result of new crises in the region, or larger groups of vulnerable persons in the country, as noted above regarding state policy learning. For example, attention in Chad and Cameroon has now shifted to the situation around Lake Chad, which on the one hand has drastically shrunk in size to nearly a twentieth of its original size since 1963, due to climate change and agricultural demands, and on the other, is also currently hosting recent internally displaced persons and refugees from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, displaced by increased violence in the region, notably attacks by Boko Haram militants. Thus, returnees from the CAR and Libya are no longer high on the priority list for donors that have minimal resources to respond to multiple humanitarian and security crises. Finally, project-based funding has also been noted as especially limiting responses, as it can be difficult for organisations to divert funding as needed during a crisis situation.

47 United Nations Environmental Programme 2008
Civil society responses, particularly NGOs, have often been those most attuned to the needs of migrants and vulnerable persons on the ground during an emergency. As such, they also have collected lessons in how to best improve responses to migrants, and related to some of the challenges in the longer-term. Across the research, the most important lessons taken up by civil society after a crisis include: better coordination between and among civil society organisations and state actors (Thailand, Lebanon, Chad–CAR, and Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire); increased advocacy for migrants’ rights in non-crisis situations (Lebanon, Niger–Libya, Tunisia–Libya); and continued operation of basic services for the displaced (Chad–CAR, Cameroon–CAR, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire).

Research conducted thus far has highlighted the need for as well as the actual improved capacities of civil society organisations post-crisis to coordinate with each other, for example through the development of standard operating procedures on division of labour and information sharing. Further, this has sometimes led to coordinated advocacy strategies towards government actors. In Lebanon, civil society organisations once formed an informal consortium that was the basis of their strategies towards working with the Lebanese government on addressing the needs of migrant domestic workers. In conjunction with this coordination work, civil society organisations also expressed a need for better cooperation and coordination with intergovernmental organisations and state actors, their main counterparts during a crisis – especially considering that civil society organisations often act as a ‘bridge’ between migrants and intergovernmental or state actors.

Considering their ‘bridging’ abilities, civil society actors can also be spurred by crises to conduct important work targeting support to and advocating on behalf of migrants who have been caught in a crisis, including the formation of local non-governmental organisations – either in a host country (Lebanon, Tunisia–Libya) or in the country of origin upon return (Niger). The growth of civil society organisations in Lebanon following the 2006 crisis has been considered as filling a gap both in terms of service delivery to migrants, as well as through advocacy on behalf of migrant domestic workers vis-à-vis government
At the same time, in some cases civil society responses in the post-crisis phase halted or drastically reduced, in particular when there is a situation of limited funding opportunities and other vulnerable groups needing humanitarian services, as noted in the above state and intergovernmental and international policy responses sections (Egypt–Libya, Ghana–Libya, Chad–CAR, Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire).

PRIVATE SECTOR

Two examples from the research stand out to demonstrate the impact of crises on the private sector. In Egypt, emerging findings show the increased pressure return migration has placed on employability service providers due to inflated supply of labour combined with high expectations on the part of the returnees. For many Egyptian returnees from Libya, they are less inclined to work as daily labourers in Egypt with lower rates of compensation than received in Libya, especially as there are still lucrative work opportunities in Libya. This example shows that reintegration efforts should also account for expectations of returnees when they return to their countries of origin and the effect of an increased supply of workers on the labour market.

In Thailand, the lack of formal contracts with employers and landlords led to a lack of guarantees of protection during the flooding, where services or flexibility was offered on an *ad hoc* basis to migrants. However, since the crisis, large-scale employers have recognised the need for business preparedness, and increasingly have developed contingency plans for crisis situations, including evacuation of staff.
Lessons learned

- Stakeholder responses should be better coordinated
- Better data is needed
- NGOs and migrant associations can better reach out to migrant communities
- Long-term (re)integration assistance is limited
- Contingency plans need to be elaborated pre-crisis and should include migrants
- Funding constraints are a major barrier
The findings detailed in this report synthesise common themes and challenges emerging from the research conducted thus far on migrants caught in situations of crisis – in particular the crises in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2003, 2010–2011), Lebanon (2006 until the present day), South Africa (2008–2015), Thailand (2011), Libya (2011) and CAR (2013–2014). In fact, these findings highlight many of the same key topics of discussion that arose in the context of the MICIC regional and stakeholder consultations, as well as the recommendations and guidance provided in the MICIC “Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster.”

In particular, it has highlighted that migrants’ positioning within the larger host country society prior to crisis has an important impact on the options available to them during crisis. Their legal status, socio-economic position, and migration history, including the conditions of both their arrival in the host country and departure from the origin country are all key factors which pre-date the start of an acute humanitarian crisis and determine the options available to migrants after a crisis hits. Indeed, for many migrants, they feel that they are in a state of perpetual or recurrent crisis due to these very factors.

This report has also elaborated on how migrants have responded to crises individually and in groups, and the impacts crises have had on them in their host countries or countries of origin after return. In many cases migrants acted on their own, without support of other stakeholders, to escape a dire situation. In such cases, migrants’ networks and social capital have been instrumental in the immediate response, as well as later on for return migrants in establishing themselves again in their country of origin. Lack of family and social networks has been an additional burden for stranded and return migrants in the longer-term. States, intergovernmental organisations, civil society organisations and the private sector have all had their own strengths and weaknesses in responding to migrants caught in crisis situations. States and intergovernmental organisations have been the stakeholders most consistently responding in times of crisis, primarily through emergency services such as evacuations. However, civil society organisations – particularly non-governmental organisations, advocacy groups and migrant associations – are most attuned to the needs of migrants and other vulnerable groups during a crisis.

Of the emerging findings presented throughout this report, several stand out across the board as relevant to all or most case studies – and nearly all have been

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48 For more information on these consultations and the consultation reports, please see: https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migrants-in-countries-in-crisis/consultations/.
important discussion points in both MICIC stakeholder consultations as well as the MICIC Guidelines:

**Irregularity is a multiplying factor**: In all case studies a significant proportion of migrant populations has been irregular, indicating an important vulnerability that is exacerbated in times of crisis. Host and origin countries should take steps to ensure that their efforts do not exclude these populations, particularly in terms of emergency and life-saving services. Furthermore, they should make efforts to understand irregular populations – both in terms of scale, and in organisation – in a privacy-friendly and trust-building manner in order to better prepare for crisis situations. Lack of data on migrant populations has been explicitly identified by governmental and intergovernmental stakeholders as a critical obstacle to proper contingency planning for a crisis, and especially in responding to a crisis in the emergency phase. Moreover, although this challenge is clearly recognised by many stakeholders, there are as of yet few tangible responses to date that have been implemented to obtain better data. Such efforts, for example by engaging migrant associations, could facilitate estimations and data on the number of people affected, as well as how best to reach them and provide them with assistance during an emergency.

**Cooperation and coordination needs to be improved**: The importance of improving and establishing cooperation and coordination mechanisms has been a fundamental policy lesson for all stakeholders following a crisis. Related to this, it is vital to establish the right environment for cooperation and coordination, building relationships and trust between all stakeholders – between states and civil society organisations, as well as between such institutions and migrants. Building this environment is in fact an essential first step in improving cooperation and coordination between all stakeholders. States in particular need to take the lead, as the stakeholder with the mandate to act on behalf of its nationals in-country and abroad; however, intergovernmental organisations have specific mandates in relation to migrants and refugees, demonstrating the need for coordination among the key actors. Civil society organisations and private sector actors also have particular strengths in reaching migrant communities and advocating on their behalf, which should be recognised and leveraged to improve crisis response. Before crisis situations, it is important to engage non-traditional actors, build focal points (including among migrant communities), and clarify standard operating procedures among all relevant actors – and to do this, relationships of trust need to be established between these actors even earlier.

**Longer-term (re)integration support is missing**: For each of the countries under research, fewer actions have been taken to address the longer-term (re)integration and support for migrants caught in a situation of crisis than for their emergency provision. This is true for state, intergovernmental, civil society and private sector responses. Where longer-term support has been implemented, it is often in an *ad hoc* manner.
Migrant responses to difficult situations are dynamic, resilient, flexible and creative: When assistance during and post-crisis has been lacking, migrants have employed creative means to assure their livelihoods in the longer term, especially when a crisis has led to loss of employment and savings or additional incurred debt, combined with a lack of opportunity in their countries of ‘origin’ upon return. This has also included establishing associations to advocate for their rights. Before, during and following a crisis, circular migration and non-linear patterns of mobility have also been a means by which migrants respond to difficult or deteriorating situations in their countries of origin, in transit countries in which they are stranded, and in host countries. The flexibility offered by regional bodies with free movement protocols has also been an important contributing factor to migrants’ mobility in all crisis phases. In some cases this has involved re-migrating to the country that experienced a crisis – even when there is still continued violence. Nonetheless, states must recognise that their nationals are acting based on opportunities available to them (or not) post-crisis. States should also take responsibility in continuing to assure protection of their nationals abroad, even when migrants have taken a risk in re-migrating or migrating irregularly.

Subsequent crises divert donor and service provider focus: In several cases parallel or subsequent crises have occurred that divert resources and attention of all relevant stakeholders away from migrants who were previously impacted by a crisis. Although it is clear that new crises imply a new group of vulnerable persons needing immediate assistance, the diversion of funding in particular can have disastrous consequences for migrants who have not yet re-established themselves after a crisis. When donors decide to shift or change funding priorities, they should take into account other still-vulnerable groups and try to include them in the target group being addressed, when possible. This emerging finding from the research has not yet been reflected in the MICIC Guidelines and consultations, and yet is an important outcome relevant for longer-term post-crisis actions.

Our emerging findings demonstrate that migrants are affected by crises in host countries in myriad ways – and accordingly, that stakeholders must better prepare to respond to their needs. From the research conducted for the MICIC project to date, it is clear that there are significant gaps in responses, but also important practices that can be taken on and adapted to improve future crisis response. The research thus far validates many of the discussion points and recommendations that have emerged from the MICIC initiative, yet also underlines new aspects relevant for migrants caught in crisis situations, especially in the long-term. The forthcoming case study reports, as well as subsequent comparative analysis, including analysis on European responses to crisis, will provide more in-depth discussion on these aspects and a comprehensive account of the variations in impacts and stakeholder responses over the crisis response cycle.


FRA (2011b), Migrants in an irregular situation: access to healthcare in 10 European Union Member States, Vienna: FRA.


Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) (2010), PICUM’s Main Concerns about the Fundamental Rights of Undocumented Migrants in Europe, Brussels: PICUM.
PICUM (2005), *Ten Ways to Protect Undocumented Migrant Workers*, Brussels: PICUM.


FOCUS
The impact of migrant returns from Central African Republic on the socio-economic development of Cameroon and Chad

INTERVIEW DATA AS OF AUGUST 2016

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TOTAL = 68
Violent conflict between Séléka and anti-Balaka militias and subsequent reprisals against foreigners prompted many Cameroonian and Chadian migrants to flee CAR in large numbers between 2013 and 2014.

While some Cameroonian migrants took refuge in Christian churches in CAR before planning their eventual escape from the country, others found havens in the homes of friends or their embassies in CAR’s capital, Bangui. Both Cameroonian and Chadian migrants fled the crisis in haste, leaving behind assets such as cash, houses, cars, bank statements and other important documents.

Up to 4,000 Cameroonian migrants were initially evacuated by air from Bangui to Douala through arrangements by their government. Others travelled by road, borrowing trucks filled with goods and even travelling in containers. Others escaped on foot through dense, patchy forests. Most Cameroonian migrants did not organise collectively, but rather individually through the assistance of relatives to whom they returned. Chadian migrants escaped the crisis narrowly because of assistance from IOM and the Chadian military. They hid their CAR nationality documents thereby claiming Chadian citizenship because of assumptions that returnees would receive substantial support from the state and international organisations. Nevertheless, due to waning support to Chadian returnees, some reverted to their CAR identity documents because of perceived benefits from refugee status in Chad.

While Cameroonian migrants benefited from familial ties in their country of origin upon return, Chadian returnees did not maintain relationships with relatives while abroad and could therefore not rely on these networks upon return.

No, we did not have time to prepare ourselves. I thought the crisis would not last above two months, but the crisis became serious and it was too late.

(Migrant from Chad in CAR, 43 years old)
Cameroonian and Chadian authorities evacuated hundreds of thousands of their nationals by road or air during the height of the crisis in CAR. Upon return, the state provided Cameroonian returnees with medical care, psycho-social counselling, transportation assistance and cash vouchers. In the case of Chad, returnees were initially held in transit sites before being transferred to more permanent dwellings in the south of the country. Moreover, the government of Chad established the National Commission to Welcome and Reintegrate Refugees and Returnees to coordinate assistance in conjunction with international agencies such as IOM. Although it is clear that the governments of Cameroon and Chad played a pivotal role in evacuating, repatriating and resettling their nationals during the CAR crisis, there is a perception by returnees and non-governmental organisations alike that the states have not adequately addressed long-term reintegration. Similar critiques have been lodged at UN agencies, which were perceived as being preoccupied with refugees and asylum seekers and less concerned about returnees. Besides national governments and international organisations, other actors have been tangentially involved in responding to the needs of returnees, including private sector actors in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, who enabled the use of cash vouchers supplied by state and international organisations as well as local community leaders in the rural south who provided land to returnees through sale or rental arrangements. In the case of Cameroon, Muslim dignitaries donated food and clothing and provided shelter to hundreds of stranded returnees.

Creating income-generating activities is the appropriate solution. Returnees need to become autonomous and to affirm themselves.

*(Gilbert Ewemeh, Executive Director, Yes Cameroon, Cameroon)*
Cameroonian and Chadian migrants could not prepare adequately for their departure from CAR. Most people lost everything; very few were able to carry their possessions back to their countries of origin. Consequently, even the wealthiest returnees have become destitute and dependent on relatives, governments or aid agencies. In the case of Chad, returnees had not maintained ties with family members while abroad and therefore could not rely on these social networks upon return. Moreover, it is clear that post-CAR crisis fatigue has left many returnees destitute and disillusioned. As a case in point, Cameroonian returnees are not formally registered with any state agency and do not receive any allocation from the state. The ‘Reception Committee of Returned Migrants from CAR’ was essentially an ad hoc structure created for the management of returnees airlifted from Bangui to Douala. Dissolved in March 2014, the Committee could have played a more meaningful role in the reintegration of returnees. From a policy standpoint, the lack of sustainable reintegration has left many returnees vulnerable to exploitation and possible re-migration to CAR, where, despite its instability, Cameroonian migrants have found considerable economic opportunity. Migrant returns to urban and rural settings in Cameroon and Chad have had destabilising impacts. In Chad, surrounding villages resent returnees whose ecological footprint has stressed land and water resources, bringing about food insecurity, changes in livelihoods and customs, and increases in criminal activity. Contrastingly, the establishment of returnees’ sites has also created possibilities for small businesses in surrounding villages and cities to thrive.

In addition to the range of impacts on communities hosting returnees, the CAR crisis has also affected national emergency response. Although the government of Cameroon does not have a policy framework on migration, it allocated funds to evacuate by air and repatriate up to 4,000 Cameroonian returnees, who benefited from the provision of basic social services such as health, water, food, and shelter, as well as transportation assistance to their desired destinations. Nevertheless, the considerable number of migrants who travelled by road did not benefit from these services, and this disparity in treatment represents a gap in policy and practice that must be addressed in the case of any future crises.

Although the governments of Chad and Cameroon initially responded to the needs of their nationals in CAR with robust efforts, they struggle to fulfil long-term obligations to returnees, particularly in respect of the provision of land for farming, national identity documents and employment. For example, in 2015, Chad designed a National Plan for Global Reintegration of Returnees, yet since the abrupt decline of oil prices the country has struggled to meet financial commitments to the Plan and donors have not been forthcoming. This demonstrates that reintegration plans must be sustainable and financially viable in order to succeed. Civil society organisations in Cameroon and Chad served as the first interface of support for migrant returnees, and continue to play a meaningful role in reintegration assistance. They provided support to returnees, assisting the UNHCR and IOM in registration processes. Moreover, Chadian NGOs were supported by the government and intergovernmental organisations to manage returnee transit sites, and served as implementers for UN agencies, thereby gaining experience and knowledge in crisis response and management. In addition, business owners and entrepreneurs intervened in transit camps, supplying food and other relief items to returnees, particularly in Cameroon. This proves that non-governmental organisations and private sector actors play a vital intermediary role in crisis situations. As donor priorities shift to emergent crises in the Lake Chad basin, civil society organisations in Cameroon and Chad struggle to secure sufficient funding to adequately respond to the needs of returnees, and this is an area of policy intervention that must be addressed.

“It’s obvious that many of the returnees will go back to CAR as soon as the borders will be re-opened.”

(Respondent in Chad)
Civil society organisations in Cameroon and Chad serve as the first interface of support for migrant returnees, and continue to play a meaningful role in reintegration assistance. They provided support to returnees, assisting the UNHCR and IOM in managing returnee transit sites, and served as implementers for UN agencies, thereby gaining experience and knowledge in crisis response and management. In addition, business owners and entrepreneurs intervened in transit camps, supplying food and water, and transportation assistance to their desired destinations. Nevertheless, the considerable number of migrants who travelled by road did not benefit from these services, and this disparity in treatment represents a gap in policy and practice that must be addressed in the case of any future crises.

Major efforts by the governments of Cameroon and Chad to repatriate and reintegrate returnees have been forthcoming. This demonstrates that reintegration plans must be sustainable and financially viable in order to succeed. For example, in 2015, Chad designed a National Plan for Global Reintegration of Returnees, with the goal of supporting migrants in establishing their businesses and gaining employment. However, the performance of the Plan has been suboptimal. Although the government of Chad initially responded to the needs of returnees with robust efforts, donors have not yet since the abrupt decline of oil prices the country has struggled to meet financial commitments to the Plan and donors have not been forthcoming. This demonstrates that reintegration plans must be sustainable and financially viable in order to succeed.

Migrants returning to urban and rural settings in Cameroon and Chad have had destabilising impacts. In Chad, surrounding villages have witnessed increases in crime, the spread of communicable diseases, competition for water, food, and shelter, as well as transportation assistance to their desired destinations. Nevertheless, the considerable number of migrants who travelled by road did not benefit from these services, and this disparity in treatment represents a gap in policy and practice that must be addressed in the case of any future crises.

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Although the governments of Chad and Cameroon initially responded to the needs of their nationals in CAR with robust efforts, many returnees have struggled to reintegrate. They have been unable to reunite with family members while abroad and therefore could not rely on these social networks upon return. Moreover, it is clear that many of the returnees will go back to CAR as soon as the borders will be re-opened. This demonstrates the need for sustainable reintegration plans that take into account the needs of returnees and their communities.

The lack of sustainable reintegration has left many returnees vulnerable to exploitation and possible re-migration to CAR, where, despite its instability, Cameroonian migrants have found considerable economic opportunity. The establishment of returnees’ sites has also created possibilities for small businesses in surrounding villages and cities to thrive, but it has also led to increased competition for resources such as water and land. Additionally, the return of migrants to their home countries has led to increased competition for resources such as water and land, as well as increased criminal activity and the spread of communicable diseases.

To address these challenges, a more integrated approach to reintegration is necessary. This would involve the involvement of both government agencies and civil society organisations, as well as the private sector. The government of Cameroon has already allocated funds to evacuate returnees by air and repatriate up to 4,000 Cameroonian returnees, who benefited from the provision of basic social services such as health, education, and housing. However, there is still a need for additional support, particularly in terms of job creation and the provision of training for returnees.

In addition to the range of impacts on communities hosting returnees, the CAR crisis has also affected national emergency response and management. In 2015, Chad designed a National Plan for Global Reintegration of Returnees, with the goal of supporting migrants in establishing their businesses and gaining employment. However, the performance of the Plan has been suboptimal. Although the government of Cameroon does not have a policy framework on migration, it allocated funds to evacuate returnees by air and repatriate up to 4,000 Cameroonian returnees, who benefited from the provision of basic social services such as health, education, and housing. However, there is still a need for additional support, particularly in terms of job creation and the provision of training for returnees.

The impact of migrant returns from Côte d’Ivoire on the socio-economic development of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia

**FOCUS**

The impact of migrant returns from Côte d’Ivoire on the socio-economic development of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia

**INTERVIEW DATA AS OF AUGUST 2016**

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**TOTAL = 81**

**Burkina Faso**  **Ghana**  **Liberia**
Liberian refugees, Burkinabé and Ghanaian labour migrants all reported being negatively impacted by the Ivorian crises. For instance, Liberian migrants who did not speak French, particularly men, or did not have Ivorian identity documents, were perceived as parties to the conflict and were therefore harassed, beaten, or physically attacked. Burkinabé migrants faced similar reprisals after being accused by Ivorian authorities of destabilising the country. For instance, in September 2002, after the outbreak of the rebellion, between 350,000 and 400,000 Burkinabé were forced to flee Côte d’Ivoire for Burkina Faso to escape repression by security forces and militias.

Many able-bodied migrants employed in informal sector work lost their property and means of livelihoods, including shop owners, traders, and cocoa farmers. Furthermore, the uncertainty and trauma associated with crises affected migrants adversely thereby shaping their decisions to return home in large numbers. Although most Burkinabé, Ghanaians and Liberians fled Côte d’Ivoire on their own with minimal support from family, home and host government authorities or international agencies; others relied on these networks for cross-border road and air evacuations, repatriation and resettlement assistance.

Although some returnees resettled relatively easily in regions both similar to and different from their regions of origin, others struggled to access food, shelter, healthcare and education. While some returnees were implicated in land disputes due to long periods away, others found it difficult to seek assistance from neighbours and other community dwellers because they were perceived to be better off than those who had not migrated.
The governments of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia intervened at varying levels to protect their nationals in Côte d’Ivoire. Burkina Faso organised the transportation of about 7,000 returnees from Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso through the ‘Bayiri Initiative’. In an exercise dubbed ‘Operation Quabgo’, the Ghana National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) coordinated activities of the Ghana Navy, Air Force and Immigration Services to screen, identify and register all migrants arriving in the country. And a government agency in Liberia provided reintegration packages to Liberians, referring them to institutions requesting employment of returnees.

Intergovernmental organisations such as IOM also played a major role in the evacuation of migrants implicated in the Ivorian crises. Beneficiaries of this support included a mixture of Liberian refugees, Ghanaian and Burkinabé returnees and other third country nationals. While the EU funded evacuation, repatriation and resettlement schemes with large-scale emergency relief channeled through governments and international organisations, other intergovernmental organisations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA intervened directly in early periods of the crisis by providing migrants with school kits, fuel, vaccines, medical consumables, and skills training.

Civic associations located in border villages also helped by negotiating with traditional authorities and community leaders to enable returnees to have access to land, in the case of Burkina Faso. Other civil society organisations, particularly in the capitals of Burkina Faso and Liberia, advocated for the political, economic, social and human rights of returnees through public awareness campaigns. As a case in point, based on advocacy by the Liberia Returnees Network (LRN), UNIDO conducted entrepreneurship training for returnees, subsequently providing them with certification, tools and equipment to secure employment.

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**We want to bring voluntarism to Liberia.**

*(Emmanuel Tyrone Marshall, Co-founder and Executive Director, Liberia Returnees Network, Liberia)*

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**2002–2003:**
Government of Burkina Faso launches ‘Opération Bayiri’ to repatriate nationals

**2002–2005:**
Millions of migrants flee to neighbouring countries

**2010:**
Opposition presidential candidate Ouattara declared winner, beginning the second crisis

**2011:**
Former president Gbagbo arrested and sent to International Criminal Court, marking the end of the second crisis

**2011:**
100,000 non-citizens require repatriation assistance to countries of origin

**2013:**
140,000 previously undocumented migrants in Côte d’Ivoire receive Ivorian citizenship documents

**LEGAL SITUATION OF MIGRANTS:**

- Ghanaian, Liberian and Burkinabé migrants exempt from visas because of ECOWAS free movement of persons protocol
- Many Burkinabé born in Côte d’Ivoire, but not recognised as citizens until after crises
- Some Liberian migrants are refugees from political crises in Liberia
- Many Liberian migrants lack proper identity cards in Côte d’Ivoire
Some Burkinabé, Ghanaian and Liberian migrants continued to travel back to Côte d’Ivoire post-crisis for a number of economic and social reasons, chief among which is the desire to maintain property and investments, particularly in farming. As a case in point, migrants who returned to rural areas in Burkina Faso were more likely to return to Côte d’Ivoire because of limited employment prospects. Those who settled in urban centres in Burkina Faso were more likely to find informal sector employment, based on vocational skills acquired in Côte d’Ivoire. Semi-skilled Burkinabé returnees have contributed meaningfully to socio-economic development by introducing new livelihoods prospects, particularly in sewing, catering, palm oil production, tree farming, and the development and processing of raw cassava into attiéké, a national Ivorian dish. Similarly, Liberian returnees have brought back specific skills that have contributed to the labour market, but there has been no in-depth follow-up assessment conducted on the impacts of their contributions. This proves that skills acquisition abroad coupled with labour market absorption in the country of origin have a direct bearing on whether or not migrants re-migrate or resettle permanently.

For migrants’ families, the abrupt return of their relatives and concomitant loss of remittances increased household expenditure thereby exacerbating tensions between returnees and their familial hosts. Migrant returns put a strain on government budgetary allocations as well, particularly related to infrastructure and the provision of basic social services such as education and health. In Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Liberia funding limitations have constrained the ability of government agencies to respond to crises efficiently and in a timely fashion. In response to crisis situations in the past decade, however, NADMO drafted a bill which is before the Ghanaian parliament. Among other provisions, it aims to create a Disaster Management Fund to boost its funding base in order to better deal with crises in the future. Similar funds must be established in Burkina Faso and Liberia, with support from donors such as the EU. It remains clear that sustainable return cannot be guaranteed without financial commitments from donors and governments alike for full economic and social reintegration.

Beyond the need for dedicated funding streams for emergency relief and sustainable return migration, the Ivorian crises have generated a series of policy lessons. Diplomatic missions abroad need to be more fully engaged in registering their nationals as well as issuing them with travel documents. From the experience of Ghana and Liberia, it is clear that the construction of purpose-built reception centres comprising a reception unit, psychosocial orientation unit, temporary camp and offices for medics would facilitate screening, profiling and record taking of returnees from countries affected by crises in a more humane manner. Moreover, organisations like the LRN must be actively involved in the creation of these centres because of their intimate knowledge of the needs of returnees.

In Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia, governments have initiated the formulation and adoption of migration-related frameworks, although there still remain gaps in directly addressing migrants caught in crisis situations. For instance, Liberia has yet to pass its Draft National Migration Policy and Ghana’s National Migration Policy does not mandate NADMO to evacuate nationals from abroad. Burkina Faso organised a national symposium on migration in 2006 leading to the formulation of the National Strategy of Migration in 2008 and its validation in 2009. The government also provisionally granted Burkinabé living abroad the right to vote during referenda and presidential elections, with full enactment anticipated in 2020. Nevertheless, this policy shift does not address directly the dearth of statistical data on the number of Burkinabé abroad, and this gap also rings true in Ghana and Liberia. As a result of the Ivorian crises, immigrant-friendly policies have also been adopted by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, chief among which is the decision taken in 2013 to solve the problem of statelessness by enabling Burkinabé born in Côte d’Ivoire to foreign parents between 1961 and 1972 to obtain Ivorian citizenship.

The international community has to play a responsible role in dealing with crises in Africa. They have to understand our history, our culture, our traditions; otherwise we will be the source of perpetual research [on crisis]...

(Peter Forkpayeza Zooglee Zoizay, Deputy Commissioner General of Immigration for Administration, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation, Liberia)
CoTE D’IVOIRE

63

to foreign parents between 1961 and 1972 to obtain Ivorian citizenship. Chief among which is the decision taken in 2013 to solve the problem of statelessness by enabling Burkinabé born in Côte d’Ivoire. As a result of the Ivorian crises, immigrant-friendly policies have also been adopted by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, address directly the dearth of statistical data on the number of Burkinabé abroad, and this gap also rings true in Ghana and during referenda and presidential elections, with full enactment anticipated in 2020. Nevertheless, this policy shift does not Migration in 2008 and its validation in 2009. The government also provisionally granted Burkinabé living abroad the right to vote abroad. Burkina Faso organised a national symposium on migration in 2006 leading to the formulation of the National Strategy of Draft National Migration Policy and Ghana’s National Migration Policy does not mandate NADMO to evacuate nationals from although there still remain gaps in directly addressing migrants caught in crisis situations. For instance, Liberia has yet to pass its In Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia, governments have initiated the formulation and adoption of migration-related frameworks, knowledge of the needs of returnees. Moreover, organisations like the LRN must be actively involved in the creation of these centres because of their intimate would facilitate screening, profiling and record taking of returnees from countries affected by crises in a more humane manner. Beyond the need for dedicated funding streams for emergency relief and sustainable return migration, the Ivorian crises have and governments alike for full economic and social reintegration. Donors such as the EU. It remains clear that sustainable return cannot be guaranteed without financial commitments from donors in order to better deal with crises in the future. Similar funds must be established in Burkina Faso and Liberia, with support from

Some Burkinabé, Ghanaian and Liberian migrants continued to travel back to Côte d’Ivoire post-crisis for a number of ... by ICMPD

Project funded by the European Union
IMI
International
Migration
Institute
In partnership with IMI

In Crisis

1970s and 1980s:
Increased recruitment of Asian and African domestic workers (especially Sri Lanka, Philippines, Ethiopia)

July–August 2006:
Crisis

July 2006:
DGSG, Caritas and country of origin governments liaise to provide laisses-passer and facilitate evacuation of domestic workers primarily via Syria

TOTAL = 71

37 Migrants
12 Government Authorities
14 Civil Society Organisations
4 Intergovernmental Organisations
4 Experts and Private Actors

The situation of migrant domestic workers in the country and impact of recent crises on this group

CONTEXT

SAO

July 2006:
DGSG, Caritas and country of origin governments liaise to provide laisses-passer and facilitate evacuation of domestic workers primarily via Syria

2006:
• Inter-Ministerial Committee on domestic workers
• Deployment ban for emigration from Philippines

2010: Task Force established for the National Response Framework for Disaster Management

2012: Philippines lifts ban on labour emigration to Lebanon of skilled workers, after signature of MoU with Lebanon

2013: Emigration ban of Ethiopian domestic workers

SOCIO-ECONOMIC POSITION OF MIGRANTS

• Poverty in country of origin major push factor
• Wages differs by nationality – Filipinas highest level, Bangladeshis lowest

LEGAL SITUATION OF MIGRANTS

• Legal status tied to individual sponsor through kafala system
• Domestic work excluded from Lebanese Labour Law protections
• Irregular migrants face incarceration and deportation

FOCUS

INTERVIEW DATA AS OF AUGUST 2016

TIME LINE

LEBANON

Bangladeshis lowest

Wages differ by nationality – Filipinas highest level, Bangladeshis lowest

Emigration ban of Ethiopian domestic workers

Inter-Ministerial Committee on domestic workers
Deployment ban for emigration from Philippines

Task Force established for the National Response Framework for Disaster Management

Philippines lifts ban on labour emigration to Lebanon of skilled workers, after signature of MoU with Lebanon

Emigration ban of Ethiopian domestic workers

1970s and 1980s:
Increased recruitment of Asian and African domestic workers (especially Sri Lanka, Philippines, Ethiopia)

1970s and 1980s:
Increased recruitment of Asian and African domestic workers (especially Sri Lanka, Philippines, Ethiopia)
During the 2006 crisis, some migrant domestic workers became active in helping ‘trapped’ domestic workers from their own as well as from other countries, which also pushed them into activism. Some retell how they collaborated with their embassies as well as with Caritas, the only NGO at the time working with this group, to help locate and evacuate others who wished to leave or those abandoned by their employers. The crisis was a turning point that directly or indirectly pushed migrant domestic workers to organise, coordinate and come together as a community. As a result they started to form communities and meet whenever and in whichever way possible, most notably in churches, to discuss their daily problems, raise awareness on their common plight and educate each other on their rights.

Although the recent Syrian refugee crisis has had minimal impact on the domestic work sector, when Syrians do enter the domestic work sector, their penetration to the market is temporary, illegal and irregular. They hence compete, if at all, with the community of freelance (illegal and irregular) migrant domestic workers rather than live-ins.

While particular crisis events can have significant impacts on migrant domestic workers, they have rather understood “crises” more broadly, and occurring more regularly for them in their lives. Many feel that they are in a precarious situation, due largely to their absolute reliance on their individual employer and their lower socio-economic status in the country. In response, they often count on others in their national communities, as well as NGOs, for financial or legal support when the situation requires it.

According to civil society organisations and leaders of the migrant domestic worker community, the past 10 years have been important in terms of strengthening of migrant associations, through meetings, events, and social networking activities – as well as the establishment of many civil society organisations which have taken the plight of migrant domestic workers to Lebanese society through awareness raising campaigns, as well as to government officials and institutions through legal and political advocacy.

Although the majority of government (Lebanese and country of origin) stakeholders stated that they are not aware of any policy changes based on the 2006 crisis, there have been a number of relevant ones in the period since that highlight the higher priority these issues have taken: the development of national contingency plans, the work of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on domestic workers and the prioritisation of domestic worker issues by the Human Rights Committee of Parliament.
The impact of the Libyan crisis on migrants returning from Libya and migrants stranded in transit countries

### Interview Data as of August 2016

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**TOTAL = 195**
During the crisis, migrants exhibited manifold coping strategies, among which return migration. Foreigners became targets of violent reprisals from rebel factions, as well as thieves stealing their savings. Almost half of migrants who fled Libya went to Tunisia, the majority organising trips on their own in perilous conditions. Emergency responses of Ghanaians and Egyptians included seeking help from Libyan nationals to escape to airports where international organisations had arranged evacuation flights. Egyptians also relied on employers for safety and on family members’ financial support for return. Migrants who were given early warnings, as Nigeriens working in Western companies, allocated funds for evacuation, allowing their safe return. However, most Nigeriens returned during the crisis, sometimes hiding their identity because of reprisals and identifying themselves as Malians, thus some were repatriated to Mali. Others who did not return pre-crisis, such as Chadians, claimed to have only benefited from the assistance of families and communities.

Migrants’ decisions to flee Libya were measured against potential loss of livelihoods. Substantial amounts of savings were buried in safe locations due to migrants’ inability to access formal banking systems, as with Ghanaians. Returnees faced difficulties in reintegrating (socially and professionally), also affecting households which lost remittances. Most of Burkinabé used all their savings for the return trip. Afterwards they were no longer able to cope with daily expenses forcing them to depend on the assistance from other family members. Some re-migrated to Libya because of well-established circular migration patterns, such as Egyptians between 2011 and 2015. Some Ghanaians also reported travelling back to Libya after 2011. Oh yes, I want him to go back! Things were much better when he was in Libya. You can see from his demeanour. Everything shows he is not a happy man.

(spouse of a returnee to Ghana from Libya, 36 years old)
Intergovernmental organisations were at the heart of aid processes during the Libyan crisis. UNHCR and IOM have clearly been the principal actors managing arrivals and evacuations, sometimes in close coordination with state authorities of countries of origin (also embassies in Libya) and transit, as well as local and international NGOs. IOM organised the evacuation and relocation of migrants from Egypt and Tunisia, and in some cases onwards to communities of origin, such as Burkina Faso. In Ghana, the National Disaster Management Organisation coordinated support for return migrants by different stakeholders such as IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the Ghana immigration, health and security services. Chadian authorities also cooperated with IOM to evacuate Chadians to Egypt and then to N’Djamena or Faya. From there, returnees’ relatives paid for transportation onwards. However, assistance to returnees ended prematurely. The government of Niger established an ad hoc committee responsible for coordinating the situation of Nigeriens in Libya, which brought together ministries, technical partners, and civil society organisations to ensure the reception and support for returnees. Nigeriens were accommodated in transit centres, where they received health and food services and were transported by bus to their local communities. Conversely, Egyptians complained about the lack of evacuation assistance from their consulate. For Egyptians in transit in Tunisia, however, the Egyptian government mobilised military aircraft carriers and Egyptair to shuttle between the airport of Djerba and Cairo, as well as military ships for repatriation operations.

Civil society, local NGOs and community leaders also provided emergency response services, updating migrants with information and supporting professional trainings. For stranded migrants in Tunisia, public opinion has also played a valuable role, through the strong solidarity shown by the Tunisian population in providing assistance to the mass arrivals from Libya.

UNHCR, the Red Cross and IOM were instrumental in getting us the buses... We always relied on them.

(Former Senior Diplomat, Ghanaian Embassy in Libya, Ghana)
One of the major effects of the Libyan crisis on migrants is the loss of employment opportunities. Despite their heightened vulnerabilities, before and especially since 2011, migrants still consider Libya a country that can offer them work. In Egypt, returnees complained of increased competition resulting from the return of large numbers of migrants from Libya. This mass return has led to an increase in supply of labour and thus a decrease in daily rates. Yet, returnees were less inclined to work for lower wages than they received in Libya. In response to the crisis, migrants have either attempted to or succeeded in re-migrating to Libya. Financing the migration costs to other Gulf states posed a challenge for most of them. The dire economic conditions of migrants indicate a need to address the root causes of migration to Libya, the Gulf or the EU. Furthermore, despite being integrated in their communities of origin, returnees from Libya still need counselling and psychosocial interventions to support their rehabilitation and full recovery from traumatic experiences in Libya and en route to Egypt.

The lack of migration policies as well as data on the number of nationals in Libya represented the main challenges for Burkina Faso, Ghana and Niger. The lack of data on the numbers of migrants in Libya inhibited stakeholders’ abilities to adequately prepare to receive returnees, and few states have made concrete efforts to obtain better data. There are still no reception facilities provided to receive large numbers of nationals in times of crisis. Although state institutions have tried to develop policies on crisis response, through contingency plans or a designated department, means and sufficient resources were important obstacles, often halting the establishment of such bodies and mechanisms, as well as (re)integration assistance. For example, the recent Ghanaian National Migration Policy enjoins stakeholders to ‘draft guidelines for the evacuation of Ghanaian nationals abroad, during situations of political crisis, deportation or natural disaster’, but no specific policy has been drafted. In Niger, with the new government, a ministry of humanitarian affairs and disaster was created, as well as a multi-risk contingency plan which was amended to integrate the management of migrants in times of crisis. In Chad, a 2015 National Plan for Global Reintegration of Returnees was elaborated, but returnees from Libya have not benefited from the Plan. Furthermore, attention in Chad has now shifted to the situation around Lake Chad, further obscuring the impact of the Libya crisis on returnees.

The success of the evacuation campaign of migrants to their home countries via Tunisia has demonstrated the strength and solidarity of state structures in a context of instability and transition. The lack of a domestic law on asylum and emergency plans were also main challenges in Tunisia. For the first time since the liberation war in Algeria, a transit camp for refugees was set in the country (Shousha camp, 2011-2013), where the army, the Ministry of Health, regional bodies and international organisations met the needs of those arriving from Libya. However, civil society organisations and migrants have criticised the Tunisian state for the lack of reform on the legislation concerning foreigners, which they view as repressive, and the lack of an asylum law. Since the crisis, local NGOs have managed to develop a know-how and skills on these topics, allowing them to exercise pressure on the Tunisian state to support migrants stranded in the country.

“The Ministry of Labour and Manpower announced work opportunities for returnees and when one reads the criteria, you feel it is tailored to us. We applied, paying EGP 50 for the application and we received nothing back. None of the people I know benefited from this employment service. Three to four months after, we were asked to pay EGP 10 to fill a reparations form listing all items lost in Libya, we did and heard nothing.

(Returnee, 29 years old, Sohag, Egypt)
**FOCUS**
The impact on and responses to xenophobic violence in South Africa by Zimbabwean informal migrant entrepreneurs.

**INTERVIEW DATA AS OF AUGUST 2016**
- **TOTAL = 50** Migrants

**CONTEXT**

**TIMELINE**
- **2000–2008**
  - Increase in mixed migration flows from Zimbabwe to South Africa

**Socio-Economic Position of Migrants**
- Migrants mostly work in low-skilled jobs
- Migrants start businesses in urban informal economy
- Migrant businesses attacked and looted
- Migrants remit funds to support families in Zimbabwe

**Legal Situation of Migrants**
- Mixed migration flows of asylum-seekers and economic migrants
- Asylum-seekers have right to work and earn income
- Large-scale deportations of migrants to Zimbabwe
- Zimbabwean irregular migrants and asylum-seekers granted legal status

**2008–2016 (ongoing)**
- 2008: Nationwide violence against foreign migrants
- 2010: Amnesty for Zimbabwean migrants
- 2015: Nationwide attacks on migrant businesses
The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia.

Xenophobia is a growing problem globally as migration flows increase and citizens become increasingly hostile to their presence. The South African experience provides important policy lessons for addressing the crisis of xenophobia. First, large-scale deportations of migrants to Zimbabwe were both costly and ineffective. Second, an immigration amnesty which gave four-year residence and work permits to 275,000 migrants unclogged the asylum system and gave many the legal right to work and establish and grow their small businesses. Third, it is important that there is acknowledgement of the extent and depth of xenophobia and that the issue is both owned at the political level and addressed in a proactive manner including demonstration of the benefits of migrant entrepreneurship, educational programmes to contest xenophobic stereotypes, and vigorous public prosecution of the perpetrators of xenophobic violence. International agencies, civil society organizations and migrant associations can play a significant role in addressing the crisis of xenophobia by protecting and empowering migrants.
The long-term consequences of the 2011 floods on migrants from Myanmar, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam and the role played by the existing registration system.

**Interview Data as of August 2016**

- **55 Migrants**
- **12 Government Authorities**
- **13 Civil Society Organisations**
- **9 Intergovernmental Organisations**
- **9 Experts and Private Actors**

**Total = 98**

**Context**

**Timeline**

- **1980s**: Shift towards export-oriented labour-intensive economy
- **2002–2003**: MoUs signed with Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR
- **2007**: Regularisation program “National Verification”
- **July 2011–January 2012**: 
  - Flood Relief Operations Centre (FROC) created
  - Shelter for max. 500 migrants established by Ministry of Labour
- **2014**: Coup d’état by the Royal Thai Armed Forces
- **2014–2015**: Massive nation-wide registration of irregular migrant workers

**Pre-Crisis**

- Migrants mostly work in low-skilled sectors
- Only Burmese, Cambodians, and Laotians have low-skilled work permits
- Thai language not intelligible to most migrants

**During Crisis**

- Migrants stuck in lengthy regularisation process still considered irregular
- Irregular migrants face incarceration and deportation
- Regular migrants’ status is tied to employer and region

**Post-Crisis**

- Stable socio-economic conditions
- Regularisation process still ongoing
Migrants’ awareness about the floods and consequent preparedness seem to depend on their level of integration in the country, in particular their level of Thai language proficiency. Some migrants were completely surprised by the floods and only realised its severity when they saw the water rising. Exclusion due to language barriers and ethnic segregation was the main reason for their lack of information. Thai speaking and socially embedded migrants were better informed (by media, employers, rumours, etc.) and they tried to protect their homes with sandbags, secure their valuables and bought stocks of food and drinking water.

Moving constituted a central coping strategy and operated on various levels. For many migrants who had friends or relatives in the same building, moving within one house to an upper level was the most obvious coping strategy to escape the flood. Migrants also found shelter with friends, employers or co-ethnics or temporarily stayed at higher elevated areas such as bridges. Not many migrants moved to government-operated shelters. Even though people without proper ID or documentation were allowed to stay in these shelters, incoming registration procedures may have discouraged irregular migrants. The majority of interviewed migrants stayed in Thailand during the crisis for several reasons: undocumented migrants feared arrest while moving across provinces in Thailand; migrants interviewed reported that hardly any assistance for returning home was available to them; migrants underestimated the severity of the flood and then it became too difficult to move once the floods struck. Still, many expressed their desire to return to their home country in case such a crisis happened again.

The response of stakeholders to the flood tended to be more an ad hoc reaction to an unprecedented event than the application of established plans and procedures. Even after the 2004 tsunami, Thailand wasn’t perceived as a country with high risk of natural disasters. A clear process for requesting and coordinating international assistance was not in place and the official mechanism for crisis response coordination under the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) was disregarded. Instead, the Flood Relief Operations Centre (FROC) was created. Aside from the efforts of NGOs working with migrants, migrant associations, and volunteers, there seems to have been no standard policy or guideline to assist affected migrants during the crisis. Furthermore, interviews highlighted limited awareness by stakeholders of migrants’ needs: in contrast to migrants’ perspectives, authorities stated that it was impossible for migrants to not be informed about the floods.

The majority of migrants and stakeholders interviewed had never experienced such a severe natural disaster before; they stated that if a similar flood were to occur again they would be more prepared and know how to react, confirming that the level of awareness for natural disasters has increased in Thailand. Two main policy lessons emerged from the interviews: the need to improve coordination among different stakeholders, in particular the ones directly supporting migrants, and the importance of guaranteeing and facilitating access for migrants to emergency measures. Regarding the former, pre-established divisions of labour, collaboration, and sharing of information could increase efficiency in providing assistance to migrants during a crisis situation. Regarding the latter, foreigners (hence migrants) have been included in new emergency plans in general, but vulnerable groups such as low-skilled or undocumented migrant workers still have not been identified in new planning.

We underestimated the skill and preparation needed to respond to a disaster of this size.
(Sompong Srakaew, Executive Director, Labour Rights Promotion Network)
This report contributes to a growing debate about how to prepare for and respond to the critical situation of international migrants who are caught up in crises in the countries in which they have settled. It presents emerging findings from ongoing research on case studies of various crises in six countries over the last two decades – Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, South Africa, Thailand, Libya and Central African Republic (CAR) – that have significantly affected migrants living in these countries, their households at home and abroad, as well as their countries of origin and transit in a myriad of ways. Based on interviews conducted with migrants, their families and key stakeholders in host, origin and transit countries, this study examines emergency and policy responses, changing policy, and practices, with a particular focus on long-term implications for development. While identifying policy shifts and the emergence of new protocols for response, our emerging findings indicate that more needs to be done to position migrants and the communities in which they inhabit at the centre of relief efforts, thereby ensuring long-term protections for migrants. What remains evident across the six crisis-affected countries under study is the need for a broad spectrum of actors involved at pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases to coordinate their data collection, standard operating procedures, contingency planning, management bodies, and resource mobilisation.

While conflicts and natural disasters have exposed migrants’ vulnerability to different threats — especially related to their socio-economic positioning, legal status, age and gender — these crises have also showcased migrants’ autonomy, agency, coping strategies and resilience. The ability of migrants to mitigate vulnerabilities induced by crisis depends on the opportunity structures available to them. Whether migrants return to their countries of origin, remain in countries affected by crisis or re-migrate elsewhere, a number of legal, political and economic measures must be adopted to alleviate the potentially negative effects of any future crises. Furthermore, state institutions, international organisations, private sector actors and civil society must work to reduce the root causes of crisis as well as the post-crisis tensions and challenges that may arise.

In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EU-funded project is a contribution to the global Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a government-led process co-chaired by the governments of the Philippines and the United States, which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the capacity of states and other stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who find themselves in countries affected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been conducted, contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster’, which provide guidance for states and other stakeholders in responding to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition, the project also develops capacity building activities to follow up on key recommendations that have emerged over the course of the project. This report presents the emerging findings from the Research Component of the EU-funded MICIC project, whose goal is to complement these efforts by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises in host countries.