7 ways the temporary protection for 4 million Ukrainians in Europe could end

As the war waged on and the original limit of the TP breached the three-year mark, the TP was then extended in March, for another year. With the war now into its fourth year, the clock again ticks to March 2026, when the extended TPD is once again set to expire. With no definite prospects for the future of Ukraine and those who fled there – both those still living there and those displaced in Europe – the question that now becomes increasingly important, is whether the EU can, or will, extend the TPD once more; or what other options there are, come next spring.

ICMPD has published a comprehensive, forward-looking Policy Paper on Charting the future of temporary protection. Authored by ICMPD Senior Policy Advisor Martin Wagner and Junior Policy Officer Marina Grama, the Paper outlines seven possible policy scenarios, that the Commission could pursue after March 2026. The Paper also analyses EU Member States’ preferences and concerns about the decision of what comes next – especially those hosting large numbers of Ukrainians.

The prevailing scenario in the EU’s possible response is a pragmatic approach to extend TP into a fifth year, with Member States continuing to provide the same support to displaced Ukrainians. This approach presents two possible scenarios:

1. The annual extension of the TP, which would continue to cover all the beneficiaries of the TP, including vulnerable groups¹. This would potentially minimise administrative burdens to Member States while not necessitating any new legislation at the EU-level. However, it also prolongs the temporary nature of TP for beneficiaries, and defers development of any long-term solution.

2. Narrowing the scope of the original definition of the TP activated in 2022, by transitioning out some groups and maintaining TP for others. These could be groups who are eligible for other forms of residence (ie, those who are employed); while continuing protection for vulnerable groups. On the other hand, this could make benefits and rights standards inconsistent among different groups of beneficiaries; while adding necessary assessments on who qualifies for what benefit(s). It could also prolong temporality for vulnerable groups, including those who have long-term needs.

A more innovative, long-term approach is that the EU replaces TP with a more structured framework. It would promote legal and inclusive pathways to enable mobility within the Union, through new mandates (eg, Reconstruction Permit), or by adapting existing EU laws like the Single Permit Directive or the Long-Term Residence Directive (LTRD), or guidance that encourages the harmonisation of national approaches across the EU. Two possible scenarios can come from this approach:

3. the EU may introduce a non-binding instrument as guidance to Member States to manage the transition of beneficiaries of temporary protection out of TP. This provides a soft law framework for Member States to exit from TP, while ensuring all beneficiaries are well protected. However, at the level of Member States, varying implementation may create some unequal protection standards, and might result in secondary movements by some groups to other host countries.

4. A new legally binding instrument could also replace TP and allow legal pathways to residence (or return) It could bridge TP with long-term solutions, aligning beneficiaries’ status with broader, existing migration and integration policies; and preventing fragmentation in national approaches among Member States. But this might also require a possibly more demanding legislative process; and depending on the new mandate, some groups of the current beneficiaries may not qualify, namely those not in active employment.

A nuanced approach might involve the continuous, although potentially narrower, application of TP (see Scenario 2), along with introducing a new binding (Scenario 4) or non-binding (Scenario 3) EU instrument to manage Member States’ residence and return solutions. This would aim to balance flexibility and coordination of tailored national responses with a coordinated EU framework, while recognising both the diverse needs of displaced populations and the different capacities of Member States. This hybrid approach envisions two possible scenarios:

5. TP could be retained for specific groups such as the vulnerable, or those not yet eligible for national statuses; while those who are eligible can transition into legal residence status, guided by anew non-binding EU instrument. While this approach allows for a gradual, flexible transition for those qualified, it also keeps TP as a safety net. Again, this can present disparities among different groups. It may also create an added administrative strain in assessing various status categories.

6. Similarly, TP could be retained for vulnerable groups or for those still awaiting eligibility for another status; while those eligible can transition into a long-term status as set out in a new binding EU instrument. Like above, it offers gradual, more manageable transition while keeping TP as a safety net; and prevents fragmented approach at national level. And because it is binding, it offers long-term, structured, and enforceable solutions. But also because of the legally-binding nature of any new EU instrument, it could be a lengthy legislative process. For those who remain under TP, this could prolong temporality.

Finally, temporary protection can end at the EU-level without a replacement, and it would be up to Member States to apply their respective laws to determine the status transitions, protection, or return.

7. This approach keeps the temporary nature of the TPD with no additional long, administrative process in Brussels. However, Member States will need to take on the administrative burden; as will Ukraine for the necessary coordination with 27 EU countries. This scenario also raises the risks of legal limbo for those who may not qualify for national legal statuses. At the EU level, there can be fierce competition for talent among those who stay; while also risking secondary movements due to discontent from possibly fragmented or inconsistent protection standards across host countries.

The Policy Paper cites preferences that Member States have indicated thus far, such as a possible convergence of some of the options above. These include sustaining TP in its current form (as in Scenario 1); continuing TP with some changes (Scenario 2); or further extending TP for another year paired with a non-binding EU instrument offering both EU guidance and national flexibility to the Member States (Scenario 5). In contrast, options that would terminate TP without support measures (Scenario 7) accompany/replace it with a new binding EU instrument (Scenarios 4 or 6), or replace it with a non-binding instrument (Scenario 3) have been viewed as less attractive by Member States. 

As discussed in the Paper, regardless of the path the EU chooses, key considerations to guide policy responses are necessary. Further extending the TP to another, fifth year must also be paired with the political will for a clearly defined, collectively agreed exit strategy from TP. The needs of vulnerable groups must also be considered. Succeeding in any – or a combination – of the seven scenarios will likely depend on how EU Member States can align on common guidance, timely coordination, and harmonised implementation of policy responses and protection standards.

DOWNLODAD POLICY PAPER

_{¹ Vulnerable groups in this context, includes the elderly, those living with disabilities, or those that may not directly or easily qualify for Temporary Protection; or the prospects of longer-term, regular status in their host country.}